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HISTORICAL SKETCH

OF THE

S E C O N D W A R

BETWEEN THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

AND

G R E A T B R I T A I N ,

DECLARED BY

ACT OF CONGRESS, THE 18th OF JUNE, 1812,

AND CONCLUDED BY PEACE, THE 15th OF FEBRUARY, 1815.

BY

C H A R L E S J . I N G E R S O L L .

v. 2.

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EMBRACING THE EVENTS OF 1814.

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PHILADELPHIA:

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# HISTORICAL SKETCH

OF

## THE WAR OF 1812.

### CHAPTER I.

CANADA—STATE OF PARTIES—LOANS—MASSACHUSETTS OPPOSITION—LAWRENCE'S FUNERAL—MARYLAND OPPOSITION—LUTHER MARTIN'S CHARGE TO GRAND JURY—JUDGE POINDEXTER'S CHARGE IN MISSISSIPPI—GOVERNORS OF CONNECTICUT, RHODE ISLAND, NEW HAMPSHIRE AND VERMONT—GOVERNOR CHITTENDEN'S REFUSAL OF MILITIA—SHARP'S RESOLUTIONS IN CONGRESS THEREUPON—OJIS'S RESOLUTIONS IN THE LEGISLATURE OF MASSACHUSETTS, WHO DISCHARGE PRISONERS OF WAR FROM THE PRISONS OF THAT STATE—SEPARATE PEACE FOR NEW ENGLAND PROPOSED IN BOSTON—JOINT COMMITTEE OF LEGISLATURE REPORT VIOLENT MEASURES—DEXTER'S LETTER—RETURN OF THE GARRISON OF CHICAGO—NEWFOUNDLAND FISHERIES—MEXICO—SOUTH AMERICA—EUROPEAN WARFARE—ENGLAND—REGENT'S SPEECHES TO PARLIAMENT—ENGLISH SUCCESSES—BERNADOTTE AND MOREAU—SPEECH OF THE DUKE OF SUSSEX—CANING PROCLAIMS WAR FOR NAVAL ASCENDANT.

THE capitol was the observatory from which events and impressions of the years 1812 and 1813 were described in a former volume of this historical sketch. As the war went on, American disasters decreased; and the year 1814, to be presented in this volume, with severer trials, better fortunes, and admirable exploits, will bring us before it ends to satisfactory and lasting peace. Surveying the state of this and other countries, from the close of the first session of the Thirteenth Congress, early in August, will prepare us for the opening of the second session in December, 1813.

Having imposed a tolerable system of still deferred taxation, and made other inadequate provision for war, Congress adjourned, hoping that the future would be less disastrous than the past, the whole government flattering themselves that severer trials of republican institutions might be avoided; for European convictions were much more prevalent then than now, when they are still by no means extinct, that republics are incapable of hostilities. A government by the tenure of popular favor cannot save itself, in war, from the discredit of defeated armies by changing a ministry: but Madison's administration could maintain power as well as place by nothing less than victory or peace. Eighteen of the first months of that war were unfortunately sacrificed to hopes of peace without due efforts of war. When delusive

hope ceased, strenuous exertion began, and as usual, fortune favored bravery, even though constrained and tardy. In the ardor of his temper declaring that peace must be dictated under the walls of Quebec, Mr. Clay spoke the voice of the whole West, most of the South and Central States, in short, of nearly all the six millions of supporters of the administration and the war. The disgraceful failure of their greatest Canadian enterprise, under Wilkinson and Hampton, with Armstrong's personal superintendence as Secretary of War on the scene of action, ending with the still more ignominious surprise and capture of Fort Niagara, the American Gibraltar, extinguishing all immediate prospect of the conquest of Canada, gave the one-fourth of the country opposed to the war and administration, represented in Congress by one-third of the members of both Houses, unexpected and great advantage.

War of conquest by that invasion, contradicting it from defensive war, was a principal theme of the peace party, while the advocates of administration argued its necessity as the best means of defence. As the Canadas must be ours eventually, our most strenuous endeavors should be to realize, it was said, what the patriots of the Revolution attempted as indispensable to American ascendancy and continental security. One of those British provinces embraces and commands the outlet and

entrance, sharing, if it does not engross, the commerce of the great valley of the St. Lawrence, which in magnitude and importance corresponds north to the valley of the Mississippi, south. Quebec, like New Orleans, by nature is the only vestibule from sea of a greater extent of country than any other in the world. More than ten millions must ultimately inhabit the borders of the St. Lawrence, and develop its resources; either French or Americans, nearly all averse to English dominion, and needing only American countenance to manifest their attachments to the United States. The people of the west, Ohio and Kentucky and Michigan, were clamorous for the incorporation with them of contiguous regions overrun by nomadic barbarians, continually excited by the English to check American extension by drenching the frontiers in blood. Canada, if not part of the United States, they contended, would soon oppose them by forming with New England a hostile combination to impede western growth: and the longer the prevention of that eventuality was put off, the more difficult would it be to prevent it at all. With Canadian neighbors under British sway, there is no chance of national north-eastern enlargement or even vicinal tranquillity; but a hostile kingdom, three thousand miles off, may control or sunder naturally united States, colonize and monopolize them, annihilating advantages by nature American, republican and vast. Facilities and advantages of traffic and intercourse, since considerably realized without national union of the opposite sides of the St. Lawrence and the Lakes, were argued by far-sighted views, short of the present and infinitely short of the indubitable future of those regions. Without foresight of the prodigious trade, travel, and growth of what is called the western country, by rapid transportation of men and things from New Orleans by Chicago, Sandusky, Buffalo, New York and Boston, proving that unrestricted communication all through and round North America is the obvious destiny and incalculable advantage of its free inhabitants, it was in 1813 urged as feasible by a few simple and cheap improvements, though railroads were not contemplated and canals only hoped for, to convey flour and other produce from the Ohio to the St. Lawrence in twenty-five days, for a dollar per hundred weight; and troops with similar celerity and economy. The government of the United States could collect an army of a hundred thousand men on the St. Lawrence in a few weeks; so that Quebec, once taken, might be held in spite of England, at inconsiderable expense, readily estimated and provided. Once ours, the Canadas would be forever divorced from British sovereignty; and

our means of effecting it were as obvious as hers were impracticable. All exertion of British force in Canada must always be extremely hazardous, expensive and uncertain; whereas distances, seas, seasons and tempests were our unconquerable allies. No expedition or armament from Europe can take place, except in five of the twelve months, from June to October, while the whole twelve months are at our command, and winter, when nature by frost and snow turnpikes the earth, winter, if well used, is the best time of all. No European enterprise could reach Canada till we have timely notice to frustrate it. British troops, even landed at Quebec, encounter immense difficulties to get as far as Montreal or Kingston. To send ten thousand loads of provisions or anything else from Montreal to Kingston, between December and March, the best if not the only time for it, requires that a train or sled must be loaded every three minutes in every day during eight hours, which is impossible. Ordnance, barrack or naval stores could not be carried in time; which no contractor would incur the ruin of undertaking; adding space as another of our defences. Napoleon's army, exterminated by the Russian winter of 1812, was pleaded as the fate of any English attempt to retake Canada after Kingston, Montreal and Quebec were once garrisoned by American troops. Such views sometimes embraced all North America, not confined to the Canadas alone, and New Brunswick was indicated as the most certain way to the conquest of Canada. The province of New Brunswick, adjoining Maine, then part of Massachusetts; the Canadas conterminous for hundreds of miles with Vermont and New York, by the lakes with Pennsylvania and Ohio; Passamaquaddy Bay and the River St. Croix, disputed ground between Maine and New Brunswick; the Grand Bank whence American fishermen had gathered their gains from a nursery of British seamen, began to be considered as legitimate pursuits of American warfare; and if New England had co-operated in 1814, would have been attempted, peradventure taken from Great Britain.

Besides the Canadian territorial there was also an ocean view of the subject, presented chiefly by the farming and plantation Americans, foremost in waging war for maritime rights. How, said they, can we make our mighty foe most sensible of American power? Not on the ocean, but in his landed possessions. To harass England by sea, or even striking the trident from her gripe, may lower the British crest, mortify her pride, and affect indeed the European sentiment of British naval superiority. It is no doubt theoretical and future advantage, but will not injure like wresting from her grasp most of the vast



territories held on this continent. The sword-fish has stung the Leviathan of the deep, but without destroying, or much diminishing his present powers. The monster furiously lashes the waves, more in anger than from injury or suffering. His naval superiority is undermined; leave it to decay, while our marine, without further risk, reposes on its glorious laurels. The naval means of the United States are too small to conquer either indemnity for the past, or complete security for the future. British American soil is the natural and certain element of both. American armies occupying British territories preliminary to their annexation to the United States, would make Great Britain feel the superior power of a despised and injured nation to redress its wrongs.

To these reasons for persevering in the conquest of Canada, the government journal added another. At all times opposing that invasion, the peace party insisted that at any rate during the pending of the Russian mediation, it was especially unjustifiable; Mr. Gaston and other members of Congress proposing to suspend not only that, but all other hostilities pending supposed negotiation. Protesting, of course, that it spoke without authority, or even knowledge of the views of government, the semi-official organ divulged not only a settled resolve to prosecute the invasion of Canada, but to hold it if taken, notwithstanding and after peace. Suppose Montreal in our possession, as we trust it will be, said the *Intelligencer*, whenever peace is made, surely that case will be provided for by any treaty that may be made. The American commissioners will be guilty of gross inattention not to provide for our holding whatever we possess when war ends.

In England, there was an opinion current throughout the years 1809, '10, '11, and '12, that it would be better for England that the Canadas should belong to the United States. The question, it is believed, was considered in council, but opposed on account of the fisheries, the West India supplies, and the Newfoundland nursery for seamen. When Foster was appointed British minister, the cession of Canada was suggested as the best means of avoiding collision with the United States. Nova Scotia was the place of refuge of many of the American refugees in the revolution, who cherished the hostile feeling which tended to produce the war. They and their descendants in Canada and England, planted seeds of hostility extremely bitter and vindictive. But the wise, provident, and pacific of England argued, that peace and commerce with the United States would be more profitable for Great Britain than Canada or Nova Scotia.

The chances of war by an overruling Providence disappointed all American and

British expectations of territorial conquest, and planted peace on the basis of mere cessation of hostilities, with their causes. If, by the *uti possidetis*, England expected to keep New Orleans, and the United States hoped to get Quebec, both of their greatest military enterprises, and all territorial aggrandizement, ours north, and theirs south, perhaps fortunately failed. In this volume, little will be said of the negotiations and their principles terminating in the treaty of Ghent. But it may be premised here, that since that second pacification, two other territorial treaties with Great Britain prove, as every treaty with her does, that this country is better matched with that in arms, than its government in negotiations. The United States, from the peace of Independence in 1783, achieved by war, and merely acknowledged by treaty, have always lost by treaty, but never by war with England. By the Maine treaty we surrendered more of old Massachusetts than the English conquered in 1814; and by the treaty of Oregon what has been justly called the New England, that is the maritime part, of Oregon; on both occasions, under that dread of war with England, of which the occurrence is improbable, and sufferings exaggerated. That unfounded apprehension, haunting the Atlantic States, by inconsiderate deprecation of war, is England's greatest American power. Less than five hundred thousand British subjects, scattered over North America in 1813-14, with all their European reinforcements, could not withstand eight millions of Americans, if duly marshalled for conflict and the conquest, not of Canada only, but all British America. With the more than twenty millions at present, nearly equal to the population of Great Britain, the apprehension is as injurious as humiliating, that on this continent, this country cannot cope with England. Rational assurance of the contrary, in spite of a portion of New England most interested and able to realize it by English expulsion from America, began to be impressed by the events of 1814, when England, suddenly abandoning extensive invasion with proclaimed violations of civilized warfare, and corresponding enormity of conditions of peace, by concessions prevented another campaign, which might have repaid all the American cost and sufferings of the contest, by North Western and, perhaps, North Eastern annexations to the United States; leaving them, indeed, with the beneficial honors of defensive, but without what might have been the still greater advantages of offensive war.

The numbers and zeal of the war's supporters increased with its progress. Misfortunes and trials did not diminish or cool deep-rooted popular feelings, eventually cultivated by triumph. The elections of

1813, between the first and second sessions of Congress, were favorable to the administration. Party antagonism and acerbity indeed augmented, as hostilities became exacerated: but the polls indicated, generally, that the heart of the American people was for war. New York, the principal theatre of hostilities, and line of separation between the non-combatant Eastern States and those of the centre, west, and south, all inclined for war, and that by Canadian conquest—New York was, as since, called from the numbers and wealth of her people, her commerce and improvements, then the Empire State, because the contest and, perhaps, the Union depended on her fidelity. By re-electing Governor Tompkins, the people not only seconded his ardor for the war, but in effect instructed him to say to New England emphatically, disunion goes no farther than your own borders; here it will be crushed. Virginia, by her state authorities and delegations in Congress, supported the war with energy. Pennsylvania stood forth with all her twenty-two members of Congress and both Senators unanimous for war, offensive and defensive; and nearly to a man for the administration as well as for the war. Of ninety-five members in the House of Representatives of that State, eighty-five were of that adherence, including the metropolitan city of Philadelphia, and all but three counties of the whole State, which three counties sent only ten members to the State House of Representatives. The only federalist in Congress, John Gleninger, elected by a majority of three hundred votes to represent the midland German counties of Lancaster, Dauphin, and Lebanon, having voted against the taxes and resigned, Edward Crouch, of the war and administration party, was chosen to his place by a majority of seven hundred. Michael Leib, a war Senator, but opposed to Madison's administration, venturing to exchange his seat in the Senate for the place of Postmaster at Philadelphia, by appointment of Gideon Granger, the Postmaster-General, also unfriendly to Madison's administration, Granger was removed, and the warlike Governor of Ohio, Return Jonathan Meigs, put in his place; Leib was removed and Dallas' son-in-law, Richard Bache, put in his place; and Jonathan Roberts, an active member of the House of Representatives, earnestly supporting the war and the administration, was elected to succeed Leib in the Senate. The war and Madison's administration, sustained by New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, relied on the three first rank States with all branches of their governments and large majorities of their people. Of States of the second rank, Kentucky and South Carolina were for the war and government unanimously, North Carolina nearly so; whose State Senate, on the motion of John

Branch, by a large majority, censured David Stone, one of their Senators in Congress, for backwardness to second the administration. Of second rank States, Massachusetts was the disaffected one, by a large majority opposed to the federal administration, but not to the extent of the violent, if not treasonable opposition, imputed by John Quincy Adams to certain federalists there. Of the third rank States, Ohio, Tennessee, and Georgia, were unanimous for war, and Jersey joined them in 1813; to which Connecticut and Maryland were opposed; Connecticut, by a unanimous delegation sent to Congress by State vote; Maryland in her State government, but not in Congress, where the members were chosen by districts. Vermont and New Hampshire, also third rank States, nearly balanced in votes, were represented in Congress, Vermont by war, New Hampshire by peace members, all chosen by general ticket. Of the fourth rank States, Rhode Island and Delaware were represented in both branches of Congress by peace, and Louisiana by war members. Thus, twelve States supported, four or five opposed, war, for which there were at least five or six millions of the people to between one and two millions, if so many, against it. District, instead of State elections, would have divided the delegations in Congress from Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont, which were unanimous, the two former against, the latter for war. The votes and population of Rhode Island and Delaware were not important, except by their disproportionate weight in the Senate, while opposition, as usual, increased in violence as it decreased in numbers, popularity, and strength. Under every discouragement, however, the war spirit predominated. The martial west, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, were all in arms, ready to march anywhere, to wage war offensive as well as defensive. More than seventeen thousand volunteers marched from Kentucky alone. Was not their patriotism wiser than the disloyalty, at once calculating and passionate, of the East? Referred to that selfish test by which all men must be tried, war, with its expenditures, was even more lucrative than sullen refusal to share its trophies and emoluments. An Eastern federal merchant, writing in 1813, from Lexington, Kentucky, to Boston, stated in a published letter—

"I find, in this country, an entire reverse of New England in regard to business. Here there is no competition, and everything brisk and profitable. The war, so far from depressing the people of the Western States, is making the greater proportion of them rich. To this you may attribute a part of their patriotism, although to do them justice, they are the most patriotic people I have ever seen or heard of. When Governor Shelby issued his late proclamation,



tion for volunteers, a large proportion of those who marched, were respectable farmers with large possessions—many entirely independent in property, leaving large and respectable families; and some at the age of fifty years and a great many over forty, with no expectations of benefit or pay, finding their own horses and equipments.—This singular patriotism is glorious and astonishing. Many men of the first character have, in former campaigns, volunteered, and some have lost their lives. These things to a New Englandman look like madness—here it is considered glorious, as it really is. With such ardor and patriotism, should it pervade all ranks of the United States, our country could war successfully against all the forces England and France could bring against us. Here are a few opposers to the war, but no enemies to our country; we have a few who are termed federalists, but not like those of New England. I am considerably altered in my opinions of the effect of the war, and although I believe it will be injurious to the merchants on the seaboard, yet it will teach our countrymen that they are more independent than was ever considered; and will induce men of enterprise to engage in profitable branches of manufacturing, that otherwise would not have been known for many years to come.”

With such popular and State support, acting Secretary Jones succeeded in 1813 in effecting another small loan, seven millions and a half of dollars, authorized by Act of Congress in August of that year. Many persons of influence and authority, Timothy Pickering by newspaper publications, and Alexander Hanson in his Federal Republican newspaper, both members of Congress, with several other presses, declared it a duty of patriotism to defeat the Government by destroying its credit, and urged that national debts contracted for so unjust a war should not be paid. The State rate of interest, seven per cent. in two States and eight in a third, together with brokers depreciating loans for speculation and merchants from party opposition, conflicted with a national loan at six per cent. Moreover, the taxes laid did not go into operation till the beginning of the next year, 1814. Without taxation or victory the last measure of momentary fiscal relief was with difficulty accomplished.

The sums borrowed in the United States and England that year for hostilities were in remarkable contrast as to amount and facility of obtaining them: resembling each other only in both being dearly purchased, owing to their payment in bank notes of depreciated paper, unconvertible into gold or silver. Napoleon's immense contest of his final year was maintained without loans and on a coin basis. While the United States, almost free from debt,

and with great substantial resources of capital, in land, industry, and other national wealth, but without artificial credit, with difficulty borrowed about a million and a half pounds sterling (\$7,500,000), England, enormously taxed and indebted, by the magic of mere credit and enthusiasm, which are both no more than public confidence, founded, indeed, on taxation, had no difficulty in borrowing one hundred and thirty millions of dollars (£27,000,000 sterling). In neither country was any money paid or received in these transactions. In England payment was made to create and found a new stock by transfer of other stocks to the sinking fund, and by exchequer bills and bank notes. The Bank of England had then been dealing by law for sixteen years under what is called suspension of cash or specie payments; which is stoppage or bankruptcy from inability to pay any money at all, but bank notes substituted, and by Act of Parliament made legal tender as money. Though less depreciated than American continental money during the Revolution, yet the Bank of England paper, by legal inconvertibility into coin, was in 1813 much more depreciated than the national stocks, treasury notes, or notes of respectable State banks of the United States then, or at any time during the war of 1812. The Bank of England circulation in 1813 was forty-three millions, risen from twelve millions in 1807; and the worth of its notes depreciated in that proportion, which depreciation exceeded one-third of their coin and former value. A one pound note, by Act of Parliament, declared good for twenty shillings sterling, would not buy as much as three dollars, which were valued at four shillings and sixpence each; that is, the Bank of England note was worth only fourteen shillings and sixpence, while the dollar in 1813 was advanced to six shillings and ninepence. One ounce of Portuguese gold, worth in the United States seventeen dollars and sixty cents, was worth in England twenty-three dollars and thirty-one cents, or five pounds and five shillings sterling. So that forty per cent. advance was the medium English value or productiveness of gold or silver compared with Bank of England notes. To raise twenty-seven millions, therefore, the amount of the English loan of 1813, the British Government had to give forty-five millions nine hundred thousand pounds sterling: twenty-nine millions seven hundred thousand pounds of which, at three per cent., and sixteen millions two hundred thousand pounds at four per cent., producing together an interest of one million five hundred and twenty-nine thousand pounds for the whole sum borrowed, which was nominally something less than six per cent. on the money raised by the loan. But adding the bonus, premiums, and discount allowed, reduced the twenty-seven millions

supposed to be borrowed to less than twenty-five millions, and raised the interest above six per cent. If the United States loan had been payable in coin, as constitutionally it must at least be supposed to be and should be, eighteen millions of American money would be equal to, and pay for the twenty-seven millions of English loan, for which forty-five millions were given to get twenty-five and a half millions into the exchequer. The English interest was thus really nine per cent., a larger rate than was ever paid by Government in the United States. In 1803, when England renewed the war with France, the interest actually paid seldom exceeded five per cent. on English loans of money.

Such were some of the realities of the mysteries of finance in both countries, when the English boast and well-nigh universal belief was that the credit of England was inexhaustible, as it seemed to be; and that the United States were without almost any credit at all, as was also the case. In 1814, when American triumphs over discredit and governmental dread of taxation accompanied those over military indiscipline and inexperience, it became evident that in funds as well as arms the United States were capable of much greater exertion, and then peace soon followed such manifestations.

The price of bread in England increased from a shilling to twenty pence in 1812, and the value of the pound sterling in quarter loaves decreased from twenty shillings to twelve; the wages of husbandry labor increased from twelve to fifteen shillings; the poor taxes from about six millions to about sixteen and a half millions of pounds sterling, and the number of paupers from about twelve hundred thousand to more than two millions: effects of war, luxury, and unrepresentative government, from which the United States were mostly free, while they were gnawing night and day at the pampered entrails of Great Britain. Yet British loans were in universal favor, and American disparaged with unscrupulous opposition, of which a single instance may suffice to manifest the spirit.

Pursuant to resolution of Congress, the President having proclaimed a fast day for the 9th September, 1813, the Federal Republican assailed the loan and the war through that solemnity: "Let no man who wishes to continue the war, by active means, by vote, or by lending money, dare prostrate himself at the altar that day, for these are virtually as much partaking in the war, as the soldier who thrusts the bayonet; and although they may not be consumed at the altar, yet the judgments of the Almighty await them."

That malediction was but an ebullition of a press, whose paragraphs, however, were supposed to be written by more than one member of Congress. The authoritative oppugnation of the constituted authorities

of the State of Massachusetts was solemn and more formidable.

The Legislature of the State appointed a joint committee of both Houses, who followed up Mr. Quincy's resolution of the 15th June, 1813, against rejoicing for naval victories, by an official letter of the 18th of that month, addressed to Gen. Wm. King, inquiring whether he had accepted any agency or concern under the United States, or received from them any arms or munitions of war by order of the U. States Executive. Our commission is accompanied with authority to send for persons and papers, added Samuel Putnam, acting chairman of the joint committee, executing a legislative resolution to punish officers of the Massachusetts volunteers for taking up arms under the national government to defend their homesteads from invasion. On the 21st of June, 1813, from Bath in Maine, General King replied. "The volunteers who tendered their services to the President for the defence of their country were accepted and organized, and have been furnished with arms on application to the proper officer of the general government. Soon after the commencement of the present war, when the services of the detached militia *were withheld from the general government*, I aided the war department in organizing such a volunteer corps as was considered necessary for the defence of this district. After two regiments were organized, the services of such a number of volunteer companies more were offered as would have made three other regiments if necessary. As citizen of the United States I have duties to perform as well as citizen of the State, in this just and necessary war." Of the three brothers, distinguished in the war, Rufus King was a statesmanlike leader in the Senate, opposed to Madison's administration; his half brother, Cyrus, one of its most violent opponents in the House of Representatives; and William, the immediate subject of this notice, its decided supporter.

That correspondence was only one of numerous proofs that but for the illegal disloyalty of the government of Massachusetts, every branch of it, no part of the State would have been disgracefully without resistance, as large part of it was, subjected to the British yoke. The journals, public festivals, party fulminations, and other pronounced sentiments of Massachusetts, particularly Boston, teemed with defiance of the national government, abuse of the war, and applause of the enemy. When the eloquence of our orators fails to secure our rights, they said, it will be done by the thunder of our cannon; our militia are determined to resent the injuries of domestic oppression, as much as to resist the assaults of foreign foes; we desire honorable peace with the land of our ancestors, with which we are too closely connected in feeling,



manners, and principles, ever to have been at variance; our patriots traduced, are not debased, but have still the spirit to rouse the people to defend their assaulted liberties. A federal member of Congress, being told, when the President was ill in July, 1813, that he had vomited something very black, said he supposed it was his conscience; and it was not uncommon newspaper vilification of the Chief Magistrate to publish that Madison made himself *happy* by habitual intoxication. Mr. Quincy's resolution against rejoicing for naval victories, moved by a gentleman of his respectable social and political position, could not fail of pernicious encouragement to the anonymous cowards of a prurient press, always foraging for ambushed defamation. Ten years after it passed the Senate, during the brief interval, when William Eustis was chosen Governor over his competitor, Harrison Gray Otis, Mr. Quincy's resolution on the 17th January, 1824, by a vote of 22 ayes to 15 nays, was ordered to be expunged from the Journal, on motion of Seth Sprague, father of the present United States District Judge. "Adopted," says his resolution, "at a time of extraordinary political excitement, upon an erroneous estimate of the nature and character of the late war between the United States and Great Britain, involving and asserting principles unsound in policy, and dangerous and alarming in tendency; not, therefore, to be hereafter considered as expressing the sense of the Senate and people of this commonwealth at this time of uncommon political tranquillity."

In August, 1813, not long after the poison of the original resolution, the mortal remains of Captain Lawrence and Lieutenant Ludlow, brought from Halifax, were entombed at Salem, Massachusetts, a neighboring town as inimical to war as Boston itself, according to ceremonies arranged and published for the mournful occasion. As soon as it was made public, that Captain Crowninshield was going to Halifax for Lawrence's remains, a Boston journal, sneering at the generous act, said that "the *privateering* Captain Crowninshield, of Salem, has obtained from government a flag of truce to proceed to Halifax to remove, with permission of the British, the remains of the lamented Lawrence. The body is, we understand, to be brought to Salem, where an eulogy on the character of the deceased is to be pronounced by Judge Story, who has been appointed to this office by nobody knows who." When they brought home the body, business in Salem—Crowninshield's residence—was suspended, and the town crowded with performers or witnesses of the funeral honors paid to heroes, sacrificed almost within sight of Boston, to the national and naval glory of the country, in whose maritime exploits Massachusetts

had the deepest interest as well as in the national honor. Brought from Halifax in the cartel Henry, commanded by Capt. George Crowninshield, and manned by ten respectable shipmasters, who volunteered for the service, the bodies, followed by a train of eight boats rowed by sailors in uniform, keeping minute strokes, were landed from the cartel, that vessel and the United States brig-of-war, Rattlesnake, commanded by Captain Creighton, firing minute guns, repeated by the Salem artillery. The Constitution frigate at Boston, some miles off, all the American and neutral merchant vessels in the harbors of Boston and Salem, the forts, gun-houses, and many other places displayed their colors at half-mast. The bodies, taken from the boats and placed on hearses, covered by the flags they so nobly vindicated, were followed by a procession, headed by the Vice-President of the United States, Generals Dearborn and Cushing, officers of the navy and army in full uniform, ministers of the Gospel, several marine societies, corporate bodies, citizens and strangers from Boston and the neighborhood, and escorted by a company of light infantry, slowly moving during two hours the long procession lasted from the wharf to the church. The streets were crowded, the windows filled with spectators, many of whom occupied the housetops, as hundreds did at Boston the first of June, to behold or hear of the unfortunate Chesapeake, when her rash commander rushed to destruction. The tolling of the bells, military music, and recent recollections of the dead rendered the solemnity deeply impressive. In the church, Judge Story pronounced an affectionate eulogy on them, which, though he was then identified with the war and the administration that shortly before raised him to the Bench of the Supreme Court of the United States, was purely national, without offensive allusion, and couched in the poetical diction in which that learned jurist was versed. Some federalists attended the ceremony and mingled their regrets with those of the republicans, constituting most of the escort. The common people sympathized, as afterwards they threatened and prevented the Boston design to surrender the frigate Constitution and Independence ship of the line to save that town from British assault. But even such a solemnity was shunned and discountenanced by cold-blooded disaffection. Though most of the Boston press exhorted their readers to attend the funeral, yet the Boston Daily Advertiser, representing the ungenerous sullenness of the State Government, insolently asked, "what honor can be paid where a Crowninshield is chief mourner, and a Story chief priest?" Governor Strong, his Council, and others of their persuasion, staid away from the ceremonies thus taunted; and although no doubt a minority of



the people, yet majorities of the State authorities, of the merchants, the bar, the church and the clergy turned their backs on national solemnities, and brooded national disgrace.

Boston disloyalty, extremely offensive at Washington, was contemptuously chid at Halifax. "They expose their weakness," said the Halifax Journal, "by the revel rout of a naval dinner for Hull, and putting their vessels in mourning for Lawrence. The naval dinner and naval mourning of Boston, reflect, in a sallow hue, the picture of Massachusetts patriotism." "We shall try," added the Montreal Herald, of the 3d of July, 1813, "to prove that the remonstrance, published by the Massachusetts Legislature against the war with Britain, is but empty blustering, adopting no final or determined system successfully to accomplish the pretended claims and redress of grievances so loudly vociferated. When a municipal or established law is violated, it becomes the duty of the Legislature to interfere; and if remonstrance have not the effect of remedy, recourse to arms is the next and last alternative. If our memory is not treacherous, we think that Mr. Quincy and other Senators did threaten an appeal to arms some years ago. But remonstrances continue, and promises are unfulfilled. How degenerated from the spirit of '75, '76, though that was an atrocious spirit."

Harrison's victory over Proctor was publicly deplored. The Salem Gazette of the 22d October, 1813, announced, "At length the handful of British troops, which, for more than a year, have baffled the numerous armies of the United States in the invasion of Canada, deprived of the genius of the immortal Brock, have been obliged to yield to superior power and numbers." The Boston Daily Advertiser of the next day, 23d of October, 1813, added, "We shall surrender all our conquests at a peace. It is, indeed, a hopeful exploit for Harrison, with five thousand troops, who have been assembling and preparing ever since July, 1812, to fight and conquer four hundred and fifty worn out, exhausted British regulars, whom the Indians had previously deserted." In Rhode Island, infected by contagion with Massachusetts, a journal pronounced Harrison's victory the triumph of a crowd of Kentucky savages over a handful of brave men—no more than a march and their capture without fighting.

In Maryland, as in Massachusetts, and at Baltimore, where public sentiment was entirely different from that of Boston, the press, and even much of the constituted authority, was extremely inimical to the war, and the national administration.—Levin Winder, the Governor, like Governor Strong, an officer of the Revolution, together with a majority of the Legislature, without

the tendencies of some of the Massachusetts partisans to disunion, which was impossible and discountenanced by all parties in Maryland, nevertheless by strong language of opposition condemned the contest, its alleged causes and supporters. In a charge to the Grand Jury of Baltimore, Luther Martin, a learned lawyer, lately appointed Judge, denounced the American doctrine of allegiance, the President and his administration, in terms to be preserved as part of the curious history of the violence with which a war of words is, and will be, always waged in a free country in opposition to war by arms against any other country; mostly without much effect, often disgusting the community, and strengthening the government it abuses.

"The horrid atrocities of France are proofs," said Judge Martin to the Grand Jury, "that fallen man, for whose restraint governments were created, is a more deformed and debased monster than the beasts of the earth. Wriggling themselves into place, republicans become demagogues; and republicanism is by no means inseparably united with virtue. False philosophy, conceived in hell, and nursed by the devil, propagated in Europe all their wretchedness, too extensively introduced into the United States. The American Revolution was completed by men of virtue, morality, and religion: but the sun does not shine on a people who have, since then, so deteriorated in virtue, morality, and religion: Their depreciation began with that of paper money, and for twenty years Europe has been spewing on this devoted country an almost unrelenting torrent of her filthiest feculency, tainting a mass, become still more rotten. Vainly do we attribute our evils to a violation of sailors' rights, or to a weak government. Providence punishes us for our sins with war, the worst of curses, worse than famine or pestilence. No guilt can be more inexpiable than that of him who, without just cause, plunges a nation into war. In the sight of Heaven, such a man will be viewed as the wilful, deliberate murderer of every individual who loses his life in its prosecution, and his soul is stained by every drop of blood thereby. They who add sin to sin with greediness in prosecuting the war with which we are afflicted by an avenging God, are those truly guilty of moral treason." From such ethical lessons, which, together with their practical, judicial application, are part of the history of that crisis, the Judge, proceeding to the enumeration of crimes, spoke of treason as the deepest malignity of guilt, and added, "I hold it, gentlemen, as a sound and incontrovertible truth, a truth of which I cannot doubt, that no citizen can more righteously divest himself of his allegiance to his government without its consent, than his government can, with-

out his consent, deprive him of its protection. This truth is formed in the very nature of civil society. The contrary doctrine is the spawn of folly and knavery, whatever wiseacres of modern growth may tell us." The Baltimore Grand Jury, of one-and-twenty members, by formal reply, protested against Judge Martin's charge, and argued the errors of most of its positions, especially, they said, "the absurd and unconstitutional ground of the Court's remarks in defence of perpetual allegiance." Soon afterwards, Judge George Poindexter, of Mississippi, charged a Grand Jury there, that, "The nature of our government and habits of our people, forbid the idea that arms will often be taken up to enforce the visionary projects of abandoned demagogues. We must search for treason in mercantile cupidity, aided by the facilities afforded for gratifying it by the enemy. He who relieves the wants of the enemy is guilty of adhering to, and giving him aid and comfort. Giving him information is more dangerous than bearing arms for him. The editors of those licentious newspapers, who have sold themselves to a British faction to overturn the only free government on earth, and justify the enormities of Great Britain, exciting unfounded expectations of a severance of the Union, are, in that class of offenders, employed for England, where it is high treason only to *imagine* the king's death."

In matters of property, judicature, mostly right, may be always respectable: but when Judges undertake politics, their passions mislead more than those of juries, actuated by the simple common sense of the community.

About that time, died two remarkable types of the two distinct species of the same English race of Americans, Theophilus Parsons, Chief-Justice of Massachusetts, and Charles Scott, ex-Governor of Kentucky. Scott was a frontier pioneer, of that class of adventurers formed by settling new regions reclaimed from wilderness, and conquered from savages by intruders who despise property earned by tranquil industry, and covet lands, not by acres, but miles square. Uneducated, but intelligent and brave, Scott rose from the ranks, in Washington's army, to command and celebrity. Parsons, unequalled as a lawyer and judge in New England, uncommonly learned, and as respected questions of property, of that perfect rectitude which characterizes the American Judiciary, yet, straying, as it often does, into politics, wandered into adjudged misconstructions of the militia laws, which discredited the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, endangered and perplexed the Union. It became the judicial function of a Massachusetts lawyer, Story, young and much inferior to Parsons when he died, to pro-

nounce the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, reversing that of Parsons and his associates, as one of the most palpable errors of the war.

During the interval between the first and second sessions of the Thirteenth Congress, Governors John Cotton Smith, of Connecticut, William Jones, of Rhode Island, John Taylor Gilman, of New Hampshire, and Martin Chittenden, of Vermont, addressed the Legislatures of those States, most of them in disapproval of the war and national government; but none of them, except the latter, with the violent anti-federal opposition of the constituted authorities of Massachusetts, whose unconstitutional sores were corroding to the rottenness in which they exfoliated next year by the Hartford Convention. Governor Jones' message, the 26th of October, 1813, paraded the power of Rhode Island to disturb the Union by the *two* cannon, of which it carefully stated the cost. Governor Gilman's, the 27th October, 1813, without a word of dissatisfaction with the war, was said by Mr. Webster, by that moderation, to have thereby prevented his re-election. Portions of the five Eastern States, irritated by commercial restrictions, were goaded by partisans to measures which a minority branded into the mass of the people of New England steadfastly attached to the Union, however adverse to its federal government, opposed to the war, but unwilling to follow factious leaders to the extremes of disunion, separate peace and British alliance. Governor Smith's speech in October 1813, in the form and method of the original presidential speeches to Congress (which Jefferson took a doubtful liberty when he abolished as English and royal, and substituted the message)—was a model of dignified and patriotic opposition. "The sentiments," said he, "of the people of Connecticut in disapprobation of the unhappy contest in which we are involved were publicly declared through the proper organ soon after hostilities commenced, accompanied with an assurance that the obligations of the Constitution should, nevertheless, be strictly fulfilled. They have pursued that honorable course which regards equally the legitimate claims of the confederacy, and the rights and dignity of their own government." The Governor cordially approved and seconded the alacrity with which the people of New London and Groton, without orders or adequate means, flew to arms to protect Decatur's blockaded and endangered squadron. "It was no time," he told the Legislature, "to inquire into the character of the enemy or cause which made him such: when no inconsiderable portion of our gallant navy was exposed within our waters to instant capture and destruction." The conduct of the Connecticut militia cor-



responded by honorable acts to the Governor's approval. When the term of service of the first requisition expired, on the 16th of October, 1813, they marched from their encampment through New London, and were discharged with the commendation of the commanding officer. By a change in the paymaster's arrangements, they could not be immediately paid before they went home: whereupon the officers advanced most of the money and generously distributed it among the men. Governor Smith requested the President's instructions, by whose request a considerable body of troops had been kept at that station, and from whom two thousand stand of arms had been received. The troops of Connecticut gave, as the Governor justly said, indisputable evidence of their attachment to its Constitutions (with laudable felicity of phrase joining the Federal to the State Constitution). If such had been the language and spirit of all the constituted authorities of New England, their annoyances by the war would have been as much less as their credit and emoluments would have been greater. But Massachusetts or Boston evil influence was at work with corresponding violence from members of Congress, to protract and embitter the struggle, and even in Connecticut, pervert the State counteraction which Governor Smith deemed lawful with many more of the wisest men of that intelligent commonwealth, next year constrained to appear as reluctant performers in the drama of disunion, ending with a farce what its authors contrived for tragedy.

Vermont, nearly balanced in the suffrages of that frontier and martial State, Governor Chittenden attempted to push to the very verge of revolt and collision with the National authority. Chosen at the annual election by mere plurality without majority, of which he lacked near three hundred votes; but thereupon being constitutionally preferred by the Legislature in joint ballot, by a majority of three votes over his competitor, Jonas Galusha, who had a majority of six hundred popular votes; Chittenden, thus lawfully, but barely installed, took his cue entirely from Massachusetts prompters, and his speech to the Legislature, the 23d of October, 1813, avowed their portentous illegalities. "The militia," he declared, "exclusively assigned for the service and protection of the several States, except to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, or repel invasions. It never could, he said, have been intended that the whole body of the militia were, by any kind of magic, at once to be transformed into a regular army for the purpose of foreign conquest." Which position, officially announced, was soon enforced by the most wanton act of defiance to national author-

ity that occurred during the war. At a crisis of great importance, when Hampton's wing of the northern army was marched into Canada to co-operate with Wilkinson's for the invasion of that province, a brigade of Vermont militia having been marched to Plattsburg, and there put under orders of United States officers, on the 10th of November, 1813—from Montpelier, Governor Chittenden issued his proclamation as Captain-General and Governor, ordering them to return to their residences, within the territorial limits of their own brigade, there to repel, if need be, the enemy's invasion, either in co-operation with troops of the United States, or separately, as might be necessary. Feeling the weight of his responsibility, the Governor added, with regard to the constitutional duties of the militia, he unequivocally declared, "that, in his opinion, the military strength and resources of the State must be reserved for its own defence and protection exclusively, excepting in cases provided for by the Constitution of the United States; and then under orders, derived only from the Commander-in-chief." To this attempt to enforce the Massachusetts heresy, the Lieutenant-Colonel Luther Dixon and other officers of a regiment of Vermont militia, from their cantonment at Plattsburg, on the 15th of November, 1813, replied, by addressing to the Governor, "the reasons which induced them absolutely and positively to refuse obedience to the order of his proclamation. When ordered into the service of the United States, it becomes our duty to march to any section of the Union; not confined to the narrow limits of the town or State in which we reside. We are under a paramount obligation to our common country, and the great confederacy of States. And while in actual service, your Excellency's power over us, as Governor of Vermont, is suspended. If legally ordered into service of the United States, your Excellency has no power to order us out of it. An invitation or order to desert the standard of our country, will never be obeyed by us, although it proceeds from the Captain-General and Governor of Vermont." The officers, treating the subject more at large, declared their opinion that "the Governor's proclamation is a renewed instance of that spirit of disorganization and anarchy, carried on by a faction to overwhelm our country with ruin and disgrace. Your Excellency's object must be to embarrass the operations of the army, excite mutiny and sedition among the soldiers, and induce them, by deserting, to forfeit their wages. Distributed among the soldiers by your agent, employed for the purpose, your proclamation has produced no effect. They regard it with mingled emotions of pity and contempt for its author, and, as a striking monument of his

folly. A knowledge of your Excellency's character induces us to believe that the folly and infamy of the proclamation to which you have put your signature, are chiefly ascribable to the evil advisers by whom your Excellency is encompassed."

By that military revolt, collision in arms and civil war were probably prevented; by insubordination, more lawful, rational, and patriotic than the command: for the militia were sustained in their resistance by the Supreme Court of the United States, whose decree condemned the militia illegalities of the Supreme Court and other constituted authorities of Massachusetts, which misled the Governor of Vermont. General Jacob Davis, of the Vermont militia, charged by Governor Chittenden with the execution of his proclamation, was arrested as soon as he attempted it, at Plattsburg, and put in confinement; General Hampton having gone into winter quarters there, after his and General Wilkinson's quarrelsome abandonment of their expedition to Canada.

Not long after Congress were in session, on the 7th January, 1814, Solomon Sharp, of Kentucky, presented resolutions that the militia, when lawfully employed in the service of the United States, are subject to the same rules and articles as the troops of the United States; that every person, not subject to the rules and articles of war, procuring or enticing a soldier in the service of the United States to desert, is guilty of an infraction of the laws of the United States, and subject to punishment; that His Excellency Martin Chittenden, Governor of Vermont, by issuing his proclamation at Montpelier the 10th November, 1813, did entice soldiers in the service of the United States to desert; and that therefore the President should be requested to instruct the Attorney-General of the United States to institute a prosecution against Martin Chittenden. James Fisk, of Vermont, said that he spoke the sentiments of the whole Vermont delegation, when he regretted the introduction of those resolutions. Few in Vermont approved the unjustifiable proclamation; but it was the Governor's act. Moreover, if guilty of any breach of law, the courts of justice were the proper tribunals for his prosecution, not the House of Representatives, which should not attempt to influence them or turn informers. If the resolutions were adopted, that should be conclusive of the law, but the House had no constitutional power over it. He therefore moved to lay the resolutions on the table. Mr. Sharp, finding, he said, the Vermont delegation opposed to his resolutions, consented to their lying on the table. Thomas Grosvenor said, that if the resolutions were cleared of that part which expressed the judgment of the House, and confined to

directing the Attorney-General to institute a prosecution, he had no objection to submitting the constitutional question to the judicial tribunals. Governor Wright added that he too was for a prosecution, but for treason, by aid and comfort to the enemy, instead of a mere peccadillo by violation of law. William Findley said a few words against resolutions giving the opinion of the House on instituting a prosecution. No good, he thought, could come of the resolutions; which were laid on the table, and never called up again for consideration. It was believed to be Mr. Madison's opinion, that Governors and Legislatures of States are not liable to prosecution for any authoritative interruption of the Federal Government. No prosecution was ever instituted for any such misconduct, on which public sentiment has passed sentence more effectual than the ordinary measure of common punishment.

No judicial proceedings or federal interference took place against the Governor of Vermont; the general, Davis, was enlarged on recognizance and bail, to appear at Albany for trial. Not long after, when the Legislature of Massachusetts met, Mr. Otis, by another step toward the Hartford Convention, on the 14th January, 1814, laid on the table of the House of Representatives at Boston, a resolution expressive of the duty of Massachusetts to aid the Governor and people of Vermont, or any other State, to support their constitutional rights, when in danger of infringement from any quarter; and when requested by the Governor of Vermont or any other State, upon evidence of such infringement, to provide by law for their effectual support. A pamphlet was about that time actively circulated in Boston, entitled "Some Thoughts on a Separation of the Original Thirteen United States from Louisiana and the Western Country." As soon as unofficially apprised of Governor Chittenden's proclamation and Mr. Otis' motion, the Legislature of Pennsylvania directed Governor Snyder to lay before Congress and the President resolutions by which they strongly denounced the Governor to punishment, and Mr. Otis with intent by intimidation to prevent it: and the determination of the Government of Pennsylvania to support the General Government in all constitutional and lawful measures for punishing all violators and infractors of law, their aiders or abettors, however elevated in station, directly or indirectly aiding or comforting the common enemy.

The Boston party, which did not comprehend even most of Massachusetts, particularly Maine, nor New Hampshire or Vermont, nor even Connecticut, in the rupturing and violent schemes contemplated, made great exertions to excite the Legislatures and Governments of all New



England to a separate peace, which must have led to disunion and alliance of the dismembered States with England. What was called in derision the Kingdom of New England, was the dream of some to make a separate confederacy of the Eastern States, including, if it could be accomplished, New York, or a separate peace between that portion of the United States and Great Britain. In the autumn of 1813, the Boston press labored to bring about a separate peace; contending that it was feasible without violence, civil war, or even separation of the States from their federal union. In November, 1813, a project for the restoration of peace was calmly and speciously argued in the Boston Daily Advertiser, urging every legislator of New England to ponder and prepare himself to meet the question the ensuing winter. It being well ascertained, was the argument, that all New England is opposed to the ruinous and unjust war, how should they restore the blessings of peace, without civil commotions, separation or any other extreme remedy that would be worse than the disease? By the Constitution of the United States, any State, with the consent of Congress, is authorized to enter into a treaty with a foreign power: and Congress should not refuse New England or Massachusetts leave to save themselves by doing so. Parts of the confederations of Holland and of Germany, the State of Holland by itself, have often done so: and during our own Revolution it was agreed by acts of Congress to suffer the Island of Bermuda to remain neutral. Let then all New England unite peaceably to ask Congress to grant permission, pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, for New England States to make a separate peace with Great Britain, leaving in full force all their obligations and connections with the United States. The other States preferring it may carry on the war, while we enjoy peace, without injury to each other or the federal Constitution uniting the whole. History abounds with examples of such transactions by confederated States. There can be no impropriety for the New England States to ask permission from Congress to stand neuter in a war which they opposed unanimously, and which proves fatal to their interests. The timid, moderate and prudent need not be alarmed by a proposition contemplated and provided for by the Constitution itself, of which the only effect will be peaceable and harmonious restoration of the blessings of peace to those most suffering by war. Connecticut has already acted on that clause of the Federal Constitution which forbids States, except in time of war, to keep troops, by raising a body of them by act of the Legislature of that cautious commonwealth, construing the war to import an affirmation of that

right, to raise and keep forces by the State.

The fact assumed that New England was unanimous against the war, as the basis of that argument, was mistaken. All the delegation from Vermont in Congress, one from Massachusetts, together with one Senator, were war members; and though majorities of all the Eastern States were opposed to the federal administration, if they were also against the war, they proved when the Hartford Convention was attempted next year, that at least three of the five New England States and large majorities of the people of the whole five were equally averse to extreme remedies, worse than the most exaggerated fears of the disease. To the project of a separate peace attempted in 1813, the Boston recommendation of it nevertheless added, if Congress unreasonably refuse, it will then remain for the wise and prudent to decide what we ought to do, when a just and reasonable and constitutional request is refused. Governor Strong's speech to the Legislature the 12th of January, 1814, high-wrought against the war, the Federal Government and the embargo act just enacted by Congress, gave no apparent countenance to separate peace or disunion.

In order to effectuate Mr. Otis' resolution for support of Governor Chittenden's revolt, not only the Legislature, but the Governor of Massachusetts must have joined in it. But the Vermont Governor was the only one so illegally anti-federal, and he in 1814 veered round from extensive opposition to warm support of the war, by contradictory proclamations equally remarkable. The Legislatures of Massachusetts and Connecticut both went beyond the Governors of those States in opposition to the Federal Government. And no act of constituted authority throughout the contest was more mischievously or ungraciously detrimental and defying, however constitutional, than that of the Legislature of Massachusetts, soon following Mr. Otis' resolution to support Governor Chittenden. On the 7th February, 1814, it was resolved to withdraw the State jails from the use of the United States for their prisoners of war at a moment when much needed. When prisoners on parole were seized and imprisoned as hostages, threatened with death, England had great advantage over the United States for the execution of that cruel retaliation. American prisoners at Halifax and Bermuda, or in England, found no sympathies; whereas, British prisoners in America, treasonably aided and comforted by some, enjoyed the regret of many, and commiseration of nearly all. On the 10th November, 1813, three hundred American prisoners were crowded into two small vessels at Halifax, for transportation to England; while English prisoners, mostly



paroled and kindly treated in America, if imprisoned as hostages, were often encouraged and assisted to escape. Col. Charles Y. Grant, Major Vallette, and several other British officers, on parole, by order of the Commissary-General, were confined as hostages by the Marshal of Massachusetts, James Prince, in the county jail at Worcester. Having no federal prisons, the United States Government have always used the State jails for national offenders: for which an Act of the Legislature of Massachusetts, as early as the 26th of February, 1790, put the jails of that State at the service of the United States. Without special leave from the local powers, Marshal Prince imprisoned his hostages in the county jail at Worcester, taking care by increased precautions to secure their custody. But as public repugnance contested all his measures, while in the act of lodging the English in jail, their lawyer, as he said he was, denied in their presence the right of government to confine them, declaring that if British officers were arrested he was ready for rebellion: which ebullition was followed as well as preceded by intimations from other interlopers that their imprisonment, if it could not be prevented, should not last long, but their escape be effected, and a person offered his chaise and horse to one of the prisoners for flight. The Marshal, alarmed by such appearances, and fearing that the jail-keeper could not be relied on, determined to remove the hostages to Albany as a safer place: which becoming known, caused their early evasion. Abijah and Jacob Bigelow, with J. W. Jenkins, of the neighboring town of Barré, were said to have contrived the means, and on the night of the 12th December, 1813, the prisoners knocked down, tied and gagged the deputy keeper, and got off. The Marshal advertised a reward for their recapture, and five of nine who broke out were retaken, but the other four escaped entirely. During all these proceedings, which occasioned much public sensation, the aid and comfort of many of the presses of Massachusetts were openly bestowed on the English. The Worcester Gazette accused the Marshal of rude, unfeeling behaviour to the prisoners, in whose escape from "Marshal Prince, a lynx-eyed, full-blooded blood-hound of Mr. Madison," the Boston Daily Advertiser warmly exulted; calling them "gallant officers, whom Mr. Madison desired to answer for the lives of self-acknowledged traitors—victims of a barbarous and cruel policy." The sequel of such sentimentality soon followed in the Act of the 7th February, 1814, providing that "nothing in the Act of the 26th February, 1790, should be construed to authorize the keepers of jails within the commonwealth of Massachusetts to take custody of, and keep any prisoners committed by any other than the Judicial authority of the

United States:" "and whereas, several prisoners have been committed under the Executive authority of the United States, the keepers of the State jails are authorized and required to discharge all prisoners of war within thirty days from the passing of this Act." Debtors of the United States might be confined in the State jails, and offenders committed by Judicial authority, but prisoners of war and others placed in custody by presidential order were set free; and the national government was deprived by the State government of any place of confinement for prisoners of war in Massachusetts.

On that repudiation by Massachusetts, the President appealed to Pennsylvania, where he never failed to find redress on such occasions. By letter of the 23d February, 1814, the Secretary of State requested Governor Snyder to authorize John Smith, the Marshal of that State, to confine the hostages in the Penitentiary at Philadelphia. The Governor immediately, on the first of March, communicated the Secretary's letter to the Legislature, calling their attention to the subject, who, forthwith, on the third day of that month, passed a bill, which the Governor at once approved, placing all the prisons, sheriffs, and jail keepers of Pennsylvania at the service of the President and orders of the Marshal for safe keeping hostages, prisoners, or any other persons, whose safe custody the general government might desire. The Pennsylvania Act was as favorable in spirit and performance as the Massachusetts Act was churlish and repulsive; and thus it often happens that the extreme opposition of one State to the Federal government, by reaction produces entire concurrence of other States. Some of the hostages, however, escaped for want of sufficient custody and State co-operation.

Abusing the right of popular petition, a remnant of English freedom extremely liable to American perversion, and by no means always indicating the true public sentiment, such a number of places represented in the Massachusetts Legislature, as with their numerous names and members appeared imposing, representing ninety thousand of the seven hundred thousand people of the State, petitioned the Legislature, setting forth grievances, which were referred to a joint committee of both Houses, headed by a respectable gentleman, James Lloyd, of Boston, who reported in February, 1814, elaborate and indignant denunciation of the embargo, war, and national administration, and significant intimations of the disappointment experienced by Massachusetts from the expected benefits of the federal union, the value of which was, on that official occasion, coldly calculated. Violent debates ensued, in which John Holmes, and a small

minority, breasted bravely a formidable majority. Crowds in the galleries, many of them interested in smuggling, or treasonable traffic, and British agents frequenting all places of public resort with great influence in this country, loudly applauded the most seditious speeches. A Convention was proposed; but the joint committee reported that it would be best to wait for another Legislature to appoint delegates to meet others, altogether to devise some plan of relief from sufferings more intolerable than those inflicted by the Boston port-bill, "which their ancestors fought and bled to resist, and it would be pusillanimous in their descendants to submit to. We have seen a power grow up in the southern and western sections of the union, by the admission and multiplication of States not contemplated by the parties to the Constitution, and not warranted by its principles, with an almost infinite progress in this system of creation, which threatens eventually to reduce the voice of New England, once powerful and effectual in the national councils, to the feeble expression of colonial complaints, unattended to and disregarded. It is no longer a question of force or of right with this Legislature, but of time and expediency. We do not see the approach of peace in the vast armaments preparing, the vast expense accruing, the demands for Canada in one quarter and Florida in another; in the late appointment of envoys, one of whom was the prominent author and adviser of the war; the other a submissive agent in producing it; and the more recent addition to the mission of a man supposed to be the secret controller of the former mission, and vested with powers to impede its pacific course." In such terms were Mr. Clay and Mr. Gallatin denounced by those who became their ardent supporters.

In Samuel Dexter, that conjuncture brought forth a patriot federalist, superior to party and independent of Executive favor; excellent specimen of the party to which, if to any, Washington belonged. From Washington, where he was attending the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Dexter, on the 18th February, 1814, addressed a letter through the Boston Palladium to the electors of Massachusetts, which nearly placed him at the head of that commonwealth, at the ensuing election, instead of Governor Strong. Denying with great force the constitutionality, expediency, and efficiency of the embargo, or any other restrictive measure, and arguing that the whole strength of the nation on the ocean would be much more effectual than frontier and territorial invasive war, Mr. Dexter, conceding the "unquestionable privilege of every citizen to examine the conduct of rulers, though in speaking to his country he may be overborne by its enemies, yet condemned the

abuse of that right by publications and speeches to prove that we are absolved from allegiance to the national government, and hint that an attempt to divide the empire might be justified. The Eastern and Southern States," said he, "are made for each other. A man and woman might as reasonably quarrel on account of the difference in their formation. New England would soon be restored from inability in the political system if improper expedients for sudden relief were abandoned." The sensation and effect of such patriotic appeals were powerful. "The principles of his letter," said a Boston press, "will paralyze the efforts of New England and promote the views of the administration. Of what consequence is his theoretical opposition to the embargo, if he practically supports the war and taxes, and denounces the federalists as active spirits and ambitious men." No part of his argument was more conclusive than that which preferred war to restriction. "The history of civil society," said he, "proves that with all the crimes, desolation and misery of war, it is a terrible necessity, and man must submit to his destiny. Still, greater evils are produced by pusillanimous shrinking from conformity to the mysterious law of his present condition." Philosophy like this taught by an eminent citizen of New England, Secretary of War in John Adams' federal administration, vouched by that venerable personage from his retirement near Boston, and by his distinguished son, then almost the only American minister in Europe, could not fail of important inculcation. Continual resistance of their own government and disparagement of the union, with extravagant vindication of all English hostilities, naturally suggested suspicions of treasonable collusion with the enemy, which the British press, if not government, provincial as well as metropolitan, countenanced. A Halifax journal, of the 8th October, 1813, deploring Perry's victory, exclaimed, "Had we not the means of being as well prepared as the Americans? Certainly we had every superiority in that respect and every other; but most wisely forbore to make offensive war in Canada, lest our friends of the Northern States should be offended, and therefore made actual invasion of the Southern with a force inadequate to cause a diversion."

By the mortifying separation and disgraceful retirement into winter quarters of the disjointed wings of Wilkinson's and Hampton's army, and of Governor Chittenden's alarming recall of the Vermont militia from New York, when the northern frontiers were disturbed by uneasiness, that the enemy was preparing sleds and other appliances for a winter invasion of Vermont and New York, to attack our outposts and subdue our dishevelled and



dispirited troops, arrived in November, 1813, at Plattsburg, from Quebec, sad remnants of the infernal brutalities with which by savage instrumentality the war was inhumanly inaugurated in August, 1812. On the 17th of July that year, Michilimacinae was surprised and taken by a British Canadian and Indian expedition from St. Joseph's, led by Captain Roberts, whose summons to surrender, the American commander Captain Heald officially wrote to his superior, General Hull, was (to the everlasting disgrace of our government) the first information he had of the declaration of war. Captain Heald, with a garrison of fifty-four regulars of the first regiment of United States infantry and twelve militia, garrisoned Fort Dearborn on Lake Huron, where there was no town, now the flourishing city of Chicago, of more than twenty thousand inhabitants. On the 9th August, 1812, Captain Heald was ordered by General Hull to evacuate Fort Dearborn, and transfer his people by land to Detroit. In so remote a frontier post, with a few soldiers, there were many women and children, and a considerable quantity of such stores as the neighboring Indians needed. Soon after General Hull's orders, Captain Wells from Fort Wayne, with thirty Miami Indians, arrived at Fort Dearborn, to serve as part of the escort to Detroit. The neighboring Indians, learning that the Fort was to be evacuated and stores distributed among them, flocked in to Fort Dearborn, to whom all the goods in the factory and a considerable quantity of provisions were given. Such arms and ammunition as Captain Heald could not take away he deemed it prudent to destroy, together with all the liquor. Though the number of Indians was large, four or five hundred, yet their crafty conduct was orderly, while maturing plans of destruction. On the morning of the inauspicious day of Hull's surrender at Detroit, 15th August, 1812, the little garrison, enumbered by women, children, large quantities of baggage and other impediments, began that always fatal movement, a retreat in presence of a superior number of ferocious savages, whose treachery, rapacity and remorseless cruelty were well known, though no war existed with them. Captain Wells with his Miamis led the van and brought up the rear of the departure, which the configuration of the country rendered it necessary to take up on the beach of Lake Huron, between its waters and a high sand bank, about a hundred yards on the other flank. In that defile the garrison had not moved more than a mile and a half on the vast prairies of marshy sand which margin the lake, when the alarm was given that the Indians were preparing an attack, mostly Pottowattamies from behind the

bank, some kind of ambush, in Indian tactics, being part of their rude science of war. Captain Heald forthwith gallantly led his company to the top of the bank, fired one discharge, and rushed on his assailants in front, who gave way but rallied on their flanks. In fifteen minutes five hundred savages, with a loss of eighteen of their number, killed twenty-six of the regulars, Captain Wells, Ensign Romaine, Dr. Voorhis, the whole twelve militia men, two women, twelve children, severely wounded Captain Heald and his wife, and got possession of all the horses, baggage and provisions. Reduced to one Lieutenant, Helm, twenty-five non-commissioned officers and privates, eleven women and four children, deprived of half their force and everything but their small arms, Captain Heald drew off the fragment of survivors to an elevation in the open prairie, out of gunshot from the bank or any other cover for his foes; who, without pursuing, gathered on the bank, and after some consultation among themselves, made signs for a parley. Captain Heald alone approached them, and was met by Blackbird, a Pottowattamie chief, with an interpreter; the chief shook hands, required him to surrender, promising that the lives of all the prisoners should be spared. Without much confidence in the promise, Captain Heald, in the desperate condition of his little force, with hardly any option but compliance, which gave at least a chance of escape with life, capitulated, and delivered up all the arms of his people, who were taken back to their encampment near the Fort. There the captives were distributed among their Indian masters, who next morning burned the Fort and began their march elsewhere. Captain Heald and his wife, both badly wounded, were taken to the mouth of the River St. Joseph, and suffered to stay there in the hut of Burnett, an Indian trader, till, in a few days, during the absence of the Indians, who marched away to take Fort Wayne, Captain Heald engaged a French Canadian to convey him by water to Detroit, where, with the surgeon attending him, he gave himself up as a prisoner to Captain Roberts, who afforded every assistance in his power to render the forlorn situation of Captain Heald and his wife as comfortable as possible, paroled him, and allowed him to proceed to Detroit. There Captain Heald found Colonel Proctor in command; from whom also he received kindness, and a passage to Buffalo, whence, by the way of Presque Isle, the Captain went by water to end the journey of his mishaps at Pittsburgh. But far worse than his was the dreadful fate of his unfortunate comrades in captivity, except Lieutenant Helm, who was able to ransom himself from savage custody. Of the re-

maining twenty-five men, eleven women and children, thirty-six altogether, twenty-seven were butchered with every barbarous refinement of indecent cruelty. The hearts of Captain Wells, Ensign Romayne and Dr. Voorhis were torn from their disfigured corpses and broiled, and their heads cut off by the savages before surviving prisoners, witnesses of the horrible exultation. In one wagon several children were massacred and scalped with yells of demoniac delight. The wife of Phelim Cabin, in an advanced state of pregnancy, was tomahawked to death, scalped, ripped open, the child dragged from her womb, and its head cut off. A child of John Neads, another soldier, was tied to a tree to prevent its following his wife, the mother of it, after whom the child went crying for food. The wretched mother perished on the march from hunger and fatigue. Hugh Logan, an Irish, and Augustus Mott, a German soldier, worn out with fatigue and unable to walk, were tomahawked for that reason. Nelson, another, was frozen to death afterwards in the winter when serving as a bondsman among the Indians. The nine survivors of the whole garrison taken to the banks of Fox River, Illinois, were there parcelled out as servants to different Indian masters: in which aggravation of captivity and bondage they remained all that summer, autumn, winter, and part of next spring, allowed scarcely sustenance enough to keep them alive, compelled to the severest drudgery, without clothes, beds, or any kind of comfort, the derision and sport of the worse than Spartan masters, of worse than American helots. At length taken back to Chicago for sale, they were there purchased by another French Canadian, by General Proctor's direction sent to Amherstburg, and thence to Quebec, where they arrived the 8th November, 1813. Exchanged and liberated there, the nine miserable remains of the garrison of Fort Dearborn, when evacuated the 9th August, 1812, reached Plattsburg, the last stage of their deplorable pilgrimage, in November, 1813, after fifteen months of hardships, privations and cruel sufferings, which to most of their companions proved fatal, and by many persons may be deemed incredible, yet an authenticated tale of war calamitous and atrocious.

The autumn of 1813 admonished New England of their dependence on the national government of all the United States to maintain an essential element of though general, yet more especially Eastern, benefit—the Newfoundland fisheries. The people of New England had been for seven or eight years loud complainants of their national government; first, for unresisted English and French depredations on their commerce, then for the embargo and suc-

cessive stages of the restrictive system, which, like changes of position on an uneasy bed, scarcely relieved, if they did not aggravate the disorder, and at last for war, which brought on its most painful and alarming crisis. War, not resorted to when they urged it, soon ceased to have commerce for a cause. Nothing remained but protection of seamen, for any one of whom, impressed and imprisoned and forced to fight against his country, as many mariners of New England were, Great Britain would have gone to war long before the United States ventured it for thousands. A great nursery once of the French marine, when it nearly equalled the English, and then of the English and American, was in danger of being wrested from its New England occupants, and made the exclusive property of England. What once employed twenty thousand French seamen, and after them fifteen hundred American fishing smacks, on the coasts of Newfoundland, was enabled the English navy to hold exclusively. A meeting of merchants and principal resident inhabitants, interested in the trade and fisheries of Newfoundland, at the Merchants' Hall in St. John's, the 27th October, 1813, James Macbraire, a shrewd and enterprising Scot, presiding, memorialized Sir Richard Goodwin Keats, the Governor of the Island, by an application which he undertook to bear to England and lay at the King's feet, in terms, said the Boston Centinel, alarmingly interesting. No peace without the fisheries, was their cry. "Conceiving that our existence as a great and independent nation must chiefly depend upon our preserving the sovereignty of the seas, the policy of excluding France and America from the advantages those nations have heretofore enjoyed, in times of peace, in this fishery, must be evident." The wisdom of British exclusive occupation of all the North-Eastern seas and coasts of America was then argued by the memorialists, not only as a nursery of seamen, but as a means of preventing illicit trade—and the infusing insubordinate notions by the Americans among the British people of Newfoundland: evils extending to their West India and European commerce, and disturbing their colonial fidelity. "Our existence as a great and independent nation depends on our dominion on the ocean, and the wise policy of shutting out other nations leagued against us in war from a future participation in so important a branch of commerce. Hostilities with America increase our trade and mariners, decreasing theirs in the same proportion." This subject will be fully treated when the negotiations of Ghent are considered. At present the English provincial suggestion of an attempt so fatal to American navigation, is mentioned in the order of events as one of those which British successes and



spirit of aggrandizement encouraged, to unite the American nation and illustrate their resistance to Great Britain. Not a word was uttered from the South or West against war for the Eastern fisheries, the preservation of which for New England, the Eastern States, most interested, felt depended on national efforts, which all New England, unanimously joined together, could never have achieved without the co-operation of American people and States, apparently without interest in the question. The Newfoundland fisheries were, moreover, near those settlements of exiles of the Revolution, who took refuge there from the pursuit of countrymen they had left to take side with the mother country in that struggle, and remained ever after vainly plotting to contrive its restoration to American supremacy.

In 1813, American and British North America were not the only disturbed parts of the western hemisphere, destined by its political innovations to shake the European continent with similar commotions. In the heart of Mexico, a band of revolutionary patriots attempted the cause of freedom; seized Acapulco, the most considerable and important port on the South Sea, and were said to be uniting with great force. Caracas, Coro, and Santa Fe in South America had established republican governments. New Granada was made known as the republic of Candinamarca, where the people published a manifesto asserting self-sovereignty. Carthagená had many privateers at sea against Spain, which kingdom sent several thousand troops to subdue the insurrection at Buenos Ayres. Nearer the United States, Texas was in motion. On the 4th July, 1813, Don Jose Bernardo Gutierrez, from the government house of St. Bernardo de Bexar, in the third year of independence, proclaimed that of Texas to the friends of the Mexican cause. On the 27th September, 1813, from the palace of the Executive power of the province of Texas, at San Antonio, the government of that independent state, by proclamation of Don Jose Alvarado Toledo, to foreigners of every nation excepting those of Spain, denounced the barbarous laws of the Spanish government to prevent the establishment of foreigners in their provinces, and announced a free government to succeed the ancient tyranny, with tranquil enjoyment of all social rights and religious opinions, in a climate remarkably healthy and soil favoured by the gifts of Nature.

Henry Wheaton, afterwards, so long American envoy in different parts of Europe, distinguished by his works on the laws of captures and of nations, asked, in his journal, the *National Advocate*, "Why are we not at war with Spain? Whilst the republican patriots of Spanish America are struggling with their tyrants, those tyrants

are committing hostilities against the United States in every possible form, and under every circumstance of aggravation; their flag received with honor in our ports, ours treated with indignity in theirs. Whilst their subjects are received in this country with hospitality, our citizens are loaded with chains and plunged in dungeons in their colonies. The indemnities for spoliations long since acknowledged to be due and liquidated, are still withheld. The savages receive the arms and ammunitions with which they slaughter our frontier settlers, from the Governor of Pensacola. The President has repeatedly recommended the occupation of the Floridas, which would have effectually secured us against the commission of those horrors; but the Senate have as often rejected this proposition, and the inhabitants of the Mississippi territory are now reaping the bitter fruits of the factious temper of those who distract and disgrace that once august body. No honorable or safe alternative remains, but an open, manly declaration of war against the countries in possession of the royalists of Spain.

"This measure would invigorate and render effectual the war against Great Britain. The neutrality of Spain is advantageous only to our enemy. Her courts of admiralty disregard the Spanish veil, which our merchants attempt to draw over their property; whilst our courts, from a scrupulous regard to neutral rights, restore almost everything claimed by Spaniards. A declaration of war against them would uncover a vast mass of British property, and insure to our cruisers a golden harvest; whilst it would deprive the British of the supplies they now draw from this country under the Spanish flag.

"The vast regions of Spanish America would open a boundless field for the enterprise of our young countrymen who aspire to fortune and to fame. The banners of republicanism invite them to flock thither. This sacred cause demands the sympathy of every free people. Our aid and interference would be decisive, and insure the eternal separation of the New from the Old World; an event which sound policy demands that we should hasten by every means in our power. The Spanish royalists are, in fact, at war with us, and none of the sacrifices we now make would be enhanced by a war against them. On the contrary, the pressure of the war with Great Britain would be alleviated by it. They are mere tools in her hands, and as such ought to be treated. An animating prospect of glory and of gain would open upon us, in such a contest. In the veins of the republicans of Spanish America flows the mingled blood of the Mexicans and Castilians. They are worthy of our friendship; whilst the rest are the refuse and scum of old Spain—the ostensible deputies of tyrants exercising their usurped authority in the name of a

prince, who is a prisoner in France, but the real viceroy of England, from whom they receive their orders, and whose mandates they obey."

The south of North America, and South America, were shaken with those political tempests, which, in Spanish colonies uprooting European, have since done little more than plant American misgovernment; while the wonderful tranquillity and prosperity of Texas finally become one of the United States, seems to prove that the Saxon is more capable than the Moorish race of self-government.

On the 6th November, 1813, the American Executive, by a semi-official publication in the *National Intelligencer*, declared those American principles respecting Texas and Mexico, which have been since always observed.

"The revolution in Mexico, to which our attention has been recently more particularly drawn, by the notorious fact that many of our citizens had unlawfully embarked in it, appears to be at last arrested in its progress, by the recent defeat of the forces of those who called themselves the republicans or patriots, and whose avowed and no doubt real object was to subvert the existing regal government, and substitute therefor a government of kindred nature with that which prevails in these states. The strife is probably not terminated; because, without a real head to the government it is impossible that a monarchical sway, very nearly allied to despotism, can long prevail, in a country in the immediate vicinity of a nation of freemen, with which it must daily and hourly have a more free and generous intercourse.

"The part which our government has pursued in regard to the intestine commotions in the territory in question, has been such as harmonized with that integrity of character it has never failed to maintain. Solicited to take part in the war, it has mildly but positively refused its interference in the broil, and avowed and maintained a perfect neutrality between these minor belligerents. It has spoken to them this language:—We can only know in a foreign territory its constituted authorities. So long as the royalists hold the reins of government, we are bound, provided they deal justly by us, to recognize their authority. Our ideas of government, our prejudice in favor of republican principles, our desire that they shall diffuse themselves throughout the world, cannot alter the fact that the royalist party are at present the legal sovereigns of the country, and as such we shall respect them. On the other hand, to the representatives of the republican party who sought our aid, our government have no doubt expressed their perfect readiness to recognize them, should they obtain possession of the government, and become

by the consent of the people its governors; at the same time declaring its indisposition to afford them aid or support. Such, we believe, has been the conduct of our government, which we believe no good citizen can condemn. It has been fair, honorable, and consistent with our relations to both parties."

Revived like *Antæus* from the catastrophe of his mad winter invasion of Russia, the Emperor of the French with armies sprung as the men of *Cadmus* also from the earth, at first discomfited and disheartened once more his desperate enemies, led by *Bernadotte* and *Moreau*: and the delusive armistice of *Prague* preluded his destruction. Twice was his great genius blind to American views which might have saved him: first, when he permitted a scientific board to reject *Fulton's* steam navigation, and again when he failed to perceive that a French squadron sweeping the American coast would have relieved his French, Dutch, and Italian ports from English blockade, and peradventure turned the ebbing tide of fortune in his favor. Amazed by unlocked-for and incredible naval victories of the Americans over the English, who had so easily and utterly demolished the marines of France, of Holland, and of Spain, Napoleon, awaking too late from his fatal negligence of American hostility to Great Britain, important, even vital as it might have been rendered to prevent his own downfall, in the midst of overwhelming military occupations, political negotiations, personal and dynastic anxieties at *Dresden*, found time to write, on the 7th August, 1813, an official letter to his long tried minister of Marine, *Decrès*, *Joseph Bonaparte's* nephew by marriage, directing him to have frigates built like the Americans. That part of a long letter full of naval details is as follows:—"You will receive a decree, by which I order the building at *Toulon*, at *Rochefort*, and at *Cherbourg*, of a frigate of American construction. I am certain that the English have had built a considerable number of frigates on that model. They go better, and they adopt them; we must not be behindhand. Those which you will have built at *Toulon*, at *Rochefort*, and at *Cherbourg*, will manœuvre in the roads, and give us to understand what to think of the model." Such an order a year sooner, and the frigates sent to manœuvre on the American coasts instead of in French roadsteads, might have kept Napoleon on the throne, even though every one of the French frigates built on the American model had been captured by the English enemy of France and the United States. His wish was, that the Congress of *Prague* should be composed of ministers from the United States, as well as France, Denmark, and other states, if any, not combined against him, together with those from Russia, Prussia, England, and the rest



of Europe confederated for his overthrow: tardy, and as it were, posthumous atonement for his misappreciation of the American war. Madison's administration, protesting with truth, and publishing in the *National Intelligencer*, that neither in Napoleon's prosperity nor tribulation, had it any connection with the monarch called by the English the French Ruler; yet we hoped that European peace, the sequel of his triumphs, would check the aggrandizement of Great Britain, put an end to all pretext for impressment, and with it, American war, on the basis of that maritime freedom which all the European maritime states, like the United States, desire. The opponents of Madison's administration, particularly Governor Strong, in his next speech to the Legislature of Massachusetts, January 1814, seized on the collusion implied from Napoleon's hope of American incidental naval aid to his territorial warfare, to renew the Anglo-American mistake of French influence in America, when it was American influence in France. Instead of Madison asking, he rejected the help of Napoleon; while Napoleon, at first disregarding, at last sought that of the United States, hoping by European maritime sympathies for a transatlantic marine to counterpoise English power in the wars, Congresses and negotiations of that continent.

Absorbed by stupendous exertions, and intoxicated by prodigious successes, following twenty years of continued reverses, during the twelve months after the peace conquered at Paris the 31st March, 1814, Great Britain had neither time nor temper in 1813 to ponder the perils and count the cost of her second war with America, fruitful of more debt and disaster to her, of greater powers and freer principles to the American Republic. Never in the proud annals of Plantagenet, Tudor, or Stuart kings, did monarch of that glorious empire in such state and exultation meet Parliament as the Prince Regent on the 22d July, 1813. His corpulent, unwieldy and unmartial person was tight-bound in regimentals, on the throne in the House of Lords, as though any other than a military garb would be unfit for the crisis of universal soldiery. Surrounded by Saxon nobles and Norman gentry, despising the dull German dynasty they upheld, and the ambassadors of Russia, Spain, and Portugal, the Speaker of the House of Commons reiterated to his master Canning's vow, that "we must put forth, in our contest with America, the whole strength of Great Britain to maintain, with our ancient superiority on the ocean, those maritime rights which we have resolved never to surrender. We have furnished our supplies with a large and liberal aid to enable your royal highness to take all such measures as the emergencies of public affairs may require." With all humility, said the official

report, they entreated his majesty's royal assent to a bill to enable him to raise five millions of pounds sterling. After condescending to assent, the Prince Regent replied, merely and coldly regretting the continuance of the war with the United States of America, briefly and disdainfully adding his desire to re-establish friendly relations; "but I cannot consent to purchase the restoration of peace by any sacrifice of the maritime rights of the British empire." During these menacing vows of British hostility, Lord Liverpool, bearing the sword of state before the Regent, pledged the realm to interminable war, to retrieve the ancient superiority of Great Britain on the ocean, which, after monarch, peers and commons resolved never to surrender, next year they, nevertheless, wholly surrendered; and, as the British press deplored, with the stripes of ignominy still smarting on their backs. On the 4th November, 1813, the Prince Regent again addressed Parliament when it reassembled. Repeating the common English misrepresentation that, "England was not the aggressor in the war, I have not hitherto," said the Regent, "seen any disposition on the part of the government of the United States to close it, of which I could avail myself with due attention to the interests of his majesty's subjects," adding, in order rather to conciliate Russia than America, "I am at all times ready to enter into discussion with that government for a conciliatory adjustment of the differences between the two countries upon principles of perfect reciprocity, not inconsistent with the established maxims of public law, and with the maritime rights of the British empire."

On the same day that the Regent delivered that speech to Parliament, Lord Castlereagh wrote to Mr. Monroe his letter of the 4th November, 1813, enclosing Lord Cathcart's of September the first, from Toplitz to Count Nesselrode, declining the Russian mediation. By the suggestion of a direct application for peace, without mediation, the British government had then, therefore, no idea of conceding, modifying, or mitigating what were called the maritime rights of Great Britain, but of merely granting peace to American solicitation on relinquishment of resistance to impressment of naturalized Americans born British subject; while, pending negotiation, the ancient superiority of Great Britain on the ocean was to be re-established by naval triumphs.

Such was the issue of 1813; a question of naval superiority, made by England, to be decided against her, in almost every encounter, at sea and on the lakes, by squadrons, frigates and sloops of war, privateers, and the numbers of prizes, by inefficiency of her blockades to prevent the egress and return of American military and commercial vessels; in a word, by every test of



maritime superiority, except in numbers of ships of war.

About that time it was that hostile enterprises against Baltimore, Washington, and New Orleans began to be indicated from the British press. As early as the 17th June, 1813, a ministerial journal, the *London Courier*, stated: "There are arguments in our colonial journals tending to prove that there exists a necessity for our government's taking possession of the province of New Orleans. We extract the following observations on that subject:—If Great Britain will only take New Orleans, she will divide the States. By shutting that outlet to the fruits of Western industry, she will make herself known and respected by those States, in spite of the power of the rest of the Union. If, in the war of 1755, France had been as superior at sea as Britain then was, we should never have heard of the United States of America. The back country would have been as well settled before this with Frenchmen, as it now is with the descendants of Britons. We ought at present to take the benefit of former lessons, and make those people our friends when so much is in our power. Take New Orleans, which is at the threshold of our West India islands, and which could furnish them with provisions at half the price they have been accustomed to pay. By such conduct, firm allies would be created on the continent, our West India planters would be gratified, and the integrity of the Spanish dominions in America guaranteed from traitorous insults." And the *London Globe* of the 18th October, 1813, detailing Admiral Warren's movements in the Chesapeake, stated that "great alarm for Baltimore existed, and troops destined for Canada had been recalled. The alarm at one time reached Washington, within 70 miles of which city our parties had approached, and occasioned much temporary bustle, and the packing up of the papers at the public offices, in case removal had been rendered necessary:" statements of uneasiness which never disturbed our government till too late.

While North America, from the Bay of Fundy to the southern borders of Mexico, was agitated with hostilities, and the elements of a western hemisphere, political, military, judicial, and altogether agitated to their foundations, European warfare broke out afresh with unexampled ubiquity and intensity, and everywhere, from the Tagus to the Catagat, marvellous English success. Liberty and credit, servitude and despair, leagued Europe under British lead against her conqueror, armed with conscription, coin, and reluctant allies. On the 3d March, 1813, Great Britain purchased the alliance of Sweden, defensive and offensive, by a treaty negotiated at Stockholm by Edward Thornton, who had been Robert Lis-

ton, the British minister's, secretary of legation in the United States. For an army of thirty thousand Swedes, led by Bernadotte, the monarchs of Europe combined to dethrone the lawful heir of the Swedish crown, and violate the revered, if not rational principle of legitimacy, by putting in his place a French adventurer, once appointed Governor of Louisiana by the self-made Corsican Emperor of the French. Denmark, immensely tempted and urged by both parties to the conflict, alone stood aloof. When the United States were resisting by war the English dogma of perpetual allegiance, in violation of it another French soldier of fortune, Moreau, was brought from America to carry arms against his countrymen. Necessity overruled the rules of legitimacy and allegiance, when, except Denmark, every nation of Europe was enlisted against an individual Dictator, stipendiaries of irredeemable English expenditures, and still more desperate profusion of perfidious royal promises of freedom, finally enforced by tremendous popular convulsions, revolutionizing nearly all Europe.

At a public meeting in London the 22d April, 1813, to promote the independence of Germany, the Prince Regent's royal brother, in the fulness of joyful anticipation, confessed a precious truth. The most democratic in his professions of George the Third's thirteen adult children, the Duke of Sussex, remarkable, after the American war, for hospitalities to Americans and liberality of politics, for which George the Fourth, apostate from such opinions, banished his brother from court, told the assembled multitude in a speech that Austria and Prussia, with the other German principalities, leagued against republican France, had combined to quell the insolence of French democracy by the complete dismemberment and annihilation of the French regicide nation. Such exterminating warfare, eventually, as war begat war, and British triumphs emboldened further hostilities, a war of politics was waged by English monarchy against American republicanism, with pretensions and calculations as atrocious and preposterous as those avowed by the Duke of Sussex against France. In 1814, down with democracy was a watchword for the British armies and navies devastating America. In 1813, war no longer commercial, but, by repeal of the Orders in Council, exclusively naval, the American flag bore no impressment, and that of Great Britain naval dominion. Re-colonization, punishment, overthrow of republican principles, the vindictive resolve of 1814, were brought on by conflict for the recovery of naval supremacy in 1813; while endeavor to sunder the States was a perennial British hope encouraging all their warfare. The New England States, in 1812 and '13, not blockaded like the rest from that vain hope,

before the undeviating course of American naval victories set in, adding squadrons to single combat, and privateers to frigates, while consternation convulsed England for the easy capture of the first two, American war and union and nationality were vouchsafed by a navy neglected here and despised there. For a moment relieved by the misfortune of the Chesapeake, joy for that gleam betrayed, in Bell's Weekly Messenger of the 6th September, 1813, the belief, that "In addition to that gratifying intelligence the Eastern States of America have, in the most unanimous manner, expressed their determination of seceding from their allegiance, unless the government makes peace with England."

Before the Chesapeake's capture the most brilliant statesman of Great Britain invoked from Parliament interminable war for naval supremacy, the issue of 1813. To subdue the navy was first undertaken, to conquer the country the attempt that followed—the country of democratic institutions. In a speech on the 18th February, 1813, authenticated, as his biographer published, by the orator's own careful revisal, Canning raised his potential voice in Parliament for war, till victory redeemed the stricken flag of England. "I am afraid," said he, with elaborate sarcasm, "that neither the hardy valor, the ardent patriotism, and the lofty magnanimity of ancient Greece and Rome, nor the gentle manners and artificial refinement of Genoa and Florence are to be traced in the hard features of transatlantic democracy. The heartless and selfish policy pursued by the Americans, &c. The loss of those two fine ships of war, the Guerrier and Macedonian, produced a sensation in this country scarcely to be equalled by the most violent convulsion of nature. I do not attribute the slightest blame to our gallant sailors. They always do their duty. But neither can I agree with those who complain of the shock of consternation throughout Great Britain as having been greater than the occasion justified. Who would represent the loss as insignificant, and the feelings of shame and indignation excited by it as exaggerated and extravagant? That indignation was a wholesome feeling, which ought to be cherished and maintained. It cannot be too deeply felt, that the sacred spell of the invincibility of the British navy was broken by those unfortunate captures; and however we must all wish the war to terminate, I hope I shall not be considered as sanguinary and unfeeling when I express my devout wish that it may not be concluded before we have re-established the character of our naval superiority, and smothered in victories the disasters which we have now to lament, and to which we are so little habituated."

Brightest star of the rotten borough orb, which shed select influences on the Commons House, and elected him by a con-

stituency of thirty-six votes; man of letters, wit, poet, epigrammatist, elegant upstart, if born of Sheridan and an actress, both father and son from humble origin rising to fashionable, literary and political distinction, practically refuted the dogma of high life, which they flattered, that manners depend on birth, wealth, or other aristocratic tuition. Canning's contempt for the vulgar American democracy, as for the fir-built frigates with bits of bunting at their mast-heads, was soon turned into respect so profound as to invoke interminable war, to recover from the convulsion and consternation caused by their first two victories, *bellum inexplicabile*, which the least blood-thirsty Briton should prefer to peace, till war smothered those fatal reverses in British naval triumphs. In desperate devotion to the shivered spell of naval superiority, the future premier proclaimed perpetual conflict, which only multiplied American victories. In 1813, war for the naval palm brought on, in 1814, an issue of politics. American resistance to impressment in peace compelled republican, assaulted by monarchical government, to put the still greater issue before the world, of American democracy against British aristocracy. In 1813, peace by Russian mediation, European negotiation, or any other than belligerent means, became, fortunately for the United States, their disappointed expectation. No terms were to be had from the justice of Great Britain; whose fears and injuries were the only American hope. Common as our mistake is, to suppose that mighty empire, unlike all other nations, incapable of yielding, it is, nevertheless, the pleasant task of this volume to prove, undeniably, that when American fear of war and hope of peace gave place to disciplined hostilities, and a republican people put forth their energies, American trophies were the rich spoils of every encounter, save one, not unuseful, however disgraceful disaster: and left this country ready for another campaign, to sweep every British vestige from the American continent; when the greatest maritime empire in the world, from vast vindictive and monstrous hostilities, with corresponding enormity of terms of peace, fell suddenly and inexplicably, unless caused by American hostilities, to reasonable concessions, fortunately, perhaps, without an inch of ground on either side surrendered, but with more than all the objects of the American government realized by lasting peace. Fortune, no doubt, had its always great influence; and other than belligerent operations contributed to reconcile, it may be said reduce, Great Britain to terms. Manufactures, the income tax, European maritime sympathies with this country, were not without effect. Still it was war that made peace; and when war with America had become much more formidable than it ever was before to England.



## CHAPTER II.

MEETING OF CONGRESS—EMBARGO—TRADE WITH THE ENEMY—LICENSE TRADE—BATTLE IN BOSTON HARBOR—BRITISH CONSUL'S ARREST—BRITISH CONSULS IN THE UNITED STATES—ANDREW ALLEN—ADMIRAL COCKBURN'S COMPLAINT OF THE LICENSE TRADE—LORD CASTLEREAGH'S LETTER THEREUPON TO MR. ALLEN—COUNT STUARTON—SWISS INFORMER—PREVOST'S SECRET INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH AGENTS IN THE UNITED STATES—GRAHAM'S SECRET MISSION TO MASSACHUSETTS—SWISS INFORMER'S SECRET LETTERS—FOSTER AND BAKER DETECTED WITH LICENSES—PRESIDENT URGES, AND CONGRESS ENACTS EMBARGO—INEFFECTUAL—BRITISH GOVERNMENT BILLS—BLUE LIGHTS—HIRAM THAYER—JOHN LEWIS—JOSEPH WARBURTON—ARRIVAL OF THE BRAMBLE—REFUSAL BY ENGLAND OF RUSSIAN MEDIATION—MR. CLAY AND JONATHAN RUSSELL ADDED TO THE PEACE COMMISSION—LANGDON CHEVES ELECTED SPEAKER—PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS—WAR ACTS—ARMY—NAVY—TREASURY—WEBSTER—FORSYTH—CALHOUN—EMBARGO REPEALED AND CONDEMNED—SAMUEL A. OTIS—OPPOSITION—SUPPLIES—MASON'S RESOLUTIONS—GORE'S RESOLUTIONS—UNEXECUTED PROPOSALS IN CONGRESS.

THE second session of the War Congress began December 6th, 1813, in bad temper, and with disappointed expectations. Harrison had only recovered in 1813, at best, by Indian rather than English defeat, part of what Hull lost in 1812; and Jackson's victories over Indians by no means made amends for the total failure of the great enterprise against English antagonists in Canada. Perry's victory was our only great consolation; conquest of Canada less probable than ever; and that, the great American undertaking, whose failure was the principal argument of the peace party against the administration and offensive war. Great Britain rejected the Russian mediation, enforced retaliation, resolved on severe hostilities with nearly all the world, her allies. Spain almost joined her in furnishing forts and posts in Florida for English succor to the Creeks. One of Porter's prizes was peremptorily ordered by the Portuguese government of Brazil instantly to leave the harbor of Rio Janeiro. Throughout Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, the United States were without an ally or sympathy, while England had them everywhere, was ostensibly rich as we were apparently poor, with the tide of fortune running strong in her favor and against us in both hemispheres. The President's message, the 7th December, 1813, under these circumstances, could only regret the failure of the Russian mediation, denounce yet threaten murderous retaliation, confess that there was no prospect of peace, and war the only alternative, argue some of its resilient advantages, and tell Congress that the nation, proud of its rights, was conscious of its strength to support them. So, indeed, the nation proved; more conscious of strength when Congress declared war than the Executive failing to begin it vigorously, or than Congress when it failed to support the Executive striving to end it well. For

at different stages of the struggle, the various branches of government faltered, both executive and legislative, but the people never; either in submission to taxation and privation, or to bear arms bravely when duly marshaled. The Senate, sometimes more energetic, but always less harmonious or united, was more intractable than the House of Representatives. Five or six Senators of the war party opposed the administration: among them, William B. Giles, of Virginia, who, besides votes and speeches in Senate, attacked the President by long publications against the nominations of Albert Gallatin and Jonathan Russell, involving disputed rights and duties of the President and Senate. Party violence in the capitol and throughout the country kept pace with hostilities; though party violence and estrangements in the United States are never so implacable as in Great Britain.

The President was bent on the embargo, for which the Senate had rejected a bill passed by the House at the close of the prior session. Though it proved of little avail, and was soon revoked, yet the fraudulent and illegal, if not treasonable, commercial intercourse between parts of New England and the British possessions was extremely injurious, and provoked, if it did not justify, that last spasm of the expiring restrictive system. The twelfth Congress, on the 6th July, 1812, soon after declaring war, enacted some inadequate provisions, and the common law of nations, marine and international, as judicially enforced, was strong against trade by enemies' licenses. But people so much akin and alike as Americans and Britons, so disaffected and enterprising as the descendants of the pilgrims, required unusual restraints to prevent their consorting and trafficking together. As soon as war was known in England, on the 9th November, 1812, a British order in



council established a system of surreptitious dealing by license, contrary to international law; and, moreover, aggravated by distinguishing the Eastern from the other States. "Whatever importations are proposed to be made under the order from the United States of America should be by your licenses, (was the instruction of the Lords in Council,) confined to the ports in the Eastern States exclusively, unless you have reason to suppose that the object of the order would not be fulfilled if licenses are not granted for the importation from the other parts of the United States." The British government thus actually established a commercial alliance with the discontented, restricted, and rapacious of the East, countenanced by some of their State governments, judiciary, merchants, bar, church, and partisans. Without waiting for any order in council, their consular and other agents in the United States arranged similar contrivances here as soon as war was declared. The Act of Congress of the 6th July, 1812, imperfectly prohibitory of licenses, was hardly public before Andrew Allen, the English consul at Boston, on the 18th of that month addressed a letter to the British naval commander-in-chief on the American station, Vice Admiral Herbert Sawyer, at Halifax, proposing the machinery of licensed trade to supply the enemy and his allies with provisions, carried by American vessels wherever wanted. On the 5th August, 1812, the admiral officially answered the consul, approving the device, which he put in use the 4th of that month. Profitable as the sale of such indulgences was to themselves, tempting to American avarice and disloyalty, and extremely injurious to this country, a more effectual method could hardly be devised for relieving, clandestinely, the unworthy from the burdens of war, enriching them, proscribing the innocent, unconscious community, and prolonging war indefinitely. British America and the West Indies, particularly Halifax and Bermuda, the allied armies in Spain and Portugal succored, and the enemy's cause everywhere aided and promoted, the Swedish and Spanish flags, as neutral covers for vessels owned and manned by Americans, were prostituted for similar operations. Hundreds of American citizens frequented Halifax with supplies, smuggling back European and Asiatic goods in return. Seventeen thousand barrels of American flour were said to be landed there in one day. Many Americans were employed in driving cattle for food across the lines separating Vermont and New York from Canada. The numbers, artifices, audacity, and it may be added, respectability of persons engaged in these forbidden ways to wealth, by land and sea, were incredible. The Federal District Court, at Rutland, Vermont, in October, 1813, had

no less than forty-three cases of such misdemeanors for trial, involving importations of goods and export of provisions, which our armies on the frontier found it impossible to prevent and hazardous to interrupt, for the parties implicated would harass them with suits in State courts, to be tried by jurors often interested in the proceedings. A sheriff's officer in New Hampshire detected a letter, dated August 16th, 1813, from Stephen Wilson, Thomas Carlisle, Benjamin Boardman, William Lovejoy, and Thomas Eames, respectable citizens there, to Josiah Sawyer, of Eaton, Lower Canada, interceding for Curtis Coo, of Barnstead, New Hampshire, who was arrested and imprisoned as a spy at Three Rivers, in Canada. "From our acquaintance with Mr. Coo," said the letter, "his character and politics, we are confident that his object is far from being unfriendly to the motives which induced your government in repelling the attacks made on you by our Executive. His politics have uniformly been what we style staunch federalism, and his object, we believe, no other than trafficking with your citizens in defiance of some of our laws. His language and conduct with us have uniformly belied even the semblance of an enemy to your government, or any of your usages in repelling the measures which our Executive has tried to enforce." John and Ebenezer Hussey were committed for trial, after examination by Judge Story; against whom it was in proof, that they drove cattle down to the beach, at Princeton, for the enemy's ship of the line, the *Majestic*, lying off the coast; from on board of which vessel a lieutenant went ashore with a boat to bring back the cattle, who had a conversation on the beach with the Husseys.

Illicit trade, like illicit love, or Spartan theft, is seldom deemed criminal or disreputable unless detected. And not only illicit but treasonable trade was an inveterate offence of New England; whose inhabitants, according to an English traveller's account of them, in the war of 1756, traded with their French enemies as their descendants in 1813 did with English. "Not scrupulous," said this authority, "in taking liberties detrimental to other provinces, but even to the nation, especially in times of war, by carrying on an illicit trade with the enemy, and supplying them with the most material articles. This they have repeatedly done with impunity, to my certain knowledge, in the course of the late war, when many scores of vessels went loaded with beef, pork, flour, &c., under the pretext of flags, which, for a certain consideration, could at any time be procured from their governor; when, at the same time, perhaps, they carried not more than one or two French prisoners, dividing the crew of one French merchantman they

had taken among a whole fleet of flags of truce, laden with articles more welcome to the enemy than all the prisoners, with the ship and cargo they took from them." Such were the ties of national intimacy between Americans and English—associations of blood, habit, and business—that it was extremely difficult to make them comprehend that they were traitors if they dealt together. The press teemed with printed copies of letters and other papers captured on board British vessels, betraying that natural incredulity by glaring proof. The Yankee privateer captured a letter, dated Morley, England, 3d August, 1813, from Joseph Asqueth for Joseph Dixon to James Webster, Quebec, explaining how goods were clandestinely taken from Canada to Albany, New York, and Philadelphia, and mentioning as their recipients many notable merchants. Among these letters, exposed to public animadversion, was one, dated Sheffield, 8 mo., 3d, 1813, from William Hodgson & Co., to Henry Cox, Quebec, of which the Quaker phraseology was in ludicrous contrast with the unscrupulous design. "If thou does attempt to get any goods into the country thou alludes to in thy No. 3, it will require great care and caution on thy part, and thou must be sure to act safely or not at all." During the winter of 1813-14, our advices were, that, among other preparations made in Canada, with exemplary industry and effect, for the next summer's campaign, one hundred pieces of ordnance were drawn by four hundred oxen from Montreal to Kingston, attended by the men who smuggled them from Vermont and New Hampshire into Canada; for which, and driving them to Kingston, they were paid four hundred dollars a-piece.

The revenue laws of the United States were continually frustrated by legal proceedings in, and often of the States. James Fisk stated, in the House of Representatives, that he knew one instance where fifty-six writs were served on one collector in the same week; and unless prevented by Act of Congress, the State courts might and would levy on property seized for taxes due to the United States.

The license trade was extensively prosecuted with an open disregard of even the appearance of American allegiance, till Judge Story put a stop to it on his, the most extensive maritime circuit, and in the most disaffected region of country, by virtue of common Admiralty law and national jurisprudence, independent of any act of Congress. On the 31st December, 1812, the frigate Chesapeake, Captain Evans, captured a licensed vessel called the Julia, on her return to Boston with a cargo of salt, after having gone to Lisbon from Baltimore, with provisions, altogether documented as American property. After her

capture the license was stolen from the prize-master, who had taken a copy of it however, being a permit signed and sealed the 4th August, on board his majesty's ship Centurion, at Halifax, by Vice Admiral Sawyer, stating, that "whereas Mr. Andrew Allen, his majesty's consul at Boston, has recommended to me Mr. Robert Ewell, a merchant of that place, well inclined toward the British interest, who is desirous of sending provisions to Spain and Portugal for the use of the allied armies; and it has been deemed expedient by his majesty's government, notwithstanding the hostilities between Great Britain and the United States, that every degree of encouragement and protection should be given to American vessels laden with flour, bound to Spain and Portugal;" on which document Judge Story, by a luminous judgment in May, 1813, decreed a condemnation of vessel and cargo to the captors, which was confirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, and became the established prize law. On the 2d August, 1813, the English vice admiralty judge at Halifax, Dr. Croke, gave judgment by an elaborate decree, that license granted by Lord Sidmouth as British Secretary of State, the 11th September, 1812, protected from capture for breach of blockade, an American vessel called the Orion, with a cargo of flour and corn, which sailed from New York for Lisbon the 15th May, 1813. The object of these licenses, said the judge, was for the benefit of the British military service. The armies employed in the cause of liberty were starving in Spain. It was necessary to have recourse to the United States as long as these necessities existed; and in hardy confession of the politics of British admiralty law, he added in conclusion, that if dissatisfied with his decree, the parties could apply to a superior tribunal where the instructions and object of his majesty's government are known *à priori*.

The license trade, thus condemned by American and upheld by British courts as a mere political contrivance managed by the ministry, while Dr. Croke was pronouncing his time-serving decree at Halifax, on the 2d August 1813, was exposed to general odium by a tumultuous and characteristic fermentation at Boston. The brig Despatch, owned by Cornelius Coolidge and Francis J. Oliver of that place, arriving under a British license from Cadiz, was captured within the lighthouse by a couple of petty privateers, the Castigator of Salem, mounting one six pound cannon, with a crew of nineteen men, and the Fame, mounting two four-pounders, and manned by eighteen men, as the law was then settled that licenses were illegal. Still the owners of the Despatch forthwith armed two boats with twenty-two men each, and sent them to recapture their vessel. As the



boats approached for that purpose, the privateers supplied the prize-master on board the *Despatch* with arms, several times hailed the boats, ordered them to keep off, and fired at them. Without returning the fire, the boats ran along side the *Despatch*, boarded, and carried her in spite of her fire. Fortunately, no blood was spilt in the ridiculous encounter, of which the tidings at Boston produced great and opposite sensation. The officer commanding Fort Independence took possession of all the vessels, delivered the *Despatch* to the Collector, and enlarged her captors. The owners of the *Despatch*, with some of the armed men equipped by them in the two boats, were arrested for breach of law; the *Despatch* was condemned to the captors, and the riotous conflict was not without influence in converting public sentiment to the aid of law and order, the former long, the latter on that occasion egregiously set at naught by those who supplied the enemy with food under his illegal licenses.

At length, after more than twelve months' endurance of the vicious system, soon after the indecent conflict near Boston harbor, the chief Anglo-American author of trade by licenses, a rallying point of British influence in Boston, the ex-British consul there Mr. Andrew Allen, was arrested and expelled under prosecution for that misdemeanor as imperfectly prohibited by the Act of July 1812. A license countersigned by him as issued by Admiral Sawyer, was put in evidence before the judge, and as Mr. Allen would not acknowledge his handwriting, his signature was proved by Mr. Thomas H. Perkins. The District Judge, Davis, after hearing the District Attorney George Blake, for the prosecution, and Mr. Otis and Mr. Wm. Sullivan, for the accused, ordered him to enter into recognizance in \$1000 for his appearance and trial at the next Circuit Court. When called to appear in court the 25th October 1813, for trial, Mr. Allen made default, leaving his recognizance and Massachusetts behind, while he went to Canada in a single horse wagon, and embarking at Quebec in the *Douro* frigate, sailed to England. In February, 1815, the gentleman who proved his handwriting, Mr. Thomas H. Perkins, and the consul's legal advisers, Harrison Gray Otis and William Sullivan, were appointed by Governor Strong, envoys to Washington, pursuant to resolution of the Legislature of Massachusetts, bearers of the behests of the Hartford Convention.

Between the peace of 1783 and war of 1812, England, without proper delicacy, stationed as consuls in the United States, several Tories of the revolution or their sons, loyalists extreme in English reverence and American aversion, of whom the consul at Boston, Mr. Andrew Allen, was a superior type of what many, if not most, Americans

admired as the model of English gentlemen. To English invidious detestation of whatever is foreign, some of the insular greatness of England may be ascribed. American either dislike or reverence, of what is English perverts, or benumbs nationality; though complete American independence is rare in seaports, where Englishmen like Mr. Allen enjoyed great social influence, and constantly sought for political, in the long-cherished English hope of re-colonization, for which disunion of the States was inculcated. Of all the agents for such purposes, none was better qualified than the consul at Boston. Stationed there in 1805, when English vexations of American commerce began, domesticated there in 1809, when Governors of Nova Scotia and Canada, with the sanction of the British ministry, sent John Henry and other clandestine emissaries, to attempt disunion by operations at Boston, and remaining there by direction of the British government after war was declared, and his consular functions legally ceased, Mr. Allen, by the license trade and other means, was the minister of a commercial alliance between persons, if not portions, of the United States and England, in spite of war and in defiance of the American government. Of superior education and attainments, in the prime of life, of handsome appearance and prepossessing manners, with inbred Anglo-American contempt for republican institutions, and transcendental love of English government, much admired as an English gentleman of American birth, he could not but delight in the duty to restore such parts of the United States as could be convinced of their revolutionary error, to the inestimable advantages of British allegiance, and of being saved by it from the infidel and fatal effects of French influence, which, through the instrumentality of Jefferson and Madison, were consummated by a war commanded by Bonaparte.

Well salaried, maintained, and established to propagate these sentiments, a universal favorite among the malcontent mercantile aristocracy of Boston, five hundred miles removed from the counteracting influences of the seat of national government, Mr. Allen effectually represented Great Britain among those soured by Jefferson's superseding Adams in the presidency, alarmed by the incalculable increase of Southwestern power, by the annexation of Louisiana, impoverished by the decline of business and of property, which followed the restrictive system, and excited to delirious disaffection by a declaration of war, resolved at all events on some change of rulers, policy, and government. In political council and social intimacy with that restless disaffection, Mr. Allen's vice-royalty was established at Boston.

Born in Pennsylvania, of one of the lead-



ing families of that leading colony, when Philadelphia, where they resided, was the North American metropolis, overweeningly attached to a great mother country, the Boston consul's grandfather, William Allen, from humble labor, became a prosperous merchant, and maker of his own fortune. By royal authority created chief justice during the primitive colonial paucity of lawyers, he administered the inartificial justice with short pleadings, enjoined by Penn the founder, as the reformed code of his radical commonwealth. The merchant chief justice's son, Andrew, provincial attorney-general, was father of the consul, Andrew Allen the younger; connected by intermarriages with the Penns and Hamiltons, who gave provincial governors to Pennsylvania, and others of the provincial aristocracy as thoroughly English as they were racially recent; and after the Revolution connected also by marriage with Hammond, the first English minister commissioned from the Court of St. James to dazzle Philadelphia by European luxuries, and annoy our first administrations by impressment and sea-search.

Born from the bloody bowels of a revolution he had every reason to deplore and deery, taken to England for the first stages of his education, and after the peace returned to America to finish it, the future consul as a schoolboy made himself remarkable for combative English disdain of whatever was American. From his father, once much attached to his birth-place, the son inherited morbid intensity of English loyalty. Persecuted, banished, fugitive, attainted, his ample estates around Philadelphia confiscated, his name published in a catalogue of traitors, compelled to live pensioned and die repining in a foreign country which paid without respecting aliens to their own; the father ruminated that deadliest of melancholy hatred which victims, exasperated by proscription and forfeiture, contract for their nativity. Such was the inheritance of Andrew Allen, the English consul at Boston, naturally and immutably an English propagandist in America. For many years of that function established among the descendants of some of the sternest authors, and worst antagonists of the American Revolution, soured with their own national government, inured to eluding, opposing and condemning its laws of peace and of war, and remitted by that antagonism like reconciled lovers to English attachments. After his departure from America, Mr. Andrew Allen took orders for the church, and lived to witness the vast progress of the United States when two wars with Great Britain, redeemed transient distress by permanent prosperity.

The British ministry in London, by their order in council of September, 1812, licensed trade between enemies, contrary to

the first principle of war, not to mitigate, but plague it by avarice. Ontrun in the race of covetousness by their consul Allen at Boston in July of that year, in concert with Admiral Sawyer at Halifax, two of the most rapacious depredators next year in the American waters, Admiral Cockburn and Captain Barrie, by anticipation protested against loss of their share of plunder. Then stationed in Cadiz Bay, to watch the war movements in Spain, those freebooters, by an official correspondence, which came into possession of our government from an interloper in the confidence of Consul Allen, protested to the British Government against licenses allowed to prevent the harvest they anticipated of American prizes. On the 6th November, 1812, in that struggle, ministerial, consular and naval, for unlawful gain by fraud of war, Robert Barrie, captain of the ship *Grampus*, then in Cadiz Bay, wrote to Rear Admiral Cockburn, "When I detained the American brig *Lydia* on the first of that month, her master and supercargo both assured me that Mr. Allen, the vice consul at Boston, receives from the American owners one dollar per barrel of the entire cargo of each vessel which is furnished with his license. The terms of agreement are one-half the purchase-money paid Mr. Allen down when he delivers the license, the other half to be paid if the vessel arrives safe at her destined port. I should conceive myself wanting in duty if I concealed such information. I conceive our government should be acquainted with the fact. May I request that, before I proceed on my next cruise, you will furnish me with some instructions on the subject of Mr. Allen's papers, as they do not appear to me to be connected with the one hundred and eighty licenses left by Mr. Foster." On the same November 6th, 1812, Rear Admiral Cockburn, from on board his ship, the *Marlborough*, in Cadiz Bay, enclosed that letter of Captain Barrie to Vice Admiral Martin, in a letter from Cockburn, complaining that "a Mr. Allen, his majesty's vice consul at Boston, has entered into a nefarious agreement with owners of American vessels, for lending his official authority towards covering their property across the sea. As those licenses issued by Mr. Allen have certainly no relation to the one hundred and eighty referred to in Admiral Sawyer's letter to the admiralty of the 18th July last, I propose, till I receive your further directions on the subject, authorizing Captain Barrie and the other officers under my command to persist in not respecting them, and to continue to send to a British port, to be there treated as other Americans, the vessels they may fall in with holding these papers, which, by the accompanying statement, appear to have been granted by Mr.

Allen more with a view to his private interest than his public duty." On the same 6th November, 1812, Cockburn by letter to J. W. Croker, Esq., Admiralty, "thought it right to transmit, without loss of time, for their lordships' consideration, the copy of his letter enclosing Captain Barrie's, transmitted by him (Cockburn) to Vice Admiral Martin." These complaints produced a letter from Mr. Croker, dated Admiralty Office, 23d November, 1812, to W. Hamilton, Esq., asking, by command of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, Lord Castlereagh's opinion as soon as possible, relative to licenses issued by Mr. Allen, his majesty's consul at Boston, to American vessels. Accordingly, on the 25th November, 1813, from the Foreign Office, Lord Castlereagh's letter was expedited to Andrew Allen, Esq., his majesty's consul, Boston, transmitting him copies of all the before mentioned letters "with respect to licenses said to be issued by you without authority, and in a manner derogatory to the character of a person holding his majesty's commission, for the protection of American vessels loaded with corn for the Peninsula. I desire that you will lose no time in acquainting me with the circumstances relative to this transaction, and particularly whether the licenses alluded to are those which you were in a manner authorized to issue by Admiral Sawyer, and upon which you have already been instructed to desist from any further issue of the same, without immediate instructions from his majesty's principal Secretary of State to that effect." Signed by Castlereagh's neat and characteristic handwriting, too well known at the American Department of State, that rebuking missive, together with those producing it, all furtively taken from Mr. Allen's repository of such precious documents, near Boston, were sent to Mr. Monroe, exposing the ministerial, consular and naval shabby strife concerning unlawful gain by trade in war.

On the 14th October, 1813, a letter was confidentially presented to the Secretary of State, of which the following is copied from the original. To His Excellency the Honorable James Monroe, Secretary of State, &c. &c. &c.

"Sir—On the 12th March, 1663–4, and on the 29th June, 1674, Charles II., by letters patent under the great seal of England, gave and granted to his brother James, Duke of York, his heirs and assigns, all Mattewaks, now called Long Island, all Hudson's River, and all the lands from the west side of Connecticut River to the east side of Delaware Bay. These gifts and grants were confirmed in the treaty of peace between England and France at Breda, July 21st, 1667, and in London, February the 9th, 1674; and the Duke in

consequence sold part of them to Lord Barclay and Sir George Carteret. At his ascension to the throne in 1685, James II. continued to dispose of the remainder as his private property, totally unconnected with the domains of the crown. After his abdication in 1688, he and his heirs enjoyed in exile (with the exception of short interruption during 1746–7) the same power until the commencement of the American Revolution. Upon application then to the French monarch, the Duke of Albany in 1779 was assured that the American Republic had no intention to invade the rights of the house of Stuart; and when under the 7th March, 1784, a Philadelphia banker, Mr. Robert Morris, offered to purchase these rights of the Duke, Louis the Sixteenth by Cardinal de Bernis, his ambassador at Rome, desired him to decline this offer, giving him in lieu an annual pension of 200,000 livres, on condition that as long as this pension was regularly paid, his most Christian majesty and his heirs were to be considered as invested with all the right of the Duke and his heirs. This pension the Duke received until his death in January, 1789, and after him his brother, the late Cardinal York, until June, 1792.

"In the will of the Duke of Albany, dated Florence, August 30th, 1788, Count Stuarton is acknowledged next to Cardinal York his lawful heir, an acknowledgment confirmed by this Cardinal in his will, dated Rome, February 15th, 1789. Both these wills were by Cardinal de Bernis communicated to the King of France, who, on the 2d July, 1789, gave his royal assent to Count Stuarton's rights and claims, with a promise to confer on him the vacant title of Duke of Albany as soon as France had recovered her then lost tranquillity and order. All the original grants, assignments, letters, wills, contracts and other documents mentioned above, are in the possession of Count Stuarton, together with the papal bull of December 23d, 1792, declaring the legitimacy of his grandfather as son of James III., commonly called the Pretender, the only legitimate son of James the Second, King of England, with Agathe Therese Adelaide, Marchioness d'Epernaish de St. Luc; and the decree of Parliament at Paris, dated February 26th, 1733, confirming and registering the papal bull.

"The object of this letter is to solicit on the part of Count Stuarton his Excellency the President's permission for the transcription of such official correspondence or of such private notes of verbal conferences between the respective agents of the American and French governments which may have taken place concerning the claims of the royal Stuarts from 1776 to 1785. I have the honor to be respectfully, sir, your



Excellency's most obedient and humble servant." Dated Washington City, October 14th, 1813.

The name of the extraordinary, mysterious, and after extensive and expensive pursuit and search throughout Europe, Canada and the United States, the nevertheless undiscovered author of that and other remarkable letters which soon followed it, perhaps an assumed name, at all events immaterial to this account of him, is suppressed, because such seems from the papers to have been Mr. Monroe's understanding with that informer, or was his frequent and urgent insistence and condition of the information he betrayed. In one of those letters he called himself a Swiss, by the mother's side related to some of the first families of Europe, having bled by the side of Louis the Sixteenth on the 10th August, 1792; poor, but rather from choice than necessity, preferring an humble independence to any affluence a brilliant bondage can bestow; living near Worcester, Massachusetts, in total retirement, as he actually lived, during the three years preceding his visit to Washington in October, 1813; an elderly gentleman, of pleasing address, fascinating manners and superior information; a fugitive, he said, from the police and vengeance of Napoleon; his wife, a charming young English woman, born, she said, in Somersetshire near Bath; both intimate with Mr. Andrew Allen, the British consul at Boston, at one time relegated to Worcester, and with his respectable associates, the Perkins, Trumbulls, Parson Gardiner, and others of the best social standing thereabouts, whose attentions, hospitalities and presents to those attractive and secluded strangers, imparted consideration, and enabled them to master and betray, if so disposed, the plans and correspondence of the consul, and others dealing with him in illicit commerce by British licenses, or other contrivances, contrary to the law and welfare of this country. To this day it remains, and probably must forever be unknown, whether those accomplished foreigners were English spies, as was believed by many, or mere adventurers. Letters from the Swiss himself and copies of letters to him from persons of consequence, as he stated, in London, Paris, Prague, Frankfort and Stockholm, which he sent to Mr. Monroe, justified the impression that if an impostor he was no common one; and as such the medium, if of some fictions, also of much useful information. Secluded, as the American Government was, by hostile naval hindrance from early and accurate European intelligence, such European correspondence was valuable, and its American disclosures still more so. No pay was required. Information concerning the royal Stuart's private Ame-

rican property, to be obtained from the American diplomatic records, and a cartel for safe passage to Europe, with the allowance of a mere ordinary messenger, were all the requisitals asked for intelligence, none of it unimportant, some of it apparently momentous. With large European as well as American experience in all the bye-ways of government, Monroe, convinced by John Henry's disclosures that successive English ministries long machinated odious conspiracies against the American Union, before and during the war, wary as he was, yet inclined to credit the most alarming of these Swiss tales. Mr. Erskine and Mr. Foster, while English ministers in the United States, at different periods were both credibly reported to have said that New England would never fight against Great Britain. The Swiss soon sent a cypher, with the key to it, in which to veil his letters, stipulating that none of them should be seen but by the President and Mr. Monroe, and all burned when read; with anxiety declaring that the slightest suspicion reaching Mr. Allen of his correspondence with our government, would be fatal to his means of information.

A letter in cypher, dated November 4th, 1813, began "Chance and not confidence has placed the annexed parcel in my hands, and zeal, not interest, transmits it to the American Government," enclosing five sheets endorsed by Mr. Monroe. "Sir George Prevost's instructions to British agents in the United States, 1812," divided into thirty-six heads, viz: "To ascertain in each of the governments of the United States whether any foreign influence prevails therein, and the name of the state, nation or country on behalf of which such influence appears. If possible, also find out the persons and channels whereby such influence is carried on, and by what means, whether by bribery and personal advantages held out, or by commercial and other national benefits proposed." "Ascertain what proportion the two contending parties in America, namely the federalists and democrats, bear to each other." "In what proportion the federalists incline towards the interests of Great Britain or France in the present war, and the proportion of democrats who espouse the cause of either party; whether the present election of President and Vice President has caused any disunion in either of the parties; what measures are most likely to be adopted by those unfriendly to Great Britain, and what by her friends, as most likely to promote her interests; in what proportion each State has suffered by the embargo; whether it is probable it will be resisted openly by any and which of the States; whether resistance to the embargo would lead to a separation of the United States; whether any party wishes it, or State, and



whether a separation is considered injurious to the country at large."—Together with many queries respecting the military, regular and militia, and the naval force of the United States, forts, arsenals, &c., are several concerning Spain and Portugal among them, "whether the change in the government of Spain has excited any and what apprehension in the American Government respecting the acquisition of Louisiana, and whether any increase of the naval or military force of America has taken place in that quarter in consequence of recent events." "To mark particularly whether the opinions of the President of the United States have undergone any and what alterations since the last meeting of Congress; whether he appears to waver from the measures which he so strenuously pursued, and still appears determined to pursue the same line of conduct; to ascertain what ideas are entertained as to the feasibility and mode of attacking Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and whether by sea or land; whether the inhabitants of those provinces have any partiality or attachment for the United States, to favor or assist them, or to separate from Great Britain and enter the confederacy of the United States."

Although those pragmatistical queries implicated no American state, or party, or person whatever, in collusion with sinister British designs against American welfare, yet odious and dangerous governmental contrivances against it by clandestine means, were the burden, tenor and aim of instructions, which could not have originated in Canada, but must have gone there from England, and, however unjustly, implied American infidelity. There was also remarkable doubt of Canadian loyalty to England and inclination to the United States; and still more remarkable fear of the exposure of the other British North-Eastern American Provinces to American hostile occupation, not only by land, but by sea. Importing American unity throughout all the confederated States, for none but those of New England could be contemplated as inclined to disunion, that document, suggesting doubts of Canadian loyalty, and New Brunswick and Nova Scotia liability to invasion, revived the apprehension derived from Mr. Quincy Adams, countenanced by Henry's mission, continued by the violent language of Eastern individuals, and confirmed by the inimical acts of State authorities in the east, that there were party leaders, as Mr. Adams solemnly averred, ready to dismember the Eastern States from the rest, and put New England under British protection. Other communications, from a real or fictitious agent, of a real or fictitious royal Stuart, as it might be, but who, if real, had royal means of knowledge, placed the be-

fore-mentioned original letters of a correspondence between Lord Castlereagh and Consul Allen, with those of Admiral Cockburn, Captain Barrie and Secretary Croker, in the hands of the American Executive, induced by all these circumstances to lend some cautious credit to an extraordinary inference, and convinced of the unwarrantable efforts of the English government inducing ours to endeavor to discover whether Prevost had American instruments. It was information the Executive thought neither to be disregarded nor believed without ascertainment. Some time, therefore, after the first assurances from the ostensible agent of Count Stuarton, the chief clerk in the State Department, John Graham, a respectable and trustworthy agent, was privately despatched to Massachusetts with the following letter of instructions from the Secretary of State, which is incorporated entire with my text as the best narrative.

*To Mr. Graham.*

"SIR:—The President commits to you a very important and delicate trust in full confidence that you will execute it with ability, uprightness and discretion. The following details will explain the nature of this trust and its duties.

"A Swiss gentleman, by the name of ———, communicated to me the following facts:—That there existed in the Eastern States a conspiracy against the welfare and happiness of these States. That Native American citizens and British agents were parties to it, and Boston its principal theatre or headquarters, where a society was instituted called a 'committee of New England Royalists;' that its object was to effect a dissolution of the Union, and establish a monarchical form of government, with the Duke of Kent at its head, comprising, in the first instance, the New England States, under the name of the kingdom of New England, to be extended afterwards as circumstances favored, to all the States. That this conspiracy was formed at, or about the close of our revolution, had been approved by George the Third, who, to promote its success, had promised to the subjects of his son, all the commercial advantages and privileges that were enjoyed by his own subjects: that some of these New England royalists had frequent conferences with the Duke of Kent when he was in this country, respecting the means of accomplishing the objects of this conspiracy, and that they had kept up a regular correspondence with him since, by means of British agents in America, and American agents in England; that the committee make annual report of the state of this country to the British government: that the orders in council, and other measures adopted by the British government against the commerce of the United States, were suggested by

the committee in the hope that they would be imputed to the measures of the Republican party in power, and thereby destroy the government in the confidence of the people: that in 1807, a well digested plan of a monarchical constitution, under the sovereignty of the Duke of Kent, was sent by the committee to England, with advice founded on the state of affairs at that period, how to increase the public discontent, and promote the success of the conspiracy; that the organization of an anti-Tamany society was among the measures then suggested, but that by direction of the British government, philanthropy, and not politics, was made the ostensible object, to which source, it is believed, that the Washington benevolent societies are to be traced; that the committee had received £10,000 sterling, for the use of these societies, had asked £2,000 annually for the circulation of their orations and celebration of their festivals, and were to have their official Gazette, for which £5,000 more were asked; that £60,000 had been expended by it in promoting the election of D— C—: that money had been advanced to the editor of the *Washingtonian*, a Vermont paper, for which his bond had been deposited with the committee at Boston: that he had seen three original letters, one from the Secretary of the Duke of Gloucester, another from the Secretary of the Duke of York, and the third from the Secretary of the Prince of Wales, approving the measures of that committee.

“Mr.— communicated the above details on the authority of a foreigner of distinction, a pensioner of the British government, who had been long, and was then, in this country. I understood from Mr.— that he made the communication to me at the instance of that foreigner, who complained of being injured by the British government in regard to his pension, said to be £1800 per annum: and for the purpose of opening a negotiation with this government for the disclosure of the information he possessed, and documents supporting it, particularly the three original letters above mentioned, for an adequate recompense. By a letter from the Foreign Office to Mr. Allen, which has been since intercepted, it appears probable that this foreigner is a Count Stuarton, supposed to be the lineal descendant of the House of Stuart, formerly on the British throne, and that his pension was £200 sterling, annually, and not £1800.

“I replied in general terms to Mr.—, that the conduct of the British government towards the United States was so well known to be odiously criminal and detestable, that documents fixing new facts on it, would be of less importance than such as established the guilt of our own citizens who had combined with it in so black and atrocious a conspiracy: that when Mr.

Henry made his disclosure, the government had not urged the exposure of any of our own people, believing that they had been led into error by party feeling, and not by corruption; but that the facts stated by him, with other circumstances, if true, could not be accounted for in any other way; that they proved the most shameful prostitution of principle for the vilest purposes. To fix the guilt of these conspirators would be an object of very high importance. In an interview with Mr.— the next day, he informed me that the foreign nobleman, at whose instance he had communicated to me the above details, had left town, in consequence of his report to him of what he had understood to be the substance of my reply to the overture made me. This was the first intimation given me that such a person had been here.

“Mr.— communicated to me other interesting facts, from his own knowledge, relating principally to the conduct of Mr. Allen, late British agent at Boston in granting licenses to favor a trade with the enemy, and in intriguing with the disaffected there. He informed me also of Mr. Allen's having absconded to avoid a prosecution which had been instituted against him by order of the government for granting such licenses, and that a deputy from the royalist committee had accompanied him to Quebec, to advise the British government to prosecute the war, until it should be able to dictate a peace, and secure to itself the next presidency, to be filled by one of the democratic party, for which purpose, measures ought to be taken to divide the Southern and New York democrats. Mr.— thinks that many important documents relating to the general conspiracy, were left with ——— in a trunk, which is either in the possession of ———, or the ———, of Boston. What Mr.— knew of his own knowledge, he was willing to communicate without any specific reward. He solicited a passport for himself and family for England, he having married an English lady who was in bad health, and desirous of returning to her friends; he offered to render to the United States all the services in his power either here or in Europe, and to leave to the government to make him such recompense hereafter, if any, as he might be thought to have deserved. Mr.— to write to me on his return to Worcester, in the neighborhood of Boston, the place of his residence, and to communicate what he might discover touching the above, which he should deem sufficiently interesting. He has written to me since, two letters, which have tended to increase the idea of the importance of his whole disclosure.”

Since the moral emancipation of this country from English influence achieved by the war of 1812, and its subsequent



progressive development, a conspiracy or plan to restore English government has become incredible, and most of the present generation will be apt to think contemptuously of Mr. Monroe's apprehension of the Boston royalists. But in 1787, Alexander Hamilton, by a letter to Colonel Wadsworth, referred to a report in the *Daily Advertiser* of New York, of August 18th, 1787, that a project was in embryo for the establishment of a monarchy, at the head of which it was contemplated to place the Duke of York, then called Bishop of Osnaburg; and desired Colonel Wadsworth to trace its source. Colonel Wadsworth inquired of Colonel Humphries, whose answer the first of September, 1787, to Hamilton was, that he first saw it in the hands of Jared Mansfield, formerly a reputed loyalist: adding, "The ultimate practicability of introducing the Bishop of Osnaburg is not a novel idea among those who were formerly termed loyalists. Ever since the peace, it has been occasionally talked of and wished for. Yesterday, where I dined, half jest, half earnest, he was given in the first toast. I leave you to reflect, how ripe we are for the most mad and ruinous project that can be suggested, when in addition to this view we take into consideration how thoroughly the patriotic part of the community, the friends of an efficient government, are discouraged with the present system, and irritated at the popular demagogues, who are determined to keep themselves in office at the risk of every thing." Ten or twelve years after 1787, when Rufus King was American minister in England, a common toast at Philadelphia, the seat of the federal government, like that Colonel Humphries heard in Connecticut, half jest, half earnest, was *our King in England*. The planting and approved portion of the federal party came out of the Revolution, resolved on republican government. But from the peace of independence in 1783, to the extremely difficult establishment of a Federal Republican Constitution in 1788, England and her many loyal adherents in America were strongly in hopes of American return to English allegiance. And from 1788 till 1812, those hopes never ceased. We shall find, in this volume, how they grew in England to royal credulity, in 1814, that the once Bishop of Osnaburg, Duke of York, might be created King of New England or North America, as the Swiss informer told Mr. Monroe, was the long-continued scheme of a Boston Secret Society; now, fortunately, scarce to be credited, but once too certain.

It is common American error and fond assurance, that the American Revolution was a unanimous and concerted result of national resistance proclaimed by the Declaration of Independence. Let those who think so, read Mr. Lorenzo Sabine's "Lives

of the American Loyalists," for unquestionable proof of the contrary. One-half the educated Americans were Tories in heart, and one-third in sanguinary action. Whigs did not propose, nor Tories oppose, independence. All that all desired, was better English treatment; Whigs more earnest to complain of want of it than Tories, but separation of the colonies from the mother country, was the wild notion of very few, which destiny brought about, as most human events are accomplished, mankind knowing not how, till they come to pass, and then claiming them as their own wise work. That such a royalist secret society existed in Boston, as the Swiss told Mr. Monroe, is not improbable. Thousands of the best men of Massachusetts were severely denounced by Washington for leaving Boston with the British, when it surrendered to his arms. Halifax was peopled by those loyalists and imbued with their bitter English hatreds and hopes. The intercourse between Halifax and Boston, always frequent, in 1813 was incessant and traitorous. By a letter from the Foreign Office to Mr. Allen, which was intercepted, and in possession of our government, it appeared probable to Monroe, who was not easily duped, that a Count Stuarton was the suspicious foreigner of the British consul's acquaintance. This volume will show, before it closes, that in London as well as Washington, there were apprehensions of royal designs of an American kingdom, with the Duke of York on its throne. As Washington, Franklin, Adams, Jefferson, and other contemporaries of the revolution, not to mention Madison and Monroe, were familiar with the facts that America was full of English adherents then, so all capable of knowledge, when the war of 1812 began, and before it, knew that large numbers of the educated, especially the commercial, professional and clerical of the Atlantic towns, were unreserved in expression of their conviction, that the experiment of American republicanism must fail, and that the restoration of British government was inevitable in the United States. It is time to render justice to the Tories of the Revolution, crushed and cursed under its successful termination; but numbering among their non-combatant, merely passive, and often conscientious men retired from conflict, many excellent civilians, and among their fighting men some of the most intrepid soldiers of that struggle, several of the former of whom were employed by Washington and other eminent Americans, to administer the republic.

The following is an early one of that extraordinary informer's remarkable letters. "As soon as Mr. Allen's return was known in Boston, several federalists came here to converse with him, and he went there in five days after his arrival. From



a conversation, I learned that an American deputy accompanied him to the British. His object was said to be to inform them of the state of parties in the States, and to advise the best means to continue the war so as to enable the British government to dictate a peace which will place the next presidency in the hands of a person in his interest, though of the Democratic party. To effect this great hope is held out from a division among the Southern as well as the New York delegates. On the other hand, I heard that the British government was offended with Boston federalists for acting so weakly after talking so loudly, and that the blockade would be extended to the Eastern ports next spring, if certain measures to embarrass the American government were not resorted to by the federalists during the winter. It was also said that an uninterrupted correspondence is carried on between the disaffected here and their principals in the British government. Letter-bags for Spain and the British government are found in the exchange coffee-houses of all open ports, though Cadiz and Lisbon are as much British ports as London and Liverpool. Could not the American government cause a law to be passed prohibiting ship letters and all other letters to pass by any other channels than the regular post-office? Such a law would at all times add to the revenue of the United States, and in time of war increase the means of the American government to discover the plots of its enemies. In all states of Europe such a law exists. In England the writer or carrier of every letter found on board a ship, or even in stages, without any post-office mark, is fined £5."

"A small part of the enormous salary of the marshal might be employed to gain some well-conducted and well-informed federalist, more patriot than partisan, to discover the machinations of his party, especially at Boston, their head-quarters. It was by selecting royalists and Jacobites, of education and talent, that Bonaparte succeeded to crush the most inimical factions, those that principally conspired against his person and government.

"A naturalized Englishman, Mr. —, of Philadelphia, (naming one well known to me, very familiar in the most fashionable circles there, whose name I suppress,) has lately become a bankrupt. In his statement and books he acknowledges to have gained upwards of \$40,000 by the sale of eighty licenses received from Mr. Allen. (The latter told me he had given the former one hundred and fifty instead of eighty.) As this bankrupt is supposed not to be over delicate, could not the American government, by his means, discover the violations of the laws and the traitors to the United States? From an authority I cannot mention, I have also been told

that he has been connected with certain contractors of the British in this country, who have furnished provisions to their colonies. His books are open to inspection of all his creditors, and may be seen by some trusty agent of the American government. The fifty licenses mentioned in my last were chiefly for Halifax and Bermuda. If no cartel sails soon, Mr. Allen writes that he will return to New Jersey and remain there until May. His reception at Boston has not been such as he expected from the gratitude of the federalists, and he will leave it soon."

On the 30th December, 1813, the informer wrote to Mr. Monroe, "What I heard from Mr. Allen and what I know from another source, made me (perhaps erroneously) alarmed for a continuance of the union and tranquillity of the United States. By performing what I promised you, I betray no confidence, as any other of his mere visitors, or even his servants, if, like myself, anxious for the happiness of the United States, may have done the same. The visit with which Mr. Graham has honored me, occasions these preliminary trespasses on your time. He said that the government might give me a flag for a cartel." Another letter, dated February 11th, 1814, says, "a letter from the British government to Mr. Allen has been received by way of Halifax. It is dated October 30th, and orders him to remain in the United States, to continue his *usual* services, and to draw for his usual salary. He arrived in England December 24th. We have had the expected visit from Boston, where they continue to prate boldly, to menace cowardly and to act foolishly." Another letter, dated March 11th, 1814, communicates to Mr. Monroe, that "bills of the British government to the amount of a million of dollars have within two months been purchased for gold at a discount of twenty per cent. at Quebec and Halifax, and sold again at Boston and other towns with a profit of ten or twelve per cent. They are bought up with avidity, as they pass current in the English, Spanish and Swedish colonies, and pay for the colonial produce carried here in neutral or rather *neutralized* bottoms. Secret but regular commercial messengers carry by land both to Halifax and Canada the gold, and bring back the bills. Last Saturday five American gentlemen left Boston for Halifax by way of Penobscot. They intend to go to England with the first Halifax packet. One of them has with him despatches for Mr. Allen from the united federal and democratic plotters for the next presidency. Twenty of British government licenses for American *privateers* have been obtained from Halifax, and partly disposed of. Two of these licensed privateers, *report says*, have already sailed with cartridge boxes

full of doubloons, and with gold or silver bullion melted in the form of bullets. This cash is destined to pay for British dry goods, which will be landed in the United States as British prize goods. Such is the report. In a letter dated March 29th, 1814, he wrote, "Not being favored with any reply to my several letters, I suppose it is not convenient for government to grant me the promised passage in some cartel for Sweden or England." A final letter of June 16th, 1814, states, "When you, sir, receive this letter, I am on my way to Europe."

Whether that Swiss, as subsequent transactions indicated, was one of the extraordinary and exquisite impostors with whom society is infested, contriving means of livelihood, or, as several circumstances cause to be believed, an ambidexter agent of the British government, by partial, and as he supposed, important betrayals of their confidence, striving to seduce ours to the much greater which he was to worm out of it, he overreached himself. No letter, written communication or other assurance from Mr. Monroe, encouraged him beyond a promise to have Count Stuarton's title papers searched for, and perhaps to give his real or pretended agent passage in a cartel to Europe, which does not appear to have been done; and no pecuniary return whatever was made or promised for his advices. In the summer of 1814, he left the village of Worcester, with his wife, for Boston, where the most liberal and elegant entertainment welcomed their sojourn and enriched his much regretted departure. A gentleman of Mr. Allen's intimacy allowed him one of his fine houses for temporary residence in Boston, loaded him with other substantial kindnesses, and insisted on sending by him a large sum in gold, which the Swiss expressed great reluctance to take, to a commercial correspondent in London, to whom it never was delivered, and where, on inquiry by a special agent sent after the bearer, all that could be learned was vague stories that he was somewhere on the continent of Europe, in the confidential employment of the English government.

Perhaps the American government, like the Massachusetts associates of the British consul, were deceived by a captivating adventurer, to whose impositions in America, the consul's intimacy with him and the British government's repeated clandestine attempts at American disunion, gave character and credibility. But for them Mr. Monroe would hardly have been, if he was, imposed upon. Nor can the State authorities, or good people of Massachusetts, charge the federal government with precipitate, unfounded or ungenerous suspicion when it ordered a secret inquisition, on the information of such a witness, to test their loyalty. Unlawful connection between

American citizens and British agents for illicit trade was frequent and notorious. Political connection between State authority, or individuals with British agents, disproved by all that ever came to light, was nevertheless averred by men of the highest credibility, rendered probable by numberless individual indiscretions, improprieties of the public press, and State government violations of the Constitution more than enough to justify the federal Executive in any effort to detect and counteract such dangerous misconduct.

The Swiss informer, besides private personal and American disclosures, in a letter dated from his Massachusetts retreat, February 11th, 1814, sent copies of several letters to him from alleged correspondents of rank and superior means of knowledge in Paris, London, Frankfort, Stockholm and Prague, of which the following extracts concerning America (exclusive of European details) conveyed intelligence then novel and important. "The annexed letters," said his to Mr. Monroe, "are from persons of education and rank in Europe. If their perusal can for a moment divert the enlightened minds of the President and yourself, my wishes are accomplished. With some truth they contain many suppositions. They show, however, that the English politics are far from being settled, that France is far from being crushed, and that England is far from being the dictator of Europe."

One, said to be from Baron de Rolle, dated London, August 25th, 1813, together with important European intelligence, contained in a letter from Prince de L., dated Prague, 12th August, 1813, stated, that "England was to assent to the discussion of her maritime pretensions at a general Congress of Representatives from all the maritime States to meet at the Hague within twelve months after a general pacification in Europe. In the mean time, a suspension of arms was to be agreed on between England and the United States, under the mediation of the Emperors of Russia and France. By the above, you will find that British pretensions are not much favored by her allies, who dread the turbulent ambition of Great Britain, nearly as much as the encroaching spirit of France. Indeed, the British ministers have rejoiced as much at the rupture of the negotiations at Prague as at the news of Wellington's victories in Spain." A Paris letter of December 4th, 1813, with much European detail not pertinent to my narrative, contained this sentence—"Austria, Prussia, and Sweden, do not much object to Napoleon's plan, but England gives a counter project, having for object to place not only Europe and Asia, but America and Africa upon the footing they were at the peace of 1763." Another, dated London, December



18th, 1813, mentioned, "An attack at some part of the United States, and on an extensive scale, is spoken of in the naval and military circles. But though I have heard the names of the commanders, and of the ships, &c., I have not been able to learn what troops can be spared for such an attempt, at a period when Spain, Holland, and Germany, demand great, and almost daily reinforcements from England." A letter of March 29th, 1814, encloses a copy of another, dated Paris, February 4th, 1814, as follows: "I have just heard from a creditable source, that the restoration of the four hundred and fifty thousand French prisoners, in the power of the allies, forms a principal obstacle to a general pacification, as with those troops under his command, Napoleon might soon again be the dictator of Europe. Several plans for disposing of these unfortunate men have been suggested, one of which is said to be a colonization, or an employment of a greater part of them, to restore order in St. Domingo, and in the Spanish colonies, and to force the people of the United States to change their republican constitution into a monarchical one, the existence of an American Republic being judged incompatible with the safety of the European monarchies. You may easily suppose from what quarter this last proposal, also reported to have been devised by the same plenipotentiaries to prescribe, at a general peace in Europe, the terms for a peace between England and the United States, which, if not accepted by the latter, an excuse will be offered for the landing and settling in America of the European royalist veterans, and with their aid to destroy the last free Republic on earth. Depend upon it, some discussion to this effect has taken place at Chatillon on the Seine, though nothing certain has yet been determined upon."

Nefarious as Cockburn characterized Allen's transactions, to increase British plunder by tempting American cupidity to share in unworthy gain, the thing became ridiculous by the mishap of Foster, the British minister at Washington, and Baker, the consul-general there. Augustus Foster, who came to the United States as a secretary to Merry, the minister, afterwards secretary of legation, and, being in some way connected with the ducal family of Devonshire, rose to be minister plenipotentiary, was such when war was declared, to his confusion, having, by all his despatches, assured his government that ours would never venture it. Mortified by that egregious mistake, and disgraced by low libertinism, he returned to England, scattering, as Parthian arrows, one hundred and eighty licenses from Halifax on his way home; repaying, like many other ill-bred English, flatteries, and excessive attentions from English idolaters in America,

by publishing vulgar vilifications of the United States, preceded by calumny against them in Parliament. Another mortification in which he was associated with Baker, the consul-general, contributed to Foster's chagrin, and precipitated Baker's departure, when detected and ludicrously punished for the clandestine distribution of licenses, even from Washington. The minister, Foster, complaining of the postage he had to pay, was in the habit, through the consul-general Baker's personal intervention with the officers of the post-office, of rejecting many of his letters, if, on opening them at the office, they were found to contain nothing deemed worth taking away. In that method of parsimony, the post-office clerks were, at length, allowed to open the letters themselves, without Mr. Baker's presence, and withhold such as were obviously unimportant. About the time of the declaration of war, by that permission, they opened several, containing licenses to trade, and secret information, such as the British minister and consul-general were authorized to receive, but extremely averse to find published. The post-office immediately communicating these detected misdemeanors to the Executive, they were generously sent, without comment, to their address, which caused Mr. Baker's speedy departure, not to appear in Washington again till he returned bearer of the treaty of peace; leaving Mr. Foster eager to pay the postage of those and all other letters to his address. The ministry in London, the envoy at Washington, the consul-general there, the consul at Boston, the admiral at Halifax, the navy, colonial courts of admiralty, merchants and other agents, English and American, as soon as war rendered them illegal and unworthy, were involved in those meanesses of ill-got gain, which it took more than a year of American resistance, by judicature and acts of Congress, to extirpate. The confidential intimate of some of them in Massachusetts, on the 4th of November, 1813, wrote to Mr. Monroe: "A person just told me that fifty new licenses have arrived from Halifax in the same vessel that brought Allen's letters. The — are preparing a vessel for Canton, and offers of \$20,000 have been made by others for licenses to protect a voyage to Calcutta. From what I learn the war is much more popular in Boston. The late successes of the American arms, and the hope of profit from speculations in the manufacturing line, have altered the public opinion for the better."

Actuated by such transactions, and urged by the war party of New England, a minority always vigorous and ardent in its support, insisting that as long as any trade or shipping at all was permitted in their waters, war would be defeated, the ad-



ministration resolved to fetter navigation with restrictions, against which a clamor was raised there and reverberated in Congress much louder than the appeal for the imposition. British ministers, admirals, consuls, and their American instruments, annulled and emasculated war for more than a year after its declaration, by traffic as effectual and pernicious as if duly stipulated with the enemy; and the President, with his original preference for passive rather than active hostilities, renewed executive invocation for an act of Congress to aid the war by embargo, of questionable constitutionality, if indefinite, and unquestionably severe in operation, and further fuel for the already heated furnaces of disaffection. Soon after his general message, therefore, the President, on the 9th of December, 1813, by special communication confidentially repeated his rejected call for an embargo; to prevent, it said, abuses of our commercial and navigation laws, by which supplies found their way not only to British ports and British armies at a distance, but in our own neighborhood, and to British troops infesting our coasts and waters, encouraged in their predatory and incursive warfare, also fraudulent importations in British vessels disguised as neutrals, and collusive ransoms of pretended prizes. Several secret conclaves, therefore, began the winter session, first in the House of Representatives, and when we passed the bill, then in Senate with closed doors, lasting till the 21st of December, 1813, when the injunction of secrecy was removed, and a very stringent act published: not, however, till one of the betrayals of secrecy, so common from the Senate, made known the provisions of it at Boston, where its effect was intended to be most felt. Mr. Calhoun, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, though he voted for, did not approve nor advocate the measure, for which Felix Grundy officiated as leader in the House. Commercial, Eastern, and party opposition, assailed it in all its stages, in principle and details, by numerous motions made by Mr. Gaston, Mr. Pitkin, Mr. Stockton, Mr. Hanson, Mr. Grosvenor, and Mr. Oakley, much of the force and talent, therefore, of the Federal minority, with whom the weight of argument preponderated. But that of party carried it through the House by eighty-five yeas to fifty-seven nays, Mr. Lowndes and a few more of our party voting against it. "The duty of the friends of the Embargo," said the National Intelligencer, "was to act, not speak:" wherefore the debate was principally confined to opposition. But it should not be supposed that in the secret session, faction overawed patriotism.

It was apprehended that the votes of Mr. Giles, Mr. Stone, and Mr. Anderson would defeat the embargo in Senate; Mr. King

and Mr. Gore, who did not reach Washington till that body was in conclave on it, hurried to the Capitol without going to their lodgings at Georgetown. It passed without difficulty, and was much rejoiced at by the administration, as the most vigorous act of the Senate, hoping that it would put an end to fraudulent trade under Swedish and Spanish flags, and British licenses; reduce the enemy's supplies and plunder, straiten their armies in Canada and navies on our coast, and also their forces in Spain; deprive England of our raw materials, such as cotton for their manufactures; and her shipping of timber and tar, increase our supply of unemployed seamen for privateers as well as public vessels; and our internal trade, as the external was diminished, encourage American manufactures, and bring war to a speedier conclusion. Capitalists complaining that it deprived them of the means of using their funds profitably, were told then to invest them in manufactures; or, if they preferred it, in privateers. The name of embargo, however, had lost its original charm generally; and in the East, where its operation was most felt, become extremely odious. Speculators, partisans, and the disloyal did not suffer alone, though the most clamorous. It was privation, in many respects as painful as war, without any of its excitements or attractions, and, as it proved, little of its however dear bought but undeniable advantages. It was resisted too, by not only numbers of poor and not well informed persons, accustomed to earn their livelihood by small traffic, but in Congress, besides the vehement opposition of some of the representatives of such distressed constituents, Richard Stockton, in his speech, in secret session, denying that those were general practices, furthermore questioned their illegality. On a small scale contributing to the comfort of the naval commanders of the enemy on the coast, perhaps, he said, they might exist, when poor people would be enticed to furnish them with poultry, vegetables, and such small articles. But yielding to such temptation was hardly unnatural or highly criminal in the unprotected state in which those poor people are left. If such things are not furnished voluntarily, they will be taken by force; and shall we destroy the commerce of the country for such a cause? Mr. Stockton's arguments savored more of courtesy and charity than law. In many instances there was probably no criminal intent to aid and comfort the enemy; but all the courts of justice declared the law perfectly settled, and so inserted on the face of the Constitution, that none of such intercourse is innocent, but all of it illegal.

By repeated, earnest, and denunciating efforts, in various motions, resolutions, and speeches, Cyrus King resumed his attack on the embargo, which, as enacted, was the

most comprehensive and annoying restriction ever fastened on commerce; in its suppression of the coasting trade—the first and extremest fetters ever put on that element of livelihood to many poor, industrious, and well-disposed people. On one of these occasions, George Bradbury stated, that there was great distress where he came from for food. They depended on importations for flour, which was eighteen dollars a barrel. Several other Massachusetts members stated the great hardship suffered in that State, by catching coasting vessels from home, and preventing their leaving ports where they did not belong. But all endeavors to mitigate the severities of the law were overruled. All that was done was by an act of the 25th January, 1814, authorizing the President, when, in his opinion, the public interest should not forbid it, on application, to grant permission to any inhabitant of Nantucket to employ a vessel to convey from the main land to that island, fuel, provisions, and other necessities of subsistence, and to carry from the island to the main land, oil, spermaceti candles, and fish, under regulations prescribed by the Embargo Act. That indulgence passed the House of Representatives almost unanimously, as it went from the Senate. It was said that a vessel, belonging to a merchant of Boston, named Goddard, which was caught by the embargo at Eastport, was burned by his orders; and that persons were threatened with violence who refused to subscribe to remunerate him for his loss; so angry was the local feeling.

A bill to enable embargoed masters to return home, reported by a committee to alleviate the distresses of commercial restriction, was voted against by many of those most vehement in denunciation of the whole system, on the plea that they would take nothing less than repeal of the act; and till repealed, they avowed their desire to render it as oppressive and odious as possible.

During the winter and spring of 1814, when the license trade began to be suppressed, British capital and American cupidity imposed another heavy impediment in our way. British government bills to a large amount were circulated, particularly in Boston, and exchanged for gold, causing some of the Boston banks to overflow with coin, while those of the Middle and Southern States were drained of it, preliminary to their suspension, as they called their insolvency, in the following September. A Spanish schooner, called *Rosa*, boarded by the American privateer *Viper*, being searched, there was found in the Spanish captain's boot an official letter, dated at Bermuda, the 17th February, 1814, from Admiral Warren to Captain Talbot, or the senior officer of his majesty's ships off New London, informing him that "Mr. Stewart,

late British consul there, but then at Bermuda, having offered to procure money from the United States, requests that, agreeably to his arrangement, you will receive on board your ship whatever money may be carried along side by persons Mr. Stewart will engage, and forward it to this island; if a large sum, send a sloop of war purposely with it; and suffer the vessel bearing this letter, the *Rosa*, to remain under your protection, if not permitted to go into New London."

Passive belligerency proved of little avail, owing to great European changes, ending with the conquering allies of England entering Paris as captors the 31st March, 1814, on which day the President, by special message, desired Congress to repeal one of his favorite measures, in consideration, was argued by his message, of the extensive changes, favorable to liberal commercial intercourse, which had previously taken place in Europe: Russia, Sweden, Denmark, nearly all Germany, Holland, Spain, Portugal, and the borders of the Mediterranean, permitted by victories over the French, to open commercial intercourse with the United States. The Swedish minister, Kautzow, and Danish, Pedersen, were at Washington, desirous of it; not long after a Dutch minister, Changuion, arrived at Boston, with similar views, in which the Spanish minister here, Onís, participated. The executive message recommended to interdict the exportation of specie, (deemed impracticable by some, impolitic by others, and not attempted by Congress,) as a more effectual safeguard and protection for our growing manufactures. Madison, always a judicious advocate of such reasonable protection to guard their infant struggles against the gigantic monopoly of Great Britain, by that message laid a corner stone of subsequent much contested industrial development, by recommending that the additional duties then in force, but to expire at the end of a year after the war, should be prolonged for two years after that event. Without adopting the President's recommendation, the House of Representatives passed a resolution, moved by Mr. Samuel D. Ingham, directing the Secretary of the Treasury to report a tariff of duties at the next Congress; which produced Secretary Dallas's project, falling no further within the scope of my sketch, than to state that the war which forced the first important manufactures into being, also superinduced the first controverted tariff on their importation.

As war spread, its exigencies and contrivances multiplied. On the 2d December, 1813, from on board the ship *Valiant*, Robert Dudley Oliver, senior officer of the squadron, blockading Deatur's at New London, by letter to Don Thomas Stoughton, Spanish consul at New York, gave



formal notice that the blockade, theretofore confined to the ports and harbors of the Chesapeake, Delaware, New York, Charleston, Port Royal, Savannah, and the river Mississippi, was extended, by Admiral Warren's proclamation at Halifax, the 16th November, 1813, to all that part of Long Island Sound, being the sea-coast lying within Montauk Point, or the eastern point of Long Island, and the point of land opposite thereto, called Black Point, together with all the ports, harbors, creeks and entrances of the East and North Rivers of New York, as well as all others along the coast of Long Island and State of New York: which extension of blockade was proclaimed to be in consequence of the American withdrawal of their naval force from the port of New York, and establishing a station at New London, to cover the trade to, and from New York; without much hindrance from which American frigates and privateers sailed from, and returned to Newport, Boston, and other eastern ports, with such impunity as to be mentioned with surprise and complaint in Parliament and throughout England.

The blue lights treason—which called forth much public animadversion, and has ever since been matter of reproach to the whole community of its putative authors—was denounced by Commodore Decatur's official letter of the 20th, published the 28th of December, 1813, and made subject of discussion in Congress the 24th of January, 1814. In tempestuous weather, with the cover of a severe storm, Decatur resolved to venture to sea during the night of the 15th December, 1813, hoping that the enemy's blockading squadron would be blown off, or otherwise unaware of his attempt. This movement, unavoidably known ashore, when about to be made, was frustrated by two blue lights, displayed on the opposite sides of the river, as signals, believed to be preconcerted with the enemy, and answered by him, intelligibly to those familiar with the practice of signals. Thus betrayed and prevented, it was not till a year afterwards, the 15th of December, 1814, of another tempestuous night, favored by another severe storm, that Decatur put to sea from New York, again betrayed by signals from shore, which informed and embodied the British squadron that captured him. A month after the New London affair, Lyman Law, a native of that place, and representing in Congress that part of Connecticut, on the 24th of January, 1815, moved for a committee of the House of Representatives, to inquire whether treasonable correspondence had been held, or information given by blue lights from the shores to the blockading squadron, whereby the enemy might learn the movements of Decatur's ships, to take evidence by deposition or otherwise, and report to the House. He

believed, he said, that the whole was mere delusion. Connecticut, by her troops, had protected Decatur's squadron till lately, when the United States stationed troops there, whose means and duty were plain to prevent any such treason. Jonathan Mosely, another of the Connecticut members, seconded his colleague's motion; and ridiculed the imputation: blue lights might be useful to illuminate charges so frequent in the House of British Tory attachments, but there were no such lights or attachments in Connecticut. Felix Grundy moved that the resolution be referred to the naval committee. Jonathan Fisk objected to the proceeding altogether, to pervert the House into a Court to try traitors. Mr. Jonathan Roberts, John W. Eppes, John G. Jackson, and Mr. Calhoun all opposed it. Mr. Law replied, that its frequent mention in the House, and apparent importance, induced him to introduce the resolution; which, on Jonathan Roberts' motion, was laid on the table, by a vote of more than two to one; and never taken up again, but left for partisan, if not patriotic, fuel.

Decatur's letter of the 20th December, 1813, was official and positive, that when the weather promised an opportunity for his squadron to get to sea, and it was said, on shore, that he intended to make the attempt, two blue lights were burnt on both the points of the harbor's mouth as signals to the enemy, "and there is not a doubt that they have, by signals, or otherwise, instantaneous information of our movements. Notwithstanding these signals have been repeated and seen by twenty persons at least in this squadron, there are men in New London who have the hardihood to affect to disbelieve it, and the effrontery to avow their disbelief." It was said, that the blue lights were seen by persons of both the other ships, the Macedonian, Captain Jones, and Hornet, Captain Biddle. Captains Decatur, Jones, and Biddle, had, neither of them, any doubt of the atrocious fact. Officers and men of the Hornet, stationed as lookouts, distinctly saw and noticed the blue lights, and soon after that signals were made from one of the enemy's ships, in consequence, they presumed, of those from shore. The officer of the Macedonian, who was rowing guard, together with all the men composing his boat's crew, saw blue lights made on both sides of the river, and immediately returned to the ship to report it to his commanding officer. They were persons familiar with the making of signals, and could not mistake the common lights on shore for blue lights. The New London Federal newspaper constantly insisted on the treason. Controversy arose among the newspapers of Connecticut on this subject. The Norwich Courier denied the facts as stated by the New London Gazette. But, on full inquiry, the former



retracted its assertions, admitting its mistake, and declared, that blue-light signals had been repeatedly made, after their first exhibition of the 15th December, 1813, or New London lights, "by some unprincipled scoundrels, destitute of every principle of honor and patriotism." Sunday night, the 9th of January, 1814, about ten o'clock, blue lights were again exhibited on both sides of the river, and were answered by all the British ships. The lights were distinctly seen by a number of our naval and military officers. Again, in March, 1814, during a storm of wind and rain, and weather favorable for Decatur's squadron to put to sea, he issued an order requiring all his officers, on shore, to repair, without delay, on board their vessels. Shortly after, blue lights were thrown up like rockets from Long Point, and distinctly seen by the officers at Fort Trumbull, and by the officers and men in our lookout boats. The lights were answered by three heavy guns from the enemy, at intervals of about ten minutes, and the blue lights continued all night.

The authenticated case of a young man of Massachusetts, named Hiram Thayer, was officially made known in March, 1814, by Commodore Decatur, one of many similar outrageous British inflictions on Americans, to redress any single instance of which, Great Britain would, without hesitation, to her honor be it said, have waged war with all her might, although she exerted it, to punish this country for attempting to get justice for six thousand such instances, acknowledged by her statesmen to be at least sixteen hundred. Hiram Thayer, born in Greenwich, Hampshire County, Massachusetts, was the son of a respectable farmer, John Thayer, resident there. In 1803, he was seized by a press gang and forced into British service on board the frigate *Statira*, Captain Bramley, when that vessel brought Mr. Rose on a special mission to America. Thayer, always with characteristic fortitude, protested against his imprisonment, refused the bounty and all pay, except so much as was indispensable, taking a small part of it in slops only. He had been immured in the *Statira* frigate six years, when that vessel became one of the squadron, blockading Decatur's at New London; and once or more in American ports. While at Norfolk, Virginia, his protection and certificates from the selectmen of Greenwich, were forwarded to the British consul there, with an application for his release, that was, of course, treated with contempt, as all such humiliating and humiliated applications then were. Similar documents were afterwards laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty by the American consul in London, but the appeal was there, too, rejected, on the frivolous pretext that the papers were not

properly authenticated. A third attempt was made after war was declared, by laying the proofs before the naval authorities at Halifax, through the intervention of the American agent there, who presented certificates from the selectmen, the clergyman, and the town clerk. Meantime, Thayer, for his sobriety, seamanship, and exemplary conduct, promoted to be boatswain's mate, more earnestly than ever repeated his protest to his taskmasters, declaring that he never would fight against his country. "Then," said Stackpole, Captain of the *Statira*, "if we fall in with an American man-of-war, and you refuse duty, I will have you tied to a mast, and shot at like a dog." The anxious, honest, and persevering father applied, on the 14th March, 1814, to Decatur for his interposition, who forthwith dispatched a boat, under a flag of truce, with the father on board, fortified by all requisite proof of his son's American nativity. The son, as boatswain's mate, piped the hands for the boat in which Lieutenant Hamilton, ex-Secretary of the Navy's son, visited the British squadron. As the boat approached the *Statira*, the son, from her deck, perceiving his father, exclaimed to the first lieutenant, "My God, sir, there comes my father!" and the meeting of father and son, upon the frigate's deck, far beyond the power of any written evidence, attested to the heart of every bystander the truth of the latter's right to be released from his cruel bondage. An accumulation of more than twelve hundred dollars arrearages of pay, which he had constantly refused to touch, (an independent fortune for a frugal New Englander,) he gladly offered to relinquish.

The father wept; the son spent every moment of their short interviews in inquiries about his family, of whom he had so long been kept in cruel ignorance: of his mother and sister, their humble homestead, and every minute domestic circumstance, all pleading in vain his right to enlargement. The aged parent burst into tears, and wept bitterly. Decatur's letter, containing a manly, high-toned narrative of the case, without omitting Captain Stackpole's brutal threat, was handed to Captain Thomas P. Capel, on board the *La Hogue*, commanding the British squadron; who instantly acknowledged the certificates of exchange and discharge from parole, forwarded to Decatur, at the request of Colonel Barclay, the Commissary-General of British prisoners of war, for which, in courteous terms, the British commander returned the order; and regretting that "it was not in his power to order the son of Mr. John Thayer to be discharged, undertook to forward the application by the earliest opportunity to the commander-in-chief, and I have no doubt he will order his immediate discharge." "Not a doubt," said Decatur,

"was on the mind of any British officer, of Hiram Thayer's being an American citizen; and yet he is detained, not as a prisoner of war, but compelled, under the most cruel threats, to serve the enemies of his country."

Whether Thayer was ever released or remained till the peace, if not longer, a British galley-slave, I am not informed: whose simple story is food for novelists and dramatists, more touching than many of the tales and lyrics of the ocean. A seed of his cold-blooded sacrifice is the emancipation of seamen from impressment. A single such outrage would now rouse the whole American nation to a war for its punishment. Thirty thousand American watermen of the West, who never saw the sea, would rush there to rescue one such victim from captivity. Not only so: but impressment has probably been expelled from British ports as well as from American vessels, whether naval or commercial. More violent, irrational and odious, more painful too and lasting, than conscription as a method of raising forces, its ends, like the means, are also more indefensible: sea warfare being much more licentious than hostilities by land. Overruling Providence rendered impressment its own destroyer. When many of the merchants, for whom the country was plunged in war, deserted it to make common commercial cause with the enemy, similar laxity of morality led them to seek gain by privateering. Besides the seven or eight thousand seamen in American national vessels, bravely contending for sailors' rights and no impressment, not less than five thousand volunteer mariners, the best in the world, were at sea in fifty privateers, carrying five hundred cannon, thirsting for vengeance and for prey. Withdrawal of the orders in council, and leaving only the cause of the poor sailors in dispute, was fortunate for them. While the country was sympathizing with Thayer, one of Washington's great nephews, John Lewis, returned, having been discharged from the British ship *Rose* the 10th February, 1812, shortly before the war, but not getting home till March, 1813, after thirteen years' confinement in British ships of war, on board of which he was repeatedly flogged, and once, as he said, obliged to run the gauntlet through a fleet, fainting under the lash. The President gave him a commission as a master's mate, and he was ordered to the lake service; but never went: he was killed at the sack of the city of Washington.

The New London blue-lights and the massacre at Fort Niagara occurred during the same tempestuous wintry nights, when a brumal day at Spithead, the 17th December, 1813, witnessed the execution of a seaman captured with the frigate *Chesapeake*. Joseph Warburton, said to be a young En-

glishman of twenty-six years, taken in her, with five more said to be English, was sentenced to be executed by hanging for making off with a prize to the *Æolus*: shocking spectacular manifestation, that British seamen fought in American frigates, (although it could not show that they fought well, as Warburton was one of the ill-assorted, undisciplined and mutinous crew of the unfortunate *Chesapeake*, who rendered her an easy victim to the *Shannon*.) Warburton was hanged at the yard-arm of the *Prince*, attended by the Reverend Mr. Jones, her chaplain, confessing his guilt, as was said, "and warning five other British seamen taken in the *Chesapeake*, then confined on board the *Prince*, expecting the clemency of their king, never to be wanting in feelings of fidelity to their king and country." All the boats of all the ships at Spithead, attended the execution of Warburton, whose sentence was read on board of every ship in that largest roadstead of the British Channel, where the military parade on such occasions usual was performed, the English seaman captured in an American frigate pinioned, blinded and suspended in sight of all his comrades, and his body then interred at Hessler Hospital. I am not aware of any other instance of a British seaman taken fighting in an American vessel.

On the last day of the year 1813, the English brig *Bramble*, under a flag of truce, in forty-two days from Liverpool, anchored at Annapolis, bearing the English Secretary Castlereagh's letter of the 4th November, 1813, to the American Secretary of State, declining to treat under Russian mediation, but consenting to direct negotiation as proposed by the American commissioners at St. Petersburg: negotiation at London, the British capital, and unmixed with affairs of Europe. Fortunately, as it eventuated, the American cause had been pointedly severed from that of France, to which English approximation the American commissioners added their consent to negotiate peace, if not sue for it, in the enemy's capital. Tidings by the *Bramble*, also reported by the *Analostan* American cartel arrived from Halifax at Boston, about the same time, and by a vessel under Russian colors bound for Amelia Island, taken into Savannah, were, that in the battles of the 17th, 18th and 19th October, 1813, at Dresden and Leipsic, the French were defeated with the loss of nearly a hundred thousand men, and in full retreat for France, pursued by their conquerors. On the 7th January, 1814, the President, without advices from our commissioners, communicated Lord Castlereagh's letter with Mr. Monroe's answer, accepting the English overture, and naming Gottenburg, in Sweden, as the place for the peace congress, though Sweden was one of the most



active and efficient allies of England. On the 13th January, 1814, the House of Representatives resolved, on Mr. Calhoun's motion, to request the President to communicate all the documents concerning the Russian mediation, which were accordingly communicated on the 18th of that month. On that day William Gaston moved a resolution, that, pending the negotiation with Great Britain, it is inexpedient to prosecute military operations against the Canadas, of invasion or conquest. But cessation of hostilities by land, while prosecuted by sea or at all while the enemy persevered in them, was deemed unwise; and the House, by the rather unusual stand of a refusal to consider the resolution, put it down by a vote of ninety-two nays to sixty-seven affirmatives; mostly party votes, though Mr. Cheves, Mr. Eppes, Mr. Macon and Mr. Alexander, of the administration party, voted to consider. On the 4th January, 1814, Henry Clay and Jonathan Russell were nominated commissioners to join Mr. Adams and Mr. Bayard in the Gottenburg mission; and Mr. Russell, re-nominated, was confirmed by Senate as minister plenipotentiary to Sweden. On the 19th January, 1814, Mr. Clay resigned the speakership in a short valedictory, and on old William Findlay's motion received the thanks of the House by a large, though not quite unanimous vote, one hundred and forty-four to nine, counted by division merely, without names called. On the same day, overruling an effort of Jonathan Roberts to postpone it, Langdon Cheves was chosen Speaker by a few of the administration united with most of the opposition votes, defeating Felix Grundy, our candidate, who received fifty-nine votes.

The seemingly conciliatory intelligence by the Bramble affected the community with unreasonable hopes of approaching peace, and American produce with sudden decline from war prices. But neither government nor intelligent men flattered themselves with pacification. Determination of the ministry not to stop hostilities till the United States yielded the question of impressment, was no secret in England. The chairman of the East India Court of Directors, Ellis, wrote to a correspondent in Bermuda, "I have had an explanation with ministers; there is nothing compromised to his majesty's government in the despatches by the schooner Bramble to affect the commercial interest. The American commissioners must have full powers to affect even their temporary interests. Before we can enter into any kind of negotiation whatever, they must relinquish their supposed right of claiming British-born subjects by right of adoption, but more particularly of seamen." Thus permission for our minister to solicit peace at London, leave to negotiate at all, and there at the foot of the throne, was to

be preceded by relinquishment of the only postulate of war. The Bramble returning with the American answer to England, Lieutenant Pogson, of that vessel, delivered it in London the 2d February, 1814, where the correspondence was published with little effect, except on the prices of American produce, which rose as if Americans being willing to treat for peace, as the London version of Monroe's letter was, was not much reason for its taking place. Very early next spring, the disengaged British conquerors of France began their confident, vindictive and menacing transit from Europe to America. Although our administration was not without faint hope that it might make something out of any negotiation that England would allow anywhere, yet in submitting the Bramble's letters to Congress, the President could hardly say less than that a relaxation of preparations for vigorously carrying on war would necessarily have the most injurious consequences.

Intelligence of the astounding triumphs to Great Britain excited great sensation in the United States. The boarding-houses of the federal members of the Maryland Legislature, at Annapolis, were illuminated, on the Bramble's arrival there with the glad tidings. A New York Journal, the Recorder, stated that "poor, murderous, proscribing, villainous democracy was going down. The illustrious and most glorious nation, Great Britain, will exhibit to the world the folly and illusory hopes of Mr. Madison and his party." The Boston Gazette rejoiced that "the destruction of Bonaparte, sacking and burning of the frontiers, probable conquest of Louisiana, want of money, of men and of confidence, would lay the present dominators of the people flat on their backs, and urge them to devise and bequeath the carrying on of the war and its difficulties to whoever will step into their shoes." These American sentiments, when they reached English ground, became of course more completely English. A Halifax paper of the 8th January, 1814—a day which twelve months after was consecrated to falsification of the prediction—stated, "The inhabitants of this and our sister provinces cannot fail to be gratified at the predicament in which Napoleon's overthrow places his pander Madison; that monster, with all the vices which blacken the character of the French ruler, without a scruple of the shadow of virtue, now at the mercy, thanks to Almighty justice, of the nation he vainly and impiously endeavored to destroy, and with it the world's freedom. It is not the wish, perhaps not the interest of Great Britain to repossess her rebellious colonies: but a portion given to her allies would at once secure those she wishes to retain, and do good to the Americans, in spite of themselves, by giving them a government."



On the 10th December, 1813, Mr. Pickering proposed a valuable improvement, which he followed up with commendable zeal, till, on the 27th of that month, it became a law, that two hundred extra copies of the journals and documents of both Houses of Congress shall be deposited in the Library of Congress for the use of members, and that together with the acts of Congress, copies shall be transmitted to each executive, each branch of the legislature of every State and territorial legislature, and a copy to every university, college and historical society incorporated in each State. Few things have contributed more to familiarize the wide-spread people of the United States with their national government, and attach them to it, than the profuse distribution by members of Congress of what are called documents, that is, the proceedings and reports of the National Legislature, which include all executive communications to both Houses of Congress. Mr. Pickering's improvement, the beginning of that dissemination, entitles him to general and grateful remembrance.

On the 23d December, 1813, I submitted, with a detailed report from a select committee, for which materials had been collected between the two Sessions, the bill authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to subscribe on the part of the United States for seven hundred and fifty shares of the stock of the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Company, which did not become a law till ten years afterwards; but was, nevertheless, one of the creations of that war, and several times considered that session in committee of the whole. On the 30th December, 1813, Mr. Calhoun, for the committee on foreign affairs, pursuant to the President's recommendation, reported two bills for more effectually enforcing the non-importation laws; one forbidding courts to deliver to claimants, pending trial, merchandize or other articles seized under those acts; the other prohibiting the ransoming of American vessels captured by enemies. Both of those forbidden proceedings were mischievously extensive; but neither of the bills became a law. That against delivery of goods passed the House the 25th January, 1814, that against ransoms the next day; but neither got through the Senate, to the annoyance of the Executive, and of the few Eastern members, whose fellow-citizens imported British goods under feigned ransoms from capture at sea, and got delivery on frail security in court of prize goods, which once relieved from judicial grasp, disappeared, leaving worthless responsibility.

As early in the session as the 20th December, 1813, on Adam Seybert's motion, a select committee was appointed to inquire into the condition and distribution of the

flags, standards, and colors taken by the forces of the United States from their enemies: who reported on the 4th February the bill which became a law the 18th April, 1814, directing the Secretaries of War and the Navy to collect at Washington all such as had been or shall be taken, to be delivered to the President for presentation and display in such public place as he deemed proper. It appeared, by the eloquent report of Dr. Seybert, that the colors taken from the British seventh regiment by Montgomery at Chambly, the 18th October, 1775, had been delivered to Congress on the 23d June, 1778; who directed the standards and colors taken from the enemy to be collected; which, owing to peculiar negligence, was not done. Only six of those trophies of the Revolution remained in 1814 in the War Office; not one in that of the Navy; although twenty-four were taken at the capture of Cornwallis, and there was reason to believe as many at that of Burgoyne. On the other hand, the standard of the fourth regiment of United States infantry, ignominiously surrendered at Detroit by Hull, was instantly sent to London, and there paraded in the Council Chamber at Whitehall. Since the declaration of war, in June, 1812, thirteen naval flags had been received at the Navy Department, and several others were known to have been captured. Dr. Seybert's report well explained the European usages regarding such demonstrations of warlike success and incitements to national distinction, cherished by all nations as wise monuments of their renown. The act of Congress he reported passed without objection; but the negligence, which in the Revolution was perhaps excusable in preventing its execution, remains to this hour unpardonably operative. Nothing was then, or has been since done to perform the pleasing and patriotic duty devolved by Congress on the Executive. The act of the 18th April, 1814, remains to this hour unexecuted. Trophies of war kept, but scarcely preserved in mouldy boxes and dark cocklofts, have nowhere been displayed. Contrary to the obvious design of the act of Congress, the Mexican flags have lately been deposited at West Point, and the Secretary of the Navy proposes to collect the naval flags at Annapolis. Whereas no school or place but the Capitol at the seat of government is proper for such objects. Authorizing the dispersion of these standards at different and distant localities, violates the act of Congress, and yields to that enroaching spirit of locality so often detrimental.

On the 3d January, 1814, Mr. Webster resumed his charge of undue French influence in the administration: of which an account is given in my former volume. He had only taken his seat a day or two before the revival of his imputation, which was,

by resolution to refer Secretary Monroe and the Committee of Foreign Affairs' (presented by Mr. Calhoun) report on the subject, to that committee. The House not having acted on the subject, he said his motion was to bring it forward; unwilling that an argument in answer to resolutions of the House, should pass quietly into precedent. When this House, the nation's grand inquest, called for information on specific points, he deprecated that a mere elaborated argument should be held conclusive on its judgment. The House had shown its nearly unanimous desire to learn why our arms had failed. Was it not as important to know if there was not something wrong in the origin and cause of the war? A better cause may have been as necessary as better generals. Let its advocates show that it was American, impartial as to both the European belligerents. Make it a war of the people, and not of a party, and it would become as energetic as it had been feeble. With such a war government would have only to direct spontaneous popular efforts, instead of being at the end of two driveling campaigns farther than ever from their object—the conquest of Canada. Canada, to the walls of Quebec, would have been ours in thirty days if the people had been satisfied that it should be. At this part of his speech, Mr. Webster was checked by Speaker Clay intimating that the House's determination to consider must precede discussion, to which Mr. Webster replied that he thought debate was in order on a question of reference. That little check enabled him to modify his motion for reference to the committee of the whole, and to render it a special order for the next Monday, instead of to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, where it would certainly have slept or been refuted as before. Governor Wright denounced the whole movement as tending to no good but to paralyze the arm of government, which ought to be busy in strengthening the army and navy, instead of such *petite guerre* of partisans. *Quo animo*, and *cui bono* such opposition? He moved to postpone it till 4th March, on which motion the ayes were 69 to 82 nays. Felix Grundy then moved the first Monday in February, to which Mr. Webster and Mr. Gaston objected as too far off. General Desha moved to postpone the matter indefinitely, which the Speaker ruled out of order. Mr. Calhoun spoke decidedly for the earliest day, denying that the war party were bound to prove anything, the burden of proof resting on the mover and his supporters. The subject was not called up for consideration till the 2d April, 1814, when Mr. Webster's motion to go into committee of the whole for the purpose was negatived by 75 nays to 37 ayes, mostly party votes, though Cyrus King was one of the nays. On the 29th December, 1813, Alexander Hanson

moved analogous resolutions, which he urged fiercely, but on the 10th January, 1814, withdrew for others substituted by him and several times debated, but without either disclosure or result worth mentioning. On the 13th April, 1814, Mr. Gaston's resolution was adopted, requesting the President to communicate any proper information, which he answered the 16th of the month, communicating Mr. Crawford's letter from Paris, of the 16th January, 1814, containing nothing of importance; a brief account of French official assurances of good will and promises of indemnity, procrastinated by the supreme crisis of French affairs, when the successive Russian and Saxon campaigns dethroned the Bonapartes, restored the Bourbons, and the hostile occupation of France, enforcing larger contributions than were ever paid by a conquered country, authorized the American minister, making a merit of necessity, to signify that the American Republic, not relinquishing, would defer their claims till the much indebted restored kingdom of France should be better able to pay them. French influence in America has always been chimerical; while, from the French revolution of 1789 to that of 1848, American influence in France has proved prodigious and portentous reality.

The first bill reported, which became a law, after the Embargo Act, was, for certain partial appropriations, reported by Mr. Eppes, from the committee of ways and means, to which, when it came to the vote for engrossment the 5th of January, 1814, containing a million and a half towards military expenses, Timothy Pitkin objected, because the estimates for the year had not come in from the Treasury. Mr. Grosvenor exhorted the House, as guardians of the public funds, to withhold all supplies in order to coerce production of the necessary estimates. Mr. Cheves said, that he should vote reluctantly for any appropriations, without estimates. Mr. Eppes and Mr. Troup replied, that partial appropriations preceding the general estimates, were usual, lessened no Executive accountability, and authorized no application of the fund but as directed by law. Mr. Pitkin's objection was overruled by a large majority. The Senate put another million in the bill, toward defraying the expenses of the navy, which renewed and increased opposition when that amendment came before the House, for Mr. Macon also demurred to voting money without estimates, though Mr. Eppes quoted precedents. When the ayes and nays were ordered, he wished to see, he said, who would vote against our gallant navy: which taunt elicited a sharp retort from Mr. Sheffey, Mr. Webster, and Mr. Pitkin, disavowing all hostility to the navy, but protesting greater regard for the Constitution, Willis Alston, Robert Wright,



and Jonathan Roberts rejoined, that the federal side of the House had voted against loans and taxes indispensable to the navy, and openly declared, that to arrest the war they would withhold the supplies. The amendment was agreed to, 89 to 52; pure party votes, except Macon with the opposition; whose characteristic speciality and established popularity it required to vote against his party, when party could hardly be distinguished from country. But to refuse the Executive money without estimates is a cardinal and conservative principle of popular government, justifying the federal objection. Precedents are plenty for improprieties. But military appropriations are supplies which may be constitutionally withheld till duly estimated. Withholding supplies in Congress differs from that resort in Parliament, where it only compels a change of ministry, leaving the king as before; whereas, when Congress withhold war supplies, it may be arrested, but does not change the administration. Even if government had suffered, on that occasion, however, the navy triumphed. Alston, Eppes, and Roberts, all of the parsimonious planting democracy, theretofore not well disposed to the navy, won or vanquished to its support, vied with its former advocates, and twitted them with opposition to a national safeguard, which thenceforward began advancement never yet, however, commensurate with the means and wants of a nation, of which it is the cheapest defence.

The naval establishment of the United States, in actual service in January 1814, was seven frigates, two corvettes, seven sloops of war, two blockships, four brigs, and three schooners, for sea, besides the several lake squadrons, gunboats, and harbor barges: three ships of the line and three frigates on the stocks. The whole number of men and officers employed was thirteen thousand, three hundred and thirty-nine, of which 3729 were able seamen, and 6721 ordinary; the marine corps, as enlarged in 1814, was 2700 men and officers. The commissioned naval officers combatant were 22 captains, 18 commanders, 107 lieutenants, and 450 midshipmen. One of the naval committee of the House, Adam Seybert, in the absence of the chairman of that committee, William Lowndes, stated it as Mr. Lowndes' opinion from investigation, that the American navy cost less, per month, than the British. The tonnage of the United States, reported that year, was six hundred and sixty-eight thousand, and the foreign, forty-seven thousand tons.

Secretary Jones' report to the Senate, 22d February, 1814, stated, three 74 gun and three 44 gun ships building, six new sloops of war built, twenty barges and one hundred and twenty-five gunboats employed in the Atlantic waters; 33 vessels of all sizes for sea, afloat or building, and 31 on

the lakes; so rapid was promotion that it was necessary to assign young lieutenants to command lake squadrons, and experienced Captains found that the withdrawal of such lieutenants from sea ships would be a serious disadvantage. In 1806, the number of seamen, authorized by law, was 925, to which number, 3600 were added in 1809. In 1812, Congress authorized the President to employ as many as would be necessary to equip the vessels to be put in service, and to build as many vessels for the lakes as the public service required.

The London press vehemently urged Canning's vow for the extermination of the infant American navy. On the 2d of July, it said, "In another part of this paper our readers will see a document calculated to call forth the most serious reflections. We allude to the official statement of the American Marine force, which may now, alas, without irony, be termed a Navy. It consists (including three seventy-fours, likely soon to be launched) of 33 vessels of war for the ocean, carrying 917 guns, and 32 vessels for the Lakes, carrying 265 guns, beside 203 gunboats, barges, &c. This force, we have no hesitation in saying, *must be annihilated*. To dream of making peace until we have performed this essential *duty* to ourselves and our posterity, would be a folly too deplorable for common reprehension. It would betray a wilful and voluntary disregard to the national safety. The fatal surrender of the *Guerriere* opened new prospects to them. Intoxicated with delight at beholding the British flag struck to the American, the Democratic Government seriously set about the task which they had before considered hopeless of forming a Navy. *It is painful to reflect how far they have proceeded in the undertaking*. It is infinitely more painful to consider that even the gallant affair of the Chesapeake has hardly served to check the full tide of their presumptuous hopes. They are now persuaded that the sea is their element, and not ours. There is but one way to turn the current of their thoughts and efforts from their present direction, and that is to *crush their growing navy to atoms*. Now, *America stands alone*—hereafter, she may have allies; *let us strike while the iron is hot*." In a few days, it added, on the 12th of July, "It seems fated that the ignorance, incapacity, and cowardice of the Americans, by land, should be continually relieved, in point of effect, on the public mind by their successes at sea. To the list of their captures *which we never can peruse, without the most painful emotions*, is to be added that of H. M. S. *Reindeer*, taken after a short, but most desperate action by the United States Sloop of War, *Wasp*."

James Kilbourn, an active member from Ohio, submitted, the 25th of January, 1814, a resolution for inquiring into the expe-



diency of increasing the pay of the navy on the northern lakes, and offering other inducements to procure the proper number of proper persons for that indispensable service. He was informed, he said, by the best authority, that it had been very difficult to obtain seamen for that service; owing to more sickness, higher prices of clothing, and inferiority of food. The chairman of the naval committee, Mr. Lowndes, objected, on the authority, he said, of a naval officer, who assured him there was no difficulty in getting seamen for the Lakes, and that if higher pay were offered, it would rather alarm than induce them, as intimating that greater hardships were to be expected. William Reed stating that the wages of seamen not being fixed, might be made whatever was necessary, Mr. Kilbourn's resolution was rejected by a large majority.

The army which, during thirty years of not undisturbed peace had mouldered away, was also reviving. No military establishment is so difficult to maintain, so costly, or in peace so apparently useless, as that of the United States. The Russian, which is the largest standing army under the most absolute government in the world, is the least expensive; that of England, the freest country of Europe, with relatively the smallest army, is the most expensive; the army of this still freer country, much smaller, still more costly. English apprehensions of standing armies are American exaggerations. Republican parsimony and mistaken popularity continually prevented any but an insignificant regular force, with idle boast of a nominal militia, which never has been, and till organized never can be, reliable. The national defence and economy, for want of regular troops, have suffered by hostilities thereby invited and prolonged, with profusion of expenses, reverses, calamities and disgrace. During Washington's administration, the stinted military establishment of twelve hundred men was unable to make head against the frontier Indians, who defeated the Americans campaign after campaign. President Adams' administration, with Washington's approbation, raised an extravagant force of regular troops, with questionable cause, rendered one of the means of the overthrow of the federal party. In the first bloom of Jefferson's experimental presidency, the army was as unwisely reduced as it had been raised, from twelve thousand men to one regiment of artillerists and two of infantry—under short-lived delusion of transatlantic republican exemption from the lot of humanity. For war, like death, inscrutable, is inevitable. Troubles soon ensued; and, after several years of them, the defenceless republic was bloodily insulted by the outrage on its floating emblem, the frigate *Chesapeake*, in her own waters. Five years after

the army (and navy too) had been almost disbanded, their presidential executor was constrained to call on Congress to restore the army ten thousand strong. On the 12th April, 1808, an act recalled those discharged by an act of the 16th March, 1802. Five regiments of infantry, one of riflemen, one of light artillery, and one of light dragoons, were ordered to be raised. Jefferson's essay of unarmed economy and repugnance to war, like all excesses, were punished by his expiring administration being compelled, at much increased expense, to recreate what it would have been wiser and cheaper not to destroy. Political experiments, to be beneficial, should be conservative. Recurrence to first principles, the saving virtue of free institutions, to rectify continual decline, differs from sudden innovations, seldom permanently progressive.

Jefferson, with ten thousand recruits, expensively and with difficulty added to the army, imposed his much more expensive and questionable commercial restrictions, only to defer and aggravate inevitable war, which he left to Madison, his still more pacific successor. The presidential essayist of impracticable tranquillity was, however, a lover of science; and on the untoward act of Congress of the 16th March, 1803, disbanding the army, engrafted a scion of military power by the section authorizing him to organize and establish a corps of engineers, to be stationed at West Point, and constitute a military academy, subject at all times to do duty in such places and at such times as the President directs. Slow and feeble of growth, an act of Congress of the 29th April, 1812, just preceding the declaration of war, enlarged and improved that excellent institution; often since assailed in Congress and by State legislation through democratic jealousy and ignorance, as aristocratic, but self-sustained, like the navy, by its inestimable contributions to the defence, economy, safety, and glory of the United States. Its distinctive merits are, that military education is thoroughly taught, and its advantages, like other republican benefits, not confined to engineers or other scientific corps, but extended to all arms, including infantry. That school, more advanced, would have saved the war with England much of its disaster and expense, as it covered that of Mexico with most of the astonishing glory, which by less than two years of victories assures the United States, if the same military spirit is kept alive, a long career of cheap peace and foreign respect.

On the 2d December, 1811, Congress ordered the ten thousand men, foreshadowed by the act of 1808, to be recruited and officered, doubling the bounty from eight to sixteen dollars, allowing three months' pay and one hundred and sixty acres of land to each soldier when honor-

ably discharged, and in case of his death in service, that pay and land to his heirs and legal representatives. Corps of rangers for the frontiers and of sea fencibles for the sea coasts, together with authority to accept volunteers, followed, with other provisions extending the military force till, in the course of the session which began in December, 1813, and closed in April, 1814, the regular army, by law, amounted to 64,759 men, with eight major generals and sixteen brigadiers; one regiment of light artillery, and one of dragoons, an artillery corps of near six thousand, forty-six regiments of infantry, four of riflemen, seventeen companies of rangers and ten of sea fencibles. The whole militia of the United States then reported, amounted to 719,449 men and officers. Preceding and with a view to war, the President was authorized to accept the services of not exceeding fifty thousand volunteers, to serve one year; to be clothed by themselves, the cavalry to furnish their own horses, but armed and equipped by the United States when called into service; the officers appointed according to State laws; but under the same rules and articles as the regulars, with the same pay, rations, emoluments and forage, except bounty and clothing; non-commissioned officers and soldiers allowed the cost of the clothing of regulars of the same rank; compensation for damage to horses in actual service; wounded men pensioned; heirs of those killed to have one hundred and sixty acres of land; on honorable discharge, after a month's service, to be presented with a musket, or other personal equipments of infantry or artillery, and with his sabre and pistols if cavalry. On the 10th January, 1814, the chairman of the military committee, Mr. Troup, reported the bill which became a law the 27th of that month, giving to each recruit, enlisted for five years, a bounty of \$124, and \$24 if killed in action or dying in service, to his wife, children or parents, and eight dollars more to any person procuring an enlisted recruit.

Such large inducements to overcome the difficulties hindering an army by enlistment were followed during that session by several other belligerent acts of Congress; one authorizing the enlistment for five years, or during the war, of the fourteen regiments by prior act enlisted for one year; another authorizing the creation of three regiments of riflemen in addition to the one before; a third prolonging for a year the services of the ten companies of rangers; a fourth empowering the President to take into regular service as many, not exceeding fifty thousand, as he chose, who volunteered to serve five years or during the war: an act better organized the army, consolidating some of the regiments, and authorizing volunteers to be promoted in the line of the regular army. The marine corps was en-

larged; four captains and twelve lieutenants authorized for the flotilla service; the navy pay was fixed; the act of 1795, for calling forth the militia, improved, particularly as respected courts martial; twenty-five millions were appropriated for the army, near eight millions for the navy; pensions given to the widows and young children of privateersmen, as well as naval seamen, and revenue cutters co-operating with navy; \$100 bounty to privateersmen for each prisoner; half a million to build floating batteries; \$625,000 to pay for vessels built on Lakes Ontario and Champlain: \$255,000 (with \$5000 more to Perry) for the captors of the fleet on Lake Erie; all captured flags were ordered to be preserved and displayed. With these military and naval provisions, medals, thanks and three months' extra pay were voted to Perry and Elliot, their petty officers, seamen, marines and the infantry serving as such on Lake Erie; and swords to the relatives of Brooks, Laub, Clark and Claxton, killed there; to Burrows and McCall, and the men of the Enterprise, Lawrence, and the non-commissioned officers of the Hornet. The war charges were provided for by a loan enacted for twenty-five millions, and five millions of treasury notes, with an additional issue of five millions to be taken as part of the loan.

Enormous bounties, near three millions of dollars a year for recruits, frequent, numerous and irrepressible desertions, hundreds per annum, notwithstanding cruel and capital punishments to prevent them, still failing to fill the ranks of the army to anything like the number fixed by law, and reliance continually and terribly disappointed on volunteers, militia and yearling regulars, combined to impress reflecting and experienced statesmen, as well as military men, with the truth of Washington's judgment, that the most if not only republican, effectual, economical and certain method of raising armies and providing for the general defence of the United States, is by drafts from the militia, classed and arranged for that purpose, as was proposed by the executive and rejected by Congress in the last stage of the war. One hundred and twenty-four dollar bounty as inducement to enlist was adopted on William Lowndes' motion, modified at my suggestion, leaving the pay as it was, and putting the whole bribe into bounty. By that method five years service, should war last so long, was paid for by no more charge in bounty than for one. Cyrus King vehemently condemned such enormous seduction to farmers' sons and other persons to enlist in a war they disapproved: to which James Fisk replied that in New England much greater inducements were given to prevent than to encourage enlistments; and that if secret archives could be made public, he had no



doubt the influence of British gold would appear among the means resorted to, to prevent farmers' sons from serving their country in arms.

Enlistments for one year proved a serious hindrance to those for five or during the war; few acts of Congress were more necessary than that, suggested by a motion of Mr. Lowndes, for re-enlisting the yearlings for five years. The paucity of riflemen soon appeared: that American invention of the revolution, which Europe has adopted, and in this country where nearly all are gun men, is an excellent arm. Excluding minors from enlistments was another error. Youth from eighteen years upwards is the best basis of armies. In vain the recruiting officers complained, did they call for recruits to serve five years when others could enlist for one, and when a large portion of their most tractable recruits were not allowed as minors to enlist. The nations of Europe were twenty years training their armies to be able to resist the French veterans; yet an American soldier, without any youthful service, was to be made at once from an adult. During January, 1814, the army bills elicited the whole fire of controversial discussion in the Capitol. Protracted debates, all the tactics of opposition, previous question, and frequent committees of conference to reconcile disagreements between the two Houses, were resorted to.

The war and administration were daily topics, and the ingenuity of both conflicting parties exercised to assault or defend them. The federalists who spoke nearly all declared a determination to put an end to the war. Colonel Tallmadge, of Connecticut, a cavalry officer of the Revolution, and Charles Goldsborough, of Maryland, were the only federalists who said they would support war constitutionally declared, though they might deem its causes insufficient and justice disputable.

On the 6th January, 1814, after the President's announcement of the failure of Russian mediation, a North Carolina administration, and respectable member, William H. Murfree, introduced, by a sensible speech, a resolution to inquire into the expediency of empowering the President to appoint a lieutenant-general to command the armies of the United States. "The last campaign, by the failure of our arms, had disappointed all," he said; "another was at hand, and nothing done to ensure more success, for which a controlling hand was indispensable." Governor Wright contended that our arms had not failed; and Jonathan Fisk, that if they had, it was more for want of soldiers enough than of good commanders. Monroe then began to be thought of as Madison's successor in the presidency, to which the lieutenant-generalship he aspired. When the first reverses took place by the shocking

failure of Hull's invasion of Canada, which fell with terrible force on the administration, many extraordinary measures were contemplated by it to recover public confidence and invigorate hostilities. Among these it was proposed that Monroe should be created commander-in-chief, and Dearborn restored to the War Department, while Jefferson should undertake the Department of State; or that Eustis should be transferred from the War to the State Department. The intimacy between Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe was such, and such the devotion of each to the success of the other's administration, that almost any sacrifice might be expected of either to the others. I am not aware whether Jefferson was apprized of the idea of recalling him for a great emergency to undertake the Department of State under Madison, who had served Jefferson, when President, as his secretary. But I know that such arrangements were considered in October, 1812, by Monroe, in whose calm, steady judgment, and great experience, both Jefferson and Madison had the utmost confidence, and whose intimacy with them induces the belief that they were made acquainted with so important a suggestion in which they were so much concerned. Mr. Murfree was little of a mere partisan, and it is not probable that his motion for a lieutenant-general regarded Monroe's presidency. Armstrong, the Secretary of War, disliked by Monroe, and the adherents of Madison, at that moment, involved in much of the discredit of the failure of our arms in the north, was also mentioned as the presidential successor of Madison: and probably the North Carolina member preferred the Virginia to the New York candidate. But there was no reason for ascribing to any such motive the resolution he moved for a lieutenant-general, which, however, was laid on the table, and never called up for consideration.

Next day, a resolution of Mr. Grosvenor, proposed inquiry why so many officers were absent from the northern army, "where," he said, "there were scarce enough to perform the common camp duties, as the National Intelligencer also intimated." Not only administration, but opposition presses were censorious of Wilkinson and Armstrong; whose task was extremely hard, to render commanding officers unselfish, subordinates obedient, transform recruits into veterans, and out of chaos bring order. The best military authorities teach, that not only are old soldiers indispensable to reliable armies, but that, like seamen, the older the better, till age begins to impair strength. Eighty years of discomfitures have not convinced this country that militia are nearly useless, and volunteers useful only for certain purposes, who have votes enough to outweigh the



more than thrice told expense and bloodshed, disease and wretchedness, of their employment; and it is probable that in America they will always be preferred to disciplined soldiery. The bill to fill the ranks by exorbitant bounties, proved some relief from the train of delays and reverses, mortification and slaughters, which trod on each other's heels during the first nearly two years of military abortion, for which the government was not more to blame than the institutions of the United States. War inculcated that Canada could not be conquered by enlisted troops. Stronger influence was indispensable than mere pecuniary temptation. Sixty-three thousand regular troops voted, and six thousand officers, largely paid, nearly all with the additional extravagance of paper money, many of them absent, others unfit for duty, constituted our army. At no time did enlistment bring thirty, if twenty, thousand men into the field. Drafts, as in the Revolution, what was stigmatized and defeated as French conscription, began to be regarded by military and statesmen as the cheapest, most republican, and only effective force.

The House bill, for converting three infantry into rifle regiments, was amended in Senate by three additional rifle regiments, leaving the infantry as before, in which shape we passed it by party votes, 85 to 67, but not without a long sitting of severe contest, the 8th February, 1814. When attacked by Mr. Sheffey, Mr. Webster, Mr. Grosvenor, and Mr. Tallmadge, it was defended by Mr. Troup, Mr. Robertson, Mr. Gholson, Mr. Calhoun, and James Fisk. In that discussion, Robertson sounded the alarm of Louisiana invaded. "Why shall not English troops be now transported to the United States? The ocean is free to her ships, and she has no use in Europe for the immense force and expenditure heretofore employed there." With which anticipations, realized so soon, came the severest trials, greatest triumphs, and honorable peace.

The Treasury Report, presented the 10th January, 1814, stated the receipts for the fiscal year ending 30th September, 1813, at thirty-seven millions and a half, which, with the balance in hand at the beginning of that year, made near forty millions; the year's payments had been not quite thirty-three millions; the expenditures for 1814 were estimated at more than forty millions, of which near thirty were proposed to be raised by loan. At the beginning of the war the financial plan was, to make the revenue equal to the peace establishment, about seven millions; interest of the old debt, about two millions, and of the new one, estimated about three, together about five millions more; making a total of about twelve millions, and then to borrow the amount of all the extra war expenses. The

sum defrayed in 1813, by loans, was about twenty-four millions. The army estimate was about twenty-five millions for rather more than sixty-three thousand men; and the navy estimate not quite seven millions for nearly sixteen thousand seamen and officers, and about nineteen hundred marines. About twenty-three millions were added to the public debt in 1813. The whole receipts for 1814, from imposts, taxes, and lands, were estimated at about ten millions. To that timid exhibit of the money, which is the main sinew of war, the acting Secretary added a faint intimation, whether it might not be expedient and prudent to provide new revenues to the very small and totally insufficient amount which he indicated. The last loan in 1813, seven millions and a half, cost thirteen dollars and nearly thirty-two cents premium for every hundred dollars. The taxes were not to be operative till 1814, when their avails were not estimated to exceed three millions and a half, and their actual receipts proved much less.

On the 9th February, 1814, the chairman of the ways and means, John W. Eppes, presented his loan budget to the house, with a bill to be filled by a loan for twenty-five millions, and treasury notes for five millions more; so that of the forty-five millions estimated as the year's charges, thirty were to be raised by loans at ruinous discount, and well nigh unsupported by taxation on any substantial basis: a paper money experiment almost as certain of failure as the continental money of the Revolution. That deplorable catastrophe, Mr. Eppes, who was not equal to the exigencies of the crisis, but shrunk from most of its trying demands, a firm and worthy man, unfitted by political theories and scruples for the great requirements of war, attempted to palliate by the calculation, that in peace the country would be, as it had been, able to pay off any debt contracted during war; which he argued from the fact of Madison's administration having paid twenty-three millions and a half of debt in five years, while borrowing about forty-four millions and a half, so that the balance of debt unpaid was less than twenty-one millions, incurred by the war. With delusive panegyric on the credit of the government, always faithful to its engagements, and visionary statistics of the wealth of the country, Mr. Eppes launched a loan bill larger than any before proposed, which, before Congress met again in September that year, proved an abortion as disgraceful and detrimental as the discomfiture of our armies. Both the financial and the military abortions were salutary, if not providential, though severe and bitter, lessons of republican improvidence and delusion. On the 28th March, 1814, the newly appointed Secretary of the Treasury, Geo. W. Campbell's answer, that officer's first

official appearance, to an inquiry of the committee of ways and means, rendered matters worse than they were before, by his opinion, that the internal resources would be more productive than the acting Secretary Jones supposed, by his report of January; so that, as Mr. Campbell stated, for covering the deficit of eight hundred thousand dollars, then acknowledged, it was not necessary to provide additional revenues. Thus the new secretary, and only secretary since Mr. Gallatin, abandoned the Treasury, completed its discredit by subscribing to the pernicious delusion, that the war would not last, and that if it should, still baseless loans, without taxes, or with such slight basis as to be nearly so, might be relied on for its funds.

Eppes' apology for neglecting the indispensable but dreaded duty of calling forth the resources of the country by taxation, from which it never shrunk, opened three weeks Saturnalian discussion on the Loan Bill, when nearly every member disposed to speak, embracing in this country a much greater number than in any other of fluent orators, by the method of conversation with constituents about themselves, explain and vindicate public affairs, and strive to recommend the people's servants to their arbitrary masters. Timothy Pitkin, a substantial and sensible New Englander, painstaking and exact in his positions, decorously maintained, succeeded Mr. Eppes, exposed his errors and denied his calculations, averring that the war was waged for unattainable objects, not worth their cost if attained, and sure to entail enormous debt with onerous taxes on the people. Daniel Sheffey followed him with still greater refinements of arithmetic. The loan he pronounced unprecedented in national extravagance, beyond the possibility of accomplishment, yet insufficient to pay all that was wanting, as the prior year's expenses far exceeded, he insisted, what government confessed, and the army for 1814 would cost fifty instead of twenty-five millions. Both of those gentlemen contended against a country, whose people and resources have always disappointed the alarming predictions of opposition, and accomplished the ends of timid government beyond its deserts. Pitkin and Sheffey's enigmas of finance were more falsified than Eppes' theories: and the country came forth safe in spite of both parties.

Historical record or sketch of the short-lived speculations of that twenty days' debate, would not inform the reader, since events have deprived those ephemeral controversies of nearly all their interest. Of orders in council never to be repeated, and impressment for which that war would now instantaneously light up another for a single instance of the six thousand then in vain complained of, till resisted, very brief

digest of debate will suffice. The federalists declared the nation ruined by commercial restrictions and war, the expenses of which would exceed a hundred millions of dollars, in the coming year. The army was not to be employed to defend the country, but for foreign conquest, not a foot of which had been effected, after two campaigns by an administration that had proved itself incompetent to carry on any war. The navy, which alone had saved the country, had always been opposed by the democrats. The army, such as it was, instead of concentrated, was scattered, and dissolved by idle invasions. The democrats answered that not the mode, but the motive of the war, characterized it as defensive; that French influence had been the federal cry, till our failures made Canadian conquest the complaint. Would it not be offensive war, to withdraw the troops from Canada, and go forth on the ocean to conquer and ravage? The invasion of Canada is the best security for the whole country from hostile attacks. The coast cities and places would all be assaulted, if we did not compel the enemy to concentrate his disposable troops in Canada, where the first blow of the revolutionary war was struck, and which it cost England many campaigns to wrest from France; and we, like other people, cannot learn the science of war, but by experience. Many vessels of war had been added to the navy, and all was doing that could be to encounter the British at sea. Reduced to essential qualities, that insignificant substance may be said to have been the whole argument on which Congress dwelt, divided, enlarged, and angrily disputed for three weeks.

With provincial antiquated pronunciation, scholastic diction, sarcastic logic, yet free from personality, a cold manner, profound reverence for the most English principles of American institutions, and saturnine apprehension of French influence to which he ascribed Jefferson and Madison's politics, and the war, by powerful speeches, Mr. Webster then commenced his eminent career, more eminently forensic than parliamentary, and much more oratorical than statesmanlike. He opposed the war because declared rashly, and conducted not only feebly, but offensively, when, if ventured at all, it should be defensive. It was not enough that government could make out cause of war on paper, and get the better of England in argument. War is a question not only of right, but of prudence and expediency. Utterly astonished at nothing since; he saw how it would be prosecuted when he saw how it was begun. In the nature of things there is an unchangeable relation between rash counsels and feeble execution. Its failures were ascribed by its advocates to their opponents



distracting the country; but that was an old English ministerial false position attempted by North when he lost America, decrying the impertinent boldness of Chatham, the idle declamation of Fox, and the unanswerable sarcasm of Barré.

Disclaiming rebellious or unconstitution-al opposition, Mr. Webster demanded evidence that the purpose of government was defensive, before he voted for offensive war: opposition to which was not only constitutional and legal, but conscientious. The entertainment we were promised by those who declared it, has not been realized; no harvest of glory and greatness, as predicted. Men acting from conscientious opposition to war, causelessly undertaken, which has reduced the country from abortive offensive to futile defensive hostilities, are not to be awed by any danger. They know the limit of constitutional opposition. Up to that limit, at their own discretion, they will walk fearlessly. If they find in the history of their country a precedent for going over, he hoped they would not follow it. They were not of a school in which insurrection is taught as a virtue. They will not seek promotion through the paths of sedition, nor qualify themselves to serve their country in any of the high departments of government by making rebellion the first element of their political science. Freedom of inquiry is a home-bred right, a fireside privilege, which hath ever been enjoyed in every house, cottage, and cabin of the nation, and not to be drawn into controversy: in private, a right; in public life, a duty. Aiming at all times to be temperate and courteous in its exercise, except when the right shall be denied, he should then carry it to its extent, place himself on the extreme boundary of his right, and bid defiance to any arm that would remove him from his ground. That high constitutional privilege he would exercise within this House and without, in all places and times, in war and in peace, and living or dying, assert it.

It was the war itself, its unwise declaration, contrary to public sentiment, and conduct, since also contrary to it, that rendered it weak. The people do not desire to acquire more territory, or wage war with the savages of the interior for maritime rights, for sailors' rights with the tribes of the Propleet. The nominal majority for war he attributed to party cohesion; the force of opposition to it to the prevalence of public sentiment against it. And party support is insufficient for war in this country, where the people must be embodied for it. They do not feel adequate motive for the conquest of Canada. The bordering people are kindred, loath to shed each others' blood. In some of the affairs we call battles, because we have nothing else to give the name to, brother has been armed against brother, and father against son.

"I honor," said Mr. Webster, "the people that shrink from such warfare, which none but cannibals could enjoy. The people of Canada are all against your war on their government, and so are the yeomanry of the Northern States, whom neither persuasion nor threat will enlist. Last year a bounty of sixteen dollars, increased this year to one hundred and twenty-four dollars, tells the enemy and the world, tells every body but the government, that war for conquest of Canada is impracticable. The Northern states alone armed or unarmed, would overrun Canada in thirty days, if so inclined. As early as 1745 they raised 5000 men and took Louisburg from the French. With adequate motive Massachusetts could now furnish forty thousand men. Two Canadian campaigns have failed, and no where had you as many as 5000 men together. Whenever attacked, the American people have defended themselves; but whenever defence ceases and invasion begins, they stop. They do not choose to pass the line, which, without serious obstacle, rises like a Chinese wall against their sentiments. What, then, should be done? Withdraw your invading armies, abandon commercial restrictions; and embargo annihilating trade by color of power to regulate it. The constitution sprung from commerce, for which war is waged by those who never heard the surges of the sea, nor have any idea of a ship until they come from beyond their western hills to protect the maritime rights of those who remonstrated against it, with eight-tenths of the seamen of the country; war for maritime rights thus forced on those alone interested in them. In the commerce of the country the constitution had its birth. In its extinction it will find its grave. The faith of the nation is pledged to its commerce. I conjure and entreat you," said Mr. Webster, "to redeem it; and without menace forewarn you of consequences, unless you alter your course. Badly as I think of the original grounds and conduct of the war, I will aid in measures of defence and protection to procure just and honorable peace. Give up futile projects of invasion. Unclasp the iron grasp of embargo. Let it not be said that not one ship of force, built since the war, floats on the ocean. Turn the current of your efforts into that channel worn deep and broad to receive it. A naval force competent to defend your coast, convoy your trade, and perhaps raise the blockade of your rivers is no chimera. If war must continue, go to the ocean; if contending for maritime rights, go to the theatre where they can be defended. There the united wishes and efforts of the nation will go with you. Our party divisions, acrimonious as they are, cease at the water's edge; lost in attachment to national character on that element where that character is



made respectable. In protecting naval interests by naval means, you will arm yourselves with the whole power of national sentiment, and may command the whole abundance of national resources; in time enable yourselves to redress injuries when offered, and if need be, accompany your own flag throughout the world with the protection of your own cannon."

So favorable was the effect of Mr. Webster's speech on the war party, that it was supposed he had resolved to support it, provided its operations were bestowed at sea instead of on Canada. Among the last published editions of his speeches, that first, produced obviously with his own revision, together with his other speeches of that period, does not appear; though the sentiments, terms, and force of the first, certainly do no discredit to the greater celebrity acquired by those of later date. Without denial of the justice and adequate causes of war, his argument struck at its wisdom and expediency; and eloquently promised to support it if directed from conquest in Canada to defence at sea. Mr. Calhoun, and others, charged the federalists with unpatriotic refusal of supplies. But, though they voted against the loans and army, the taxes and most other means of carrying on hostilities, there was nothing in such a speech as Mr. Webster's, of which I give but a faint outline, obnoxious to the charge of refusing supplies, or opposing the war without reason.

On the auspicious 22d of February, 1814, John Forsyth surprised the House of Representatives by his first elaborate speech, from the pedestal of which he rose to become, during many years service in both Houses of Congress, a conspicuous, attractive, and effective public speaker; formidable by the power of oratory unpremeditated, pungent, not aggressive, but retorting; which recommended him to President Monroe for Minister to Spain, not his fittest place, and to Presidents Jackson and Van Buren as their Secretary of State, in which department he was honourable and respectable, though, as elsewhere, indolent. I was in the Supreme Court, which quorums of both Houses then often frequented to hear the commanding disputations of Pinkney and Dexter on constitutional and prize law, when a member of the House, John G. Jackson, informed me that Forsyth was making an extraordinary speech at the other side of the capitol. The representative hall was then arranged as now, after undergoing, since, several experimental transpositions in fruitless endeavors to overcome its incurable acoustic miscontrivance. The Speaker's chair was then, as now, south, and the two parties sat as at present, the Federalists on his left, like the Whigs now, the Republicans, or Democrats, on his right. But, as there were from thirty

to forty more of the latter than the former, some few unavoidably took seats among the party they voted against, among whom was Mr. Forsyth. Not long before he united with the federalists, on Mr. Clay's retirement, to elect Mr. Cheves his successor as Speaker, instead of the special war and administration candidate, Felix Grundy. During all the first, and nearly three months of the second session, Forsyth sat mute, or nearly so, taking no prominent part on the floor. When, therefore, after such lapse of reserve as led to impressions of, at any rate, oratorical insignificance, and doubts of party entirety, rising in the midst of his federal neighbors, he fulminated gracefully and defyingly, a war harangue, the surprise of all parties, delight of his own, and disappointment of their opponents, were manifested at his unsparing denunciations, bursting like a bomb on the House. With a handsome face, charming voice, graceful action, and ready elocution, from his youth at college always distinguished as a speaker, without premeditation or labor, few members of Congress commanded more attention. Like many captivating public speakers, Mr. Forsyth was one of whom no perfect idea can be formed without listening to and feeling the influence of his voice, manner, and address, his many physical advantages, without any salient peculiarity. Mr. Grosvenor and Mr. Hanson, particularly, had spoken with fierce freedom. "The opposition," said the National Intelligencer, "had been allowed to emit their most poisonous venom, and it was proper the antidote should be applied, as it was, in a spirit and tone which the language of habitual defiance not only justified but required. Without disrespect to others, we may be allowed particularly to commend the able, patriotic, and spirited speech of Mr. Forsyth, exhibiting the fire of genius, which, like the fire of the flint, severe collision can only awaken from its repose." Like the spark, it may be added, it dazzled and went out. The questions of that contest were, indeed, many of them, so temporary, that a digest or repetition of them would be without much of their actual excitement. And few discourses have left less of their immediate impressions than John Forsyth's, who became what Thomas Grosvenor then was, the readiest impromptu debater of his time. "I wish it understood," said he, "that my object is not to defend the government, but to show that the opposition to it is indefensible. In Mr. Gaston's correct and polished language, what means his dark intimation that *now* the majority can speak freely of the Emperor of the French?" Averring that no one denied there was just cause of war, Mr. Forsyth extensively repelled the charge, that it was produced by French subornation against England, "miscalled the bulwark of our

religion, whose atrocities disprove that New England ascription." After extensive review of the causes of the contest, and its continuance, of which subsequent events make irksome the repetition, Mr. Forsyth, addressing Mr. Webster's assertion of the freedom of opposition, said "that threats of physical strength were not constitutional objections. The direct tendency of the conduct of a portion of the Legislature of Massachusetts leads to separation of the Union. Inflammatory resolutions, violent complaints of injustice, stimulate public prejudice, and prepare for more decided steps, which he mentioned, not from fear," said Mr. Forsyth, "but to express my profound contempt for their impotent madness. Fear and interest hinder the factious spirits from executing their wishes. If a leader should be found bad and bold enough to try, one consolation for virtue is left, that those who raise the tempest will be the first victims of its fury."

When debate on the loan bill had consumed more than two weeks in daily speeches, Mr. Calhoun said, the objections were all reducible to two; first, that the loan cannot be had; secondly, that the war is inexpedient: both of which he denied extensively. Of men impressed, we estimate six thousand; the British confess sixteen hundred. Under pretext of taking her own seamen, Great Britain converts the commerce and navigation of the world into a nursery of seamen for the British Navy. After reviewing that question, he proceeded to the commercial causes of war. The magic charge of French influence, by which England spell-bound the world, including this country, had lost its charm by English triumphs. All Europe must unite with us to prevent the ocean's becoming English property; since we have broken the trident of British naval invincibility. Without resistance even unto war, and supposing our opponents in power, American commerce must have been destroyed by English illegalities. The momentary inconvenience to Massachusetts will be repaired by the greatest share of commercial prosperity with peace. Whether war is offensive or defensive, depends on its cause; and so considered, ours is defensive war. Supplies in whatever shape, are opposed by those who are bold in facing bankruptcy, refusing a loan which would be to shock private as well as public credit. All the analogies of private life teach, that when war is lawfully begun, party should not oppose, though it may disapprove it, which would be like a son taking side against his father, if disapproving his conduct. The justice of the war was acknowledged by the votes of Mr. Quincy, Mr. Emott and other leading federalists in the House, when the preliminary steps were taken. What are to be the limits of opposition now? If they withhold sup-

plies, because the war is unjust, will not that reason justify further resistance? If the pledged public faith is no obligation, is the Constitution any more? How far a minority in war may justly go in opposition, is a question of the greatest delicacy. Among ourselves we may divide; but in relation to other people, we ought to be one nation. Government can, indeed, command the hand and arm, but they are powerless without the people's heart. Union and zeal, more than numbers, are the elements of power. Whenever attachment to party is stronger than to country, faction takes place. The war, Mr. Calhoun said, had done much in liberating this country from dread of British power, prevalent before it was declared. If we have done little against England, she has done less against us. Rebellion, civil war, conflagrated towns, prostrated credit predicted, have not been realized. English power, till we defied it, was too great for our complete independence. With the independence of thought and action we have acquired military knowledge. Connected with this I rejoice, said he, to behold the amazing growth of our manufacturing interests, which will more than indemnify the country for all its losses. No country, however great and variant its staples, can acquire a state of great and permanent wealth, without the aid of manufactories. Reason and experience both support the position. Our internal strength and means of defence are greatly increased by them. War, when forced on us hereafter, will find us with ampler means; and will not be productive of that distressing vicissitude which follows it, where the industry of the country is founded on commerce and agriculture dependent on a foreign market. Even our commerce in the end will partake of the benefits. Rich means of exchange with all the world will be furnished to it, and the country will be in a much better condition to extend to it efficient protection.

It is impossible to condense without injustice to them, and irksomeness to the readers of this sketch, more of the many voluminous speeches of those three weeks' debate, when the war underwent that merely temporary and mostly party discussion, of which events soon superseded the interest. Brief outlines of those of the three young statesmen, then rising to distinction, are offered as profiles of their promise. William Gaston, Alfred Cuthbert, John G. Jackson, John McLean, William Lowndes, Timothy Pickering, Morris Miller, Samuel Sherwood, John Alexander, John Rhea, Thomas Grosvenor, Joseph Pearson, Bolling Robertson, Robt. Wright, Alexander Hanson, I and others entered the lists, during the three weeks that the controversy lasted. At length, on the 3d March, 1814, late in the day, when Mr. Grosvenor



was called to order by the Speaker for what he deemed an offensive expression, before he could get the floor again, evidently for a long speech, Jonathan Fisk supplanted him by the previous question, and the bill was ordered to be engrossed for third reading. Next day, on the passage of that bill, Richard Stamford, James Fisk and Roger Nelson, resumed the debate, and the bill, unimportant as to any principle involved, except those engrafted on a mere loan, passed the House by ninety-seven ayes, strict war-party votes, to fifty-five nays, the whole present opposition. "The question," said the *Intelligencer* of the next morning, "would probably not have been taken last night, as we know several gentlemen intended to speak, but for the great sensation created in the House by the temper of Mr. Grosvenor's speech. After which, by a majority of forty, the House determined to close a scene, in which unlimited indulgence and liberality on the part of the majority had extorted from their opponents nothing but invective and personality;" censure, heavier than the offence; for most of the opposition speeches were not more violent or disorderly than English parliamentary license.

On the 5th April, 1814, a bill was reported by Mr. Eppes, from a select committee, fixing the meeting of the next session of Congress the third Monday of October, inasmuch as the war might continue, he said, and then the taxes must be put in operation, which passed afterwards, fixing the last Monday of October as the day; and Mr. Ingham's resolution was adopted after some opposition, directing the Secretary of the Treasury to report at the next session a general tariff of duties; Mr. Lowndes objecting to Alexander McKim's amendment, which was rejected, to extend the specific duties as far as practicable. One of the last movements of the last hour of the session, was a motion by Morris Miller, for a select committee to sit during the recess, with power to send for persons and papers, to inquire into the causes of the failure of our arms on the Northern and North-western frontiers; for which twenty-nine members voted, mostly federalists; with them, Macon, Bradley and Stanford, who (Stanford) professed to be of the democratic party. The action of any committee of the House of Representatives, when Congress is not in session, is an irregularity.

On the 4th of April, Mr. Calhoun, from the committee of foreign affairs, reported a bill to repeal the embargo and non-importation acts, and another bill to prohibit the exportation of gold and silver coins and bullion. After some conversation, in which Messrs. Calhoun, Ingham, Webster, Macon and Pitkin took part, and rejecting several motions on the subject, it was referred to

the committee of the whole. A national bank had then begun to be much talked of; rather than which, as the finances were every day declining, General Desha launched one of those wild schemes of paper money, which are almost the universal resort and frequent perdition of governments in such crises. That resolution was to inquire into the expediency of emitting not exceeding fifteen millions of treasury notes, in sums from ten dollars to a thousand, bearing six per cent. interest, payable quarterly, and redeemable in five years; with taxes on watches, gold seals, plate, boots and fine hats, to pay the interest. Felix Grundy declared his preference for a bank; Alexander McKim said he found it necessary, when his business was small, to be exceedingly cautious in signing promissory notes, and that government should never issue notes without providing adequate taxes for their redemption; Mr. Eppes objected to paper money, or more treasury notes than already authorized; William Barnett warmly advocated any money or taxes that would carry on the war; General Desha pronounced treasury notes no worse paper money than bank notes, which Willis Alston reaffirmed; but Jonathan Fisk declared that the mere reference of such a proposition would spread alarm at the prospect of such a mass of paper money to be thrown into circulation; and Desha's scheme was rejected by one hundred and eight votes to thirty-seven, but all the minority of the war party. The shadows began to cast themselves forward of a financial failure and national bank. As soon as we had done with Desha's affair, consideration of Grundy's motion to appoint a select committee for a bank was resumed, and Newton's motion for its indefinite postponement came within nine votes of succeeding, 71 to 80; mixed votes, but the war party mostly affirmative; my impression being that it was quite too near the day fixed for closing the session to take up so momentous a topic.

The shackles of that hard servitude to questionable law, indefinite commercial restraint, were never borne with patience. While the war party in New England maintained, and throughout the rest of the Union applauded it, not only the Eastern people and their representatives in Congress, but others continually remonstrated against and combated commercial restriction. On the 10th of January, 1814, Christopher Gore moved in the Senate to suspend the embargo as to coasting trade, which was refused by 23 votes to 10; on the 2d of March, 1814, Robert Wright, a vehement adherent of administration, proposed in the House of Representatives to suspend it during negotiations for peace, for which he got 65 votes to 68; on the 14th of March, 1814, William Gaston moved to repeal the embargo and non-intercourse

acts, rejected by 86 votes to 58; on the 17th of March, 1814, Mr. Wood proposed to exclude fishing, fire-wood and lime coasters, bound from State to State, negatived by 80 to 63; on the 26th of March, 1814, Mr. Webster carried a select committee, who reported, on the 28th of March, pursuant to a petition from the inhabitants of Portsmouth, to import lime from Thomastown and Camden. These restless movements, if not all honest, were nevertheless indicative of irrepressible local disquiets.

On the 6th of April, 1814, on Mr. Calhoun's motion, the House went into committee of the whole, James Pleasants being called to the chair, on the bill to repeal the embargo. The war, Mr. Calhoun said, was for free trade and sailors' rights, against the British maritime policy to destroy our free trade and seamen's rights. To counteract her assaults on neutral commerce, it was our policy to cultivate the good will of commercial nations. The restrictive was a pacific and temporary policy, and in his opinion, should have ended with our war. But now that nearly all Europe is open to our commerce, there should be no embargo. Opening our ports to the maritime nations, would lead them to make common cause with us, who would be irritated by English paper blockades stopping their trade with the United States. Persistence now in the restrictive system would be inconsistent with the reason of its establishment. As to the manufacturing interest, the vote on Mr. Ingham's resolution was a strong pledge that the House would not suffer that to be unprotected; at all times and under every policy he hoped it would be protected. Mr. Webster rejoiced to read the funeral obsequies of the restrictive system, about to be consigned to the tomb. Like faith, it had been adhered to without reason, and its character would never be known till abandoned. It was expiring with general execration. The country had never been told till now that it was dependent on European politics. It had been called an American system. But as soon as French predominance has ceased, it falls with it. Its coincidences were obvious with the French continental system. It was now confessed to have been a system of co-operation with France. It was a great error to render the politics of this country dependent on those of Europe. Nothing is more injurious to a commercial country than frequent changes of system. As to the restrictive system promoting infant manufactures, the administration would sacrifice them if need be, with as little remorse as the merchants. He was an enemy to rearing manufactures in hot-beds. Those compatible with the interest of the country should be fostered, but he never wished to see a Sheffield or Birmingham in this country, the true spirit of whose constitution

did not empower government to change the habits of whole sections of the country, but to protect all in the pursuit of their own avocations.

Those two rising statesmen took their first stands both against what finally became the declared doctrine of their public lives, each more consistent in change than by adhering to original positions.

Alexander McKim, an intelligent Baltimore merchant, moved to retain the non-importation acts, which were repealed by one section, for which he was supported by only 31 votes. Mr. Bradley proposed to allow commerce in neutral vessels forbidden to our own, in which he was supported by Timothy Pickering and Timothy Pitkin, opposed by James Fisk, Elisha Potter, Robert Wright, and Thomas Newton, and the motion rejected. Before the final question was taken, Mr. Calhoun replied to Mr. Webster's charge of French co-operation, which he denied, and French influence, which he said he despised. If Mr. Webster's policy had been pursued, American commerce would have been entirely under English control. Mr. Webster rejoined that the good old-fashioned policy was the best; to rely on ourselves, and not on others. William Reed opposed the repeal of the embargo while the Russian mediation was pending, because it would drain the country of specie. The bill required neutral vessels to be manned with their own seamen, and prohibited any American citizen from going in their vessels without a passport: which part Mr. Forsyth moved to reject, but it was retained after some debate, though opposed by several of the most respectable members of both parties.

Next day, the 6th of April, 1814, when that bill was resumed in the House, Mr. McKim made a strenuous effort to keep the non-importation law as a security to infant manufactures, which he estimated as a national interest of two hundred millions, and our utmost exports at sixty millions, so that the manufactures added probably a hundred millions to the agricultural interest. He feared that the English manufacturers would overwhelm ours. Mr. Calhoun answered that with the double duties they had fifty per cent. protection, which was enough, and Mr. McKim's effort got but 34 votes. Finally, after a great deal more contest that day, the repeal passed by 115 ayes to 37 nays, the latter being the remnant of the large administration majority once taught to rely on national self-denial and passive suffering as preferable to the inconveniences and chances of war.

When the bill was reported in Senate, Joseph Anderson, Outerbridge Horsey, Rufus King, David Daggett and John Taylor urged a suspension of the rule preventing three readings of a bill in one day, so that the embargo and non-importation



might be forthwith annulled; which William Giles, Samuel Dana, and Eljijus Fromentin opposed, and prevented. On the 12th of April 1814, rejecting the sections concerning neutrals and seamen, the Senate passed the bill almost unanimously, only four of the least influential senators voting against the repeal; on the same day the House without debate on Mr. Calhoun's motion, by a vote of 68 to 52, concurred in the Senate amendments, and finally passed the bill.

It was known, and published at that time, that Jefferson acquiesced in that abrogation of his favorite and abortive experiment to prevent war by unlimited embargo, non-intercourse, non-importation, and permanent commercial restrictions on a nation confederated for the furtherance of commerce, which he thought would have succeeded, had it not been prematurely relinquished. But questionable as was its constitutionality, still more doubtful was the feasibility of such painful and irritating privations inflicted on the navigating parts of the Union, who during seven years submitted to despotic regulations, gradually, as was to be expected, infringed by innumerable devices, but still always legally upheld. When the Senate rejected the bill which the House sent to them, prohibiting the delivery by the courts on bonds of goods secured under the non-importation law, the last hope of the restrictive system failed, and it was a dead letter on the statute book. The armed neutrality, the continental system of Europe, and the restrictive system of the United States were all in vain aimed at that enormous monopoly of commerce which Great Britain created and continually increased by irresistible naval ascendancy till her own wonderful constancy and success in war opened nearly all Europe to her manufactures again, thus rendering the American restriction of commerce less injurious to her than to the United States and their European customers. Repeal of the embargo, therefore, was more obviously necessary than its original enactment and persisting maintenance. War of itself interdicted all trade between enemies, both by law and in effect, and neutral vessels could be the only legal bearers of any commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain. Impost on them and our own, was expected to contribute revenue for warcharges. The repeal, however, was not an act of submission, to fear or to opposition, but a war measure, to give activity to cotton, tobacco, flour, and other staples, the export of which, it was reckoned, might yield an income of ten millions a year, on which government could borrow, at the same time enabling the producer of our staples to pay direct taxes, for the first time during many years imposed on them.

Retrospect of that experiment of free

government, by which it outdid despotic in severity of universal pressure on the community, causes admiration of the law-abiding patience of the Eastern people, extremely distressed by interruption of their livelihood, and though taught to evade, yet never provoked forcibly to resist laws, which legists and legislatures denounced as unconstitutional and void. A majority believed that Jefferson was an instrument of Bonaparte's conquests, terrifying America as well as Europe, and enabling England, by the resemblance of the American restrictive to his continental system, to spread alarm that the American was part of the French scheme of destruction of trade. Yet under all these causes for forcible resistance there was none. By industry paralyzed and property depreciated, the losses were incalculable; during the seven years of embargo, non-intercourse, and non-importation, much greater than the nearly three years war. Nor did commercial restriction prepare for, any more than prevent, war. Angry discontent was increased, not allayed by President Jefferson's relaxation of his experiment on the assurance of a Massachusetts senator, Mr. Adams, that it was indispensable to prevent resistance and perhaps disunion. By proclaiming Henry's attempt at disunion, President Madison introduced war with embittered animosity of the accused of New England, whom it failed to convict, and whom it was impolitic to inflame by accusation without conviction. Notwithstanding injuries and indignities, the people of New England clung to the Union, when some of their ambitious and impoverished politicians were excited to calculate and deny its value. Another year's war, if successful, as was probable, would have marshaled the fighting men, the yeomen of the Eastern States under the national banner, to which a much greater number of them than from any other part of the Union rallied in the War of the Revolution. War was infinitely less odious or painful to them than passive and supine restraint. In vain did the authors of an inglorious system of commercial self-denial plead precedents of the Revolution, when twice, American non-importation acts forced Great Britain to yield. Jefferson's honest experiment bequeathed to Madison to govern without army or navy, and resist foreign enemies without war, proved total failures, more costly than war, and much more odious to the people and dangerous to the Union.

On the 14th of April 1814, Cyrus King made a last and urgent effort to repeal the act against licenses to trade. Many American vessels detained in foreign ports could not come home without them, he said; nor would there be any submission to the enemy, for in the exterminating war raging between France and England such licenses were used. The House by a vote agreeing

to consider his resolution, a long and sharp debate ensued, in which the resolution was supported by Governor Wright, Mr. Grosvenor, Mr. Sheffey, and Mr. Gaston, who (the latter) proposed to modify the act, instead of repealing it, by authorizing licenses under the President's supervision. Mr. Calhoun, James Fisk, Mr. Murfree, Mr. Sharp, Mr. Rhea, Mr. McKim, Mr. Potter, Mr. Duvall, and I, spoke against the motion; King and Fisk becoming at last very personal and recriminating. By 81 votes to 49, the House refused to repeal or modify the act. James Fisk then carried a motion for his favorite project of strengthening the revenue laws to prohibit smuggling by provision for the removal of suits from state to the Federal courts, which, on Saturday the 16th of April, the last business day of that session, the House refused to consider, and in which he never finally succeeded till so late in the next session, that the war closed before it could be available.

On the first of April, 1814, a member of the House of Representatives, John Dawson, died, not of wounds, but disease contracted by following as a volunteer the Northern army on its disastrous campaign the year before: a tall, well-looking, fashionably dressed and rather taciturn bachelor, commonly called Beau Dawson. For sixteen successive years he represented the same Virginia district; not an orator, or conspicuous personage, but regular attendant, reliable voter, and veteran politician. From the time he came of age, till near fifty years old, when he died, he was hardly ever out of public life, which was his only vocation, and nearly always by popular election. President Jefferson, to whose school of politics he belonged, conferred on him the complimentary mission of carrying to France the ratified treaty of Louisiana, by which excursion Mr. Dawson's tastes for the gay and the elegant were gratified. His successor was Philip P. Barbour, afterwards Speaker of the House, and Judge of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Soon after Mr. Dawson's demise, on the 5th April, 1814, a more athletic and successful member, follower of the war, Colonel Richard M. Johnson, resumed his seat in the House of Representatives, on crutches and much mutilated, but with spirit unbroken, inexhaustible good nature, and more incapacity than ever to say "no" to any one about anything; a talent extremely rare and difficult in our popular government. On the last sultry night of the first session of the thirtieth Congress, August 14th, 1848, Colonel Johnson, who had been a member in both Houses for more than twenty years, and Vice President, was there again, anxiously soliciting an Indian appropriation. In 1814 he was an object of universal admiration, as if, notwithstanding all modern humanities, the first of vir-

tues is the military, so deemed by the Romans. In 1848, Congress reluctantly and irregularly voted grants to the families of Jefferson and Hamilton, and indirectly to the impoverished conqueror of Tecumseh.

Monday, the 18th April, 1814, that session of Congress ended, by adjournment till the last Monday of October, after having disposed of all but what was left as unfinished business. The final movement concerning the war was a resolution submitted by Morris L. Miller for a committee to sit during the recess, with power to send for persons and papers, to inquire into the causes of the failure of our arms on the northern and northwestern frontier; which unwarrantable demand was rejected by 68 to 29 votes. The House did not find it necessary to sit later than nine o'clock in the evening of Saturday, and Monday was a day of mere completion, without undertaking any more business.

Though much was done by the legislation of that session to create a navy and invigorate the army, yet was it the untimely and culpable semi-official boast of the administration, that "no law was passed during the session to lay additional taxes on the people; the only acts respecting revenue were those authorizing a loan and treasury notes, calculated, together with the revenue from impost and internal duties, to raise a sufficient sum to meet the large appropriations made for the service of the current year." The same authoritative announcement confessed also that the necessity of raising a revenue was a motive for repealing the restrictive system, "over which a veil of concealment was thrown during the discussions in Congress. That veil raised, exhibited the fact that the alternative was repeal of that system, or imposition of additional taxes for 1815, amounting, in case the war continued, to more than five millions annually, more than doubling the then rates of internal taxation." Such further acknowledgment of the inefficiency of self-restraint glaringly impugned it by its authors, whose inveterately fallacious hope of peace, and dread of burdening a people willing to bear any burden for supporting the war, were still uncured. In none of its lessons was the war more instructive, than that free people shrink less than their government from the discomforts, perils and charges of war.

After the Senate had disposed of all their business, Vice President Gerry stated, with reference to the question that had been raised as to a temporary president of that body, that it had been the practice ever since the act of 1792, for the Vice President to retire, in order that the Senate might elect a president pro tempore, to adjourn them, and that he should do so.

On the 22d April, 1814, died at Washington in his 74th year, Samuel A. Otis, Sec-



retary of the Senate from its first organization at New York, in 1789: during five-and-twenty years of his faithful incumbency, not one day absent from a place, the duties of which he performed with exemplary punctuality and intelligence. He was the father of Harrison Gray Otis. His successor was Charles Cutts, brother-in-law of President Madison, whose most considered competitor for the succession was William W. Seaton, one of the editors of the *National Intelligencer*. As a method of superseding Mr. Cutts, with whom the Senate became dissatisfied, after he had been eleven years their Secretary, that body introduced for the first time, in 1826, a system of biennial elections of their Secretary, by which Walter Lowrie was chosen, both Cutts and Lowrie having been Senators before they were chosen clerks. During the first thirty-six years of Senatorial existence, there were no pernicious and disreputable changes of such officers, by which mercenary thirst for place is induced, not less inconvenient to the Senate than injurious to individual aspirants, thus invited to multiply, compete and intrigue for a clerkship, to which no Senator should descend, and from which numbers of claimants should be discountenanced.

When, after three weeks' debate in the House, the Loan Bill passed by only the administration majority overruling the party minority, the *National Intelligencer*, uttering the sentiments of most of the former, accused the federalists of want of patriotism. The principal point of all their objections was that the money was to be raised for the war. On a bill to maintain the credit of the nation, had they a right to inquire whether it was just to pay debts for which acts of Congress had pledged the public faith? The Loan Bill did not propose money to carry war into Canada, yet was opposed, because to defeat it, would arrest such hostilities, and overthrow the administration. Such ground the government journal complained, would justify a future Congress in acting on the execrable idea, more than hinted at by a number of the opposition, of distinguishing between former national debts as just, and those of this war to be disregarded, as unjust; though no one, however violent, denies the integrality of public debt, incapable of classification, or gradation. The public faith once pledged, must remain forever inviolable, amid all the storms of party, changes of administration, and even the uprootings of revolution. The federal party, therefore, would bankrupt the treasury, causing confusion, anarchy, and ignominious submission to the enemy, as must have resulted from the success of their opposition to the loan. Such was the angry argument of the moment: but is it the verdict of history? In Congress, as elsewhere, the war and administration were stigmatized

as wicked, imbecile, and ruinous, by accusers, who, in turn, were branded as a desperate and nefarious faction, refusing their country supplies in time of need, giving aid and comfort to the common enemy of all parties. The federal minority voted against many of what must be deemed supplies, mostly alleging that they did so to put a stop to the war, few of them, however, absolutely denying its justice or necessity, which are convertible terms, or contending that it should be left entirely without support, having been, as they contended, unwisely declared, inopportune and improvidently undertaken, wholly unprepared, unjustly selecting England as the enemy, instead of France, or both; and declared against England under French influence, by an administration weak and wicked, incapable of its vigorous and successful prosecution, whose object was conquest of Canada, not defence of maritime wrongs. Without impracticable and forbidden imputation of motives, and denial of assertions which cannot be positively disproved, may history condemn votes as against the country, or even the war, which, predicated opposition to the Executive, averred nevertheless sincere attachment to the country, and seldom if ever denounced even the mere war, but its time, manner, or some other collateral circumstance? Violent and factious parties are parcel of the freedom of this country, and when government has all the constitutional power, its measures will and should be watched, criticised, and counteracted by a jealous minority. There were members and measures of Congress trespassing beyond party, and inflamed by faction. Individuals, the press, and even State authorities preached unpatriotic, some of them practiced traitorous, opposition. Mutinous party passions excited inevitable personal, local, and sectional prejudices and animosities; language of extreme abuse was applied by both parties to each other. But tested by votes in Congress, which are the best evidence of intentions, there is no reason to sentence the opposition at that time, embracing many of the most respectable and approved citizens, to historical reproach for want of patriotic adherence to their country. The Hartford Convention, and acts of Congress to compel the whole population by drafts to carry arms, against which many revolted as conscription for foreign conquest, shall be fairly submitted to the reader's judgment when we reach that stage of the narrative. But avowed refusal of supplies never was resorted to by the minority in Congress till then, if ever. On the 14th of January, 1814, when the first war measure of that session—the bill to fill the ranks of the regular army—was read the third time, and the question was on its final passage, Daniel Sheffey moved, by way of rider to it, that the troops enlisted should be limited as to service to

the defence of the territories and frontiers of the United States, or such part thereof as the President might elect and determine; on which proposition a strict party vote of all the members present, by 103 ayes to 54 ayes, indicated as well as could be the declared sentiments of both parties as to the war: ours, that what our opponents condemned as offensive was the most effectual defensive war; theirs, that they would support defensive but not offensive war; the insincerity of which, their avowed position, who could prove? What right had we to accuse them of striving to compel dishonorable submission? On the 5th of March, 1814, the annual appropriation bill for the navy passed the House by 121 ayes to 9 nays, all of the nine negatives being from the North and East, one from New Jersey, three from New York, and five from New England—all, but Elisha Potter, of Rhode Island, members of no note, but all federalists. The same navy bill passed the Senate unanimously, every Senator present putting his name on the journal for it. The army appropriation bill, on the 7th March, 1814, passed the House by 82 ayes to 38 nays, and the Senate by 22 ayes to 10 nays, all party votes. The general appropriation bill passed both Houses without opposition, except the item of fifty thousand dollars for the expenses of foreign missions, which uncommonly large grant of secret service money was carried by 69 ayes to 52 nays. The amended militia bill passed the 29th March, 1814, by party votes, 88 to 53. The loan bill the 3d March, 1814, by 97 ayes to 53 nays, a strict party vote; but after three weeks of provoking controversies by debate in both wings of the capitol, fomented by the party presses and other contributions from without of fuel to the flames. Notwithstanding the sentence of partisans in 1814, the judgment of history, after thirty-five years of calm consideration, must be that patriotism predominated, not unalloyed, (when is it?) by party; but on the whole that country triumphed over party in Congress.

Of contemplated but unexecuted movements of that session, may be mentioned a proposal by Israel Pickens, a respectable North Carolina member, afterwards Governor of Alabama, to amend the Constitution for the election of presidential electors and members of Congress in single districts, which he afterwards abandoned as to the latter, and which was rejected as to the former by a mixed vote of 64 ayes to 83 nays. John G. Jackson, afterwards District Judge of Virginia, proposed an amendment of the Constitution, never urged to action on it, to empower Congress to tax exports, make roads and canals and establish a national bank. Elijus Fromentin in Senate, and Thomas Bolling Robertson in the House, moved to regulate the right of expatri-

ation as well as naturalization, which, by act of the 30th July, 1813, at the prior session, was extended to residents in the United States on the day of the declaration of war, who had before declared their intention to become citizens, or those entitled to become such, without having so declared, though alien enemies according to prior laws. Mr. Fromentin connected his motion on this subject with a plan for ascertaining many statistical details. Cyrus King made an unsuccessful attempt to have the House committee of elections chosen by ballot, as it is in the House of Commons, instead of appointment by the Speaker. Mr. Murfree got a bill passed by the House, but too late for its passage by Senate, for a survey of the coasts of the United States; and there were several movements by various members for territorial improvements by land and water. An act revived the consent of Congress to laws of the states of Maryland and Georgia for tonnage duties, to improve their ports, excepting steam vessels. It was opposed by two Connecticut members, John Davenport and Benjamin Tallmadge, and by John Reed and Cyrus King, of Massachusetts, and advocated by Maryland and Georgia members; passed without alteration in committee, Joseph Lewis in the chair, and finally by a vote by division without ayes and nays of 56 to 44, ordered to be read a third time next day; certainly without anticipation of the argument since drawn by President Polk from these acts of Congress against the constitutional power to improve rivers, harbor and lakes. I reported a bill for requiring certain post office appointments, till then within the exclusive control of the postmaster-general, to be submitted to the Senate for confirmation, and a bill for a new organization of the federal judiciary, neither of which became laws that session; though the former has since, the latter in some way is generally conceded to be indispensable. I also reported from the judiciary committee a bill which passed the House, originally proposed by John M. Taylor, but lost in Senate, requiring the Attorney-General of the United States to reside in Washington, which was believed to have occasioned William Pinkney's resignation of that place and Richard Rush's appointment to it. A Yazoo bill, much contested, became a law under the chairmanship of Mr. Oakley, who reported from a select committee of which I was a member; and a bill was reported by James Fisk from another select committee, of which also I was a member, for giving the federal courts entire control of revenue suits, which, in parts of New England, became vexatious hindrances by litigation in state courts of the war operations, particularly those to prevent smuggling and intercourse with the enemy. A bill recommended by the President to prevent the delivery of prize goods



on bonds by the courts, which passed the House, was rejected by the Senate; and an interdict of the exportation of specie, which the President also recommended, was negatived in the House of Representatives. Congress authorized the Secretary of State to cause the printing and distribution of a work comprising a thousand volumes, called Duane and Bieren's edition of the Laws of the United States. To the eighteen standing committees of the House of Representatives then ten or more have since been added, of which those on public subjects are, on Indian affairs, territories, pensions, patents, mileage, roads and canals, and agriculture. The States of Indiana represented by Jonathan Jennings as delegate, Missouri by Edward Hempstead, Illinois by Shadrach Bond, and Mississippi by William Lattimore, were then under territorial government, the embryo of that vast West which now binds the Union together.

When Mr. Gallatin left the treasury in May, 1813, the expectation was that he should resume it in six months. Nine months having elapsed without his return to its crying wants, on the 24th January, 1814, Jeremiah Mason moved in Senate a series of resolutions that, by the President's message of the 7th June, 1813, he had informed the Senate that he had commissioned Albert Gallatin to proceed to Russia, and negotiate treaties of peace with England and commerce with Russia: that by his departure, the treasury became and remains vacant, and that such vacancy affects public credit, retards current service, endangers general welfare, and ought not to exist. The question was made the order of the day for the 7th February following. On the 8th February, 1814, George W. Campbell was nominated Secretary of the Treasury and Albert Gallatin Minister to Gottenburg. Not satisfied with that partial triumph over the President, Mr. Mason, on the 14th February, 1814, moved to repeal or amend the acts of 1792 and 1795, making alterations in the treasury and war departments, and to inquire when the President may, without consent of the Senate, appoint persons to perform the duties of secretary of any of the four executive departments; but never called up the resolutions for consideration. Not content with that movement, on the 28th February, 1814, Christopher Gore moved that the President may fill vacancies happening during the recess of Senate by

commissions, to expire at the end of their next session, but that no such vacancy can happen in an office not before full; that the office of minister to negotiate peace with England, during the late recess, as stated in his message of the 29th May, was not constitutional, as the vacancy did not happen in the recess and the Senate had not consented to the nomination; wherefore they protested against the commissions of Mr. Gallatin, Mr. Adams and Mr. Bayard. Mr. Gore proposed that a committee should present his resolution to the President. That resolution, moved with closed doors, involving a cardinal denial by certain Senators of the President's constitutional power of appointment to office, on James Turner's motion was ordered to be considered in public. On the 25th March, 1814, Mr. Gore moved for copies of several commissions granted by President Washington, which prior to the debate the President sent, showing that they were not in terms limited to the end of the next session of Congress ensuing the appointment. On the 31st March, 1814, the debate began, was continued the 2d April, when Wm. Bibb by resolution called on the President for more similar commissions, and the debate was renewed on the fifth of that month: but on the twelfth, on General Smith's motion, postponed till the following December, which was equivalent to indefinitely. Outerbridge Horsey, of Delaware, a federalist, answered Mr. Gore's argument with complete demonstration that the President is authorized, when the Senate is not in session, to appoint without their confirmation to places not before occupied by incumbents, there being many occasions, especially in war, when such appointments are indispensable, and such have accordingly been made by every President.

The Senate, much the least responsible, is the most encroaching of our public bodies. In the latter end of February, 1814, Return Jonathan Meigs, Governor of Ohio, being nominated by the President to supersede Gideon Granger removed from the place of Post-master General, it was some time before Governor Meigs' nomination was confirmed, as was rumored, because certain Senators denied the President's power of removal more than appointment, without the consent of the Senate, which position, if assumed, was not, however, persisted in.

## CHAPTER III.

## EXPEDITION TO MICHILIMACINAC.

By Perry's and Harrison's victories in the autumn of 1813, the British lost Lake Erie, and most of the peninsula of Michigan. Lakes St. Clair, Huron, and Superior, together with the whole north-west, the numerous Indian tribes inhabiting their borders, and the valuable fur trade, still depended on Michilimacinae, the key of that vast region of pellucid waters and immense prairies or meadows, the American steppes. Those magnificent demesnes of savage vinery and recreation, abounded with grouse innumerable, herds of deer, and other game, much finer than any noble or royal park in the world, which they surpassed as much in picturesque scenery as in game. That fortress, surprised and taken from us as soon as war began, was the main British reliance for supplies to their Indian allies, trading and warlike intercourse with them, and combination between Eastern and Western Canada, on which depended the preservation and control of the vast wilds extending from the St. Lawrence beyond the Rocky Mountains to the almost unknown and fabulous shore of the Pacific ocean. To replenish Michilimacinae, strengthen St. Josephs, supply all the British posts, and confirm British authority throughout the borders of the northern lakes, from Lake Simcoe to the Lake of the Woods, an enterprising officer, Colonel McDouall, as soon as navigation opened in the spring of 1814, conducted detachments of troops to Michilimacinae, and beyond it. Some of them were marched by land all the way from Halifax, so enterprising and provident was British preparation against American attack of Canada. McDouall proceeded through Lake Simcoe into Lake Huron, by the River Natewasaga and Gloucester Bay, in open birch canoes, laden with stores, ammunition and supplies, braving the tempestuous weather of those northern regions, and safely deposited his freight at Michilimacinae the 18th of May, 1814; replenishing that important station with fresh troops, munitions, provisions, and whatever else was necessary for the garrison which he remained there to command. Colonel McDouall dispatched Colonel McKay, of the Indian department, with six hundred Canadian and Indian troops, who, on the 17th July, 1814, surrounded Prairie du Chien, on the Mississippi, and planted their battery of one solitary cannon against that American station. After short parley, and

no resistance, the American garrison of seventy men and three officers, surrendered a post of the utmost importance to British trade and arms, effectually securing their influence over the Indian tribes, traffic, and supplies in that region.

Our government, likewise, in the spring of 1814, planned an expedition to the north-west, the objects of which were to recapture Michilimacinae, destroy St. Josephs, and a fort which it was erroneously believed the enemy were building at Machedash, on Gloucester Bay, in the north-east corner of Lake Huron; capture a large quantity of furs and peltries, which it was also, erroneously, believed at Washington, were on their way from north-western to north-eastern Canada, and break down English power as effectually in the far west as Harrison had done in the north-west, and Jackson in the south-west. On the 15th of April, 1814, therefore, Captain Sinclair was appointed to the command of the Upper Lakes, separated from McDonough's command of Lake Champlain, and Chauncey's of Lake Ontario. Sinclair was to convey Major Holmes with a land force to destroy the British boats supposed to be building on Lake Huron, their establishment at St. Josephs, the new fort said to be building at Machedash, and capture the peltries. Some difficulties and correspondence ensued as to the command of the expedition, which the senior officer at Detroit, Lieutenant-Colonel Croghan, in the absence of Colonel Butler, insisted the Secretary of War had no right to confer by a letter direct to Major Holmes without passing through the hands of his superior officer. A similar difficulty, about the same time, on the 11th of May, 1814, caused General Harrison's retirement from the army. Throughout the war it suffered much more from insubordination of commanding officers than disobedience or indiscipline of the rank and file. Procrastinated by these causes, the expedition was not embarked at Detroit till the 3d of July, 1814, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Croghan, with Major Holmes to serve under him; Croghan, to the last, protesting that his force was too small, and that Michilimacinae, if taken, was not an object worthy of the expedition. Five hundred regular troops, and two hundred and fifty militia, embarked in Sinclair's squadron; and on the 12th of July, at Fort Gratiot, were reinforced by Colonel Cotgrove's regi-



ment of Ohio militia. The naval officers, accustomed to sea room, and unused to the novel, if not difficult, navigation of the lakes, moved so slowly through St. Clair and Lake Huron, that Indians, in their birch canoes, or by land, had plenty of time to go forward and advise McDouall of the approach of an American force, to attack him. Another reason for the extremely slow navigation was, that the commanders expected to discover, or hear of large quantities of peltries which they might capture. Except the annual single schooner, or sloop, with supplies, which, pursuant to treaty arrangement between the United States and Great Britain, traversed those waters, their navigation, theretofore, had been confined to birch bark canoes. The large brigs of war Lawrence and Niagara, with the smaller vessels composing the American squadron, were the first of such a size ever seen there. More than one thousand miles from the high seas, and upon deep waters several thousand feet above the level of the ocean, a fleet of vessels of war, with all the power and parade of armament, traversed those vast inland waters. Commodore Sinclair deemed Lake St. Clair extremely difficult and dangerous, and Lake Huron still more perplexing. Iron-bound coasts were lined by perpendicular rocks. There were no harbors but in the mouths of the rivers entering into the lakes, and no pilotage but for one main channel from Detroit to Michilimacinae; the water transparent enough to steer by, but the fogs as prevalent, thick and impenetrable as on the Banks of Newfoundland. The depth of water was so variable, that from no soundings all at once to two or three fathoms was a common occurrence and constant disquiet. The remains of thousands of large islands become mere peaks, just rising above the surface of the water, contributed to render the navigation, as the seamen considered it, extremely perilous. Dousman and Davenport, two inhabitants of English Canada, who, before the war, had become Americans, accompanied the expedition to afford their information and advice, not only as respected the lakes, but the whole course of operation. John Jacob Astor's agent, Mr. Ramsay Crooks, was also of the expedition, to point out the property of his principal, who was the head of the South-west Fur Company, and distinguish it from that of the North-west Fur Company, which was an English Association, large quantities of whose furs it was hoped to make prize of. From their connection with the Indians, annual supplies to, and constant influence over whom, it was deemed an important object to cripple their resources, and, if possible, break up their establishment.

On the 20th of July, the squadron found St. Josephs evacuated and destroyed: Major Holmes was detached with two vessels

under Lieutenant Turner of the navy, to destroy an English factory on St. Mary's Straits, which unite Lake Huron and Superior; denounced by Colonel McDouall as pillage and robbery, for which he threatened retaliation on the American villages of Ogdensburg and Hamilton on the St. Lawrence. Major Holmes, a well informed young gentleman, justified his proceedings as authorized by the laws of legitimate warfare, and Sinclair reminded McDouall of the excesses committed by the British on both our Indian and maritime frontiers. As is common in controversies between Americans and English, by public written correspondence, the loftier English insistence triumphed. Commodore Sinclair and Colonel Croghan consented to pay the extortion of fifty cents a pound for some sick cattle, the same day that Colonel Dickson, at the head of his Indian warriors, as was said and generally credited, after Croghan's repulse, tortured the American prisoners, and mangled their dead.

When the squadron at length arrived at Michilimacinae, they found the British passing boats full of men from that place to Round Island, a small island not far off, which they thus prevented Croghan's taking possession of. Colonel Croghan instantly proposed to attack Michilimacinae, stripped of its defenders. But Sinclair would not venture to expose his vessels to the lofty batteries which towered a hundred feet above their decks, an elevation from which they could fire point blank on the vessels, without their being able, as was apprehended, to return a single shot. To that omission instantly to attack Michilimacinae, some of the land officers ascribed the failure of the enterprise. On the 4th of August, 1814, the troops were well landed on a fine open beach without molestation or difficulty, and forthwith marched to attack the British, fortified beyond a dense wood. Major Holmes was in the advance on the right, gallantly leading—a promising officer befriended by Jefferson. Captain Vanhorn led the left. Our artillery was commanded by Mr. Pickett, who has since represented the United States at one of the South American Republics. Colonel Croghan was at his post in the rear full of ardor, and soldierly bearing. But there was in fact no battle, though the Americans were repulsed after losing some dozen officers and men killed, and about forty wounded. A thick wood of dwarf trees, with long low projecting limbs, interrupted the advance of our troops, crowded them together and confused their march. The same thick woods were a perfect cover to the Indian skirmishers, concealed among the trees, in the cowardly ambush from which they delight to kill and dread to leave for the exposure of an open field. A little Indian boy, not more than ten years

of age, from within ten feet of Major Holmes, pierced his breast with two balls, which struck him dead. Captain Vanhorn was killed at the same moment leading the left, and Captain Desha, standing near Major Holmes, so severely wounded in the groin as to disable him, though he refused to leave the ground. He was, I believe, the brother of General Desha, one of the Kentucky members of the House of Representatives in 1814, and afterwards represented a District in Congress from another State. Discouraged by the death of their leaders in the advance, Holmes and Vanhorn, and the inability, from his wound, of Desha, and the men being all crowded together by the low branches of thick woods seemingly filled with sharp shooters, invisible, whose destructive fire our men could not return, the regulars fell into confusion. Col. Croghan led on Cotgrove's militia regiment, who bravely moved up to the rescue of the regular troops. But the Colonel considered it too hazardous under such circumstances to persevere. The onset failed, the men were discouraged and discontented; it was risking too much to march through woods, in themselves a serious obstacle, from behind every tree of which a rifle was supposed to be leveled in the dark, and after getting through the woods, then to attack the entrenched British, about nine hundred strong, which was the total of the American force. Colonel Croghan, therefore, ordered a retreat, which the enemy suffered without interruption, leaving the American dead and wounded on the ground. It was said, that they were subjected to the usual cannibal barbarities of the Indian triumph, the dead mutilated, the wounded murdered, the hearts of some of them cut out and devoured. But Captain Gratiot, who next day went with a flag of truce for the bodies, does not confirm this imputation. On the contrary, he was treated by Colonel McDouall with great attention and kindness, and proffered whatever comforts the English stores afforded. Holmes' body was found, as left the day before, covered with leaves by Colonel Croghan's black servant.

With that unfortunate skirmish the expedition ended, the troops re-embarked, and soon after the squadron set sail on the return to Detroit. But misfortune marked every stage by water as well as by land of an unlucky enterprise, to which even the elements were adverse. A violent storm overtook the squadron sailing down the perilous waters of Lake Huron, which destroyed all their boats, save one that was picked up by their vigilant and indefatigable enemies, the plank of their rescue and of our almost miraculous and complete discomfiture.—Perry's consecrated ship, the Niagara, with four hundred regular troops on board, was saved from destruction on that iron-bound coast of perpendicular rocks by a

mere sudden change of wind. Such was the jeopardy, that total loss seemed inevitable of nearly all the adventurers of the ill-fated expedition, when a mere flaw of wind enabled them to save themselves.

On the 13th September, a detachment under Captain Gratiot landed near the mouth of the Natewasaga river, and succeeded in destroying six months' supplies of provisions deposited there for transportation to Michilimacinae. Entirely dependent on those supplies, that place was thus believed to be at length reduced, at any rate rendered useless by this destruction, provided the garrison was deprived of the means of repairing their destitution. For this purpose, Lieutenant Daniel Turner was left by Commodore Sinclair with two of the schooners of Perry's squadron, the *Tigress* and *Scorpion*, distinguished both, and one under Lieutenant Turner's command, at the battle of Lake Erie. His peremptory orders were, that, as it was all important to cut the enemy's line of communication from Michilimacinae to York, through the Natewasaga river, Lake Sinclair, &c., and on which his very existence depended, therefore Lieutenant Turner was to remain in the mouth of that river with his schooners, and keep up a rigid blockade until driven from the Lake by the inclemency of the season, suffering not a boat or canoe to pass in or out of the river. Lest the enemy's desperation should induce him to attempt boarding Turner's schooners by surprise in the night, as the blockade must starve Michilimacinae to surrender in the spring, Commodore Sinclair particularly warned Lieutenant Turner against such attempts. But disasters marked every stage of the expedition, and the blockade, like the battle, the weather, and the navigation, combined to doom American disparagement and decree English triumph. Lieutenant Worsley, of the English navy, in charge of the stores destroyed by Captain Gratiot, escaped into the woods, and in spite of whatever blockade Lieutenant Turner now maintained of the Natewasaga, on which all depended, the English lieutenant, more adroit, enterprising, or fortunate, effected his passage in an open boat to Michilimacinae. That boat, supposed to be one of those belonging to the American ships lost in the storm a few days before, picked up by some wandering Indians, was placed at Lieutenant Worsley's service; by which mere casualty, furnished with intelligence of his irreparable loss and the desperation of his condition, Colonel McDouall went to work with commensurate ardor to repair the disaster. The boat was employed stealthily by day and night to dog the American squadron as it slowly and dangerously made its way down the lake. Meantime, four batteaux were fitted and equipped at Michilimacinae,



manned by seventy of the best Lake watermen and rangers, with a detachment of Indians, commanded by the notorious Colonel Dickson, who acted as the marines of the squadron. On the first of September, Lieutenant Worsley embarked on one of the most adventurous and successful cruises of the British marine during that era of its first eclipse. The Lake was foggy, the nights dark, and even by day the navigation difficult. If the schooners discovered the batteaux before they desiered the schooners, the latter might overhaul, and with their artillery, sink their enemies without a contest. The blockade being raised, the schooners had separated, and the Tigress cruised among the numerous islands which diversify those waters. On a cloudy and dismal night, the 3d of September, Lieutenant Worsley, having warily reconnoitered and ascertained the situation of the Tigress, with the utmost silence, dexterity, and celerity, approached by means of his oars, without being detected, as the Tigress lay at anchor off St. Josephs, and with a tiger's bound his watermen and Indians leaped on board. Sailing-master Champlain, the American commander, though completely surprised, made the best resistance in his power under such circumstances against greatly superior numbers, and did not surrender till several of his men were killed or wounded, himself severely. Having thus carried one of the vessels, Lieutenant Worsley instantly resolved with that one to engage and take the other. The Scorpion, Lieutenant Turner's vessel, had a long twelve-pounder more than the Tigress, which vessel mounted but one small gun, and nothing would have been easier, but for the tide of ill luck, than for the Scorpion to subdue the Tigress. On the evening of the 5th of September, flushed with success and deserving it, Lieutenant Worsley, with a light wind, anchored the Tigress not far from the Scorpion. He had taken the signals, and no

signal was passed. The men for the vessels were picked by Commodore Sinclair from his squadron, twenty-five men added to the original crews of the schooners, and Colonel Croghan furnished some of his best soldiers as marines. Still the British much outnumbered the Americans, though that by no means detracts from the gallantry of the English exploit. Although the Scorpion was provided with boarding netting, and, in all respects, prepared by Commodore Sinclair for the apprehended endeavors of the enemy to prevent so great a hindrance as the blockade, yet the Tigress, after passing the whole night not far from the Scorpion at anchor, next morning weighed anchor, set all sail, swept down on the Scorpion, fired into, boarded and captured her almost before it was reported to Lieutenant Turner, who was below, that an enemy was thus suddenly upon him. Not an American officer was on deck at the moment; the capture of the Scorpion was as easy and quick as it was creditable to English enterprise. Throughout the war no action of the British navy was more conformable with its well-earned glory than that little enterprise on Lake Huron, which was much extolled, and, indeed, exaggerated by Canadian accounts, but not more extolled than it merited. Colonel McDouall's whole campaign, by land and water, was a series of highly creditable success; while that of the combined American forces was at least unlucky. Two of Perry's vessels were lost under mortifying circumstances. The young hero of Sandusky, to whom we were beholden for the first western victory, was unfortunate at Michilimacinae. The navy, till then, notwithstanding the ill-fated Chesapeake, everywhere superior to that of Great Britain, did not maintain its shining reputation. Those distant operations, far beyond the outskirts of civilization, however, made less sensation, and were less noticed than our Atlantic occurrences, especially in Europe.

#### CHAPTER IV.

CANADIAN PARLIAMENT—EXECUTIONS—INDIAN COUNCIL—AMERICAN TREATY WITH INDIANS—ENGLISH INDIAN PENSIONS—AMERICAN TROOPS—WAR SPIRIT—SMALL WARFARE—SHERWOOD'S INCURSION—HOLMES' EXPEDITION—PETTIPAUG—AMERICAN PLANS OF CAMPAIGN—BROWN'S MARCH TO SACKETT'S HARBOR—WILKINSON'S TO PLATTSBURG—PRING'S ATTACK ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN—BRITISH ATTACK OTSEGO—BRITISH SURPRISED AND CAPTURED AT SANDY CREEK—WILKINSON'S REPULSE AT LA COLE MILL—BROWN'S CANADIAN CAMPAIGN—CAPTURE OF FORT ERIE—BATTLES OF CHIPPEWA AND BRIDGEWATER.

THE Canadian Parliament assembled at Quebec, the 13th January, 1814, much less united or tractable than Congress, but more liberal in grants of men and money for the war. The colonial conflict of races, insti-

tutions and languages,—French, English and Americans, in the population and government, striving between a House of Representatives, indigenous, elective and free, and a Senate, European, executive and

irresponsible, with a viceroy over all, did not, amid the contests of the session, prevent vigorous and salutary legislation. The Canadian military establishment was much more respectable than that of the United States. Six battalions of embodied militia, nearly four thousand strong, other militia and provincial corps, frontier light infantry, voltigeurs, and lake sailors, at least as good as the common British seamen, constituted altogether, with their Indian allies, a considerable force, better disciplined and more obedient than ours. With the large number of veteran troops transferred that summer from Europe to America, after the conquest of France, England had military means for the defence of Canada superior to ours for its conquest. English tenure of French Canadian colonies, always precarious, was never more so than when the American Republic was vainly endeavoring, by arms, to force its laws where its free principles and population abound. That large reinforcements of veteran troops from Europe were timely successors, was shown by the trials, in May, of no less than fifteen of the inhabitants of Upper Canada for high treason, by a special court at Ancaster, under Lieutenant-General Drummond's administration of the Upper Province, of whom eight were executed by hanging, at Burlington, the 12th July, 1814, just between Brown's two victories, the 5th and 25th of that month. In the midst of these cruelties, and notwithstanding Brown's triumph, the Canadian population was not only kept in submission, but its representatives in the local parliament voted ample means, which their servants in arms applied with vigor and success to defeat much desired liberation from colonial thralldom.

On the 13th March, 1814, an embassy of chiefs and warriors from the Ottawas, Chippewas, Shawnees, Delawares, Mohawks, Sacs, Foxes, Kickapoos and Winnebagoes, northern Indians, visited Quebec, and held an imposing council with the Governor-General, Sir George Prevost, in the Castle of St. Louis. At that talk the savages urged their right by English co-operation to recovery of the lands taken from them by the Americans, and they required their old boundaries. The Prince Regent's viceroy assured those vagrant landlords of the wilderness, that their father, the King of Great Britain, considered them all his children, and would not forget them whenever peace was made with the United States, against whom he expected the Indians to persevere in hostilities. His excellency condoled with them on the death of General Tecumseh, to whose blanketed brown sister Lady Prevost, representing the fair sex of Great Britain, presented mourning dresses and ornaments. Colonel Dickson was sent from Quebec to the north-west,

loaded with presents for the Indians beyond Lakes Michigan and Huron, who were caressed and courted by all the means of English conciliation.

Next month Louis the Eighteenth, with his family, attended a chapter of Knights of the Garter, at Carlton House, the palace of the Prince Regent, in London, where, surrounded by peers, prelates, judges and ladies, that order of knighthood was conferred on the King of France, who, in return, conferred the order of the Holy Ghost on the regent's brother, the Duke of York. Swords, ribbons, personal ornaments and lands were the rewards by which princes and savage warriors were alike encouraged to expose life in battle; the Indian and royal ceremonials not very different on the two continents, at London and Quebec; and the philosophy of the whole much the same.

Indian hostilities always among the most terrible of British warfare against America, after that congress of the allied powers, Indian and English at Quebec, were provided against on our part by a commission, consisting of General Harrison, Governor Shelby, and Colonel Johnson, appointed by the President, in June, 1814, to treat with the north-western Indians, at Greenville. Shelby and Johnson declining to serve, Generals Cass and Adair were substituted; but Gen. Adair did not attend. From the 20th of June till July, 1814, Generals Harrison and Cass received the tribes to the number of one thousand warriors, with three thousand followers, most of whom had been employed with the English in the war against the United States; who engaged to take up the tomahawk against their old allies. But most of the Pottowatomies, Winnebagoes, and Chippewas persisted in their English alliance offensive and defensive. By the treaty of the same name, negotiated at the same place in 1795, these Indians had stipulated to remain at peace and neutral in the event of war with England. They desired neutrality in 1814, which was refused, because they had, in violation of the treaty of 1795, taken up arms against us. From that time during the rest of the conflict, the Indians ceased to be formidable; their power, numbers, spirit and character reduced and degraded by American resistance to English subornation. At Ghent a faint effort was made for their protection, but forthwith rejected on our part and abandoned forever.

Harrison in the north west, in 1813, and Jackson in the south, in 1813, '14, broke up the Indian confederates of England, and deprived her forever of that Canadian reliance, of whose atrocious coalition a London journal boasted that, "with patriotism that would do honor to men that pretend to be more enlightened, they joined the tomahawk and scalping knife to the bayonet and sword, and swelled the British



shout of victory with the yell of the Indian war whoop." There was reason to hope that the Canadian government, before Harrison's and Jackson's exterminating reaction, had become sensible of the inhumanity of Indian warfare. On the 20th of July, 1813, a board of officers, convened by the Governor-General of Canada at the head quarters, St. David's, presided by General Vincent, took into consideration the claims of the Indian warriors to head money for prisoners of war, and made provision for those disabled in service; the rates of pensions were fixed for the wounded and widows of the slain, together with prize money for the capture of Detroit; in order to soften, said the order published by Adjutant-General Baynes, which was confirmed by the English Government, and restrain the Indian warriors in their conduct towards such Americans as should be made their prisoners of war.

Our American militia were beginning to be ashamed of constitutional scruples, the volunteers to learn that subordination and patience are military virtues as essential as courage and hardihood, while the spirit of the officers of the regular army was bravely buoyant and enterprising; undismayed by two years of discouragements, eager for further trials, and resolved to redeem the national character. Instead of being disheartened by continual reverses indicating incurable national inferiority, as their proud enemies boasted, the American inheritance of English fortitude, added to the more alert and intelligent courage of the natives of this country, from repeated discomfiture, roused it to more strenuous and successful effort. The war too had become defensive, although we continued to proclaim and prepare for the invasion of Canada. Subduing the fleets and vanquishing the armies on its lakes and shores were defensive rather than offensive operations. Great Britain, by large fleets and forces, assailed the United States at all points, in New England, New York, Maryland, Virginia, and all the southern states; everywhere European troops were the assailants and instructors of ours, trampling upon useless disaffection, corroborating patriotic union and exertion, rousing national enthusiasm, discountenancing the party divisions which had been our fetters and her strength. The cycle of British success was completed, and ours began when her horizon was fairest, but all the depths of sentiment, if not power, were ours.

Several smaller expeditions and encounters preceded the Canadian campaign, which began in July, 1814.

On the night of the 6th of February, 1814, Captain Sherwood, of the British quartermaster-general's department, with Captain Kerr, and a few marines and militia, crossed the river St. Lawrence, from

Cornwall, in Upper Canada, to Madrid, about fourteen miles from Hamilton, both towns on that river, and captured a quantity of goods taken from Canada the preceding October. The British, also, surprised at night and captured Lieutenant Lowell with thirty of our men, stationed on the Thames river, below the Moravian town. Captain Lea, of the Michigan Mounted Rangers, made prisoners of Colonel Baby, Major Towley, and Captain Springer, of the Canadian militia, with some others. Towley and Springer were born in the United States, and becoming British Canadian subjects, were among the most efficient and vindictive of the partisans against us. Frontier incursions and barbarities, blended with treasonable intercourse and supplies, were disgusting incidents of neighborhood between bordering people of the same family, who fought and fed each other with similar, yet various fortune, avarice, and ferocity; the Canadians, whether of British, French, or American pedigree, less disloyal or covetous, but more sanguinary than their American enemies.

Colonel A. Butler, of the Second Rifle Regiment, commanding at Detroit, on the 21st of February, 1814, resolved on a stroke at some of the enemies' posts in that quarter, despatched Captain A. H. Holmes, of the 24th Infantry, with small detachments from the 26th, 27th, and 28th regiments, to attack Fort Talbot, about one hundred miles down Lake Erie, below Malden, or Delaware, as he might choose. Fallen timber, bad roads, winter weather, and other impediments, compelled Captain Holmes to leave the two pieces of artillery he took with him and depend on his musketry alone. Captain Gee, with his company of Rangers, and Captain Lee with a troop of Michigan cavalry, joined Holmes' detachment, which soon got within striking distance of a superior British force, a light company of the Royal Scots, another of the 89th regiment, Caldwell's Indians, and McGregor's Canadian Rangers, not less than three hundred good troops, fresh from their barracks, well found in all respects, high spirited, and commanded by Captain Barden of the 89th regiment. Holmes' men had suffered so much from fatigue and exposure, that several had been sent home, and of the rest, altogether about one hundred and sixty, many strongly opposed fighting a force so superior to their own. But Holmes and his adjutant, Heard, a grandson of the famous rifleman, General Morgan, could not brook retreat without combat, and resolved on victory or death, which much oftener leads to victory than death. After some time spent in marches, countermarches and manœuvres that would not have been discreditible to celebrated commanders, the mutually well resolved leaders of miniature armies met on the 4th March, 1814, at a place called Long-

wood, where the British, after vainly trying to draw the Americans into disadvantageous action, were induced to attack them, entrenched and prepared for their superior assailants. After repeated onslaughts at close quarters, bravely made and repelled, the British were defeated, with the loss of between eighty and ninety men, nearly one-third of the whole, including Captain Johnstone and Lieutenant Græme, killed, while the American loss was but six or seven, and they captured one hundred cattle. For this harbinger of our victories that year, Captain Holmes was forthwith made a major. It was his further good fortune that his victory was confessed in British general orders, published at Quebec the 18th March, 1814; acknowledgment so unfrequent among all combatants, that even individuals, much less armies, seldom concede their own discomfiture.

The attempts to conquer Canada proved such total, disgraceful, and inexplicable failures, that while the army was more excited than discouraged, the Executive was discontented and shrinking like a burnt child that dreads the fire. Generals Armstrong and Wilkinson bitterly upbraided each other, the country blamed both, the President trusted neither, while schemes for a third Canadian campaign were suggested, questioned, pondered, and rejected. Wilkinson's army was somewhat comfortably cantoned at French Mills, where he erected extensive and expensive quarters, fortified, and left them to visit Albany, and plan winter expeditions with Governor Tompkins.

The General's scheme, in which he said the Governor concurred, was to surprise Prescott, where he said the enemy had but a few hundred men, ill fortified or prepared for attack, and thus sever Upper and Lower Canada asunder. The Secretary's plan that year, as the year before, was to attack the enemy at Kingston, the head-quarters of his naval, and an important station of his military, strength and operations, and overpower his principal post before reinforcements could be received. The President's plan was to attack nowhere, but pause and think. The terrible catastrophe of the prior autumn, extending from St. Regis to Niagara, concluding Wilkinson's and Hampton's ignominious miscarriages, brought him to a determination to stand on the defensive merely, and attempt nothing further. American disasters, with formidable threats from England, and tidings from Europe, reduced our plans and posture to the merely defensive. On the 2d January, 1814, therefore, Wilkinson was directed to detach Brown, with two thousand men, to Sackett's Harbor, for the protection of that place, and with the rest of his army, abandoning his position on Salmon river, to fall back to Plattsburg, and rest on his arms there. The

Secretary deemed Wilkinson's position on Salmon river, though fortified, insecure: and the overwhelming triumphs of England in Europe, conquering peace there, threatened invasion of New York by Plattsburg, with augmented hostile forces in Canada, transferred from France, as took place in September. On the 13th of February, Brown marched accordingly for Sackett's Harbor, and Wilkinson afterwards, with the rest of the army, to the borders of Lake Champlain. In the latter end of that month, Armstrong, on the inducement of confidential and credible information of the exposure of Kingston, with the fleet and public stores there, to easy capture, there being only twelve hundred men in garrison, without the possibility of reinforcement or supplies till June, again suggested an expedition there; and on the 28th of February, 1814, directed Brown to undertake it; but to mask the enterprise by appearances of its being intended to retake Fort Niagara, towards which he was to march, in order to promote that deception. But in the opinions of General Brown and Commodore Chauncey, four thousand men, the disposable force, was inefficient, the doubtful condition of the ice unfavorable, and the President, extremely apprehensive of all hazardous undertakings, so unlucky in that quarter, readily rejected the scheme on these doubts of his best officer on the spot.

As our troops did not attack Kingston, the enemy, always more enterprising and assailant, executed an assault under General Drummond and Commodore Yeo, from that place, on Oswego, a station where large quantities of stores and provisions, ordnance and naval equipments were collected for additional supplies to Sackett's Harbor. Lake Ontario cleared of ice, became navigable about the 25th of April, 1814. On the 4th of May an expedition sailed from Kingston, consisting of infantry, artillery, rocketeers, sappers, miners, and marines, which arrived next day off Oswego, near the eastern end of Lake Ontario. From the indications at Kingston, General Brown accidentally at Sackett's Harbor anticipating the attempt on Oswego, dispatched four companies of heavy and one of light artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel G. S. Mitchell, of the first artillery, who reached Oswego the 30th of April. On the 5th of May the enemy, commanded by Drummond and Yeo, attempted a landing, but were repulsed; and not being favored by the wind, drew off, for better anchorage. Next day they renewed the attempt, and succeeded, but without any important result, and with credit to the American arms. The British, not less than fifteen hundred soldiers, marines, and seamen, were courageously and judiciously resisted by Mitchell, with less than four hundred soldiers and sailors, supported by some of the neighboring militia,



who repaired on short notice to the encounter, anxious to take part. Mitchell retired in good order from a dilapidated fortification, and fell back fighting, towards the spot inland, thirteen miles up the Seneca river, at the falls, where the stores were deposited, none of which fell into the hands of the enemy, whose loss in killed and wounded was ninety-four, and ours sixty. Captain Holtaway, of the English marines, was killed, Captains Ledgergrew, Mulcaster, and Popham, Lieutenants May and Griffith, of the navy, wounded, in a sharp conflict, well contested, for which Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchell was complimented, in general orders, by General Brown, and brevetted colonel. The enemy, having dismantled the fort, destroyed the barracks, and buried the dead, returned on the 7th of May to Kingston, after an unprofitable excursion.

About the same time the English naval commander on Lake Champlain, Captain Pring, sailed from Isle aux Noix, on the 9th of May, 1814, with a detachment of marines, to capture or destroy the new American vessels just launched at Vergennes, and to intercept the stores and supplies intended for their equipment. On the 14th of May, Captain Pring appeared off the mouth of Otter Creek, a bold stream, where Macdonough's squadron was fitted for its brilliant exploit, soon after, near Plattsburg. The enemy had his new brig and several sloops at hand to support the eight galleys, with a bomb vessel which made the attack. Captain Thornton, of the artillery, and Lieutenant Cass, of the navy, commanded the American battery. Many shells were lodged in the parapet, but no material damage done. Colonel Davis was advantageously posted to receive the enemy if he landed.

After an hour and a half's ineffectual bombardment the assailants drew off, and passing by Burlington, returned up the lake to the Isle aux Noix, leaving, in their precipitate retreat, two fine row-boats, shot loose from their barges by the fire from our battery. On their retreat up the narrow lake the galleys were fired upon, harassed and cut up by militia from shore. At Gilleland's Creek, where they landed to capture the flour from some mills, many of the men of two of the galleys were killed or wounded. The enterprise more than failed: it was completely defeated. The commander, Pring, was sent to Montreal and tried for misconduct.

The British squadron having, by outbuilding ours, the ascendant on Lake Ontario, threatened several American places on the lake, and kept close watch to intercept supplies going from Oswego for the equipment of the new American vessels launched at Sackett's Harbor; which place it blockaded on the 28th May, 1814. Captain Wolsey, of the navy, long employed and

experienced in lake navigation, set sail with a brigade of nineteen boats, loaded with forty-eight heavy ship cannons, cables and other articles for Sackett's Harbor. The utmost dispatch, secrecy and even deception (of the enemy by circulating false rumors), were necessary to the transportation of this armament, indispensable to our squadron. Besides sailors, Captain Wolsey had one hundred and thirty riflemen under Major Apling, of the first rifle regiment, distributed as a guard in his bateaux, and a party of Oneida Indians, led by Lieutenant Hill, of the rifle regiment, part of the way, to accompany the boats on shore. After reconnoitering and ascertaining that the coast was clear, the boats set off at dark, and riflemen as well as sailors working hard at the oars, in a deluge of rain, they got to Big Salmon River at day-light, on the 29th,—all except one boat, which, in spite of order and exertions to keep the brigade as compact as possible, fell into the hands of the watchful enemy. At that place the Indians joined; and Captain Wolsey took his boats about two miles up Big Sandy Creek, there to repose briefly from laborious and hazardous duty. The captured boat made known, however, to the British commodore that there were more at hand; and he dispatched Captains Popham and Spilsbury of the royal navy with three gunboats, three cutters and a gig, to capture a prize, on which the naval supremacy on Lake Ontario, that campaign, probably depended. Captain Wolsey prudently sent to Sackett's Harbor, sixteen miles distant, for reinforcements. Commodore Channey immediately dispatched Captain Smith with one hundred and twenty marines; and General Gaines added a squadron of cavalry under Captain Harris, and Captain Melvin with a company of light artillery, who arrived in time to protect the boats. The British, having reconnoitered, resolved on an immediate attack. Captains Wolsey and Harris deemed it best not to display their force, lest it should deter the enemy's attempt. The riflemen were therefore judiciously posted in ambush half-a-mile below the boats. The artillery, cavalry and seamen kept out of view. The enemy went up the river, with their gunboats, cutters and gig, landed on both sides to prevent any escape, and were about possessing themselves of their valuable prize, when the riflemen rose from concealment and poured in the deadly fire which is so much more fatal than that of musketry; sailors on shore, moreover, never feeling as confident as on their accustomed element. In ten minutes they all surrendered at discretion, with midshipman Hoare and fourteen seamen and marines killed, Captains Popham and Spilsbury, Lieutenants Cox and Kagh of the marines, with twenty-six men wounded, and the whole party, gun-boats,

barges and all, with nearly two hundred men, captured, without the loss of a man on our side, and only one wounded. For this well-conducted surprise and capture, Major Apling was brevetted lieutenant-colonel. Captain Popham, in his official report of this misfortune to Commodore Yeo, acknowledged with the warmest gratitude the humane exertions of the American officers of the rifle corps in saving the lives of many of the English officers and men devoted to slaughter, said his report, by the *American soldiers* and Indians. The Oneida Indians were first to seize the English when they surrendered and disposed, as, either encouraged or permitted by English officers, at Raisin, Buffalo, Lewistown, and other places fresh in universal recollection, to massacre captives; but they were prevented by the American officers. It was an ungenerous as well as unjust aspersion of the British commander ungratefully, with his acknowledgment of that interposition, to couple the calumny that the soldiers were as savage as the Indians. No instance of such barbarity is imputable to men too justly shocked at English connivance in such enormities to practice them, and too humbly solicitous of English good opinion thus to forfeit it.

Wilkinson's repulse at La Cole Mill was the last of our Canadian disasters, and of his military service. His little army, four thousand strong, in March, 1814, was concentrated at the village of Champlain, three miles from the lake shore, and one from the dividing line between the United States and Canada, to give the enemy battle, if he would venture from his fastnesses to meet our forces, superior in numbers, in the open field, which was improbable, or to fortify Rouse's point with a battery that would prevent, as was certified by the engineer, the British squadron, then nearly ready for action, from entering Lake Champlain. Early in that month, Brigadier-General Macomb, with two thousand men, crossed the lake on the ice, entered St. Amant's in Canada, staid there several days without further movement or any molestation, and returned to General Wilkinson, who had then the three brigades of Generals Smith, Bissell and Macomb, all full of courage, ardor and devotion; excellent troops as far as could be without experience, which was confined to their commander-in-chief alone. Forty years before, he had visited the same country as Captain Wilkinson, aid-de-camp to Brigadier-General Benedict Arnold, one of the most enterprising American generals, as Wilkinson, then like Hull and Dearborn, was a young officer of great promise.

On the 29th March, 1814, a council of war, at which General Wilkinson was not present, but whose judgment was immediately made known to and approved by him, resolved to attack La Cole Mill, the wall of

which, it was said, could be easily breached by light cannon. One of the officers present knew the mill, had been in it, and no doubt was entertained of taking it. But to cover the artillerists, it was deemed prudent to take along several bundles of packed hay, of which there were many stored in the village, to serve as ball-proof protection from the enemy's musketry. That part of the plan made no impression on the General's mind; perhaps he considered it useless; on his court-martial, he denied it altogether; but the engineer officer, Major Totten, is positive that it was to have been done next day, 30th March, 1814; when the army marched without the hay, led by Colonel Clarke, and Major Forsyth, in the advance, who had a sharp skirmish on the main road, which rendered it necessary to deploy two of the brigades, and occasioned much lost time. The main road to Canada was impassable, from obstruction by felled trees. At Odletown, the General caused one of the many persons of that name there, to be placed between two dragoons, and forced to show the way to the mill, to which that road for three miles traversed the forest, by a very crooked path, only wide enough to allow the passage of the small sleighs of the country. The heaviest cannon, an eighteen pounder, broke down in the miry ground, between the main road and the wood. General Wilkinson's military secretary, Captain Macpherson, who volunteered to take charge of a twelve pounder, got it forward with great difficulty and labor; the wheels continually coming in contact with trees on both sides of the road. Lieutenant Laribee conducted a howitzer in like manner. But another twelve pound gun, although the party in charge of it were directed by the chief of the artillery, did not reach the front at all. And there was a second sharp encounter in the forest-path, before the guns were allowed to be carried forward. The best place in the clearing that could be found, was selected by Captain Macpherson for the battery; but, unfortunately so near the mill, as to be exposed to such fire without cover, as no troops can bear. Of the twenty men and three officers at the guns, two of the officers were severely wounded, and fourteen of the men either killed or wounded. The mill was defended by Major Hancock and some two hundred men, whose firing was incessant, accurate and destructive. From a gun-boat, and also from other places, the enemy kept up, moreover, a fatal fire; besides, several times, with the utmost gallantry, rushing forward to seize the American guns; in which attempts, however, they were as bravely repulsed by our troops, whose conduct throughout the whole engagement was excellent. The twelve pounder and howitzers continued their discharges, as their officers flattered themselves, with good ef-



fect; which the desperate efforts of the enemy to seize and spike our cannon, seemed to justify. As our troops arrived, they were stationed promptly and in good order, so as to prevent the escape of the garrison or succor to it; and, also, to be ready for the assault, whenever the time for it should be announced. The troops stood in snow about one foot deep, and in a forest so dense, that scarcely any of them could see the mill at all, from which a desperate sortie of a couple of companies, had nearly reached our guns, to capture them, before they were perceived, and driven back by our troops, who were so incommoded by the trees, as to be obliged often to stoop very low, in order to fire with any effect. Larabee had hardly joined Macpherson with his howitzer, when a musket-ball pierced his breast, which was immediately extracted by the surgeon, from between his shoulder blades; in a few days he had quite recovered, and is living now a respectable farmer in Connecticut. Macpherson was soon hit by a passing ball, under the chin, which he disregarded, and continued with great animation, to serve his piece, till struck down by a dreadful shot in the hip, from which he never recovered. He survived, indeed, several years, but always a miserable cripple, kindly sent by President Madison, as Consul to Madeira, in a vain attempt to recover his shattered health, which continually failed, till that able officer and amiable gentleman suffered a premature death.

Under so destructive a fire as the British maintained, the artillery officers were of opinion that heavier guns would have been of no avail. To make a breach in the wall, even if much thinner than it was, it would have been necessary to plant in it many balls near to each other, whereas scarcely any of them struck the wall at all, as it was impossible to point or aim the cannon with precision under the storm of bullets and accurate firing of the British, which no troops could stand, exposed, as ours were, to certain destruction. Night was coming on; it was too plain nothing had or could be done, and the general drew off his disappointed troops in perfect order and deliberation, encamping them for the night near the point in Odetown where the Mill road diverges from the main road. General Wilkinson must have been aware of the cause of his mishap, the whole matter turning on a small point of detail which should have been, but unluckily was not, provided for in the first instance, and no doubt intended to renew the attack next day with the bundles of hay or other protection for his artillery, and nothing contingent could be more certain than the success of a renewed attack. But that night torrents of rain fell, the snow melted, the whole forest was flooded with a substratum of basin like ice, and the officers sent to recon-

noitre reported that it was utterly impracticable to march forward or renew the attempt on the mill. This vernal deluge was soon followed by the opening of the lake of which the enemy had command, and it was but common prudence for General Wilkinson to withdraw his army within our own borders. On his court martial at Troy, something censorious was said of not setting fire to the roof of the mill by red hot shot, and also of not covering the artilleryists with materials to be found on the ground, but snow was the only material there, and if there had been red hot shot, they could not be lodged on the roof, because it was impossible so to point the guns as to strike or aim at it. The repulse was one of those misfortunes which, perhaps, more foresight might have prevented, but which, unexpected and mortifying as it was, was no discredit to the American arms, while it left something in dispute between the engineers and the commanding General, he declaring that he performed the expedition to draw off the enemy's attention from whatever might be General Brown's designs on Lake Ontario, and pursuant, as Wilkinson supposed, to the wish and plan of the Secretary of War, which the Secretary positively denied by a publication in the public prints.

That unlucky renewal of Wilkinson's attempt on Canada, superadded to his inglorious discomfiture the autumn before, induced him to retire from the command of the army, and demand a court martial by which he was tried and acquitted, but he never regained the confidence of the government or the country, and was unavoidably left out of the army when it was reduced to ten thousand men, and two major-generals at the peace.

One of the best conducted enterprises of the English marine was, safely to them, with considerable American loss, accomplished on the 8th of April, 1814, when, after midnight, a detachment of two hundred men, from the blockading squadron, off New London, in six boats, entered Connecticut river, landed at Saybrook, disarmed the small battery there, and re-embarking, went eight miles up the river to Pettipung, where they landed again and burned twenty some of them valuable vessels. They spent the morning there, the seamen enjoying themselves playing ball, pitching quoits, and other amusements, while the officers superintended the conflagration, which was done with kind expressions to the inhabitants, staving in several hogsheads of rum, lest, as the commanding officer said, it might intoxicate his men, and stopping the burning of two vessels on the stocks for fear of their setting fire to the neighboring buildings. The country round was soon alarmed; some volunteers with arms, by noon repaired from New London

and Killingsworth, followed in the afternoon by detachments from the Macedonian, under Captain Jones and under Captain Biddle from the Hornet. At night, when the enemy still remained, an American victory seemed certain. But at nine o'clock, when it was extremely dark, taking advantage of a freshet in the river, the lucky invaders, without the least noise, or pulling an oar, but swiftly borne away on the top of the flood, floated out of reach; just as they cleared, the American forces saluting them with three hearty valedictory cheers. A couple of hundred venturesome mariners penetrated eight miles into a thickly settled part of the United States, spent the day there merrily, and escaped without a man hurt. What was more remarkable, and as much to their credit, they behaved as courteously and inoffensively as was possible on such an occasion, injuring only the property which, by the law of war, they had a right to destroy. That incursion, though it cost American citizens one hundred and fifty thousand dollars of their property destroyed, admonished the people of New England to be on their guard against an enemy, like death, always at hand, and no respecter of persons or places. The alarm embraced Boston in its preparations against such unwelcome visits.

The Secretary's plan of campaign was, that while parts of the Erie fleet and the garrison at Detroit should be sent into Lake Huron and the Western Lakes, to recapture Michilimacinae, and break down the Indian power in the northwest, other parts of that fleet were to go to the east end of the lake, and there co-operate in landing a military expedition in Canada. That expedition was to march rapidly to Burlington Heights, and seizing that position fortify it, and there wait the co-operation of the Ontario fleet. With that, which the Secretary of the Navy promised by the 10th of June, and the troops at Sackett's Harbor, Kingston, might be attacked, and eventually Montreal. By these operations forts Niagara and George would be rendered useless to the enemy, who would be shut off from all direct communication with his western posts and settlements, and disabled from reinstating his control of the Indians. The heavy expenditures on Lake Ontario would be no longer necessary, and a large part of Canada taken into American possession before that season, mid-summer, when England could reinforce from Europe. General Armstrong flattered himself that the heart of Upper Canada might be reached from Lake Erie, where American ascendancy was undisputed, as well as from Ontario where it was disputed. With naval co-operation on that Lake, which was indispensable, six thousand men on the Niagara, marching to Burlington, could not be

resisted without so weakening the British Eastern posts as to expose them to ours at Sackett's Harbor and Plattsburg. Such was his plan: which the President at least doubted, if he did not disapprove.

The romantic peninsula between those inland seas, Lakes Ontario and Erie, and the river Niagara, whose waters unite the two lakes, was the theatre in the summer of 1814 of an isolated and sanguinary campaign, as striking as the rugged features of that wild region. The river running about thirty-six miles from one lake to the other, constitutes the natural boundary between rival empires of the same lineage, language, hardy and adventurous spirit, exaggerated to greater boldness in America by the vaster territories inhabited, waters navigated, and liberty enjoyed. Fort George, in the corner between Ontario Lake and the river Niagara on the British side, stands opposite to Fort Niagara on the American, since December 1813, and throughout the war forcibly held by the English, much to the disgrace of America, and in spite of all that public sentiment could do to goad public force to retake it. At the other end of the peninsula the British Fort Erie stands opposite to Buffalo, where the river Niagara flows into Lake Erie. Black Rock, Williamsburg, Manchester, are villages on the New York side; Newark and Chippewa on the Canadian, their Queenstown right opposite to our Lewistown. Midway between the two lakes the river Chippewa, coming from among the Six Nations and other tribes of the West, empties into the river Niagara near the falls, opposite to the American town of Manchester. There the Niagara, about three-quarters of a mile wide, after tumbling over rapids for near a mile, plunges down 170 feet of the most stupendous cataract in the world, one of the prodigious lineaments of the North American continent. By the treaty of independence in 1783, and that of Ghent in 1815, the line which separates the United States from Great Britain passes where never human being could trace it, or bear, or hardly water fowl venture—through the middle of the Falls of Niagara. Near the magnificent mist and eternal commotion of that prodigious waterfall, the younger people challenged the older to combat. The rival nations there met to fight, first by the brilliant sunset of western skies, then under the dark midnight of such scenery, and finally at noon-day, when a sanguinary sortie surprised and overthrew the British arms.

During a campaign of seventy days almost every kind of battle tried the mettle of the combatants: in an open plain at Chippewa, by night, in conflict hand to hand at Bridgewater, by British siege repulsed at Fort Erie, and finally American sortie there in mid-day, demolishing the British army, and



if Brown had been seconded as he should have been by either Chauncey or Izard, probably giving American troops the complete possession of a large part of Canada.

The hazardous and improbable design of Brown and Scott, who were the life of the enterprise, was to take Fort Erie at that end of the Niagara, Fort George at the other end, of course the intermediate places, Chippewa, Queenstown, and Newark, and proceeding north along the shore of Lake Ontario to Burlington Heights, seize and fortify that place, the western extremity of the lake, not many miles from York, and the whole extent of it from Kingston, which stands where King's River enters the lake, in the midst of islands in the frith where the lake originates the mighty St. Lawrence, with great advantages of navigation. To subdue and hold that Canadian peninsula, from Burlington to Erie, with a fleet commanding the lake, might sever Upper from Lower Canada, control the Indians, paralyze Western Canada, and begin the invasion of the Eastern province, Montreal, Quebec, and all that was necessary to drive back English foothold beyond the banks of the St. Lawrence. So impracticable a scheme, with so small a force, depended on two cardinal contingencies, either of which failing must be fatal—and both failed—viz., timely and cordial co-operation from the navy, and conquering the way to Burlington before British reinforcements from above could overpower Brown. The navy neither did, perhaps could or would co-operate with the army; and British reinforcements, not only from Kingston and Montreal, but from Quebec, and even from Europe, arrived before it was possible for Brown to conquer halfway to Lake Ontario, where the enemy held the ascendant on the water as much as by land. But Brown, the upstart of emergency, ardent, brave, athletic and sagacious, was impatient for distinction, and Armstrong, an old soldier, who cherished soldierly qualifications, was disposed to gratify the enterprising borderer, for whose promotion to command he was responsible. Scott had been to Washington, communicative, plausible, and persuasive, a soldier of some standing, though a young man not thirty years of age, who, as Colonel of the Second Regiment of Artillery, as Adjutant General, and on all occasions had displayed that alacrity of courage and vanity of exploit which, like earnestness in an orator, are among the instincts of success, and command public admiration. Inopportune to be allowed to lead an expedition into Canada, they at last got leave, with many executive misgivings, after long hesitation and much reluctance, to cross the Niagara, capture Fort Erie, *risk* a combat, march on Chippewa, *menace* Fort George, seize and fortify Burlington Heights,

but only if assured of Chauncey's ascendancy on the lake and co-operation with the movement, who had promised to be in arms on the lake by the 1st of July.

The plan seems to have been, to collect several thousand regulars and militia at Detroit, as many more on the Niagara, a brigade or more at Sacket's Harbor, and a considerable force at Plattsburg, Burlington, and thereabouts, on Lake Champlain, while by threatening Montreal and the enemy in that part of Canada, he should be deterred by Izard from sending any considerable number of troops beyond Kingston or York, Brown, with six or seven thousand men, should invade the Canadian peninsula from Erie to Burlington, and there fortify an establishment. But his force never exceeded thirty-five hundred men, volunteers and all; little or no reinforcements came from Detroit, at least not till after his two battles at the Falls of Niagara; Chauncey's fleet never co-operated with him; and Izard withheld his assistance when required: so that the fate of the campaign devolved on the insignificant enterprise of Brown, but was by him rendered, therefore, more glorious, auspicious, and memorable. Without either Chauncey or Izard, Brown alone conquered and held a position in Canada, just when all the armies of Great Britain, having subjugated France, could be landed in Canada, where reinforcements, not less than thirty thousand of the best troops in the world, were actually landed. Then it was that a little forlorn expedition invaded that province, as the frigates went to sea in 1812, government shrinking, officers confident, men willing, and, during the whole summer and autumn, by repeated defeats kept the enemy at bay in six bloody tournaments.

Our troops had been so industriously drilled and severely disciplined, that battle was almost recreation to the soldiery as to the seamen, from the irksome toil of incessant exercise. The officers were mostly anxious to fight, as a corps of officers must be, and the men were ready to follow wherever officers led. Brown, with Scott, promoted to a brigade, were intimate and cordial in their arrangements. If they had been more experienced commanders, they might have been less sanguine or venturesome. But the army and the country had reached one of those conjunctures when temerity is a virtue. Brown and Scott, if they had failed, would probably have followed Dearborn and Wilkinson into retirement. But their success, besides its own justification, the greatest captain of the age would have pronounced legitimate warfare. Reviewing the campaigns of Frederick, Napoleon testified that councils-of-war, and displays of discussion, end, on all occasions, by adopting the worst plan; that, almost

always prudence is pusillanimous, and true military wisdom consists in energetic determination.

Upon the impulse of these principles, on the eve of the anniversary of that national independence which began in much more peril and doubt, the 3d July, 1814, in the darkness of night, with imperfect means of crossing the Niagara, no stores or supplies prepared where he was going, Brown led Scott's and Ripley's brigades of regulars and Porter's of volunteers, with Major Hindman's battalion of artillery with their guns, and Captain Harris' troop of horse, into Canada, and landed without opposition; Scott in the night; Ripley, not till the next morning, less intimate with his leader, and less confident in the undertaking, embarking with reluctance.

Three thousand five hundred men invading a hostile country, armed at all points, by land and water, prepared with more than twice that number of superior troops hard by to confront the invaders, seemed to be worse than useless irruption. But, soon after, a British army of about the same size, without artillery or cavalry, baggage wagons, or supplies, penetrated Maryland, put to flight twice their numbers at Bladensburg, captured Washington, and, after besieging Baltimore, retired safely to their shipping. What we wanted was bold, if not rash leaders, to face overpowering ascendancy, more injurious than superior force, American audacity to defy English arrogance, and, fearless of consequences, risk all for victory:—to burn the ships and trust to fortune.

On the 24th January, 1814, George Izard and Jacob Brown were promoted from brigadiers to major-generals; and on the 1st of May, 1814, Andrew Jackson: the two former destined to command in the North, the latter in the South. On the 2d May, 1814, General Izard took General Wilkinson's place, as commander of the northern army.

What was called the second, or division of the left of the northern army, was composed of two squadrons of light dragoons, commanded by Captain Harris, a detachment of the corps of artillery under Major Hindman, a battalion of the first regiment of Riflemen, under Major Morgan; and the 1st, 9th, 11th, 21st, 22d, 23d, and 25th, seven regiments of infantry, commanded by Major-General Brown, Brigadier-Generals Gaines, Scott and Ripley, Adjutant-General Gardner, Inspector-General Snelling, Engineers McRee and Wood. The first, General Scott's brigade, consisted of the 9th, 11th, 22d and 25th regiments of infantry, commanded respectively by Colonel Campbell, Major Leavenworth, Major Jessup and Major McNeill. The second brigade, commanded by General Ripley, consisted of the 21st regiment, Colonel James Miller; the

22d, Colonel Brady, with detachments of the 17th and 19th regiments. The first regiment, Colonel Nicholas, joined them afterwards in Canada, but was attached to neither brigade. Captain Harris, with a troop of Colonel Burns' regiment of cavalry, and Major Hindman, with a battalion of artillery, consisting of the companies of Captains Towson, Thomas Biddle, Ritchie, Williams and Fanning, made up with the before mentioned two brigades, General Brown's regular force. Early in April, 1814, Col. Fenton, with one hundred and eighty volunteers from Pennsylvania, and more if needed, were ready to go, embarked at Erie in the schooners Scorpion, Tigress, Porcupine and Somers, under Captain Elliott, and being landed at Buffalo, joined General Porter's standard, under which they served with great gallantry throughout the whole Canadian campaign.

In the month of April, 1814, on the east bank of the river Niagara, among the devastated places of that almost houseless vicinage, the officers of all ranks went to work to discipline their men by drill, manœuvre and march from eight to ten hours a day, so that, to the army, as to the navy, battle was relief from the severity of constant exercise; and it cannot be too forcibly impressed by history, as a great lesson to the licentious independence of the country, that to superior discipline, is ascribable the first victories by land, as well as sea, which from the depths of degradation, raised the national character to the heights of renown, and to this hour, cover the nation with that shield of its protection.

Will the advocates of perpetual peace, who for many centuries have, in vain, striven to prevent war, whose frequency and barbarity are often inhumanly unjustifiable, excuse my adding that Buffalo, the great western seaport, and all that flourishing neighborhood, for many miles around, was then a desert from hostile devastation, as the most fertile portions of Europe, Flanders, Northern Italy, and the finest parts of Germany, many times have been, proving that regions flourish and population multiplies from the manurance of bloodshed and ashes of desolation, by one of those inscrutable overrulings of Providence which mysteriously favor development; while the indolent, opulent, undisturbed and contented, often decrease in numbers as they decline in energy, and seem to prove, that the uses of the hardest adversity, at times, affect nations, as they do individuals, more beneficially than the most wanton prosperity?

On the morning of the 2d of July, 1814, Major General Brown authorized the generals of brigade to inform the commandants of corps, that the army would cross the strait before them, so as to invest Fort Erie as day dawned, on the 3d. Limited means of transportation were divided between Generals



Scott and Ripley, who were to embark during the night of the 2d, debark in Canada, at dawn, on the 3d; Scott below, Ripley above Fort Erie, which they were to surround and subdue, as soon as possible. General Ripley was so averse to the enterprise that he tendered his resignation, which General Brown refused to accept, who was inflexibly resolved to proceed according to the arrangements made. General Scott immediately assembled the chiefs of corps of his command, Colonel Campbell, Major Leavenworth and Major Jessup, Colonel Brady not then having joined, and communicated to them General Brown's design, who said his army's attitude in Canada would be a powerful diversion in favor of General Izard at Plattsburg, and if it did nothing more than restore the tarnished honor of our arms, that was an object worth the sacrifice of the whole force he commanded. He had met with opposition where he expected support, "but," he added, with emphasis, "we go, nevertheless; nothing but the elements shall stop us." The communication of his design by the commanders of corps to the respective officers was received with the utmost enthusiasm. General Riall was known to be in force not far off. Every one was eager for an opportunity of trial with him; most of the officers agreed to wear their sashes and feathers, and everything else demonstrative of military pride. The men had been under arms so many hours every day, that every corps manœuvred in action, and under fire of the enemy's artillery, with the precision of parade. General Brown followed General Scott before General Ripley embarked, attended by Adjutant-General Gardner, Majors McRee and Wood, engineers, and Captains Austin and Spencer, the General's aids. A body of Pennsylvania militia volunteers, under Colonel Fenton, and several hundred Indians, constituted a third brigade, led by General Peter B. Porter, who, throughout the whole campaign, on all occasions, nobly repelled the taunts of political opponents, and as far as it was possible for him to do, redeemed the pledge he gave in Congress, where he held a very conspicuous situation, of Canadian conquest and annexation. The whole division under General Brown never exceeded three thousand five hundred men, and was reduced, in the course of the campaign, to less than two thousand; but if there be anything in national honor and military character, seldom, if ever, were a thousand lives or wounds lost or suffered with better result.

Reconnoitering the woods in advance of Scott's right, Brown's good luck began, by falling in with an inhabitant and a little boy, his son, on the way to the Strait for fish, who by threats and promises were induced to accompany Adjutant-General Gard-

ner, ordered to go and meet the reserve of Ripley's brigade, as they landed from Black Rock, and march them up to Scott's right. Major Jessup was ordered forward with the 25th infantry, to invest the Fort in conjunction with Ripley's brigade, which had not arrived when Jessup reached the station assigned to him. With Majors McRee and Wood he approached and reconnoitered the fort, which delivered some discharges from both cannon and musketry, wounding a few of Jessup's men.

Investing Fort Erie with his two brigades, Brown's good fortune commenced, by its capitulation almost without a blow, surrendered by Major Buck, of the 8th infantry, the English commander, the afternoon of the first day. If he had held out only long enough for the report of his resistance to reach Major-General Riall, entrenched at Chippewa, Brown's sword might not have been flushed with instant and bloodless triumph. Whereas, one hundred and thirty men, well provided with means of some defence, gave up a place of refuge for the Americans, in case of need, and the eventual theatre of their final triumph. One hundred and sixty prisoners with trophies were marched from Buffalo to Flatbush, the harbingers of Brown's auspicious venture. Before they could perform the first stage of their journey, while the people of the United States were celebrating the Declaration of Independence, Scott was pushed forward with his brigade to Chippewa; and, on the 4th July, surprised General Riall's advance at Black Creek, strongly posted behind that stream. Captain Towson, with his company of artillery, compelled the British to retire, in doing which they removed the bridge over the creek, and a small engagement ensued, which, like the whole series, attested the emulous intrepidity of the American forces. Captain Crocker, with a company of infantry, passing the creek above the bridge and pursuing the retiring enemy, before the brigade could get over, was assailed and surrounded by part of the 19th British dragoons, whom, with great self-possession and steadiness, he drove off and put to flight. This, on the 4th, was the overture of more extensive success on the 5th July, the battle of Chippewa.

The British under General Riall were entrenched beyond the bridge over the Chippewa, a stream too deep for fording and surrounded by marshes, which, difficult to pass, must have been turned, at some loss of time and exposure to casualties. Why Riall did not remove the bridge, it is not easy to understand, and thus impede, retard, if not frustrate Brown's advance, or cross the Niagara and capture his supplies there; either of which seemed to be obvious means of resistance. But there were many turns in the wheel of Brown's

fortune, which he pushed forward with impetuous diligence. Reaching Scott's encampment near midnight of the 4th of July, with Ripley's brigade, Brown made his disposition for a speedy attack, in which it was his good luck, in the place and manner to be favored by his enemy. From early dawn of the 5th, the British assailed Brown's pickets. General Porter, with his regiment of Pennsylvania volunteers and some hundred Indians, did not arrive till the morning of that day. In the afternoon he was ordered to proceed with them through a wood, and drive in the enemy's pickets, while ours should withdraw, and Porter also to entice the British to follow and approach our main body. General Porter with great gallantry led his men as directed, driving the enemy's light troops before him, when suddenly their whole column, encouraged to leave their entrenchments in order of battle, broke upon Porter, who, unable to make head against such odds, retreated; Brown said with his men in disorder. But there was reason, from the events of the battle which ensued, to believe that the general unjustly depreciated the volunteer force. Riall followed Porter with great commotion of arms and clouds of dust, supposing himself the assailant by anticipating an expected attack. The place of action to which Scott with the advanced brigade was thus invited, and forthwith hastened, was a plain on the east side of the river, in front of the British entrenchments, the time about five o'clock in the afternoon, within short distance of the Falls of Niagara, whose dull monotonous roar, as it were a tocsin or alarm bell to rouse the combatants to action, accompanied the constant explosions of cannon and rapid discharges of musketry for more than an hour at close quarters, thinning the American, and more than decimating the British ranks. Major General Riall had with him some seventeen hundred men, bravely led by Colonel Gordon commanding the Royal Scots, the 100th regiment of infantry led by the Marquis of Tweeddale, Majors Evans and Risle with detachments of the eighth regiment of infantry and nineteenth of dragoons, Captain Machonachie and the royal artillery, Lieutenant-Colonels Pearson and Dickson of the militia, and a body of Indians. Scott was drilling his men when ordered into action. Towson's battery of three guns was first quickly advanced to the plain on the river front of the American camp before Scott could form. The battle began, by Towson's animated fire from the bank of the river, an officer on all occasions, prompt, judicious, cheerful and effective, who enjoyed the fire and uproar of great guns. The enemy considerably outnumbering outflanked Scott's line, and might have turned it but for one of those inspired movements which change a perilous crisis

into greater safety and assurance, by nearer approach to danger. Major Jessup, at the head of the 25th regiment, whose horse was shot under him, and his men falling fast on the extreme left, where he contended with the British right, ordered his firing to be suspended and his regiment to advance with the bayonet in the teeth of deadly volleys, gaining thereby a more favorable position and compelling their adversaries to retire from a log fence, behind which they stood, but by Jessup's gallant charge driven back exposed to flank as well as front fire. Major McNeill on the right, Major Leavenworth parallel to the enemy's attack, meanwhile, poured in their rapid and destructive discharges. McNeill judiciously occupied an oblique position, and delivered his well-aimed shots with fatal effect; and though Captain Towson's own gun was thrown out of action, he served with unabated ardor at the other pieces. Captain Harris of the dragoons, which corps was not made use of, volunteered to serve out of his place and had his horse shot under him. Major Wood of the engineers also served as a volunteer. Colonel Campbell, the only officer disabled, was wounded as he led the eleventh regiment into action. While it was raging General Brown arrived and cheered the first brigade with assurance that the second would soon come to its aid, which, in killed and wounded, had lost a fourth of its numbers, yet unshrinkingly continued the action alone. The 21st regiment from Ripley's brigade, notwithstanding every exertion to get to the ground in time, did not arrive till the enemy were routed by Scott alone.

The New York volunteers did not join the division till after the battle; the volunteer honors of which belong to three hundred Pennsylvanians who, though compelled by superior numbers to retreat at first, rallied to another part of the conflict with great spirit. In the onset which preceded the main engagement, General Porter with these volunteers encountered about the same number of Canadian militia and Indians, and drove them behind the line of the principal British column, destroying at least one hundred and fifty. Colonel Fenton, with the volunteers, formed in line with General Scott, and steadily sustained the destructive British fire of cannonade and musketry, till their retreat began, when Colonel Bull, Major Galloway and Captain White of the volunteers, too eager in pursuit and exhausted by exertion, were made prisoners. The British artillery was admirably served: but the musketry of the people to whom the use of arms is forbidden by severe penal laws, till put in their hands as enlisted soldiers, did not, as it cannot, equal that of those accustomed from infancy to handle guns, and of course more dexterous in their management. The American gunnery altogether superior to the



English, the cannon, the musket, and the rifle, demonstrated its superiority that day by killing or wounding nearly two English to one American. After an hour's sanguinary contest, the British were inclined to change their uncomfortable position and try the charge, for which the Americans were promptly prepared. But one of Towson's best directed shots blew up an ammunition wagon, silenced their battery and produced complete confusion in their ranks. Colonel Gordon, the Marquis of Tweeddale, severely wounded; Captain Holland, the aid of General Riall, disabled by wounds, and very large numbers amounting to a full third of their whole force killed, wounded or captured; the American troops maintaining their dauntless attitude and unrelenting fire—at last as the shadows of sunset began to fall, the British broke, fled, and pursued by the victorious Americans, took shelter behind entrenchments. Just then, Captain Ritchie, with his company of artillery, and Lieutenant Hall, with part of Biddle's company, got up. Biddle and Williams, hastening up with more cannon, but arriving only to see the enemy's backs, broken and flying in disorder, leaving their dead and wounded in charge of the victors. By the British published general orders, fifty-three of the regiment of Royal Scots were acknowledged killed, one hundred and thirty-five wounded, and thirty captured; of the Marquis of Tweeddale's regiment sixty-nine killed, one hundred and thirty-five wounded; and so of the rest, though not quite so many as of those two distinguished regiments.

To my account of the cardinal battle of Chippewa, digested from all authentic accessible sources of information, as these interesting details will bear some repetition, I think proper to add General Jessup's narrative, kindly furnished to me as follows:

"On the morning of the 4th of July, Gen. Riall's light troops were discovered in our neighborhood.—Gen. Scott was detached towards Chippewa—the enemy slowly retired before us—the march was a continued skirmish, and on the plain between Street's Creek and Chippewa our light troops were warmly and vigorously attacked, but maintained their ground most gallantly. On that occasion Captain Crocker, of the 9th, with a detachment of light infantry, received and repulsed a charge of a detachment of the 19th dragoons. General Scott, finding the enemy strongly posted behind the Chippewa, called in the light troops, and took a position in rear of Street's Creek, where he encamped his brigade. General Brown came up, about midnight, with the second brigade and the artillery. At dawn, on the morning of the 5th of July, the enemy began to annoy our pickets, and kept up a desultory fire for several hours, so near to

our line, that a soldier of the 25th was wounded not more than thirty paces in front. Some time in the forenoon, General Peter B. Porter arrived with three or four hundred Indian warriors, and about three hundred Pennsylvania volunteers. After allowing his command time to refresh, General Brown ordered him to file from the rear of our camp, pass through the woods, and, if possible, place himself between the enemy's advance and his main body. To facilitate this object, our advanced pickets were directed to provoke a fire from the enemy's pickets, and then fall back to some log cabins in front of Street's house, to induce them to follow, and to draw, if possible, their light troops in that direction.

"A heavy firing soon commenced, and continued for more than half an hour, when the enemy's light troops were observed to be retiring; and, from a cloud of dust seen rising on the road leading to Chippewa Bridge, it was evident General Riall was in motion with his principal force, and that he had attempted with his light troops a similar ruse upon us to that which General Brown had attempted upon him. At the time the firing had become so heavy, Major Jessup ordered the 25th to be in readiness to move at a moment's notice; and, mounting his horse, he crossed the creek and joined General Brown. When the movement of Riall was perceived, he returned immediately to his place and found the regiment forming under arms, by order of General Scott, for exercise. A few moments after, the order was given by General Brown to march and meet the enemy.

"Captain Towson had been ordered to take a position with his artillery near the bridge over Street's Creek; and, as Scott's brigade was compelled to cross that bridge under the fire of the enemy's artillery, he rendered important service by covering the movement and annoying the enemy's line.

"General Riall had formed his line of battle, with his left resting on the Niagara, where he had a formidable battery of twenty-four pounders and howitzers; his right consisting of his grenadiers and light infantry, commanded by the Marquis of Tweeddale, supported by a body of militia and Indians in the wood, was strongly posted behind a fence and a breastwork of large oak logs. Porter's command, though it had for some time gallantly sustained an unequal conflict, had fled on meeting Riall's column; and by the time Scott's brigade had engaged the enemy, not a militia man or Indian was to be seen on the field. When the several corps had passed the bridge, Major Jessup was ordered to go to the extreme left, and be governed by circumstances. Major Leavenworth, with the 9th and 22d, moved forward on the Chip-

pewa road and engaged the enemy's left. Colonel Campbell led the 11th to the left of the 9th, and was about to take his position in the line, when he received a severe wound in the knee, and was obliged to leave the field. Major McNeill, who succeeded to the command of the regiment, immediately formed it and led it into action. Major Jessup, perceiving that the enemy greatly outnumbered us on the field, moved his regiment in column until he attained a position within a hundred and twenty paces of the position of the Marquis of Tweedale, in order to deceive him in regard to the force of his regiment. There he formed under a most destructive fire from the grenadiers and light infantry in front, and the Indians and the militia, covered by a thick wood on his left flank. He soon found his position untenable, and that he must either retreat or advance. The second brigade not being on the field, to have fallen back would have uncovered Scott's left flank, and have enabled the Marquis, by throwing forward his grenadiers and light infantry, to attack him on that flank, which, pressed as he then was by a superior force in front, would have caused his instant defeat. Relying on the firmness and excellent discipline of his troops, the Major determined to advance and try the effect of the bayonet, believing that, even should he be sacrificed, time enough would be gained to enable the second brigade to come to the relief of the first. He ordered his men to cease firing, and lest they should recommence the fire, he directed them to support their arms. Deadly as was the fire under which they were suffering, the moment they heard the words of command every musket was at a shoulder and a support. The charge was made. The enemy, however, did not wait to receive the bayonet, but strong as his position was, he fled in confusion. Captain Ketchum, with one of the light companies of the 25th, was detached to harass him and prevent him from rallying; the remainder of the regiment was formed across the flank of the line engaged with Scott, and by an oblique fire assailed it at the same time in front and rear; part of the line gave way, but rallied immediately behind a fence. Whilst Major Jessup was making his dispositions to drive them from this position, General Brown came up and assured him of immediate support. About this time Major McNeill, relieved by the position and operations of the 25th from a part of the force with which he had been engaged, with the ready presence of mind and decision which on all occasions distinguished him, promptly threw forward the left of the 11th and attacked in flank that part of the enemy's line which still maintained its ground, when the whole gave way, and fled rapidly behind the Chippewa."

British general orders published at Kingston, the 9th July, by Lieutenant Colonel Harvey, stated that Major-General Riall *withdrew*, having sustained a very heavy loss in killed and wounded, including a large proportion of officers. The Montreal Herald of the 12th July announced, with extreme mortification, that a severe battle had been fought in which the British were under the necessity of retreating with considerable loss. The Adjutant-General Baynes made a similar statement. The British Annual Register of the year recorded the historical avowal of a British defeat by Americans in Canada, the 5th July, 1814, with the loss of one-third of the number of Englishmen engaged.

Thus every British soldier was impressed with the fact, on British authority, put unquestionably before the world, that several regiments of British troops, in a fair trial of strength, in open ground, without any apology to soothe the wounded national pride, were defeated by an inferior number of Americans: whose total loss killed, wounded, and missing was 328, not much more than half the British loss, and not one American commissioned officer killed. In a fair national trial of the military faculties, courage, activity, and fortitude, discipline, gunnery, and tactics, for the first time the palm was awarded by Englishmen to Americans over Englishmen. Without fortuitous advantage the Americans proved too much for the redoubtable English, though superior in number, theretofore universally arrogating to themselves, even with inferior numbers, a mastery but faintly questioned by most Americans; no accident to depreciate the triumph of the younger over the older nation; no more fortune than what favors the bravest.

Physical and even corporeal national characteristics did not escape comparison in this normal contest. The American rather more active and more demonstrative than his ancestors, many of the officers of imposing figure, Scott and McNeill particularly, towering with gigantic stature above the rest, stood opposed in striking contrast to the short, thick, brawny, burly Briton, hard to overcome. A nobleman of the best blood of Scotland, whose daughter was afterwards selected to continue the illustrious race of the Duke of Wellington, to whose eldest son she was married, the Marquis of Tweedale, with his sturdy short person, and stubborn courage, represented the British. Scott, with his much loftier form, more alert and more ostentatious bravery, was the American type. Even the names betokened at once consanguinity and hostility. Scott, McNeill, and McRee, in arms against Gordon, Hay, and Machonachie. And the harsh Scotch nomenclature, compared with the more euphonious savage Canada, Chippewa, Niagara, which latter modern Eng-



lish prosody has corrupted from the measure of Goldsmith's Traveller:—

Where wild Oswego spreads her swamps around,  
And Niagara stuns with thundering sound.

Two unfortunate young men, a captain and a lieutenant, sternly if not harshly stigmatized, (one of them the son of a respectable member of the war party in the House of Representatives with us,) in Brown's official dispatch, as wanting spirit, were the rare exceptions to the general rule, and there was reason to doubt the justice of that severity. With those exceptions every officer and man, inspired by their admirable leaders, fought as if the fate of the day depended on each one. Brigadier-General Scott, Majors Leavenworth, Jessup, and McNeill, Captains Crocker, Towson, Harrison, and Austin, (Brown's aid,) Lieutenants Worth and Watts, (the aids of Scott,) were immediately brevetted; Captain Harrison, not only for active bravery, but more difficult passive endurance. Severely wounded by a cannon ball, he preserved his serenity and refused all help till the enemy was beat. Worth, the handsome and gallant lieutenant of that day, is the Major-General who has realized its martial promise by numerous feats of soldiership, and now with General Scott in Mexico, swells to a volume of fame the page unrolled at Chippewa.

The battle known by that name has never been appreciated as it ought to be. Mankind, impressed by numbers and bloodshed, regard the second more extensive battle near the Falls of Niagara, on the 25th of the same month, between the same parties with British reinforcements, known as the battle of Bridgewater, as more important than its precursor. So Jackson's sanguinary defeat of the English attacking him the 8th January, has unjustly eclipsed his more masterly preliminary attack of them the 23d December, on which the fate of New Orleans, and, perhaps, the sequel of the war, depended. The victory of Chippewa was the resurrection or birth of American arms, after their prostration by so long disuse, and when at length taken up again by such continual and deplorable failures, that the martial and moral influence of the first decided victory opened and characterize an epoch in the annals and intercourse of the two kindred and rival nations, whose language is to be spoken as their institutions are rapidly spreading throughout most of mankind. Fought between only some three or four thousand men in both armies, at a place remote from either of their countries, the battle of Chippewa may not bear vulgar comparison with the great military engagements of modern Europe. But few better judges, less disposed to either flattery or partiality, have pronounced on its merits than Wilkinson, a man of education, mili-

tary knowledge, and unavoidably invidious of the commanders who superseded him in those fields, and, as he thought, robbed him of their renown. He described it as an "obstinate contest, fought on a plain, and in direct order, whose simplicity presented few occasions for display of tactical skill: literally a trial of strength and courage, breast to breast, in which the American arms triumphed. Brigadier-General Scott led his corps to the attack with conspicuous gallantry, in which he was supported by three field officers, Majors Jessup, Leavenworth, and McNeill, of whom it is no disparagement of the General to say, that they were his inferiors in naught but the accidental circumstance of rank. The contest for glory was ardent and uniform, from the ranks to the brigadier. But it was Major Jessup's fortune to be most closely engaged; pressed in front and flank, he found it necessary to appeal to the bayonet, and his antagonists recoiled." The charm of British military invincibility was as effectually broken by a single brigade, as that of naval supremacy was by a single frigate, as much as if a large army or fleet had been the agent.

After all done and written, from Cyrus to Napoleon, on warfare, there is no magic, nor much mystery, in a science of which vigilance, diligence, and execution, are the arts, force concentrated on a point, by blows repeated; with success superadding its moral to the physical power employed in action. To organize victory the simple method is, to be in earnest and not afraid. On these lessons of mother wit, to a bold man, with a stout person, thirsting for fame, Jacob Brown, the Quaker schoolmaster, pursued his triumphant march in Canada after the victory of Chippewa. Preparations were made immediately on the 6th July to overcome Riall in his entrenchments, enfeebled by deaths, sore with wounds, mortified and discouraged. Beat by part of Brown's force, could he resist it altogether, flushed with triumph? After ground was marked for the American batteries, and other arrangements for attack, Riall, disconcerted, destroyed his artillery, abandoned his intrenchments, and decamped. Putting part of his troops in Fort George, where Colonel Tucker commanded, with the rest Riall retired twelve miles further up the lake to Twenty-mile Creek, there to prepare for revenge; worsted, but not consternated. Brown directly followed, and during three precious weeks, with the enemy cooped up in Fort George, from the 5th to the 25th July, was undisputed master of that peninsula, which he might have held against any force the enemy could bring to oppose him, provided Chauncey took command of Lake Ontario, as he did from and after the first day of August, and was expected, if he had not even promised to do,

by the 15th July. Should Fort George be invested, or Riall attacked by a sudden movement on him, more conformable to the onward course thus far? It was essential to keep near intelligence, reinforcements, and naval co-operation, anxiously expected, but never to come, from Sackett's Harbor. On the 12th July, the only wrong of the campaign was perpetrated and punished; the hamlet of St. David's was burnt by Colonel Stone, of the New York militia, retaliating some feuds between them and the Canadians. Instantly disavowed by Brown, Stone was indignantly discharged. Recollections of the devastations in New York, caused by Maclure's conflagrations in Canada, in December, were too flagrant for repetition of border barbarities, with American Fort Niagara garrisoned by English in full view. On the 13th July, General John Swift, an aged and enterprising officer of New York, successfully reconnoitering Fort George, was murdered by a prisoner in the very act of begging and receiving quarter. On the 15th July, General Porter, with his brigade of volunteers, Major Wood, of the engineers, and Captain Ritchie, with two pieces of artillery, drove in the pickets at Fort George, and formed the brigade within a mile, in full view of the fort, with little interruption. Colonel Wilcocks, with his American Canadians; Captains Hall, Harding, and Freeman, of the New York volunteers; and Captain Flemming, with Indian warriors, advanced under cover of a tuft of woods within musket shot of the fort, and gave Major Wood an opportunity, with hardly any loss, to examine the works: only a few of Captain Boughton's New York cavalry being surprised and captured.

Unfortunately, Commodore Chauncey was ill; but not more ill than Wolfe when, storming the Heights of Abraham, he took Quebec, and expelled French power from Canada; or Jackson, when he repulsed the British, with great slaughter, from Louisiana. Well acquainted with the country, and informed of the enemy's number, location, and condition, Brown's conduct and correspondence breathed the utmost, perhaps extravagant confidence. From the neighborhood of Queenstown, on the 13th July, while reconnoitering Fort George, he wrote to Chauncey, "For God's sake, let me see you. All accounts agree that the force of the enemy at Kingston is very light. I do not doubt my ability to meet them in the field, and march in any direction over their country, your fleet carrying for me the necessary supplies. We can threaten Forts George and Niagara, carry Burlington Heights and York, and proceed direct to Kingston and carry that place. We have between us sufficient means to conquer Upper Canada in two months, if there is prompt and zealous co-operation

before the enemy can be greatly reinforced." This, it may be, extravagant but not unfounded confidence, Chauncey, suffering with feverish prostration, reprimanded as "a sinister attempt to render the fleet subordinate to, or an appendage of, the army." Even if so, it was better for him, and much better for the country, so to serve than demur for such a cause. He did nothing with his fleet at all comparable to what Brown proposed for it. A brave and skilful seaman, of whom Brown's exactions may have been unreasonable, demurred upon selfish and mistaken dignity. Though the navy "might be somewhat of a convenience, he confessed, in the transportation of provisions and stores for the army, yet the Secretary of the Navy had given him the *higher destiny* to seek and fight the enemy's fleet." On the 22d July, Brown was advised by General Gaines, commanding at Sackett's Harbor, that not only the fleet, but even the guns and riflemen he had sent for, (in boats, if the Commodore should not accompany them with his squadron,) were blockaded by the enemy. Doubtless, it was material that Chauncey's vessels should be exercised on the lake, before brought into action with British vessels accustomed to it. But the American Commodore's demur was unlucky, if not untimely. The navy had fought its way to public regard. It became the spoiled pet of the country. History must not repress, that in September, 1813 (vol. i. 429), and July, 1814, the squadron on Lake Ontario, both times when Burlington Bay and Heights were in view, twice disappointed general expectation.

Constrained to abide that disappointment, General Brown suffered other privations. Five hundred regular troops of General McArthur's brigade ordered to his support, and arriving the 8th of July from Detroit at Erie in Pennsylvania, did not reach Canada till after the second battle at the Falls of Niagara. Those cunning attendants on fortune, selfish, and dastardly deserters in emergency, the Indians, all left the American standard. On the twenty-second of July, when Brown relinquished the last hope of prompt naval co-operation, his predicament became precarious. But resolved not to abandon the enterprise begun, he came to the heroic if not desperate determination to disencumber his army of baggage, and push forward to Burlington Heights at all events. To mask that movement, and also replenish his provisions from stores at Schlosser, the army was led back to Chippewa on the 25th of July, whose classic grounds and proud recollections soon elicited the memorable achievements of one of the most obstinate, sanguinary, and altogether extraordinary battles by night. Invidiously criticising the wild encounter of that bloody night, Wilkinson condemns Scott for rebuking an



officer's suggestion of retreat, by appealing to history for occasions when armies vanquished four times their number. Brown and Scott needed not to recur to ancient history for the military wisdom of never despairing and seldom yielding. Not long before, Bonaparte, snatching victory from almost defeat at Marengo, installed the greatest of modern empires. Some years after, Wellington, from near defeat at Waterloo, demolished that empire and reconstructed Europe.—The American general's smaller scale had a destiny to fulfil, the character of an army to redeem, and honorable terms of peace to vouchsafe: all of which the second battle of the Falls consecrated at Bridgewater or Lundy's Lane, as it is variously called, superadded to the first known as that of Chippewa.

Owing, probably, to Generals Brown and Scott being disabled by wounds, no official accounts of that engagement reached us till the middle of August, when the British marched upon Washington, and superseding Canada in public interest, absorbed attention. Dissension among generals, infecting whole corps, and prejudicing individuals, produced conflicting and invidious accounts from officers in the action. The confusion of a night conflict, its vicissitudes, contradictions, mistakes, and disputed catastrophe controverted between English and Americans, and among the latter themselves, obscure and perplex the realities of that affair, of which, from all these causes, no full or satisfactory account has been published. Military reports of battles, being compiled from the various statements of different officers, no one witnessing more than part, few agree in what they did witness. Any sketch taken from them may be wrong, and must be imperfect. Jealousy of the different kinds of troops, of brigades, regiments, and individuals, of each other, to say nothing of national prejudices, beget charges of injustice, to which this sketch, though made from all reliable information, American and English, may be obnoxious. But without motive to misrepresent, care has been taken to describe, correctly, that remarkable conflict.

The battle of Bridgewater was unexpected to both armies. General Riall had followed Brown from the neighborhood of Queenstown to the Falls, without his being aware of it; and General Drummond followed Riall. But their attack was not intended till daybreak on the 26th of July. On the 25th, all the British forces and artillery not having arrived, General Scott, more courageously than, perhaps, prudently, without the design of either commander, or either army being prepared, precipitated the strange and severe nocturnal contest, by which, of six thousand combatants, seventeen hundred killed, wounded or captured, were sacrificed to the point of honor.

Emboldened by the confusion in which a perplexed and obscure conflict closed after midnight, and the retreat of the American army next day, the British claimed victory, with some plausible pretensions. They claim, too, inferiority of numbers, though much superior, in their own well-chosen position, with better armament, more ammunition, and every means of success, when they were defeated in that impressive trial of arms.

Without official authority for their number, beyond their own accounts, chargeable with the usual partiality of such statements, the English forces in Canada, that summer, exceeded all the regular troops of the United States, anywhere on this continent. There were considerable forces in Canada before peace in Europe multiplied them. The Eastern British provinces, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, added many to Canadian levies, which were numerous and well organized. Early in July reinforcements began to arrive from Europe, with the utmost perfection of military armament and naval transportation on board many transport vessels, though the unemployed British navy was itself sufficient to convey large armies without employing transports. According to English and Canadian credible publications, the expedition to America was on a large scale, to be commanded by a lieutenant-general, and several celebrated generals, leading the *élite* of the Duke of Wellington's army to the punishment, if not conquest, of the whole United States.

No better use could be made of that large disposable force than to send them, in great numbers, to America. It was cheaper, more politic, less offensive to the officers and soldiers than to disband them at home, that they should be employed abroad, where, if many perished, it was an economy. Attacks on the State of New York, through Canada, and on the city by water; on New England through New Brunswick; on Louisiana from Bermuda, and on all the Atlantic coast from Boston to Savannah, were the gigantic plan of an incensed nation. Of the troops destined for their execution, it was said that twenty-five thousand were to be landed from Europe at Quebec, and ten thousand at Halifax. While Brown maintained his foothold on the Niagara peninsula, which he did till the enemy gave up attempting to dislodge him, not less than thirty regiments of regular soldiers, besides all others, amounting to between thirty and forty thousand men of all arms, from Niagara to Quebec, composed the Canadian army: with renown not greater than discipline, complete equipments, and the confidence of tried commanders in veteran soldiers. The same pontoons which carried them over the rivers of Spain and France, the same cannon which battered formidable fortresses

there; the very English horses which winged the flying artillery at Toulouse, and worsted Soult; the identical physical and moral means of conquest subjugating the most martial nations of Europe, were transported over the Atlantic to dismember, punish, and put down the least belligerent of all people in America, to whom warfare was but a remembrance, its exactions and severities novel, odious, and intolerable.

From the 16th to the 25th of July, General Brown had no tidings and no fears of his enemy, but no hopes from his naval compatriot. Major General Riall, with refreshed and reinforced troops, had followed him to the Falls of Niagara, with every preparation made to attack the American army, early in the morning of the 26th of July, in its former auspicious encampment at Chippewa. Lieutenant-General Drummond, Governor of Upper Canada, sailed from York the evening of the 24th, and reached Niagara river early next morning. Thence sending forward some regiments drawn from Forts George and Mississauga, under Colonel Morrison, to join Riall. Colonel Tucker, with about a thousand soldiers, sailors and Indians, crossed to the American side against Schlosser.

To contend with all these superior forces, having control of all the waters, the American army at Chippewa, mustered in action not more than twenty-five hundred fighting men. Each of the two brigades contained some eight or nine hundred. The volunteers were from five to six hundred. The killed and wounded on the 5th July, and in skirmishes afterwards, the sick and diminutions by other casualties, and departure of all the Indians, reduced by many hundreds the thirty-five hundred combatants who ventured to invade Canada three weeks before. Expecting no action on the 25th, especially towards evening, when it suddenly came on, three hundred or more detailed for washing and other camp services, were not taken from them into action. At noon General Brown was informed by an express of the British movement about Queenstown, the arrival of the vessels, boats and reinforcements brought by Drummond. Soon after, by another express, he was apprised of the expedition of Colonel Tucker to Schlosser. Lieutenant Riddle, sent out to reconnoiter, had not returned, but Captain Odell, commanding a picket on the north of the encampment, reported soon in the morning to Major Leavenworth, officer of the day, who sent to head-quarters, that with a glass a troop of horse and two companies of infantry, in scarlet regimentals, could be seen, about two miles off, believed to be the British advance, near Wilson's tavern, not far from the Falls of Niagara. There was no apprehension, however, of an attack or of any immediate hostile intention, except against the stores, ammunition, sick, and

other deposits on the other side of the river, at Schlosser, whither it was known the enemy had proceeded, and which General Brown had no means of either defending, transporting or removing. His predicament perilous he felt, was more so than he was aware. He had no idea, however, of an attack, as the British had crossed over to Schlosser in force, still less of retreat, but courted battle. A march towards Queenstown, which might induce the enemy to return from the other side of the river, was his hazardous, not injudicious, and, as events soon proved, fortunate determination. Nor was it, whatever military theorists or sciolists may say, inconsistent with those improved principles of modern warfare, which, casting away the impediments of baggage, the supernumeraries of camps, crowds, and all that can possibly be dispensed with for an emergency, take the boldest way to victory, risking much, that much may be accomplished. It was a course which Cromwell, Frederick or Napoleon would approve. Reviewing the campaigns of Alexander, Cæsar, Hannibal, Turenne, Gustavus and his own, Napoleon testified that their principles were all the same, viz: to keep their force together, and be vulnerable at no point, push them rapidly on important positions, trust to moral means, the reputation of their arms, and the fear they inspired. Never did any one of these mighty commanders think of keeping open communication behind him, of regarding inferior hostilities in his rear, but always aimed by amassed means at one great object. A campaign is like an argument, in which the great position being carried, all the minor ones follow. And always the moral are more important than the merely military means and consequences.

General Scott was therefore ordered to march at once, report to General Brown, and call for help, if needed. When he marched, there was no design or idea in either army of the contest that ensued. Taking his men from afternoon drill, when ordered to Queenstown, General Scott led out the first brigade; the 9th regiment, Major Leavenworth; 11th, Major McNeill; 22d, Colonel Brady; 25th, Major Jessup; all feeble in numbers: Leavenworth's regiment only one hundred and fifty; Jessup's, some two hundred—not one well supplied with ammunition. Towson's company of artillery, Harris' troop, and some volunteer cavalry, were with the rest, altogether not eight hundred men. With this small force, on their way to Queenstown, not to fight, General Scott fell in with the enemy, right in front, who retired, but it was believed intended to give battle. Major Wood, the engineer, having reconnoitered, and reported to that effect, Scott dispatched Assistant Adjutant General Roger Jones to inform



Brown; and without hesitation led his brigade, with the utmost alacrity, to attack the enemy. Though their force was unknown and his considerable, yet with inferior numbers he had in like manner attacked and beaten the same troops a few days before. Inspired by the confidence of that success, he made immediate disposition for attacking much superior numbers, in a strong position. The rules of war were against, but fortune favored the movement. The British, without counting General Drummond's reinforcement of eight hundred, arrived that afternoon; and Colonel Scott's that night, of twelve hundred more, at first far outnumbered our troops. When the conflict began, the British could not have been less than from two thousand to twenty-five hundred strong. Their seven pieces of artillery were posted on the summit of a hill, supported by a heavy line of infantry, flanked by cavalry. Scott's advance was led by Captain Harris with his dragoons, and Captain Pentland's company of the 22d infantry, both officers much distinguished throughout the action, towards the end of which Pentland lost a leg, was left on the ground, and taken prisoner. Between Wilson's tavern and Lundy's Lane, near the village of Bridgewater, the British artillery opened upon Scott, who formed and reversed his column, faltering under its destructive severity. As it must be some time before Ripley's brigade and Porter's could come to Scott's aid, he detached Major Jessup with the 25th, to seek and engage the British left, while the General attacked their right. The other three regiments were moved beyond the advanced companies, and stationed where, as well as during the change of position, their exposure and losses were so severe, that both McNeill and Brady, with many, if not most of the other officers, were disabled by wounds, and their regiments so much demoralized as to be confused, some retreating, their ammunition, too, at last falling short. Towson's inimitable battery on the right, by incessant reverberations of the most exciting martial music, encouraged the column; but the British guns were so high that his shot passed over them, while their's plunged down with deadly aim, and for some time Towson ceased firing, as useless. The action began towards evening; for more than an hour was maintained by the first brigade alone, notwithstanding great disadvantages to contend against, and the loss of half their force; Jessup's detachment, meanwhile, whose loss in killed and wounded was in proportion to the other regiments, never faltering in its signal episode, till the enemy on the right were routed. By musketry, at a hundred yards, at first, and then the bayonet, the British left was put to flight by Jessup, who thereupon seized a road, which he discovered, to turn

their flank, and with that advantage routed still more of them. Scott, with enthusiastic and matchless bravery, prosecuted his onset, a personal example to all, if of extravagant, yet sustained and invincible ardor. It was Jessup's good fortune, the common effect of good conduct, to capture General Riall retiring wounded, together with Captain Loring, aid-de-camp of General Drummond, several other officers, and altogether one hundred and sixty-nine prisoners—as many as were left unhurt of his own command. Drummond's dispatch confessed, that on his arrival he found Riall's "advance in full retreat; and when his own formation was completed, the whole front was warmly and closely engaged, the principal American efforts directed against the British left and centre; after repeated attacks, those on the left forced back, and the Americans gaining temporary possession of the road." Thus taught by the enemy, and the results, we are safe in denying the imputed rashness, and as was said, frenzy of Scott, on that occasion, in applauding the ability of his dispositions, though they began by a charge of seeming rashness, and at all events, admiring the excellent fortitude, as well as courage, by which he made head against formidable odds, and introduced a hard-earned victory. The drooping took courage from the fearless, and vied with the example of a conspicuous leader, foremost in every danger. Numberless were the instances of individual heroism, while the trained confidence and pride of corps pervaded the shattered brigade, held together, carried forward, and though broken into small fragments, induced to preserve the integrity and character of the whole. One of the bravest officers in the field, Major Leavenworth, of whose one hundred and fifty rank and file, one hundred and twenty-eight were killed, wounded, or missing, and only sixty-four could be mustered next day, sent to General Scott that his rule for retreating was fulfilled: Scott having laid it down as an aphorism, said to be attributed to Moreau, that a regiment may retreat when every third man is killed or wounded. To which intimation, communicated by another gallant officer, Captain Harris, who volunteered to serve with infantry, when cavalry could be no longer serviceable, Scott's animating reply, uttered in a transport of intrepidity, imparted hope, confidence, and endurance to officers and soldiers. When Jessup's success and Riall's capture were made known to Scott, he loudly proclaimed it, calling for three cheers. Apprised by that vociferation where to aim in the dark, the British battery fired a broadside upon Scott's station, which, passing over the heads of the infantry, struck a caisson of Captain Ritchie's guns and blew up several ammunition wagons. Most of his men

being killed or wounded at their guns, and he too wounded during the night, was advised to retire. "Never," said the dauntless Ritchie, "will I leave this gun but in death or victory." Captains Bliss, Harris, and several other officers, when their own corps were no longer available, joined Major Leavenworth, with his skeleton of a regiment. Colonel Brady, severely wounded, Major Jessup, suffering excruciating pain from several wounds, were of those noble remains who would not retire, even though some of them intimated an opinion that it should be ordered. General Scott's aid, Captain Worth, and Brigade Major Smith, were both compelled, by severe wounds, to leave the field. Of Scott's brigade, one hundred and sixteen were killed, and three hundred and thirty-three wounded or missing, so that not half the original number remained, whom he finally embodied into a battalion, and led to repeated charges. Before that, telling them to maintain their ground, he announced the thrice welcome tidings that General Brown, with Ripley's and Porter's brigades, were at hand. Volleys of musketry on the hill joyfully confirmed that grateful relief, then indispensable.

Ripley's brigade and Porter's volunteers, by cordial and expeditious, but circuitous and unavoidably somewhat retarded advance, bring us to the next still more excited and doubtful stage of that nocturnal conflict; for it was sunset when they arrived, and after near two hours of evening battle, by not more than one American to three Englishmen, during the remaining three hours of darkness, seldom if ever was there fiercer fighting in the dark.

As soon as Ripley heard Scott's firing, he formed his brigade. General Brown, whose aid, Captain Austin, had been to inquire what firing it was, ordered Ripley's and Porter's brigades to the field, and his aid to tell Ripley where to take his station. Brown then, with the engineer, Major McRee, hastened forward. Ripley and Porter lost no time, the men trotting forward to move as rapidly as possible over the bridge, and nearly three miles they had to go. It was night when they formed for action. The formidable annoyance of nine heavy cannons, Drummond having added two to Riall's seven, in battery on the top of a hill, at once suggested the obvious expediency, if not absolute necessity, of overcoming so fatal a hindrance to any chance of success. It remains matter of question whether Brown, Ripley, or McRee was first to declare that the battery on that hill must be stormed and taken. General Armstrong awards the honor to the engineer Major McRee. The regiments of the second brigade were the 21st, Colonel James Miller, the 23d, Major McFarland, detachments of the 17th, and 19th; with Captain Ritchie of Major Hindman's battalion of artillery,

preceded by Captain Biddle's artillery. The first regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholas, was not attached to either brigade. General Ripley forthwith ordered Colonel Miller, who at once undertook to storm the park. Major McFarland, with the 23d regiment, was to take it in flank, and Colonel Nicholas to keep the musketry employed. After a few rounds his men recoiled, fell back in confusion, and could not be rallied to face the terrible fire from the hill they were to scale. Major McFarland was killed, and the 23d also faltered and retreated. But Ripley soon restored them to good order, and in person led them up the ascent, where they displayed in a few minutes, as intended. Miller, meanwhile, unsupported by either the 1st or 23d, nevertheless, moved steadily upward with unflinching intrepidity, drove the British from their guns at the point of the bayonet, took their whole park; and then, forming his line within twenty paces of the retiring but hardly retreating foe, at least twice his number, a perfect sheet of fire, at half pistol shot distance, signalized the desperate efforts of the victorious to retain, of the partially vanquished to regain, the great armament and trophy, the palladium and key of the contest. During this struggle, of some continuance, the 21st regiment, gallantly led by General Ripley, marched up on the flank, by his order reserving their fire till within twenty paces, then poured it forth with such effect, that, superadded to Miller's, the British were driven down the hill, leaving Ripley, with the two regiments, in undisputed possession of the artillery and the eminence. "In the darkness of the night, during that extraordinary conflict," said General Drummond's official report of it, "in so determined a manner were the American attacks directed against our guns, that our artillerymen were bayoneted by them in the very act of loading, and the muzzles of the American guns were advanced within a few yards of ours." With such unusual homage of reluctant truth, history needs no figurative embellishment, common in most descriptions of battles, but unnecessary for reality more romantic than fiction, truth fairly told by those interested to conceal or deny it. Compared with some other nations' sense of it, English and American truth is a remarkable characteristic.

The British, driven down that hill, leaving their killed and wounded with their guns in charge of their conquerors, took shelter and counsel about two hundred yards from and underneath it; where, shrouded in profound darkness and discomfort, they re-organized for another effort. Soon afterwards, some two hundred of the first regiment found their way up the hill, whither also Major Hindman repaired, with Captain Towson and Ritchie,



with their guns; and, for a short time, General Brown was much elated with the triumph, which he hoped would be conclusive. By that time a pale moonlight had disappeared, and nothing but impenetrable darkness prevailed. Sight was useless; no colors could be seen; there was no music. One flag, picked from where it lay on the ground, struck from some killed or wounded standard-bearer, had to be handed by a corporal, as every officer of his regiment down to a column sergeant was disabled or gone; on such occasions, many men besides the sufferers, disappearing from various causes or pretexts. Amid the gloom of a still, sultry night, in the wild scenery of a picturesque region, occasional shouts of onset and triumph, more frequent though fainter cries of distress from the wounded, and continual yells of the English Indians, were overpowered by the predominant murmur of the vast cataract, with eternal commotion, tumbling the waters of one large lake into another. Stunned by the incessant roar of mighty waters, the troops exhausted with fatigue, were parched with thirst. The toil and tug of war, however, were only begun, when they seemed to be over. When Ripley, with his 700 and Porter with his 500 men, went to Scott's relief, reduced to less than 400, as his brigade was broken into fragments, Drummond was stimulated as well as strengthened for further efforts by the continual arrivals of fresh troops: the British Annual Register confesses 1200, under Colonel Scott, received during the action. Moved by every feeling of soldierly and national pride, duty, and propriety, he was resolved to recapture the lost guns and restore the adverse fortune of the night, excited by national even continental or hemispheric rivalry. Europe against America sharpening individual exasperation, made a struggle of more than for victory or death. That peculiar mixture of respect and aversion which prevails between English and Americans, despising, hating, and admiring each other; the same lineage, language, some of the same Irish and other soldiery in both armies, and some of the corps even dressed alike in the same gray uniform, the changes and vicissitudes of precarious conflict, imbued it altogether with the bitterness of family strife, worse than civil war, or contest for mastery, regardless of sufferings or consequences. Men on both sides of strong nerve, unflinching, were forced to give way. But with most a military conjuncture raged steeling affection, stifling apprehension, and in a tempest of passion inflaming all to unmitigated extermination. One of the features of that remarkable battle was an old church dedicated by religious consecration to peace on earth and good-will to man. Near the fence of the graveyard of that temple of Christian piety, under

the guns of the battery pointed at Scott's position, Miller, by the light of their blaze and report of their explosions, his only means of locating the artillery, moved in silent, stealthy desperation against it, poured in a fatal volley announcing his onslaught, and then prostrating the fence rushed in with the bayonet and seized the park from which the British were driven. What a deed for a churchyard! filled with English graves, over which Americans strode to put more Englishmen to death.

After about half an hour's absence from their place of retreat under the hill, being reorganized and reinforced, they were heard again moving up the ascent. Ripley closing his ranks, forbade all firing till the flashes of the British musketry enabled the Americans to aim unerringly—for that purpose to reserve fire till they felt the very push of the bayonet. Still, superior far in numbers, the British marched on again, and after one discharge from the Americans as directed, many more rounds were exchanged between the combatants for some twenty minutes in close and furious battle. Never good marksmen, however, and with the disadvantage of standing lower, the British now fired over the Americans, whose plunging shots were more effective, and the British again forced to give way, retreated down the hill to their hiding-place.

Fear is of one and the same pallid complexion. Courage wears many faces. Miller was as calm and Ripley almost as cold, as Scott was vehement. As the first regiment under Colonel Nicholas, conducted by Major Wood, was taking its position, General Brown repeated to Colonel Miller that he was to charge and take the battery with the bayonet, to which good humoredly he answered, "It shall be done, sir."

During the first combat on the hill, the first brigade at some distance enjoyed a short respite. Scott was eager as ever for more fighting, and Brown even more so, if need be, superintending every operation, which in the total darkness could be done only by personal attention, rather feeling than seeing what must be done. When the firing on the hill ceased, General Scott ordered all the men of the 11th and 22d regiments who could be found, to be collected and formed into a battalion: on whose revival it was that Jessup's success was announced by Scott. Without figure of speech, the ghosts of the skeletons of three regiments were wandering in utter darkness, invisible on the margin of death's river, another Styx. Revived into a small battalion, the command belonged to Colonel Brady, with whom, too much exhausted by loss of blood for command, his Major Arrowsmith remained. After the enemy's repulse, when attempting to retake the cannon, Brown and Scott meeting, directed Leavenworth to take command of the battalion consolidated

from the three regiments of infantry, which were formed into column in Lundy's Lane.

The 1st, 21st and 23d regiments were now on the hill, and Major Hindman, Captains Towson and Ritchie, with their guns on the summit, near the church. The 9th, 11th and 22d consolidated, were on Lundy's Lane, or its proximity, with Captain Bidle's company of artillery. The 25th, with Major Jessup, had returned and joined Leavenworth's battalion. Porter's volunteers gallantly led by him, were with Ripley, and always among the foremost in the hottest fire, several of them killed, wounded and taken prisoners. After their victory they were appropriately employed in escorting the British prisoners to their place of confinement in New York.

When information came that the British were advancing to retake the guns, Scott led his battalion-brigade in an impetuous charge, which put the British left to flight: forming them again for another charge, when his shoulder was fractured by a painful wound, after having his horse shot. As he retired in great pain, his farewell order to Leavenworth was to charge again. About the same time Brown was wounded, and though he did not dismount or retire till victory appeared won, yet exhaustion then compelled him to leave the field; his aid, Major Spencer, was mortally wounded and captured.

In the Canadian campaign, a young man, not thirty years of age, Scott won his major-general's brevet. While this sketch is in hand, after an interval of thirty-three years, as commander of the American army in Mexico, he has by many wonderful victories throughout a triumphant campaign, realized the promises of 1814. With matured knowledge of his vocation, and its ardor mellowed by time, the enthusiastic Brigadier of Canada is a consummate General in Mexico.

General Brown, when the victory of Bridgewater, as far as could be judged from all circumstances, was complete, was with difficulty supported on his horse as he retired to Chippewa, and thence to Buffalo, where his robust frame soon recovering health, he hastened to a more signal triumph over Drummond at Fort Erie.

All that remained of the first brigade, after that terrible conflict, did not exceed two hundred and twenty men; the ninth, eleventh, and twenty-second regiments consolidated under Major Leavenworth, not altogether one hundred. Many of the cartridges with which the Americans fired, when attacked on the hill, were taken from the cartridge boxes of the English lying dead around them. Men and officers, after five hours' constant fighting, were completely exhausted, and many almost fainting with thirst. There was no water nearer than the Chippewa. Before they marched,

however, from the hill, the wounded were carefully removed, and the return to the camp behind the Chippewa was slowly in perfect order, entirely undisturbed by the enemy. Seventy-six officers were killed or wounded, and six hundred and twenty-nine rank and file; of whom the first brigade lost thirty-eight officers, and four hundred and sixty-eight rank and file. The commander of the brigade and every regimental officer were wounded. Every officer of the brigade and regimental staff was killed or wounded. General Scott and Major Jessup had each two horses shot under them; Jessup was wounded four times severely; Scott has never entirely recovered from his wound in the shoulder; Brady, Leavenworth and McNeill had each a horse shot under him. No battle in America, before or since, was ever so severely contested, or attended with such casualties in proportion to numbers.

Three more attempts were made by the enemy to retake the guns on the hill, each one after an interval of about half an hour, and the conflict each time more strenuous, if not desperate, than that preceding it. For more than half an hour after the fourth and last attempt, in one of which General Drummond was wounded severely, but refused to retire, nothing more was heard. It was past midnight, and still as death, save the groans and complaints of the wounded. The British loss altogether, by their subsequent official report, amounted to eight hundred and seventy-eight; the American by theirs to seven hundred and forty-three. Every general in both armies was wounded, and every officer, except Ripley, who had several shots in his hat. Battle had raged for more than five hours, three in the dark, when all firing ceased: overcome with fatigue and thirst, it was hazardous to refresh on the hill, because the enemy might cut them off from the camp at Chippewa. Majors Leavenworth and Jessup's opinion was made known to General Ripley, left in command, that the wounded should be collected and the whole army removed to camp. Wagons were accordingly sent for to carry off the wounded. Those who had sunk exhausted, those gone to take care of the wounded, the numbers who in all battles stray from their places, those left in camp when the rest went out to battle; all these diminutions left, in the judgment of reliable officers, not more than a thousand fighting men embodied, when they were marched back to Chippewa. Moving in as good order from as to Bridgewater, Ripley led them back to their encampment, between one and two o'clock of the morning of the 26th July; victorious according to every circumstance and indication except one, which the enemy, not without reason, laid hold of to claim the victory. The British cannon, so nobly captured at first, and kept afterwards against so many desperate



attempts to regain them, were left on the hill; all but one of the American howitzers, exchanged by mistake in the darkness and confusion of the night for that one English gun, was left too. For want of horses, harness, drag-ropes and other contrivances to carry off these inestimable trophies, they fell at last into the hands of the English, who returned to the hill soon after the Americans left it. Major Hindman going there, by General Brown's order, to bring away the guns after Ripley had gone to Chippewa, found the hill, together with the guns, in possession of the British, who did not fail to proclaim the precious prize as proof that theirs was the victory, which perversion was further countenanced by Ripley's destroying the bridge over the Chippewa, and some of his baggage, camp equipage and provisions, preparatory to his retreat to Fort Erie.

All this, which became the subject of much controversy among the American officers discrediting or defending Ripley, was more dexterously than candidly, but so commonly as to be almost always the case on such occasions, therefore not unpardonably, turned by General Drummond into evidence that he was not conquered, but conqueror. "A howitzer which the enemy brought up was captured by us," said his dispatch. They captured nothing, but merely found a cannon accidentally left, when, an hour after the enemy's retreat, their conquerors in complete and undisturbed possession of the guns and the field, slowly and in perfect order left it, and them to return to the indispensable repose of their camp. The struggle was over. Pride of success was supplanted by bodily exhaustion, anxiety for repose from excessive toil, and relief from tormenting thirst. The Americans therefore, but as victors, were marched to their encampment, as Brown had directed, though without the cannons captured, as he ordered. Vexed, mortified, stung by the omission to bring them away, when he heard of it, he unwittingly countenanced General Drummond's unfair assumption by censuring General Ripley, ordering him to march next morning at sunrise to re-occupy the hill and bring away the guns; which was impossible. Ripley's division fit for duty that morning did not exceed sixteen hundred men. In the judgment of many, if not most of the officers, it would have been madness, with such a force, hardly refreshed from yesterday's labors, (for sunrise came in three hours after their repose began the night of the battle,) to storm the hill of Bridgewater again. At noon of the 26th July, Ripley led the division from Chippewa towards Fort Erie, in good order, and encamping that night opposite Black Rock, crossed himself to Buffalo to obtain Brown's permission to withdraw the division from Canada, and abandon an enter-

prise towards which from the first he had been disinclined. Brown peremptorily forbade that retirement, ordered the army to be stationed at Fort Erie, and sent for General Gaines from Sackett's Harbor, who arrived the 4th August, to take command there till Brown should be himself well enough to resume it. Invincibly tenacious of his foothold in Canada, he was resolved at all hazards not to give it up.

Where so many were distinguished as at the battle of Bridgewater, few brevets were conferred; only on Scott and the two engineer officers.

The following is General Brown's unpublished diary of events, from the close of the battle at Chippewa, on the 5th, to that of Bridgewater, on the 25th July, 1814.

"As General Ripley had not come up, and General Porter's command had been routed, the left battalion of Scott's brigade, commanded by Jessup, was outflanked and greatly exposed. It was the crisis of the battle. Captain Austin, being struck by a half-spent ball, which deprived him of his breath, and supported on his horse, for the moment, by Captain Spencer and Major Jones; the major-general rode up in person to Major Jessup, and assured him of having speedy support. He then turned to the rear of Jessup's left flank, and met Col. Gardner, who informed him that Ripley's command was nearly up, and would be able, in a few minutes, to close with the enemy. The major-general returned; but before any additional force came into action, the enemy was defeated by Scott's command.

"They were promptly pursued by our whole army, and would have been killed or captured to a man, but for the retreat afforded them in their works behind the Chippewa.

"The enemy's loss was much greater than estimated by General Brown in his official report: and the services of the gallant Porter and his command were undervalued at the time: great execution was done by their brave encounter with, and advance upon the enemy, through the wood. They certainly effected as much as could have been expected from undisciplined men.

"July 6th. It was late in the evening of the 5th, before the wounded of both armies could be taken care of. The dead remained on the field during the night. Much of our time was engrossed on the 6th and 7th in carrying the wounded to the hospital at Buffalo, and in burying the dead that were found in the woods and on the plains. General Brown was impatient at this delay. He was apprehensive that he could not arrive on the shore of Ontario, and meet our fleet on the 10th; as, on examination of the enemy's works, the passage of the Chippewa bridge was considered too hazardous if practicable, and the country on our left

was represented as an impracticable forest. On the evening of the 6th, General Brown secured the interest of an inhabitant, who informed him of an old timber road that led, in a circuitous way, from the rear of Mrs. Street's house, to the conjunction of Lyon's creek with the Chippewa.

"On the morning of the 7th, Generals Brown and Porter, with the senior engineer, the *guide*, and a small guard, explored this road. It was determined that it could be rendered passable for artillery in a short time. Accordingly, a heavy detail was immediately made for this duty, and at night it was reported 'passable for artillery.'

"As General Scott's command had manifested, from the moment of crossing the Strait, the greatest degree of emulation in the promptitude with which they executed their orders, as well as in the gallantry with which they improved each opportunity of distinction; and, on the contrary, as General Ripley was tardy in the investment of Fort Erie, and his brigade had not participated in the laurels of the 5th; the commanding general was induced to give him this opportunity to establish the reputation of his command; and was particularly anxious to diffuse throughout the ranks that stimulus to gallant achievement which is ever produced by the spirit of emulation. Accordingly, General Ripley, with his brigade, reinforced by Porter's command and two companies of artillery under Major Hindman, was ordered to take the road we had opened; force a passage which existed formerly near the mouth of Lyon's Creek, and cross the Chippewa. We found that the enemy had erected no work for the defence of this passage, and we believed, that it might be approached undiscovered, as the road lay through a thick wood, and the enemy had confined himself to the lower side of the Chippewa since the battle of the fifth.

"The materials for a bridge were procured by taking up barn-floors, and selecting the light boats, which were forwarded in wagons, with the troops: and it was not supposed that General Ripley would be delayed but a short time in crossing; after which he was to place himself upon the enemy's right flank towards his rear—when we should be governed by circumstances.—General Ripley advanced, but did not pursue that prompt and decisive course which the service he was on particularly required. The day was far spent, and he continued to doubt and hesitate. The commanding-general advanced to the front, and assumed the immediate command. The materials for the bridge were then advanced to the creek, and Hindman's artillery to command the opposite bank. The enemy appeared, but after a short cannonade, was disconcerted and retired. It was soon reported that, apprehensive of our forcing a

passage to his rear, he had abandoned his works. This proved to be true; and we found that he had destroyed the guns of his batteries, by breaking off the trunnions, and had thrown them into the Chippewa. The construction of the bridge was abandoned. Ripley's command marched down a road running along the stream, and Scott's advanced on the main road to the bridge, which had been destroyed by the enemy. With our boats, we were enabled to cross, during the night, Scott's and Ripley's brigades, and a part of our artillery.

"*July 9th.* The army marched in pursuit of the enemy, with the exception of General Porter's command; which was left to guard the baggage, and rebuild the bridge across the Chippewa. As the enemy had a strong new work on Queenstown Heights, it was expected that he would occupy this position. We were greatly surprised, when, at our approach, he abandoned this work, and fled, leaving his entrenching tools and a quantity of stores. We immediately occupied his post; and advanced our column of infantry to the village of Queenstown. The enemy retired to Forts George and Niagara, and left the country open to us in every direction. We could march to the shore of the lake from our present position, in a few hours, whenever our fleet should arrive.

"General Brown had been induced by the Government to rely implicitly on the co-operation of the fleet, in the execution of the plan of campaign prescribed—and had experienced the greatest anxiety concerning his arrival at the lake shore, by the time appointed to meet Commodore Chauncey—to wit, the 10th of July. In anxious expectation of the speedy arrival of the fleet, the army encamped—having every advantage in their position, of strength, of health, and convenience, which the country would afford. General Porter, reinforced by a detachment of New York volunteers, and having rebuilt the bridge over the Chippewa, brought up the baggage, and joined the main army on the 10th.

"After remaining for some days in painful suspense, we found that the original arrangement intended for our supplies could not be realized. We could draw nothing from the depots at Genesee river and Sodus, without the fleet. We, therefore, were dependent for provisions upon a line of supplies from the rear. During this halt, nothing of moment occurred, except the loss of General John Swift of the New York militia. This brave officer was killed by a soldier of a picket near Fort George, which the general, with a few men, had surprised and captured. Detachments occasionally marched to the lake shore, for forage or for observation, without being molested.

"The Indians left us about the 20th, and



were crossed to Lewistown. On that day, the works on Queenstown Heights were blown up; and the army took a position near Fort George. As this movement might induce the enemy to close upon our rear, it was hoped that he would come out of his works and give us an opportunity to engage him. On the 22d, we re-occupied our former position on Queenstown heights, which the enemy had possessed with a few men; who were soon routed, and fled. General Porter, with his usual zeal, pursued them, and captured a few prisoners: of the number were nine officers.

"On the morning of the 23d, the commanding general received by express a despatch from General Gaines, commanding at Sackett's Harbor, with advice that our fleet were in port, and the commodore sick. In consequence of the delay of the fleet, the major-general had ordered from Sackett's Harbor all the riflemen at that post, with a battering train of artillery. It was hoped that this reinforcement, by coasting the south shore of the lake, could reach in safety some of the harbors or creeks near the head of the lake; and thence be transported to the army. In this the major-general was also disappointed. Major Morgan, after being embarked, was detained at Stony Island, under the conviction that he was in danger of being captured by the enemy's squadron. This information from General Gaines precluded all hope of co-operation from the fleet; and of the timely arrival of Major Morgan. It was therefore resolved to fall back to the Chippewa; and be governed by circumstances. It was the intention of the commanding general (in which all his principal officers coincided), to march upon Burlington, having first received a small supply of provisions from Schlosser—and removed from the army all unnecessary baggage.

"With this object in view, the army fell back to the Chippewa on the 24th. General Scott, ever ambitious to distinguish himself and his command, was solicitous to be allowed to march for Burlington Heights with the first brigade; and expressed his wish to this effect, on the evening of the 24th. On the morning of the 25th, he made the request in form; and was so tenacious on the subject, that he appeared quite vexed that the commanding general would not divide his force:—Scott honestly believed, that with the troops he asked, he would cover himself with additional glory, and add to the fame of the army.

"General Brown received, about noon, by express from Colonel Swift, who was posted at Lewistown, advice that the enemy appeared in considerable force at Queenstown and on its heights; that four of his fleet had arrived during the preceding night, and were then lying near Fort Niagara; and that a number of boats were in view, moving up

the straits. Within a few minutes after this intelligence, the major-general was further informed, by Captain Denman, (of the quartermaster's department,) that the enemy was landing at Lewistown; and that our baggage and stores at Schlosser, and on their way thither, were in immediate danger of capture. It was conceived that the most effectual method of recalling him from this object, was to put the army in motion towards Queenstown. If he were in the field on the Canada side of the strait, our only business was to meet and fight him, without loss of time, as General Brown had almost ceased to hope for co-operation or reinforcements from any quarter. While the support on which the general hitherto relied had failed to appear, the enemy, having the command of the Lake, could reinforce at pleasure.

"General Scott, with the first brigade, Towson's artillery, and all the dragoons and mounted men, was accordingly put in march on the road towards Queenstown. He was particularly instructed to report the appearance of the enemy, and to call for assistance, if that were necessary. Having the command of the dragoons, he would have, it was considered, the means of collecting and communicating intelligence.

"On General Scott's arrival near the Falls, he learned that the enemy's forces were directly in his front, a narrow piece of wood alone intercepting his view of them. Waiting only to dispatch this information, but not to receive any communication in return, the general advanced upon them. Hearing the report of the cannon and small arms, General Brown at once concluded that a battle had commenced between the advance of our army and that of the enemy; and without waiting for information from Gen. Scott, ordered the second brigade and all the artillery to march as rapidly as possible to his support; and directed Colonel Gardner to remain and see this order executed. He then rode with his aids-de-camp and Major McRee, with all speed, to the scene of action. As he approached the Falls, about a mile from the Chippewa, he met Major Jones, who had accompanied General Scott, bearing the message from him, advising General Brown that he had met the enemy. From the additional information of Major Jones, it was concluded to order up General Porter's command; and Major Jones was sent to General Porter with this order. Advancing further, General Brown met Major Wood, of the corps of engineers, who had also accompanied General Scott. He reported that the conflict between Scott and the enemy was close and desperate, and urged to hurry on reinforcements; which were now marching with all possible rapidity. The major-general was accompanied by Major Wood to the field of battle. On his arrival, he found that General Scott had

passed the wood, and engaged the enemy on the Queenstown road and the ground to the left of it, with the 9th, 11th, and 22d regiments and Towson's artillery: the 25th having been detached to the right to be governed by circumstances.

"Apprehending that these troops were much exhausted, notwithstanding the good countenance they showed, and seeing that they had suffered severely in the contest, General Brown determined to interpose a new line with the advancing troops, and thus disengage General Scott, and hold his brigade in reserve. At this time, Captains Ritchie and Biddle's companies of artillery had come into action, and the head of Gen. Ripley's column was nearly up with the right of General Scott's line. In consequence, it was believed, of the arrival of these fresh troops, which the enemy could see and began to feel, he fell back at this moment; and General Scott's line gave a general huzza, that cheered the whole army. General Ripley was ordered to pass Scott's line and display his column in front: the movement was commenced in obedience to the order. Majors McRee and Wood had been rapidly reconnoitering the enemy and his position: McRee reported that the enemy had taken a new position with his line, and occupied a height with his artillery, which gave him a great advantage, it being the key of the whole position: to secure a victory it was necessary to carry the artillery and seize this height. McRee was directed by the commanding-general to conduct the second brigade on the Queenstown road with a view to this object, and to prepare the 21st regiment, under Colonel Miller, for the duty. Ripley's brigade immediately advanced on the Queenstown road. General Brown, with his aids-de-camp and Major Wood, passing to the left of the second, in front of the first brigade, approached the enemy's position, and saw an extended line of infantry formed for the support of his artillery. The 1st regiment of infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholas, which had arrived that day, and was attached to neither of the brigades, but had marched to the field of battle in the rear of the second, was ordered promptly to break off to the left, and form a line facing the enemy's at the height—with the view of drawing his fire and attracting his attention, while Colonel Miller advanced with the bayonet upon his left flank to carry his artillery. As the 1st regiment, conducted by Major Wood, under the command of Nicholas, approached its position, the commanding-general rode to Colonel Miller and ordered him to charge and carry the enemy's artillery with the bayonet; he replied, in a tone of great promptness and good humor, "It shall be done, sir." At this moment the 1st regiment gave way under the fire of the enemy;

but Miller, without regard to this occurrence, advanced steadily to his object, and carried the cannon and the heights in a style rarely equalled—never excelled. At the point of time when Colonel Miller charged, the 23d regiment was on his right, a little in the rear: General Ripley led this regiment: it had some severe fighting, and in a degree gave way; but was promptly re-formed, and brought up on the right of the 21st, with which were connected detachments of the 17th and 19th.

"General Ripley, being now with his brigade formed in line, the enemy driven from his commanding ground, had the captured cannon, nine pieces, in his rear. The 1st regiment, having rallied, was brought into line by Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholas on the left of the 2d brigade: and General Porter having arrived, at this time, occupied the extreme left with his command. Our artillery formed between the 23d and 21st regiments, on the right. Having given the order to Colonel Miller to storm the heights, as he advanced, General Brown moved to his right flank, by the rear, with Major Wood and Captain Spencer, as far as the Queenstown road: turning down that road, he passed directly by the rear of the 23d regiment, then advancing to the support of Miller: the shouts of our soldiers on the height, at this moment, assured him of Miller's success; and he hastened on, designing to turn from the Queenstown road up Lundy's Lane. In the act of doing so, Wood and Spencer, who were about a horse's length before him, were very near riding upon a body of the enemy—it being nearly dark: and nothing prevented them from doing so, but the exclamation of an officer before them—'They are the Yankees.' This halted our officers: and upon looking down the road, we saw a line of British infantry drawn up facing the western fence of the road, with its right resting on Lundy's Lane. The British officer, who gave this alarm, had at that moment discovered Major Jessup's battalion. The major, as has already been stated, had, at the commencement of the action, been ordered by General Scott to take ground to his right. He had succeeded in turning the enemy's left flank; had captured General Riall, and several other officers, and sent them to camp;—then searching his way silently towards where the battle was raging, he had brought his regiment, the 25th, after but little comparative loss, up to the eastern fence of the Queenstown road, a little to the north of Lundy's Lane. The moment Major Jessup was apprised that the British officer had discovered him, he ordered his command to fire upon the enemy's line: the lines could not have been more than four rods apart. The slaughter was excessive; the enemy's line fled down the Queenstown road at the third or fourth fire. As



the firing ceased, and General Brown approached Major Jessup, the latter inquired where he should form his regiment; and he was directed to move up Lundy's Lane and form upon the right of the second brigade.

"The enemy rallying his broken corps, and having received reinforcements, was now discovered in good order, and in great force. The commanding general, doubting the correctness of the information, to ascertain the truth, passed with his suite in front of our line. He could no longer doubt that a more extended line than he had before seen during the engagement was near, and appeared advancing upon us. Captain Spencer, without a word, put spurs to his horse, and rode directly up to the advancing line, then turning towards the enemy's right, inquired in a strong, firm voice, 'What regiment is that?' and was as promptly answered, 'The Royal Scots, sir.' General Brown and suite, without loss of time, threw themselves behind our own troops, and awaited the attack. The enemy advanced slowly and firmly upon our line. Perfect silence was observed throughout both armies until the enemy's line approached to within from four to six rods. Our troops had levelled their pieces, and the artillery was prepared: the order to fire was given, and truly awful was its effect. The lines closed in part before that of the enemy was broken: he then retired precipitately, the American fire following him. The field was covered with the slain, but not an enemy upon his feet was to be seen. We dressed our lines upon the ground we occupied. General Brown was not disposed to leave it in the dark, believing it to be the best in the vicinity. His intention then was to maintain it until the day should dawn, and be governed by circumstances.

"Our gallant and accomplished foe did not leave us much time for deliberation: he showed himself again within twenty minutes, apparently in good order and undismayed. General Ripley now urged the major-general to order up General Scott, who had, during this time, been held in reserve with his three battalions. The major-general rode in person to General Scott, and directed him to advance: that officer was prepared, and expecting the call. As General Scott advanced towards the right of the second brigade, General Brown passed to the left to speak with General Porter, and see the countenance and condition of his militia, who, at that moment, had been thrown into some confusion, under a very galling and deadly fire from the enemy. They were, however, kept to their duty by the exertions of their chief, and most nobly sustained the conflict. The enemy was again repulsed by the whole line, and driven out of sight.

"But a short time had elapsed, when he was once more seen advancing, in great

force, upon our main line of troops, under Generals Ripley and Porter. General Scott, now on our left, had given to his column a direction, which would have enabled him, in a few minutes, to have formed line in the rear of the enemy's right, and thus have brought the enemy between two fires: but, in a moment, most unexpectedly, a flank fire from a party of the enemy concealed on our left, falling upon the centre of Scott's command while in open column, blasted our proud expectations: his column was severed in two, one part passing to the rear, the other, by the right flank of platoons, towards our main line. About this period General Brown received his first wound, a musket ball passing through his right thigh. A few minutes after, Captain Spencer, aid-de-camp to the major-general, received his mortal wound. The enemy had nearly closed with our main line. Moving up to the left of this line, General Brown received a violent blow from a ball of some kind, on his left side. It did not enter, but such was its force, it nearly unhorsed him: (in the general's own words) he 'began to doubt his ability to sit his horse.' Meeting with his confidential friend, Major Wood, he thought proper to state to him his wounds and condition. Wood exclaimed, with great emotion, 'Never mind, my dear general; you are gaining the greatest victory which has ever been gained for your country.' His heroic soul (says the general) was exclusively occupied with the battle, which was then, if possible, raging with redoubled fury. This was the last desperate effort made by the enemy to regain his position and artillery. A broader display of heroism was never obtained from the ranks. The hostile lines met, in several places, and we captured many prisoners, who surrendered at the point of the bayonet. Porter's volunteers, who were not excelled by the regulars in meeting the charge, were seen precipitated, by the incitement of their gallant commander, upon the enemy's line, which they broke, and, hand to hand, compelled many to surrender.

"The enemy now seemed to be effectually routed; his forces disappeared. In a conversation which occurred a few minutes after, between the major-general, Majors Wood and McRee, and two or three other officers, it was the unanimous belief of all, that we had nothing more to apprehend from the foe with whom we had been contending; but it appeared to be admitted by the whole that it would be proper to return to camp. The idea did not occur to any one present, that it would be necessary to leave behind a man or a cannon. It was observed by Major McRee, expressly, that there would be no difficulty in removing the cannon by hand. Wagons had been, by previous order of the major-general, provided for the wounded. General Brown,

suffering severely from his wound, now left the field with Captain Austin, his surviving aid, observing to the other officers, that they would remain and aid General Ripley by all the means in their power. As the general moved towards camp, many scattering men were seen by him on the road; not a man was running away, none appeared to be alarmed, but having lost their officers, were seeking water, and were either drinking or straggling for drink. This scene assured the major-general that it was proper for the army to return to camp, in order that the scattering men might be arranged to their companies and battalions, the army reorganized and refreshed before morning. An officer was accordingly sent to say to General Ripley, that the wounded men and the captured cannon being brought off, the army would return to camp.

"Being supported on his horse, the commanding-general moved slowly to his tent. Within a few minutes it was reported to him that General Ripley had returned to camp, having left the captured cannon on the field. General Ripley being immediately sent for, General Brown stated to him that there was no doubt on his mind, but that the enemy had retired, and that our victory was complete. He appeared to be of the same opinion, as was every officer present. General Brown then, in strong and emphatic language, ordered General Ripley to re-organize his battalions, to see that they were refreshed with whatever could be afforded in the camp, and put himself, with all the men he could muster, of every corps, on the field of battle, as the day dawned, there to be governed by circumstances; at all events, to bring off the captured cannon. It was not believed that the enemy would dare to attack him, if he showed a good countenance. Gen. Ripley left General Brown under the conviction that he would execute the order given to him; he did not make the slightest objection to it; none was suggested from any quarter.

"As day approached, finding that no column had moved, General Brown ordered his staff to go to every commanding officer of corps, and order them to be promptly prepared to march in obedience to the order given to General Ripley; but it was sunrise before the army had crossed the Chippewa. General Ripley led on his troops as far as Bridgewater Mills. Halting his column there, he returned to the commanding-general, and stated his objections to proceeding farther. General Brown persisted, when he informed the general, that General Porter was also opposed to proceeding. At these words, General Brown replied, 'Sir, you will do as you please;' and had no further intercourse with him until they met at Buffalo.

"General Brown had entertained no doubt

of the intelligence or personal bravery of General Ripley, nor has he ever expressed himself to that effect. In consequence, however, of the events of the night of the 25th, and more especially on the morning of the 26th, his confidence in him as a commander was impaired. The general believed that he dreaded responsibility more than danger; in a word, that he had a greater share of physical than moral courage. General Scott and the major-general being both severely wounded, a courier was despatched, without loss of time, to General Gaines, ordering him on, to take the command of the gallant remains of the army of Niagara."

The military or even the general reader will hardly object to my adding General Jessup's narrative to General Brown's of those remarkable events, as follows:

"After the battle Majors Wood and Jessup, and Captain Ketchum, examined it at dawn on the morning of the 7th, and were unanimously of opinion that the road could be made practicable with but little labor, and that a force might be put in motion on it which would be able to attack the enemy in flank, or turn his position. And the road was repaired in the course of the day, so as to admit of the passage of artillery over it.

On the morning of the 8th, General Ripley, with his brigade, Porter's volunteers and Indians, and two companies of artillery, was ordered to move rapidly on this road, cross the Chippewa, and attack the enemy's right flank, whilst Scott, with his brigade and the remainder of the artillery, should hold him in check in front. Plank and timber had been prepared to construct a bridge, should it become necessary, which, with a number of small boats to be used as pontoons, were loaded on wagons, and transported on the road to the Chippewa. General Ripley, finding the difficulties to be overcome greater than had been anticipated, did not move so rapidly as was expected. General Brown, impatient of the delay, proceeded to the front and took the direction of the operations. Arrangements were made to construct a bridge, and an advantageous position was taken by the artillery to cover the passage of the river, and command the opposite shore. General Riall, alarmed at this movement, in place of sending his light troops to defend the pass, destroyed his heavy artillery, tore up the bridge over the Chippewa, abandoned his works, and retired to Queenstown. Scott's and Ripley's brigades crossed the Chippewa in boats during the night, and General Porter with his command was left on the western side in charge of the baggage, with orders to repair the bridge, pass the baggage over, and join the army as soon as possible.

"General Brown, with the troops that had crossed, moved forward on the morning of the 9th, expecting, as the enemy had a



strong work at Queenstown, that General Riall would wait for him and fight there; but as we approached, the work was abandoned so precipitately that the enemy left his entrenching tools and a large quantity of public stores in our possession. We occupied the heights, and General Riall, after detaching part of his force to Fort George, took a position in the open country with the remainder of his force ten or fifteen miles from the fort.

"General Porter, whose force had been augmented by a detachment of New York volunteers, having repaired the Chippewa bridge, brought up the baggage of the army and joined on the 10th. The infantry was then pushed forward to the village of Queenstown, and the artillery, with Porter's brigade, occupied the heights. The army remained in this position until the morning of the 20th: in the mean time several detachments were made to the Lake and into the country; but nothing of any consequence occurred except that in a skirmish with a British picket, a post of the picket was captured by Gen. Swift, of the New York volunteers, who was murdered by one of his prisoners.

"On the 20th the army moved to the vicinity of Fort George, and two companies of the 25th, under Captain White and Lieut. Seymour, engaged and drove in the enemy's advanced pickets. Major Jessup being officer of the day, had advanced with those companies to reconnoiter the ground, and observe the enemy previous to posting the guards for the night. On the 22d the army returned to Queenstown, which the enemy had occupied in our absence, and from which he retired on our approach. The writer could never comprehend the object of the movement to Fort George. We had no battering train, and our force was not sufficient to warrant the attempt to carry the place by storm, particularly when General Riall, with a force known to be nearly equal to ours, was in the field, and within striking distance of us.

"We should have sought and beat him first, and then we might have taken the fort at our leisure. It is an axiom in military science, that where the alternative is presented of a fort to be attacked, or an army in the field to be fought, the army should be fought first, because, even with a numerical superiority the assailant might be so crippled in the attack on the fort as to fall an easy prey to the army in the field. Had Riall been attacked, his whole force must have been captured or destroyed; and our troops, flushed with victory, could have beaten Drummond on his arrival, and afterwards have taken the forts on both sides of the Niagara; but the favorable moment was allowed to pass, and we were consequently, during the remainder of the campaign, thrown upon the defensive. General

Brown, contrary to his usual habit of relying on his own sound judgment, was, it is thought, overruled by the zeal and importunities of General Scott, who stood almost alone in favor of attacking Fort George, whilst Porter, Leavenworth, McRee, Wood, and Jessup, and before the matter was decided, Ripley, were for attacking Riall. Information having been received of the arrival of Lieut.-Gen. Drummond with large reinforcements, our army broke up its encampment at Queenstown on the morning of the 24th, and retired behind the Chippewa, except the 9th regiment, which was left in and near the block-house, on the north side of that river.

"On the morning of the 25th, it was ascertained that Gen. Drummond was at the village of Queenstown with a large force; and Gen. Brown was informed that he was detaching the greater part of his force to the American side of the Niagara, against our depôt at Schlosser. Major Leavenworth was officer of the day. Major Jessup crossed the bridge about 2 o'clock, P. M., and was informed by Leavenworth that a detachment of the enemy was near Mrs. Willson's house, about two or three miles from Chippewa, but in what force he could not ascertain. A picket consisting of a troop of dragoons, and at least two companies of infantry, had been distinctly seen, and Majors Leavenworth and Jessup both expressed the opinion that Gen. Drummond would not trust such a force in our immediate neighborhood beyond supporting distance from the army. Major Leavenworth had reported at head-quarters what he had seen, but Gen. Brown was so strongly impressed with the belief that the enemy's main object was Schlosser, that he could not believe there was any other force than a few light troops in our front, which he supposed the British general had pushed forward to cover his real design, and believing that to menace Fort George would be the better plan to counteract the movement on Schlosser, he ordered Gen. Scott with his brigade, Towson's artillery, Harris' dragoons, and all the mounted volunteers, to move immediately to Queenstown. The brigade moved about 5 o'clock, P. M., and with the dragoons and volunteers, perhaps exceeded twelve hundred men—the 25th was about three hundred and fifty rank and file. As we advanced the enemy's picket slowly retired, and it soon became evident that he was in considerable force. Information was received at Mrs. Willson's that Gen. Riall commanded, and that a wood, not exceeding half a mile across, alone separated him from us. The 9th regiment, which had been detached to the left, was called in, and General Scott, having despatched an officer to apprise General Brown of the position and probable force of the enemy, informed the officers commanding corps that

he would immediately attack. He ordered Major Jessup to the right, with instructions to pass through the wood, and be governed by circumstances. The enemy began the battle by a fire on our advance, commanded by Captain Pentland. The 9th, 11th, and 22d regiments passed the wood, and formed within four or five hundred paces of the enemy's line. Captain Towson posted his artillery on the right of the 9th, and a most obstinate and sanguinary conflict ensued, which continued perhaps an hour. On our side both officers and men evinced the most heroic courage, but the enemy was so superior in force and position, and his battery so destructive, that no impression could be made upon him. When Major Jessup moved to the right, he discovered a narrow road through the wood, which the enemy had either not observed or had neglected to occupy. Determining at once to avail himself of the advantage thus presented, he left Lieut. Seymour with one light company to occupy in extended order the whole front which the regiment would have covered in line, and advancing rapidly on the road, was soon on the enemy's flank. That part of the line being composed of militia and volunteers, fled in disorder without firing a gun, and the major placed himself in Riall's rear. Here he encountered several detachments of the enemy, all of which he routed, and made numerous prisoners. Whilst making dispositions to attack the enemy's battery in rear, Major Jessup was informed by a prisoner that General Drummond was a short distance behind, with a heavy reserve. Sensible that, under the circumstances of the case, it would be folly to attempt to carry his intention into effect, and that the safety of the army depended upon holding Drummond in check, and keeping him out of action until General Brown should arrive with Ripley's and Porter's brigades, he seized the Niagara road, took a position to attack advantageously any force that might advance, and detached Captain Ketchum with his company to make prisoners of all who should attempt to pass either to the front or rear. General Riall and ten or fifteen other officers, and among them the aid of General Drummond, were captured, with from two to three hundred men. The General, with seven or eight of the officers, was sent to the rear of our line, but several of the officers, and nearly all the private soldiers, escaped. We had, however, deprived them of their arms. It had now become quite dark, and the firing had partly ceased, when, about twenty minutes after Riall had been sent off the field, General Scott's command gave three cheers, which drew a heavy fire from the enemy. Major Jessup moved with his command slowly and silently towards the rear, keeping a fence between his line of march and the Niagara

road. He had proceeded but a short distance when he was informed that troops were advancing, and he soon met Captain Biddle, of the artillery, from whom he received the pleasing intelligence that General Brown had arrived with his whole force, and was about to renew the action. Not knowing where to find General Brown or General Scott, or where to apply for orders, Major Jessup decided to resume his former position in the rear, and he had nearly attained it, when he met a part of the enemy's force advancing, which he attacked and routed with great slaughter. A few moments previously, a heavy firing on and near the heights announced that our troops had attacked the enemy there. General Brown then approached Major Jessup, and informed him that Colonel Miller had carried the heights with the bayonet, and had taken the enemy's artillery. By his order the major fell back and joined General Ripley, on the heights, by whom he was posted with his command on the right of the line which was then forming.

"The enemy gave us but little time to rest; he advanced in line, supported by a heavy reserve, evidently with the intention of charging; his left was almost in contact with the 25th before the firing commenced. Our troops took deliberate aim, and our fire was so terrible, that in a few minutes his line recoiled—then broke, and officers and men fled from the field. Our line was adjusted, and the cartridges taken from the boxes of the soldiers who had been killed and wounded, and distributed among those who remained unhurt. In about half an hour, the enemy approached again in great force, and in good order, and after a severe conflict which lasted fifteen or twenty minutes, he broke and again fled from the field. Major Jessup, who, about the time General Riall was taken, had received a wound by a ball passing through the right shoulder, received in this contest a slight wound in the neck, and a shot through the right hand. In a short time the enemy was again seen to be advancing, apparently with undiminished force. To preserve the front of the 25th, Major Jessup was obliged to form his men in a single rank, and to put all the files closer into that rank. The contest was now more obstinate than in any of the previous attacks of the enemy; for half an hour the blaze from the muskets of the two lines mingled; but our fire was so well directed, and so destructive, that the enemy was again compelled to retire. During this contest, General Scott joined the 25th, and whilst conversing with Major Jessup, received a wound in the left shoulder, which compelled him to leave the field. General Brown soon after approached and inquired for General Scott, wishing to devolve on him the command, as he was severely wounded; but being informed that



General Scott was also wounded, he retired. Major Jessup soon after received a violent contusion on the breast by a piece of a shell, or perhaps the stock of a rocket, which brought him to the ground; in a few moments, however, he rose and resumed his command, which had temporarily devolved on Captain Murdock. In this attack Captain Kinney and Ensign Hunter, of the 25th, were killed, and Lieutenants Sholer, M'Chain and Dewitt were severely wounded. So sanguinary had the last conflict been, that, when it terminated, Major Jessup found a considerable interval between his corps and the troops on the left of him. He formed the 25th behind a fence, where Major Leavenworth, with the fragments of the 9th, 11th, and 22d, not exceeding in all a hundred men, soon joined him and took post on the right. By great exertions on the part of Captains Murdock and Watson, the 25th had been furnished with a good supply of cartridges before Major Leavenworth joined.

On the morning of the 26th, the wounded were placed in boats, and in the evening of that day arrived at Buffalo. Whilst this movement was being made by water, the army abandoned its strong position behind the Chippewa: and after destroying the greater part of its stores, fell back to the ferry opposite Black Rock, a short distance below Fort Erie; and General Ripley, who commanded, but for the opposition made by Wood, McRee, Towson, Porter, and other officers, would have retreated to the American shore. The army was finally encamped at Fort Erie by the positive order of General Brown; and measures were taken immediately to cover the troops.—Had General Drummond availed himself of this hasty and ill-judged retreat, not a man of our army could have escaped. Whether it was the purpose of General Ripley to defend Fort Erie, or to cross the Niagara, he should have held the Chippewa, which was a strong fortress in itself. There were only two places where it could have been passed; at the bridge which he commanded, and which three hundred men were sufficient to defend against the whole force of the enemy, and at the junction of Lyons Creek with the Chippewa, where there was a floating bridge. To cross at the former place so long as the American general chose to hold it, was impossible; and to have crossed at the latter, would have involved the destruction of the British army, even supposing our army to have performed one half of what it was capable of; for Drummond, after having crossed at Lyons Creek, would have had several miles to march on a narrow and difficult road, through a dense forest, liable, at every hundred yards, if opposed by an active and determined enemy, to have fallen into an ambuscade. Half of Porter's brigade, with

what remained of the 9th and 25th regiments, would have been sufficient to defend this defile. The American general could have held General Drummond in check during the remainder of the campaign. At all events, had his object been to hold Fort Erie, he should have maintained his position at the Chippewa until the Fort had been strengthened, and an entrenched camp formed near it; had his object been to destroy Fort Erie and abandon Canada, (as it no doubt was,) he should unquestionably have maintained his position until the sick, the wounded, the baggage and public stores had been sent to Buffalo, and transports prepared to cross the army at once to that place. By leaving the Chippewa he put the army, its artillery, all its supplies, and the whole Niagara frontier into the power of the enemy. Fortunately for his reputation, and that of the country, Drummond failed to avail himself of any of the advantages thus offered to him. Ripley was personally brave; displayed great gallantry on the night of the 25th;—but he was a junior officer;—his flight from Chippewa had shaken the confidence of all the principal officers of the army in his capacity to command in chief; that of General Brown had been previously shaken—who, therefore, sent orders to General Gaines at Sackett's Harbor to repair to Fort Erie and take command of the army."

Among the mortally wounded was General Brown's aid, Captain Ambrose Spencer, bearing the name, and son of an eminent magistrate, Chief Justice of the State of New York at the era of her greatest juriprudential celebrity. Young Spencer was taken prisoner. General Drummond, with assurances of his convalescence, proposed to exchange Captain Spencer for Captain Loring, the aid of Drummond, taken prisoner by Major Jessup. General Brown, though he questioned the fairness of an exchange of an uninjured officer for one severely, and who might be mortally wounded, sent a flag to inquire into Captain Spencer's condition, whether he was even alive. The messenger with the flag was detained, without being permitted to see Spencer. Anxious for his release, General Brown informed Drummond that Captain Loring should be given even for Spencer's body. His corpse was accordingly sent to the American shore, and General Brown requested the Secretary of War, as matter of faith, however revolting to honor and humanity, to release Captain Loring.

General Scott's gallantry at the Falls of Niagara made his fortune; for he never was in battle again till thirty-three years afterwards in Mexico. So true is it that a single occasion, well seized, often establishes, as failure to make the most of one opportunity, mars, character for life. His brevet was unanimously and warmly

approved. As he returned from Canada, wounded, but convalescent and buoyant with youthful spirits, respect and attention welcomed him everywhere. The students of Princeton College, when he arrived at that seat of youth, rising to influence, saluted his presence with the cordial homage of the least selfish and most enthusiastic of mankind. Arriving there during the annual commencement, the young gentleman who delivered the valedictory oration, introduced the general in his speech with electrical effect on the auditory. The town of Petersburg, in his native county, presented him a sword, and what was much more, both to his honor and his happiness, one of the richest and more respectable families of Virginia received him into its bosom by marriage with a lady of uncommon attractions, to whose hand it would have been vain for him to aspire without considerable, above all, military distinction.

If battle, bloodshed and hostilities are not mere animal contention of brute force, but war justifiable as a necessary and inevitable evil, there are moral consequences which philosophy extracts from its distresses to be weighed as national results. None but fiends or fools could contemplate without horror, the sixteen hundred human beings killed or mutilated at Bridgewater, unless some great benefit like religion flourishing from martyrdom, sprang from the blood-soaked earth, in such otherwise lamentable destruction of life. To wage the war declared by the United States against Great Britain, invasion of Canada was almost the only alternative. Exulting in the miserable abortion of that attempt in 1813, and surprised by the mere fact of the insignificant incursion in 1814, but mortified by undeniable defeat of superior numbers at Chippewa, the belligerent representatives of England, in that colony, bent on retribution, resolved to wash out an unlooked-for stain which tarnished their great nation's character, and endangered their dominion. The impression, even illusion, of superiority is more powerful than armies. Vastly superior in numbers in Canada, considerably so at both battles at the Falls of Niagara, deeply versed in the art, and familiar with the habitude of warfare, a people justly renowned for stubborn valor, always hard, as many believed impossible, to beat, were fairly worsted in the two Canadian engagements. Victory, a decisive, is not the only test of national confidence and estimate. Numbers are not always masters; even the vanquished may be formidable. Four millions, for seven years, contending against eighty millions, founded the Prussian monarchy, as three overcame twenty, after seven years of revolutionary resistance to Great Britain in America. The British Annual Register's summary of the battle of Bridgewater,

adopting General Drummond's assumption of his victory, qualified, if not annulled, the consequence by adding, "that though another American attempt to penetrate into Canada was defeated by British valor and discipline finally triumphant, yet the improvement of the American troops in those qualities, was eminently conspicuous."—Thus, the British soldier's assurance of success was impaired by confession, that the army was teaching its foes how to conquer them. American war, on however small a scale, which had, if not arrested, at least alarmingly contested, the British trident, was endangering the lance, too. No national arrogance could be so stolid, as, without absurdity, to treat such enemies with contempt. And what was to be gained by further warfare, but teaching them how to excel their masters? Continual skirmishes, sieges, sorties, and other demonstrations, following the two pitched battles in Canada, proved only corollaries to the problem solved by them, that the American army, like the navy, was superior to that of England. As soon as the double elements of military ascendant were well combined, and strict discipline added to stern enthusiasm, the mercenary Briton was subdued. Nations, like individuals, have their trials. The effect of a single peradventure, small, but any unquestionable proof of courage, fortitude, and capacity for forcible vindication, mostly durable, encourages repetition, and impresses belief that it is characteristic. Coarse, vulgar English prejudice, uttered by envious and odious journalism, continued abuse of the United States as a licentious and knavish nation. But English better sense perceived, and dispassionate judgment pronounced them also martial and formidable. Not a little of that impression came from the seemingly insignificant invasion of Canada, which, during the months of July, August, and September 1814, not only defied, but invariably defeated, the great power of Great Britain by land and water, ending, perhaps fortunately, not by the conquest of a British province, but discomfiture of British armies and fleets, wherever Americans encountered them.

Further results, political, moral, and belligerent of war, were attested by the Canadian campaigns of 1813, when all was disastrous with superior American numbers, compared with 1814, when all was successful with inferior. If the events of 1814 elevated internationally the American character, and insured the country from further foreign aggression, what was the effect of hostilities on republican institutions, on the American Union, on individual morals and general welfare? War is a science learned only by itself, and perfected, like all other sciences, by appropriate professors. Without martial faculties, no nation can protect itself from in-



justice. Mere unregulated martial spirit is not enough; it must be organized. Military practice, the habit of warfare, confidence in themselves, the courage of corps, disciplined subordination, are the schools of soldiery. If this country were near Europe, a standing army would be necessary to its existence. Inscrutable destiny is so preponderant in human affairs that the foreign wars of the United States have been with a mother country, to whom it was bound by the strongest ties, with France, to whom it was indebted for independence, and with Mexico, a neighboring republic, whose interests with ours are almost the same. It is vain to suppose that any wisdom can always preserve peace, or policy select either enemies or friends.

Has war proved detrimental to republicanism? Democratic progress has been continual since the declaration of independence, and military chief magistrates its most liberal promoters. Washington reduced attempted centralism to republican federalism, which Jackson carried to democratic radicalism. A severe and arbitrary restrictive system, and the annexation, by questionable constitutionality, of Louisiana, were Jefferson's expedients for avoiding war, which was declared under the Presidencies of Madison and Polk, the least military of American chief magistrates.

Has that government proved disadvantageous to war? The common European belief, till dispelled by the French revolutionary wars, was that mankind, naturally timid, ignorant and slothful, require a separate class to lead them into danger, and teach them not to fear death; a caste educated and endowed with hereditary privileges, to induce them to set examples of heroism. Nobles were the only officers. Fearful soldiers, their instinctive timidity reformed by noble officers, artificially courageous, were to be led into danger and instructed in heroism. Soldiers were to be raised to courage by compulsion, like flowers by manure. But whatever their aptitude, they could never become leaders. Enlisted at low wages from the vulgar and refuse of the merest populace, armies were thus commanded under the great Frederick, Marlborough, Turenne and other renowned leaders. In England the basis was the same, but with a mercenary superstructure, whether noble or plebeian: and money still commissions their officers. The seaman is impressed, the soldier hired, the officer buys his rank. Everywhere throughout Europe, law or society has invented an honor which is not courage, and a point of honor often dishonorable for the profession of classes and the protection of states. A Grecian said, better an army of deer commanded by a lion, than an army of lions led by a stag. But Roman military virtue

was not confined to any class; and the French Revolution demonstrated, by a large harvest of military heroes, that they rise from the ranks as well as aristocracies.

The American experiment, taking soldiers by enlistment, is no advance beyond European hostilities, if not retrograde; for except in Great Britain, European soldiers are no longer enlisted. To officers, the United States allow no titles, though more than any European pay for all lower grades; both officers and soldiers no half pay or pension for the war of 1812, nor the permanency or consideration which in other countries attend superannuated officers. The emoluments, livelihood and prospects of all the superior American officers, are narrow, compared with those of like grades in other countries. Scott, Worth, Jessup, Towsen, and some few others of the distinguished in the campaigns of 1814, are still in the army. But Miller, the hero of Bridgewater, and McNeill obscurely vegetate on the stinted salaries of custom-houses, while many of the surviving officers of that war are compelled to earn a living as they may.

What, then, was it that nerved the arms that struck so powerfully for victory at the Falls of Niagara? Why is it that but one traitor officer has in seventy years disgraced the American army? Why, without national vanity or historical romance, may it not be asked, has the star-spangled banner, by sea and ashore, seldom if ever been struck when Americans were disciplined? It cannot be from the privates alone that the spirit came to overcome the English; for they were all got by enlistment, and many of them the same by birth and habits as the English themselves. Energy of will put forth in constant efforts for advancement, education, consequent greater intelligence and activity, familiarity with fire-arms, lives of adventure and hardihood, will explain some superiority, but not the whole, which nearly every trial throughout 1814 evinced. Do I flatter myself and mislead by the assertion, that the greater the liberty the greater the excellence, whilever the liberty is regulated; that man, like religion, like trade, like at least the useful, if not the fine arts and sciences, like everything perfectly liberated from all but indispensable government, is improved? What is indispensable time only can determine, and that time is yet only in process of fulfilment; but in military as in civil progress, has so far vindicated self-government.

These reflections will be found justified by an almost unbroken course of success, whenever war tested national superiority, till the peace.

Not till the 3d August, 1814, was Lieutenant-General Drummond sufficiently recovered from the discomfiture of Bridgewater, to follow the American invaders to

Fort Erie, to which he laid siege with about four thousand, nearly all regular troops, who, after attempting to carry it by storm, on the 12th August, were demolished by a sortie on the 17th September. If Commodore Chauncey, in July, or General Izard, in September, as ordered, had supported Brown, there is every reason to believe that the whole British army, under Drummond, would have been compelled to capitulate in Canada, like Burgoyne at Saratoga, and Cornwallis at Yorktown.

Ordinary appreciation, and admiration of battle and victory, is naturally greater, when hundreds of thousands of combatants, led by renowned captains, with immense carnage, contend for provinces, frontiers, kingdoms and dynasties, in the heart of the country ravaged by hostilities. Yet, their philosophy teaches, that the little victories in Canada were significant, if not decisive, of empire in this hemisphere. National struggle begun for independence, and renewed for similar principles, was to determine which was the strongest people in America. On few occasions, if ever before, had British soldiers turned to fly from Americans in equal combat; much less in superior numbers. British troops are seldom put to flight. There belongs to the free-born Briton a spirit of hardihood, and pride of endurance, which his American offspring cannot but respect. American reverence for England, mixed by English injustice and contumely, with inimical recollections, nevertheless is so impressive, that Americans seldom think Englishmen invincible. That filial reverence was a revolutionary disadvantage, under which they contended for independence, diminished, but not extinct during the many years of British domineering and American submission, which provoked the long-deferred war of 1812. Natural impression, and habitual consideration, required violent shocks to provoke American vanity to self-respect, and overcome filial and colonial veneration. A small American army overcame a larger one of those strenuous men of the mother country, by superior intelligence, agility, and the still greater energy of greater freedom. The charm of British invincibility, shivered to pieces at sea on the deck of a single frigate, was broken near the Falls of Niagara by a brigade. Each victory inaugurated a career of triumphs. A hundred thousand soldiers could not do it more effectually. Every succeeding Canadian battle manifested, till those of Plattsburg and Erie established, that the confidence and illusion of success, so largely instrumental to its attainment, were transplanted from the British to the American standard, ashore as at sea; that vows of victory or death much oftener led to victory than death; that the American army, like the navy, could be victorious if

it would. The secret revealed by the blaze of triumph made known that far from impossible, it was feasible, if rightly willed and bravely insisted on. To yield, long the American, became at last British necessity, and the habit exacted by the one and conceded by the other people. Contumelious English annals began to confess, that the Americans were not degenerate offspring of Britain. Americans, more afraid of England than of death, enforced that reality. After a long tract of discomfiture, when the English General Stuart, with a few thousand men, boldly faced and defeated the all-conquering French at Maida, that little victory turned the tide of triumph which soon began to flow, till, under Wellington, at last it reached the Emperor in the metropolis of France.

To the student of history, the view reaches farther in the doctrine of warfare, its martial, political and territorial effects. The battles which made Cromwell the master of Great Britain and arbiter of Europe, which immortalized Turenne, and which signalized the prowess of Spain, when mistress of the world, were fought by small armies of a few thousand men. Courage, strategy, every military virtue, were as well displayed on the smaller as the vaster scale. And since, beginning with Louis the XIVth's lust of aggrandizement, armies, carried further by Marlborough and Frederick, till stretched to enormous dimensions by Napoleon, immense forces have struggled with immense carnage for mastery, have France, Germany or Spain changed materially and permanently their boundaries or power? Military reaction has equalled action with mechanical precision. Nations, states and principalities, overrun by hundreds of thousands of men in arms, with conscription and paper money, swelling the bulk of war, remain much as they were when ten thousand settled their fate.

The Canadian tournaments which began at Chippewa, not planned by government or systematically executed, gaining no territory, costing some blood, made strong impression both in England and America. Just where Great Britain, turning from vanquished France, transported from Bordeaux the veteran conquerors of numberless battles, and the American government shrunk justly alarmed by the vast display of British power and overwhelming shout of continental vengeance, a few young officers without experience of arms, but by mortifying defeats, the army like the navy, long trodden down by European contumely and fettered by republican parsimony, resolved by noble effort to rescue the American flag from its degradation where it had been most degraded, in Canada, or perish in the glorious attempt, like the naval effort at sea. Nor did the army, like the navy,



fear the trial, for, like the navy, they felt the just confidence of their capacity at least equal to that of their enemies. By the peace of Europe, this country was left single handed to strive against Great Britain: a predicament providential for the future and lasting amity of both nations. Revocation of the orders in council removed what England deemed the chief cause of war. Peace in Europe put an end to that for which the United States still contended. England had no occasion or pretext for impressment; the United States had no cause of complaint. Nothing but the theory of a principle remained in controversy.

Still Great Britain persisted with redoubled power, vigor, resource and acrimony; the United States almost humbly seeking peace. In that relative position of the belligerents, the last campaign was fortunate for this country, warning to that, salutary and durably tranquilizing for both. Peace with Canada conquered might have been long deferred and dearly bought, might have cost the pacific institutions and predilections of the American republic. Peace without the Canadian battles, without Chippewa, Bridgewater, Erie and Plattsburg to memorialize, would have been too humiliating to one nation and too flattering to the other to last. It must have been an uneasy truce. Both belligerents needed more war; which Providence gave such as to be the pledge of lasting and respectful amity; the only relation that nations seldom interrupt and never regret.

The hazardous martial excursion, which Brown and Scott, perhaps contrary to human reason, led into Canada, a rash experiment to conquer or die there, a selfish thirst per-adventure of mere renown, revived the martial and national spirit, created an army, raised the drooping credit of government, excited the enthusiasm, and corroborated the union, of the people. The tone of public sentiment was entirely changed. English inveterate and revengeful enmity most opportunely still further invigorated American nationality. Battles in Canada which conquered nothing but victory, did more to make peace than all its solicitation at St. Petersburg and London, negotiation and arrangement at Ghent. The treaty of Ghent without those battles would have been the shame of the United States, and beginning of another war.

The veterans of the American revolution had fallen into the sere: their sap was gone. The officers of the mere skeleton of an army kept on foot, had never seen a battle, or performed more than garrison duty. Except some Indian combats, there had been no battle in North America for thirty years, during which period, the most enervating influence of lucrative prosperity had undermined American energy, which was nearly all turned to growing rich.

Till an English frigate struck her flag and an English army fled, there was no trial of strength with the mighty English, proved in a thousand combats by sea and land throughout Europe, Asia, Africa and America, magnified to American reverence by irresistible exaggeration, fomented by English arrogance. The best American regular soldiers were but a few dispersed sea fencibles, employed to keep dilapidated forts or overcome marauding savages. Recollections of Bunker's Hill, Saratoga and King's Mountain were obscured by the unanimous surrenders at Detroit and Niagara, the dreadful massacres at Raisin and Hampton; the miserable abortions at Williamsburg and La Cole. A few dawning successes introduced the third year of hostilities; two prior years of which but for naval prowess would have been an historical tissue of American incapacity for war. The jousts on the banks of the Niagara were like duels, which human reason condemns but human infirmity suffers. War itself is only a necessary evil, unjustifiable in all but extreme cases. When its ravages and bloodshed are diminished, shall it therefore be condemned or its triumph less? The national sacrifice in Canada, at a small cost, taught Great Britain to respect the United States more effectually and less painfully than its conquest would have done. Bloodier battles, more extensive and expensive conquests would not better have inculcated the necessity of forbearance and the wisdom of peace. Thirty-five years of it since, notwithstanding numerous continual causes of contention, attest the virtue of that amity which those battles contribute to ensure. As before intimated, the United States have lost ground by treaties, but never by hostilities. Several treaties with Great Britain in 1783, 1794, 1815, 1841, 1846, and many negotiations demonstrate that her controversies with the United States have always been more successful, by the influences of consanguinity and arts of diplomacy, than by force of arms.

Stratagetical science and military learning may censure Brown's experimental battles as contrary to well-known rules of the art of war. His magazines left at Schlosser, where the enemy might at any time have taken them and paralyzed thereby his whole adventure, his little army divided at both battles, fighting by detachments, when every principle of the common sense of attack dictates consolidation of power and concentration of blows, not to mention other less important errors, have been censured, and are obnoxious to it. But there is genius as well as fortune in war: of which the ruling spirit is that courage at the same time ardent and considerate which will not brook defeat. By that he triumphed over his own errors and his

enemy's resistance, not merely by success, but by certainly deserving it.

Brown's Canadian campaign of less than seventy days, monumental for his fame, glorious for the American army, was inestimable in its beneficial national consequences. It defended the Atlantic seaboard more effectually, and infinitely cheaper than a hundred thousand militia could have done. With complete command of the waters, the British could transport and land forces as, and where they would, which it was impossible to anticipate, provide against, and for the most part to resist. From the time of formal annunciation to our government of barbarous systems of warfare, pursued throughout the summer and autumn of 1814, from Eastport to New Orleans, there was hardly a city or place near the coast, Portland, Salem, Newport, New London, New York, Baltimore, Norfolk, Washington and so to New Orleans that was not threatened, many attacked, some captured and all kept in continual alarm. No army could be everywhere ready to repel these some actual, all apprehended assaults. The invasion of Canada kept a large hostile force occupied there. If Brown's, instead of two or three had been eight or ten thousand strong, they would probably have detained the British who captured Washington from venturing there. Massachusetts and Connecticut might have escaped the hostile visitations by which their coasts were beleaguered and many of their towns captured, which Massachusetts failed to defend. The thirty or forty thousand British troops with which Canada swarmed after the peace of Europe, would have overwhelmed large parts of the Atlantic shores; for how could sudden and unexpected inroads be resisted, of which the mere dread was oppressively costly in the numbers of militia called forth? One hundred thousand good troops could not have prevented such inroads by one-fifth of their number. The defensive effect of offensive war in Canada was strongly felt.

But in all wars the moral exceeds the actual influence; hope or fear do more than force. The effect of Brown's campaign was, therefore, striking, prompt, palpable in lowering the tone of British confidence, as betrayed by the English and Canadian press, the thermometers of public sentiment and expectation. The London press, announcing news unfavorable from Ontario, declared the accounts "doubly disagreeable, coming so unexpectedly, at a moment when we hoped that the mighty efforts of the undivided strength of Britain were about to crush the stripling insolence of the United States into its native nothingness. We can hardly suppose, that an army so strong in numbers, so high in character, and so accustomed to victory, would be sent so far to act eventually upon the proceedings of com-

missioners at Ghent. The differences with America will not be so well or so promptly settled by discussion as by acting. American ascendancy on the Lakes will make Mr. Gallatin and his associate commissioners assume a tone of insolence the very reverse of that national style in which they would treat if Lord Illill, at the head of twenty thousand men, should penetrate into the heart of their territory. But, if he waits till frost sets in, the negotiations of Ghent will freeze too."

English demands and expectations were as lofty as that arrogant tone. All the lakes, at least all Ontario and Erie, all the fisheries, all the colonial trade, excluding this country, from both East and West British Indies, new boundaries for it; east, north and west; New Orleans, if not all Louisiana, and much of Massachusetts, taken from the United States; no American possessions north of the Ohio; Indian sovereignty within the United States, and no United States authority among their Indian borders; were postulates of British public sentiment and views of government, in the spring of 1814. Wantonly enforced by illegitimate hostilities proclaimed as the rule and the right of British warfare against America, lineal offspring of the maritime wrongs, by which at sea they provoked the long-deferred and reluctant American appeal to arms, these haughty, vindictive and insupportable expectations rapidly disappeared under their continual discomfitures during the summer, and were abandoned before the British reverses in Louisiana were known at Ghent, where their Canadian failures sufficiently established the impossibility of peace on any such terms; while American population, manufactures, military science, discipline and power, union, nationality and strength were in constant development under the same administration, policy and state of parties which declared and prosecuted the war. In August, the London press, still unapprised of the changes of affairs and prospects, persisted in plans of conquest, when the Canadian official journal, the Quebec Gazette of the 23d September, 1814, more than confessed the hopelessness, and declared the danger of attempting it. "With all our strength," said that voice of official warning and despondency, "with all our strength, it would be rashness to penetrate far into the United States, and might produce another Saratoga. British troops on the Niagara have now an enemy to contend with not to be contemned." This lowered tone, striking the flag of conquest, deprecation in Quebec of the conquering war, directed from London, probably regarded the waters and banks of Lake Champlain, where British fleets and armies had just been defeated, as well as those of Lake Ontario. But the



distinct allusion to the enemy on the Niagara unquestionably acknowledged the stunning blow of Brown's signal victories there. Drummond's army of six thousand five hundred superior troops, "strong in numbers, high in character, and accustomed to victory," had not only been overthrown by inferior numbers, low in character and unaccustomed to victory, but the English army was demolished. Consisting at first of the eighth regiment, or King's Own, four hundred and fifty men, the forty-first regiment, consolidated four hundred; the eighty-ninth regiment, six hundred and fifty; the one-hundredth regiment, six hundred; the one hundred and third regiment, eight hundred; the flank companies of the one hundred and fourth regiment, two hundred; the first Royal Scots, seven hundred; the Glengaries, three hundred; and the Royal Artillery, one hundred and fifty; from which total, deducting what they lost by the capture of Fort Erie and battle of Chippewa, there remained at least three thousand five hundred combatants, defeated by

two thousand five hundred at the battle of Bridgewater. After that battle, Drummond was reinforced by De Watteville's regiment, one thousand strong; the eighty-second regiment, seven hundred and fifty; the sixth regiment, six hundred, and the ninety-seventh regiment, five hundred. Not less than six thousand five hundred excellent British regular troops, without counting their hordes of Indian and Canadian militia, had been routed, mostly killed, wounded, captured, all demoralized and discouraged. In defiance of the "mighty efforts of the undivided strength of Britain," three or four thousand American troops held possession of that part of Canada, where in May, the defeated commander of the province had executed a number of persons convicted of high treason for even wishing well to us. Such were General Brown's important defence of the Atlantic cities, and argument for peace, by his bold invasion of Canada and adventurous campaign.

## CHAPTER V.

### SUBJUGATION OF PENOBSCOT—BOSTON AND PORTSMOUTH ATTEMPTS TO SURRENDER THE SHIPS OF WAR.

THE provisional articles between the United States of America and his Britannic Majesty, done at Paris in 1782, and the definitive treaty of peace between them signed there in 1783, opened questions of boundaries between the two countries which were not settled for seventy years; and then by treaties arranged at Washington, surrendering large portions of territory in North Eastern and North Western America to Great Britain, the power of whose influence and dread of whose hostilities effected what no war would have done: nor was there danger of the alternative of war, as urged by those calling themselves peace-makers, if this country had refused to surrender the portions of Maine and of Oregon yielded. The United States have purchased from the Indians, from France and from Spain, and lately by mixture of conquest and purchase got from Mexico, large territorial acquisitions; and to England only have yielded ground. The north-west angle of Nova Scotia, said by the before-mentioned articles and treaty of peace to be formed by a line drawn due north from the source of the St. Croix River to the Highlands, and an exception of islands within the limits of the province of Nova Scotia, were questionable premises

which tempted England, in 1814, to undertake the conquest of the Penobscot Valley, about one hundred miles of the north-eastern part of Massachusetts, comprehending forty-two towns, a considerable number of inhabitants, and great maritime advantages.

For nearly a hundred years the river St. Croix had been the undisputed western boundary of Nova Scotia. The country between the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot, defended for near a century by Massachusetts from the Indians, was part of that commonwealth, both colonial and independent. In 1814, from Eastport to Castine, not less than forty thriving towns, each containing several hundred inhabitants, were represented in the State Legislature at Boston, and in Congress, at Washington. That region then beginning to develop its excellent territorial and maritime resources, lumber trade, fisheries and navigation, as much part of the old Bay State as Boston, was coveted by England, claimed at Ghent, in scarcely veiled frivolity of pretext—as Frederick claimed Silesia, seized beforehand; relinquished indeed by equivocal stipulation, and not without suggestions ultimately realized, of an equivalent north of it for a highway between

Halifax and Quebec, which by unfounded demand in the beginning, England succeeded at last in wresting from the United States. The valley between Passamaquoddy and Penobscot enjoys the maritime advantages of almost every place near the Atlantic, having its own peculiar water channel to the ocean, besides numerous islands on the coast. A range of lofty mountains in the interior, one of them the peak of Katahdin, towering above any but the White Mountains of New Hampshire, through that space, connected with the Alleghany range, shows by vast continental configuration, that Maine and Mississippi, which in 1820 entered the American Union as twin states, are linked together by bonds of natural and territorial as well as commercial association, which no European invader should be allowed, or perhaps can sunder. Androscoggin lakes, several fine rivers, and a sea coast of unsurpassed seafaring opportunities, render that north-eastern extremity of the United States a rich correlative of the south-western valley of the Mississippi. That country England subdued without resistance. The government of Massachusetts made no effort to prevent, if it did not connive and rejoice at, its subjugation. The same jealousy of southern extension and opposition to the war paralyzed resistance to English invasion of Massachusetts, and part of the north-east was almost peaceably and permanently reduced to English dominion, just before the south-west defeated a much more formidable invasion there. As the repulsion of English invasion of Louisiana was the most brilliant, so was submission to that of Massachusetts the most ignominious and alarming event of the war; and but for the victories of the former, and other American victories, the latter might have remained a lasting loss and stigma to the American Union.

On the 12th July, 1814, the governor of the province of New Brunswick, Sir John Sherbrooke, officially communicated from St. Andrews, in that province, through Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzherbert, to Brigadier-General John Brewer, of Robinstown, in that part of Massachusetts since become Maine, commanding the tenth militia district, which communication was forwarded to Governor Strong, at Boston, that the object of the British government was to obtain possession of the islands of Passamaquoddy Bay, in consequence of their being considered within the British boundary line; but that there was no intention of offensive operations against the people of the continent, who would not be disturbed, if remaining quiet. That communication, not indeed in time to prevent invasion, at all events warned the state government that the state was to be invaded, and where and what part of it was to be subdued under

British dominion, and why. The islands on Passamaquoddy Bay were to be severed from New England and annexed to New Brunswick, where the governor of that province informed the Governor of Massachusetts they belonged. Governor Strong was challenged to perform what the constituted authorities of Massachusetts and the Eastern opponents of the national administration in Congress, with vain-glorious asseveration, had constantly pledged themselves to do, to repel invasion from their soil and homesteads, and carry on defensive war with a vigor and effect that should put to shame Madison's puny abortions of offensive war. It was the very case which those malcontents had demanded and boasted they would signalize, as contra-distinguished from the conquest of Canada. It was the very boast of Mr. Webster in his eloquent speech. Governor Strong had left undone nothing that could be done, short of forcible resistance, to organize defeat of the national government; but far from abjuring the defence of his state, it was the boast of all his adherents, that they never would suffer what they called their country to be invaded,—indeed, that they would wage even offensive war, if allowed to do it as they pleased.

On the 11th of July, 1814, two thousand troops, among them the regiments which, a year before, committed the outrages at Hampton and Craney Island, in the Chesapeake, led by Adjutant-General Pilkington, were landed from Commodore Hardy's ships, the Ramilies and others, and captured Eastport, the last American town in the State of Massachusetts, where the river St. John separates the United States from the British province of New Brunswick. No resistance was made, nor could be, effectually, by Major Putnam, of the 40th, a Massachusetts United States Regiment, with a garrison of less than sixty men, in a fort of six guns. Mr. Benjamin Crowninshield, a rich and patriotic citizen of Massachusetts, soon after appointed Secretary of the Navy, happening to be there, offered his services to assist Major Putnam to defend the fort; but the two hundred and fifty militia of the Island had not been prepared to repel such an attack; and even if they could, there was no option but to suffer the British to take possession of Moose Island, on which Eastport stands, a small territory of four miles by two, surrounded by water, convenient for smuggling, and frequented by both English and American interlopers, who abound wherever boundaries of either water or land encourage their depredations; which petty treason is inseparable from hostile frontiers. Responsible persons of Boston countenanced, if they did not share, ill-got gains with law-breakers there, who, from the imposition of the embargo, and throughout



successive stages of a restrictive system to prevent war, as lawyers, merchants, jurors, and perhaps magistrates, almost without disguise inculcated the right of resistance to what were denominated arbitrary and unconstitutional acts of Congress, dictated by usurpations of Presidents. In that way the eastern community were moved onward from anti-federalism to misdemeanor, preached from the pulpit, declaimed at the hustings, journalized by the press, argued in the courts, and resolved by the government, executive, legislative, and judicial. Taking possession of Eastport and Moose Island, together with Allen's and Frederick's Islands, so that all the islands in that bay were subject to British rule, the enemy established a garrison there, increased and improved the fortifications, and otherwise, in all respects, made arrangements for permanent occupation of the conquest as an immediate arsenal of British supplies, and an ultimate part of British territory.

On the 14th of July, Commodore Hardy posted up his proclamation, calling on the people to take the oath of allegiance, or their departure. About three-fourths took the oath; a custom house was opened, and the American deputy-collector, well known for his English preferences and smuggling connivance, continued in that place. Weston, a representative in the Legislature of Massachusetts, was appointed by the British conquerors chief magistrate of Castine. Some poor and ignorant persons, without unworthy motives, were constrained by necessity to relinquish their American citizenship. Too many of the fifteen hundred inhabitants of Moose Island had been predisposed by Boston politics for British rulers. As they deserved, however, like their instructors, they made nothing by disloyalty. Most of the offices were filled by English, whose habitual rudeness was not softened by the contempt displayed for American denizens, kept under martial law, allowed only partial British rights, exposed to privations, indignities, and suffering, without having the common English and American privilege of complaint. Hardy, Pilkington, and the other superior officers, having completed their arrangements, withdrew, leaving Colonel Antes in command.

Without a blow struck, part of Massachusetts passed under the British yoke; and so remained, without the least resistance, till restored at the peace. It was the only part of the United States under undisputed British dominion. Two frontier fortresses, Michilimacinae and Niagara were surprised, captured and forcibly held by the enemy during the war: and parts of Maryland and Virginia were overrun; but Massachusetts was the only State that acquiesced in such subjugation.

On the first of September, Lieutenant-

General Sir John Sherbrooke, with Rear-Admiral Edward Griffith, proceeding with a small land force under General Gerard Gosselyn, arrived at Castine. The day before, being informed by Captain Pearse of the Rifleman sloop-of-war, with whom they fell in at sea, that the Adams frigate had got into the Penobscot, and gone up the river twenty-seven miles above Castine, to Hampden, instead of taking Machias, as intended, they resolved to proceed at once to capture the Adams. Captain Charles Morris, for his distinguished service as First-Lieutenant of the Constitution, had been promoted to the command of the Adams. Returning from a cruise on the coast of Ireland, having captured several prizes, and run the gauntlet through the numberless British cruisers swarming the ocean, attempting to make Portsmouth, she struck a rock at Mount Desart, going at a rapid pace among the archipelago of uninhabited islands in that difficult navigation. After at first making for Castine, when the Adams was got off the rocks, Captain Morris deemed it better to sail up as far as Hampden, there to overhaul and repair his vessel. On the first of September he was advised by express of the approach of the enemy, who, on the wet, dark night of the second of that month, favored by a fresh breeze, arrived within three miles of Morris, led by Commodore Barrie, in the Sylph and Peruvian sloops-of-war, with a transport, a tender, and ten barges, accompanied by about three hundred land troops under Colonel John; altogether some seven hundred fighting men, soldiers and seamen. As soon as apprised of danger, Captain Morris mounted his guns, some on a commanding eminence, selected by General Blake for his militia, others on the wharf, commanding the river below, and hasty arrangements were made for battle. General Blake, summoned by Captain Morris to his reinforcement, appeared with three hundred and seventy militia. But their destitution of arms or ammunition was the first symptom of suspicious defection. Many of the militia were without muskets; and if they had had muskets they would have been useless, as most of them were without powder. Captain Morris supplied them from his ship with both. The spirit of the men was not bad. The neighboring people worked with cheerfulness at the temporary fortifications prepared. The crew of the Adams were more than three hundred excellent combatants, well armed with cutlasses and pistols, and skilful at great gunnery. Captain Morris, and his lieutenants Wadsworth, Madison, Watson, Parker, Beatty—in a word, all his force were men tried in frequent dangers. There was no want of men, of armaments, or courage—of means to defeat the enemy, had not the politics of Mas-

sachusetts perverted the generals, and morally disarmed the men at first not armed with weapons, never with the fire, without which that of the flint is in vain. The British official accounts of American misconduct there, the best testimony, afford deplorable materials for American history. The people, the navy, the small detachment of army there, all behaved well, except the militia leaders. The little force of United States artillerymen at Castine, manfully refused to surrender, not thirty men, when surrounded and summoned by several hundred. They fired their cannon, blew up the fort, and carried off two small brass guns with their carriages.

After mastering Castine, the enemy proceeded to Belfast, which they left occupied by Major-General Gosselyn. A strong party of militia assembled in the road four miles from Castine, called together by the alarming tidings; but sheep without a shepherd, if not indeed ordered to retire, they dispersed before the enemy reached them. On Sunday, the 2d of September, when religious worship, besides alarm of invasion, brought all the people together—on their way to Hampden, General Sherbrooke and Admiral Griffith, eighteen miles above Castine, at a small place which they called Buckstone, tested, if not already aware of, the defection of the principal inhabitants, whose town they threatened to destroy unless the two brass guns and carriages carried from below and concealed there, were delivered up, which demand was instantly complied with! At daylight on the morning of the 3d of September, the fog so thick that it was impossible to reconnoiter, the British by land and water advanced upon what they understood were fourteen hundred American militia, whom, as the mist cleared away, about seven o'clock, they saw well posted on advantageous positions in front of the town, well armed, and most of the men, probably, well disposed for battle. General Blake had received a reinforcement of three companies; the neighboring towns abounded with able-bodied men; though the number engaged was not probably as many as the British reported. But it was enough to defeat them if headed by well-disposed commanders. No impeachment of the men's courage is necessary if their commanders deemed it wrong to fight. As soon as the British land troops approached General Blake on the hill, Lieutenant Wadsworth's battery there, and Captain Morris, on the wharf, dependent entirely for protection in flank and rear on General Blake's command, that command retreated, dispersed, and fled in great confusion, without an effort to prevent the miserable rout, which left the seamen entirely uncovered on all sides, with nothing but their boarding pikes and cutlasses to rely upon. Having the hard choice of captivity or pre-

cipitate escape, Captain Morris ordered Lieutenant Wadsworth to spike his cannon and retire across the bridge behind. At the same moment orders were given to fire the ship, spike the guns of the wharf battery, and join the retreat across the creek. Before all this could be done, the enemy had gained the hill from which the militia fled: and it was impossible for the seamen to reach the bridge. Retreating in front of their assailants, they plunged through the creek and escaped towards Bangor, thence farther into the interior of a region then thinly inhabited. As it was not practicable to subsist a body of three hundred men together in those wilds, Captain Morris ordered them to separate and make the best of their way to Portland. Before many days those children of the ocean, mostly unmanageable ashore, performed a pilgrimage of two hundred miles to that place, where every man joined his commander, at a time when desertion from the British navy was so rife that hardly a boat's crew, though well officered, could be trusted to any distance. Such was the moral superiority explaining constant victory, which British wounded pride referred to so many unfounded physical causes.

Commodore Barrie, the naval commander, whose barges had not been in action, joined Colonel John in pursuit of the militia, flying at full speed and pursued toward Bangor, by water and land: but they were too nimble for us, said the commodore's cutting sarcasm. "At Bangor, those who opposed us at Hampden threw off their military character, and as magistrates, select men, &c., stopped all pursuit by unconditional surrender." Disgrace of American arms did not, however, end there. "About two hours afterwards," adds the commodore, "Brigadier-General Blake came into the town to deliver himself up a prisoner, and with one hundred and ninety-one men was admitted to parole." The commodore's official dispatch states that the English loss amounted to one man killed, one captain and seven privates wounded.

Adjutant-General Pilkington was then despatched to subdue Machias, the only remaining unconquered place of that region. Seventy men of the fortieth regiment of the United States, with thirty militia, in the fort near Machias, evacuated it in the night, abandoning their colors and guns; the town was taken on the 9th September, not only without opposition, but pursuant to Brigadier-General John Brewer commanding the district's unconditional surrender. By a written proposal to the British commander Brewer, because forsooth there was no hope that an adequate force would be furnished by the United States to protect the country between the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy,



offered his parole and that of his brigade not to bear arms during the war, upon condition that, while they consider themselves under the British government, their private property should be safe, and their usual occupations." "The inhabitants," said Admiral Griffith's official dispatch, "of several townships have sent deputations to Castine, to tender their submission to the British authority." "Brigadier-General Brewer, who commanded the militia in this district, and some other respectable persons," said General Sherbrooke's dispatch, "has sent a letter to General Pilkington, and next day was appointed to receive those gentlemen and accept their terms." "The county of Washington has passed under the dominion of his Britannic majesty. This accession of territory wrested from the enemy embraces about one hundred miles of sea coast, and includes that intermediate tract of country which separates the province of New Brunswick from Lower Canada."

Our narrative is relieved, by these British accounts, from selection of terms to characterize this subjugation, which remained in British possession till the 27th April, 1815, when restored, pursuant to the Treaty of Ghent; but by the Treaty of Washington, signed by Mr. Webster with Lord Ashburton, in August, 1842, there was substituted for the conquered valley of the Penobscot, a larger and more convenient dislocation of ancient Massachusetts, as "an intermediate tract of country separating the province of New Brunswick from Lower Canada," in the very terms of its original military conqueror.

On the 21st of September, 1814, returned to Halifax Sir John Sherbrooke, with Rear-Admiral Griffith, issued their joint proclamation for the government of that part of the United States as British conquered territory, observing the established regulations and formalities on such occasions. The whole people were disarmed, and required to swear allegiance to Great Britain or retire from their homes: in other respects not molested, but protected in their property, business, and religion. Provisional government established by the conquerors, was maintained by martial law, subject to such ulterior permanent arrangements as the British government might order, or a treaty of peace stipulate. All judicial officers were continued in their functions, administering municipal law, as before the conquest of the territory. General Gerard Gosselyn was appointed the military commander. All revenue and tax-gatherers were to account to the English custom house. All inhabitants swearing allegiance were promised protection, or threatened with punishment, as they kept or broke that oath. Sea vessels were to be registered, and coasters licensed at Castine, which

was declared the port of entry, and opened to all lawful British commerce.

Resolutions of the legislature applauded the governor for what "he had done to defend the State, and the militia for their alacrity, discipline, the good condition of their arms and equipments, and earnest determination to defend to the last extremity their native soil at all hazards;" which mockery of the governor and of the unarmed militia, unprovided with either muskets or powder, whose officers led them to flight at the first glimpse of the enemy, and when they had escaped by flight, voluntarily returned to surrender, was carried still farther by a speech of a senator, named Blake, who said "he hoped to God the State would rise in opposition to the general government; it was time to break off all intercourse with the republic; he hoped before the legislature rose, the season for action would come; he was ready to change our constitution for that of Great Britain, monarchy and all." The Centinel newspaper, published at Boston, stated that "Major Putnam, Captains Fillebrown and Varnum, arrived under parole from Eastport, speak highly of the good conduct of the British regiment there, so abused by the Virginians for their reputed misconduct last year at Hampton. All alarm at Eastport has subsided. Commodore Hardy has assured the inhabitants that the expedition had only in object the capture of Moose island, which, he repeats, belongs to his royal master. The soldiers behave remarkably well there; yet this is the corps said to have committed such outrages at Hampton." The New Bedford Gazette published that "a report was current in New York, a few days since, that this town had been burned by the British. It appears that the story originated in Providence, Rhode Island. As the administration harpies have lately renewed their efforts to render the war popular, it is not unlikely this story was fabricated with a view to excite a spirit of irritation against the enemy." When the 4th of July, 1814, was celebrated at Dorchester, where Washington commanded in 1775, one of the sentiments drunk was "our country united (to Britain) and happy till the pestilence of democracy poisoned and blighted it." On the 22d of September, 1814, the Salem Gazette proclaimed "as indispensable to self-preservation that a State deserted by the general government should reimburse itself by retaining the amount of imposts, taxes, and proceeds of captures within the State that might have gone into the national treasury, exchange the prisoners of war kept in the State for such of her own citizens as were in the hands of the enemy, invite neighboring States to a convention of alliance, amity, and commerce, make an honorable peace with Great Britain before the anti-commercial States do it, leaving

the whole burden of the war on the commercial States, and by these means free Massachusetts from the evils oppressing her." From such foul exhalations of distempered public sentiment arose the Hartford Convention, thus obviously indicated. On the 16th of March, 1814, in the same Salem Gazette, Timothy Pickering, who represented that district in Congress, published, with his respectable name signed to the shocking infidelity, "for myself, as a member of the national legislature, I do not hold myself under any obligation to give my vote to redeem the paper money, exchequer bills, or other loans to continue this unnecessary and iniquitous war." The *Endymion* frigate and other British vessels of war established their hospitals at Nantucket as if it were a British port, while represented in Congress by Mr. Artemas Ward, son of the general who competed with Washington for the command of the American army before Boston in 1775. Mr. Wilson, who lived near Belfast, represented in Congress the Penobscot district after its subjugation; and no member voted more constantly against all grants of money, men, or other provision for war, either offensive or defensive, than Mr. Ward from Boston, and Mr. Wilson from the north-east of Massachusetts.

The hearts of the common people of New England remained American, however labored and exasperated against the national government, still steeled for resistance to English hostilities. But in the progress of the war, its privations, exactions, and mortifying reverses, the party opposed to the national administration in possession of the governments of every one of the five New England States, carried unconstitutional and delirious opposition to the verge of forcible resistance by authoritative hindrance, machination and contrivance, at the time when the enemy, tired of waiting for New England co-operation, assailed the Eastern States, as they had the Southern and Western war States, with devastating and unmerciful war; and then it was that a considerable part of Massachusetts was subdued to English possession, without the slightest resistance from, if not connivance of, the State government.

At the same time, in 1814, there was found an unlooked-for champion in the Senate of Massachusetts, in John Holmes, who came forth from among the opponents of the war and Madison's administration, one of their most eloquent and popular supporters. Finding that government, instead of being driven from its ground by Eastern frenzy, was strengthened by it, we might have hoped, said Mr. Holmes, that such futile opposition would have been discouraged. Everything inflammatory and seceding that could be, was done, by Massachusetts, but to no purpose. Some twenty

or thirty out of more than five hundred towns labored by emissaries, were all that could be seduced: of them the poor fishermen signed a recantation, declaring that they are not oppressed. You boast of forbearance: but you forbore only because afraid to go further. You complain of Southern aggrandizement, with ten members in the Senate, an undue proportion, according to your population. Massachusetts has become contemptible, a by-word of reproach. Your conduct has disgusted the people everywhere. In the great State of New York they have risen against your cabal and hurled defiance in your teeth. There is among us, a restless, daring and ambitious faction, who, I do not hesitate to proclaim, prefer the British government, *monarchy and all*. Your proceedings are viewed with detestation and abhorrence. Every outrageous doctrine of Great Britain I have heard advocated on this floor, [and here Mr. Holmes recapitulated the questions in issue,] by gentlemen who advise us to count the cost, to state the account, debit and credit, and see whether we can *make money* by it. Every right is estimated in money. Suppose the South and West to count the cost of our fisheries, and give them up for cheaper supplies from England. The ocean, you say, is England's exclusive domain, and you would give her even a worse line of frontier for us than she got by the peace of '83. I believe she may make peace with us on the assurance that we will let her have whatever she wants, full of her partisans as are our public bodies. We are under French influence forsooth! But now that France is under English influence, what becomes of that absurd imputation? Show me the nation that for twenty years has not been barbarous, inglorious, in your always English predilection, as it was either opposed to, or in alliance with, England. You desire to send Mr. Madison to Elba; to do it by foreign, I suppose, as you have failed to do it by domestic force. The British army that deposed Napoleon is coming this way: and I am not sure but that many of our countrymen, hoping for restoration of the old order of things, finding it can only be done by force, are rejoiced at the prospect.

On the 29th July, 1814, at General Dearborn's request, Governor Strong issued orders for detachments from seven of the divisions of State militia to remain in the service of the United States, General Blake's brigade to be ordered to Castine, and Gen. Brown's to Machias. But they were withheld from command of the United States officers; the east of the State was then already conquered, the few militia hastily collected there had neither muskets nor powder, their commanders set the first example of flight and voluntary surrender. Sherbrooke's communication through Brewer to



Strong, Brewer's unconditional surrender to Pilkington on the pretext that the country was not protected by the federal government, morbid inaction and malcontent administration, with distempered public opinion everywhere, conspire to infer that the authorities, civil and military, of Massachusetts had no objection to Sherbrooke's proposal of a peaceable restoration of the Penobscot Valley to Great Britain. Accordingly the British conqueror, "conceiving it of importance that his government should be informed of such successes," called on the admiral for a vessel of war to carry the news to England. And his aid, Major Addison, was dispatched in the *Marin* sloop-of-war with the colors of Massachusetts, to be displayed, with other trophies, in the capital of Great Britain, to the indelible dishonor of a State, the only one of the American Republic whose constituted authorities surrendered part of it, together with its flag, without contest, to the enemy.

Massachusetts had military annals and glorious recollections: New England invasions of Canada, Acadia, Nova Scotia; expeditions to Quebec, Montreal, Cape Breton, Crown Point; Massachusetts leading the way, bearing the brunt, furnishing most of the troops and paying most of the charges. But in 1814 their energies were spent in disaffection, their politics perverted to faction, and their religion to politics. When their old enemy, more than ever vindictive and devastating, brought war to their doors, cold-blooded party and government disarmed a martial people by deadening their loyalty. Yet there was nothing in Governor Strong's speeches and official correspondence with the national government so prominent, pertinacious, or vehement as his insistence for pay of the militia he refused to put under the orders of that government. Boston, the cradle of American independence, had become the arsenal of political revolt against the American nation; the educated classes of a calculating people, sacrificing their interests to their prejudices, and patriotism to bad passions; sectarians with whom it was difficult to agree and dangerous to differ.

Of that distempered condition, not of the popular but educated, and, as they deemed themselves, better classes of New England, especially in the seaport towns, there were abominable demonstrations in Boston and Portsmouth, in 1814, more hostile to the national cause, and more disgraceful to the local powers, than the tame submission of Penobscot. When the ship-of-the-line called *Washington*, building at Portsmouth, under the superintendence of Captain Hull, was in danger of being burned by an assault from the numerous English cruisers on the coast, the State authorities of New Hampshire refused to co-operate in the protection of

that national vessel. "The navy," said the report of the Massachusetts legislature, "is in a situation rather to invite than repel aggression, and requires protection instead of affording it"—vile abnegation, also uttered in Congress. Wherefore, the *Washington* was deserted by the State power, which repudiated all care of that national bulwark. Hull had two hundred seamen at Portsmouth, where there were also two companies of United States artillery, to whom two companies of United States infantry were added. On the 20th May, 1814, the Governor of New Hampshire addressed the Secretary of War concerning the militia, who, when called out, had been expressly ordered not to serve in any United States post, or under any officer, military or naval, of the United States. The governor, according to the usual anxiety on that subject, desired to know from the Secretary of War whether such militia would be paid by the federal government. The Secretary's answer did not satisfy that inquiry; whereupon the legislature of New Hampshire, then in session at Concord, resolved by large majorities to disband the militia called out for defence of Portsmouth, its important harbor, and the ship-of-the-line there, on the sorry plea that the federal government did not want, as it would not pay, the militia; who were not subjected to even musters and inspection for the nation; and could not be employed or paid as mere allies, independent of one and the same national command. Fortunately there were seamen and soldiers of the United States at Portsmouth, to deter the apprehended attack.

After her second capture of a British frigate, the ship *Constitution* put into Boston, where her commander, Bainbridge, was employed to superintend preparations for the third of her glorious cruises. One of the three line-of-battle ships, the *Independence*, was also built at the Charlestown navy-yard, in charge of Commodore Bainbridge. These vessels, and the *Washington*, at Portsmouth, were objects of particular malevolence, which the British men-of-war, it was apprehended, would especially strive to destroy. The *Independence* and *Constitution* were therefore so arranged with armaments at Charlestown as to enfilade the harbor, in case of any hostile attempt upon it. Cannon were also mounted by Bainbridge on batteries ashore, palisades were put up, a chain of sentinels kept constantly on guard, and every preparation made for vigorous defence. The militia of Charlestown, well disposed, and of Boston, though not so much so, volunteered their services to mount guard. Still Bainbridge was disquieted by the large number of British vessels of war hovering on the coast and off the harbor. Threats of destruction were notorious, and that numerous troops

were provided at Halifax and Bermuda to put them into execution, at every assailable point. Bainbridge, himself as much of a federalist as an officer might be, no adherent of Madison's administration, perceived to his great regret that the state and Boston authorities were more than tardy; they were averse to measures of adequate defence. As the danger increased, his uneasiness induced him to make official application to the adjutant-general of the state, Brooks; by repeated letters endeavoring to enlist his assistance, impart his own well-grounded apprehensions, and rouse the local pride as well as fear of danger. With an enterprising enemy at our threshold, with the interests of both state and general government in jeopardy, should it be a question, said he, which of them shall repel the assault? If the enemy enters these waters to attack the navy yard, both Charlestown and Boston will be endangered. The commodore, therefore, entreated the adjutant-general to confer with the governor and ascertain his determination. To this appeal the governor and council answered by suggesting, that the Independence and Constitution ought to be removed beyond the forts Warren and Independence, that is, abandoned. The committee, directed by the State executive to make that shameful suggestion to the naval commander, insisted that, as the ships were national property only, their destruction ought not to involve danger to the town. Finding Bainbridge not only inflexible but indignant at the base suggestion, they asked, what would he do, if the Boston authorities should withhold all defence, by which means the national vessels, like Castine, might be captured without serious resistance. Bainbridge nobly replied, that the ships in his care belonged to the country, and he would defend them to the last. If Boston thought proper to suffer bombardment or capture without it, as appeared to be the design of some of its rulers, on their heads the disgrace should rest; but he would perform a duty which he owed to no particular administration, but to the nation and his own character. The men (shall they be called?) of Massachusetts left him to separate the national cause and honor from theirs, and as he told them, answerable for all the terrible consequences. An enterprising British officer, a favorable wind, a dark night, the accidental rashness which sacked Washington, any of the incalculable contingencies of war, might at that moment have laid Boston, with the ships, in ashes. The governor refused General Dearborn militia even to man the harbor forts. While the invasion of north-eastern Massachusetts was in progress, as before described, the summer was suffered to elapse at Boston without a single step by the State or local authorities to defend the capital from conquest.

Popular discontent, however, rose to the height of the emergency, and seconded the naval commander in preventing the *select* and *respectable* men, so called by Sherbrooke as the authors of the surrender of the Penobscot, from yielding the national ships as the State towns were surrendered. What!—said the people, in street groups and accidental communions, at a time when there was scarcely any business, but all thoroughfares and public places were thronged with idle and anxious wayfarers—what! give up the old frigate, which first brought down the English flag? Let the enemy burn a ship, every timber of which is an American trophy! Murmurs of the streets, emotions of the thoughtless but faithful mass, threats, and signs of a people formidable in their outbreaks, the terrors of a Boston mob seconded the constancy of Bainbridge, and the national vessels were at any rate left where and as he had fortified them.

The summer wore away with continual incursions and alarms everywhere, and inflamed accounts of hostile enormities. After the capture of Washington and attack of Baltimore, all the cities on the Atlantic were fortified by local contributions. Public meetings, numerous volunteer encampments, and universal efforts of defence spread over and around the whole country. At length, about the period of the final conquest of Penobscot, the inhabitants of Boston generally, of all parties, roused by the tidings of general resistance and the urgency of their dangers, overcame the disaffection of their public servants, erected redoubts and breastworks, moored hulks to be sunk in the harbor, the militia garrisoned the forts, and British contemplations of attack were deterred by the countenance of manly preparation. But for this national and salutary reaction, Boston was in peril of invasion like Maine, all the constituted authorities being perverted to the creation of a separate sovereignty, when by every consideration required to vindicate what they had.

It was in 1814 that the blockade, so long withheld from New England, was extended to all the coasts of the Eastern States, the marauding ravages, so long confined to other places, repeated there with uncommon vexations, and their colonial neighbors of Nova Scotia proclaimed that England would be deceived, if she relied on the aid of New England. The Acadian Recorder, a Halifax journal, deprecated "the avidity of searching after, and the pleasure taken in reading the speeches of Governor Strong, with the federal answers. No publication from the American press has so fatal a tendency. The English reader, finding sentiments so just, so consonant with his own, swallows the poison, and dreams that the man, his Senate and House of Assembly, are friends of Britain. Nothing is more erro-



neous. Madison and his democrats are unwittingly our friends, and the change that would put a Strong in the President's chair, would be the greatest evil we could experience, not from increase of force or talent, but the federal mania which has bewildered our sense, and paralysed our arm. Can we forget that Boston was the cradle of rebellion? Can we imagine that the people of Massachusetts have repented of their evil deeds? We hope, from present appearances, that the federalists will come in for a share of alarm on the *favoured* northern coasts of the United States. We have no desire to know the destination of our preparations. To the result we look forward, and fervently pray it may be successful." Such were common opinions of the North American British provinces adjoining and hating New England. In the same Halifax Recorder of the 27th June, 1814, a sturdy Briton, who signed himself "an anti-federal Englishman," in still stronger terms of indignant deprecation warned his government against any trust or faith in the Bostonians, at that time objects of both American and English reprobation. The anti-federal Englishman's ire was kindled by the Boston attentions to Perry, presenting him a service of plate for "our first triumph in squadron," which this angry Englishman pronounced "a lie, whether on metal, canvas, paper, tablet, or falling from any lips: a deliberate lie of six thousand federalists of steady and sober habits, professed enemies of the late French emperor, yet more given to scandalous falsehood than any of his notorious bulletins. Who is it thus exults in debasement of Britons? Not our sworn enemies, the democrats. No such thing; but our staunch friends, the federalists; for what is Boston but the hotbed of federalism? The democrats only amuse us by vaunting their rabble army. The federalists provoke our just indignation by basely calumniating our navy."

When all calculation on New England was abandoned, the British ministry resolved on conquering part of Massachusetts, and no portion of the United States was more severely visited than the East. A highway through Maine, from Halifax to Quebec; Canada and Louisiana united, as of old, by the Mississippi boundary; the fisheries, exclusively English, were among the dreams of transatlantic ambition.—During the summer of 1814, the naval vexations of the shores of the Middle States, were renewed on those of the East, with all the legalized rapacity of the British maritime code. Snacks, fishing craft, oyster and clam boats, everything afloat, and all assailable ashore, isolated hovels, the huts of watermen, private dwellings, factories, salt works, were attacked. Towns and cities, navy yards and barracks were threat-

ened; Barnstable, Alexandria, Salem, Boston, Newport, were insulted and alarmed. New London, on the most frivolous pretext, was bombarded for two days, by a furious, harmless, senseless, and salutary cannonade. Lords of the ocean, masters of the world, gentlemen of noble families, loaded their floating barracks with plunder of the poor and non-combatant, whose hard earnings are spared by the rudest hostilities by land. Sir George Collier, from the quarter-deck of the frigate *Leander*, on the 21st September, 1814, sent his barges full of men ashore near Salem, in chase of a fishing boat, with a note bearing his rank and title to Colonel Appleton, commanding some militia of the Cape Ann regiment, hastily assembled, threatening, "if not allowed to examine the boat, which he believed to be a fisherman, he would destroy every house within two miles of the cove."

Such aggressions made daily annoyances of the neighborhood, whence the Essex Junto, as the most rancorous opposition were called, sent their representative to Congress, Timothy Pickering: undeniable proof that, however delirious was the antagonism to their own government and obsequious their applause of the enemy, there was no criminal understanding between the British and most of the violent opponents of the war.

The rugged shores of New England, with their thousands of inlets, the abiding-places of transcendent navigation, from Fairfield, Connecticut, throughout that commonwealth along Rhode Island, the whole extent of ancient Massachusetts, including Maine, all the way from Fairfield to Eastport, from New York to New Brunswick, studded with bright and busy villages, with their white churches and glittering spires, neat, crowded school-houses, ambitious private dwellings, residences of the staid and decent gentry of an orderly, intelligent and polite population, keeping strictly the puritanical Sabbath, and busy in all useful arts, were roused from slumber and disturbed at worship, by sons of the invaders of their sires, whose injustice was the tradition of every hamlet, come again to harass their coasts, blockade their ports, capture their craft, degrade their flag, impress and imprison their mariners, and destroy the commerce and the privateering by which they were enriched. Pulpits, courts, legislative halls which had resounded with intemperate British apologies, felt British invasion in their vestibules, their property robbed or ransomed, their worship profaned, their supposed exemption from war's calamities for unworthy enmity to fellow-countrymen, required by the nocturnal orgies and merciless hostilities of enemies despising and punishing all Americans alike, especially those disloyal to their own country,

and obsequious to its foes. Party could not make head against such appeals for country. In vain the pulpit, the bar, the bench, the politician, had argued against the popular motives excited by such lessons, taught by an infuriated enemy.

In the midst of these conflicts and contradictions, all the constituted authorities of all New England being combined in opposition, most of them unconstitutional opposition, to the national government and the war, which England prosecuted against New England as fiercely and unwarrantably as against the war states, many individuals resolved on separate peace, if not alliance, with the enemy, and that last effort of the eastern anti-war party, the Hartford Convention, was matured, to break the Union, without forcible resistance. Government was nowhere forcibly hindered, however assailed or perplexed, by seaport disaffection striking for wealth, without revolting for power. There is a fund of instinctive mother wit, pervading common people, continental nationality throughout these United States, that holds the population together beyond the power of individual, sectional, or party, however well educated or contrived sedition. The situation of the

country often critical, and that of government seemingly desperate as in 1814, in 1776, and 1781, rights itself as it were providentially. British seeming might, and American apprehended inability, in collision and contrast, strike American triumphs from such conjunctures. American vitality abides in the sense of individual and universal sovereignty, the elasticity of republican independence and recuperation of self-government. During the war in 1814, there were infuriate partisans who desired our discomfiture, numbers who preferred selfish gain to general welfare, and a large party inclined to make almost any peace, rather than let another party wage any war. But few who would have joined the English in arms, and hardly any who did not prefer republicanism to monarchy, which had few admirers, and England, with many admirers, few adherents. The Eastern disaffection of leading politicians was too selfish for the body of the people, who shrunk from rebellion. Threats of disunion remained so long unexecuted, that England ceased to rely on New England, whom another campaign would have probably found carrying on the war like the rest of the country.

## CHAPTER VI.

### BATTLES OF PLATTSBURG.

FROM the ignominious and suspicious surrender of the Penobscot, one of the most dishonorable events of the war and Boston treachery, the transition is pleasant to the twin battles of Plattsburg by land and water, among its most glorious exploits, and the naval victory presenting not only a highly edifying view of the morals of the American navy, but probably the first step in a great naval reformation.

The fortune of war was completely reversed on the Canadian frontier between the years 1813 and 1814. In 1813 our forces on Ontario, Champlain, and the St. Lawrence, were more numerous than the British; yet, not merely failed, but shamefully, in every attempt at conquest. There seemed to be something in the hostile soil to discomfit Dearborn, Bloomfield, Pike, Wilkinson, Chandler, Winder, Boyd, Hampton, Burn, Boerstler, Smythe, Van Rensselaer—every American officer attempting to carry American arms into Canada. In

the autumn of 1814, there were about thirty-five thousand British regulars, and nearly all veteran troops, there, kept in check, and worsted in frequent and severe encounters, by never more than ten thousand American troops, counting all from Detroit to Plattsburg, men and officers inexperienced, mostly mere recruits, few or none of whom had ever been tried in battle. The British were not merely veterans, but renowned, fresh from European campaigns, completely equipped, supplied, and corroborated by recollections of recent exploits, the admiration and master-strokes of the world. Five regiments of the late arrivals from Europe were sent to Drummond, to replenish his casualties. A brigade, under Major-General Kempt, went to Kingston, thence to make a descent on Sackett's Harbor. The remaining fourteen or fifteen thousand men were concentrated, in August, between La Prairie and Fort Chambly, under Major-General de Rotten-



burgh. The three brigades into which they were distributed were commanded by Major-Generals Powers, Brisbane, and Robinson, with General Baynes as Adjutant-General, and the Governor-General, Sir George Prevost, commander-in-chief. So large and fine an army of British troops had reason to be confident of certain success. To the general order of universal devastation, announced by Admiral Cochrane, and in process of execution everywhere, from Eastport to New Orleans, was added the promiscuous retaliation of what Prevost denounced as American aggressions, besides recovery of lost, and acquisition of new territory, thus making such impression on the United States as would deter them from future hostilities. To these general principles of warfare, specific directions as to Canada added, destruction of American vessels on the lakes, and fortresses on the frontiers, particularly the military occupation of some point on Lake Champlain to secure Canada. The conquest of the Penobscot Valley, of the outlet of the Mississippi, and of positions on the borders of Vermont and New York, were Castlereagh's dreams, British schemes, and American perils. Prevost was not to penetrate far into the interior, but expected to march as far as Crown Point.

As soon as General Izard left the borders of Champlain with four thousand of the best troops there, Prevost made arrangements to attack Plattsburg, and to capture that hindrance to his advance to Crown Point and Ticonderoga, ancient seats of British conquest over Americans, and also as a demonstration to retard Izard's advance, and increase his avowed, angrily avowed apprehensions, that his march to Brown's succor would be interrupted. Whenever he went, he wrote to the Secretary, on the 11th August, 1814, not only should he move "with the apprehension of risking the force under his command, but with the certainty that everything in the vicinity he left, and the lately erected works at Plattsburg and Cumberland Head, would, in less than three days after his departure, be in the possession of the enemy." Nothing occurred to warrant these misapprehensions, the ebullitions of temper rather than fear. On the first of September, three days after Izard began his march to the west, Prevost put his army in movement, not to interrupt or disturb Izard, who was beyond his reach, and would hardly have been disturbed if he had gone directly towards the St. Lawrence, because Prevost's primary object was the capture of Plattsburg, from which he would not have been diverted. Passing the frontier at Odletown on the first of September, he advanced on the third to Champlain town, which was abandoned by the Americans on his approach.

General Macomb, as officer next in rank to General Izard, was left by him in command of that frontier. Like Izard, war had always been Macomb's vocation, which he had followed as his only profession from the time he entered the army as a very young lieutenant. Without Izard's authoritative tone and manner, perhaps his information and decision, his exclusive habits and unpopular demeanor, Macomb, accessible, sociable, playful, was a well-trained and industrious soldier, with no supercilious aversion to militia, volunteers, and those irregular troops whom Izard contemptuously designated as *people* requiring a *popular* leader. Macomb's brigade was broken up by Izard in selecting his men to take from that station, where he left only fifteen hundred fit for field duty, to make head against the British fourteen thousand. Falling back upon Plattsburg, Macomb had but a few days in which to prepare for the most serious attack, as to disparity of numbers, ever made on the Americans: nearly ten to one. More than three thousand regular troops were left by Izard with Macomb, perhaps twenty-five hundred of whom might be rendered available behind entrenchments, but not more than fifteen hundred fit for the field. Pursuant to authority from the executive, militia were called out from New York and Vermont, about three thousand two hundred of whom repaired, of all parties, to Macomb's standard, under Generals Moers and Strong; good troops as they proved, as such troops are for any sudden and defensive operation, especially whenever they are protected by streams, woods, and forts, associated with regular soldiers, and commanded by a leader willing to make the best, instead of inclined to make the worst, of such indispensable comrades in arms in nearly every American conflict. Besides completing his entrenchments, Macomb employed his men in harassing the enemy as they advanced, and preparing by such apprenticeship for the contest soon to ensue. General Izard had constructed a redoubt, which he called Fort Moreau, after the name of the French general, whose residence at Morrisville in Pennsylvania, the place, at one time, of General Brown's home, was not far from General Izard's seat, Farley, in that neighborhood. With better taste in patriotism, after Moreau's departure from this country, in English pay, by Russian inducement, to make war on France, General Macomb, to remind his troops of their brave countrymen, of whom he had no invidious feelings, named the two redoubts he constructed Forts Brown and Scott, names dear to American soldiers, and electrifying the ardor pervading their ranks. Generals Izard and Macomb differed much as to the condition of the place and troops left by the former to the latter's care, who found

it, he said, in great confusion, the ordnance, the stores, the works, in no state of defence; the garrison composed of convalescents and recruits of new regiments, unorganized and unprepared for their difficult task. To excite their emulation, that indispensable spur of mankind from childhood to death, Macomb assigned to different parties the separate defence of the several forts, declaring, by general orders, that he relied on each party to defend his particular charge to the last extremity. Major Appling of the rifles, Major Wool, now General Wool, Captain Sproul, and General Moers, from the 6th to the 11th September, contested every inch of ground with the enemy, who advanced, nevertheless, with irresistible resolution, in overwhelming numbers, driving the Americans into Plattsburg before them.

The militia, in the field, and even in the woods, often timorous, fled at the sight of scarlet; and, as that was the dress of the New York dragoons, the militia sometimes ran away from their own fellow-soldiers. But a few days' practice under officers who gave every encouragement, brought them to the Saranac river better disciplined, and, when on their own side of it, with the bridges taken up, easily rallied to resist and successfully repel attempts of the British to force their way across the fords. The enemy marched steadily forward, in two parallel columns, through the neighboring forests, the western column, led by Generals Power and Robinson, on higher ground; the eastern column near the lake, on low and swampy ground, led by General Brisbane, cannonaded from the American gunboats, manned by thirty-five men each, armed with a long twenty-four pound gun and carronade, one of which, the *Netley*, was commanded by the present Captain Breese, brother of the present senator. Majors Appling and Wool, and Captain Sproul, were indefatigable with their small corps in opposing and harassing the steadily advancing enemy. But every road, on every side, was crowded with the British irresistible troops, who, by the 7th September, drove all their opponents under their batteries, and began to erect their own just beyond the Saranac. The bridge over that stream was taken up by the retreating Americans, and the planks piled up for breastworks, which enabled our people to defeat several attempts to cross the river. British sharpshooters, who, from the balconies and windows of houses fired on the Americans, were driven away by hot shot, by which the Americans burned their own captured dwellings. Repeated attempts to drive our people from their new breastworks, to force the fords, or otherwise by any means to get over the Saranac, were constantly defeated. From the 7th to the 11th September, the British batteries, and

other arrangements for assault, were completed, however, and then all depended on the shipping; for, without capturing or destroying the American flotilla, taking Plattsburg was deemed an almost useless conquest. As long as McDonough commanded the lake, Prevost could make no extensive or permanent advance, or impression with the army, large as it was, and prohibited by orders from hazardous enterprise into the interior. Meantime, the militia from New York, and from Vermont, poured into Plattsburg, so that Macomb was sustained by a regular and irregular force altogether exceeding seven thousand men in arms, well disposed for resistance, and admirably commanded.

The splendid North American autumn was beginning to brace the pure air, tint the forests with its various hues, azure the bright skies, and ruffle the clear lakes of that region of beautiful woods, waters and hills, every knoll of which, from Montreal to Saratoga, was the classic ground of American battles, every hut full of traditions of the old French war and the war of the Revolution. The hamlets and villages abounded with those who remembered Gates, Schuyler and Arnold, and could repeat the stories of Amherst and Abercrombie. Arnold's flotilla at Crown Point, Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga, were the themes of a population of fishermen, marksmen and woodsmen, inured to adventures and hardships, whose frontier enterprises had taught them the stratagems and boldness of individual hostilities. The Saranac, like the mighty St. Lawrence, contravening the common course of American rivers, by flowing northeast, empties into Lake Champlain in the midst of the town of Plattsburg, surrounded by an amphitheatre of hills, whose distant horizon reaches the lofty peaks of the Green Mountains, which give their name to the State of Vermont. Natural configuration combined with historical recollections to embellish the scene of the approaching battles, memorable as probably the last to be fought between Europeans and Americans in that region, destined, with all the Canadas and all the lakes then contended for by Great Britain, to be peaceably absorbed by the United States of America.

The contest of ship building, so long, expensively and vexatiously kept up on Lake Ontario, had been waged also on Lake Champlain, where a young lieutenant commanded the American flotilla, an abortive attempt to destroy which, by the enemy, has been mentioned. The British, as usual, beat us in building. Their frigate, the *Confiance*, of 37 guns, was finished soon after our sloop-of-war, the *Saratoga*, of 26; and they were able to go forth on the lake with not only more guns and more men than we, but the great advantages of more and heavier



guns on the decks of one and the same ship; not only more numerous crews, but veteran seamen, many of them fresh from their large ships-of-war at Quebec, commanded by officers of greater experience than ours, nearly all of the Americans being untried in action, and having their proof under fire to make as well as reputation. On the 3d of September, Commodore McDonough (as he was styled) anchored his squadron off Plattsburg, to cover the entrenchments there. The American shipping consisted of four vessels and ten gun-boats or barges, altogether fourteen craft, carrying 102 cannon, manned by 850 men, many of them not seamen, and their marines supplied by soldiers from the army. The British squadron had also four vessels, with twelve gun-boats or barges, altogether sixteen, carrying 115 guns, and manned by 1000 mostly tried and veteran seamen and officers; their greater number of thirteen cannons, enhanced by eleven of them being mounted in one superior ship. The American commanders were McDonough in the *Saratoga*, Henley in the *Eagle*, Cassin in the *Ticonderoga*, Budd in the *Preble*. The British were Downie in the *Confiance*, Pring in the *Linnet*, McGhee in the *Chubb*, and Hicks in the *Finch*. That jealousy which seldom fails to alienate different corps of the same troops, and still more prevails between the land and sea service, broke out among the British, to the advantage of Macomb and McDonough, whose situation was too perilous, and their forces too few to venture to quarrel with each other, and they were furthermore, both army and navy, commanded by gentlemen of great amenity and strong disposition to make the best of their precarious situation by harmonizing not only with each other, but the militia, volunteers and irregular levies unavoidably summoned suddenly to their aid.

As soon as the Governor-General of Canada was reinforced by large bodies of Wellington's troops in July and August, fresh from their triumphs in Spain and France, he was ordered to carry the war into New York by way of Lake Champlain. Utter failures of the American army in every Canadian attempt gave rational encouragement to the belief that whatever so large a force undertook must be effected; for, till Brown checked the tide, it was a continued flood of victory. As the flotilla at Isle Aux Noix was necessary, indeed indispensable to the advance of the British army, positive orders were given to the quarter-master-general and commissary-general to suspend all other work, and every branch of service whatever that would interfere with the construction and equipment of the frigate *Confiance*. Her size, tonnage and armament were all made so much greater than those of the largest

American ship, the *Saratoga*, as to leave no doubt of the capacity of the English vessel to overwhelm the American. Captain Fisher superintended the British naval preparations, which were urged with the utmost expedition. Early in August Commodore Yeo, who commanded both Lakes Ontario and Champlain, was called on by the governor-general to put the Champlain division of his command under immediate orders for the contemplated service. Then it was that the jealousy between the sea and land officers, seldom sleeping, began to show itself. Yeo answered Prevost's importunity that the Champlain squadron had already nearly a hundred men more than its complement, and he sent Captain Downie, of the ship *Montreal*, to take the place of Captain Fisher, who had prepared the squadron for action. Disappointed by Yeo, the governor-general applied to Admiral Otway, at Quebec, and Captain Lord James O'Brien, who instantly sent from their ships, the *Ajax* and *Warspite*, the required supply of experienced seamen.

On the 3d of September the gun boats in advance of the squadron, under Captain Pring, accompanied the army as it slowly proceeded along the lake, waiting for the whole fleet, and took possession of La Motte, a small island. In a council of war held by the British generals, it was unanimously resolved that the attack on Plattsburg must be simultaneous by land and water, and therefore that of the army was deferred till the whole squadron arrived. Naval ascendancy on the lake was deemed indispensable to land operations. Entire confidence prevailed in the superiority of the British vessels, their heavier metal, more numerous veteran crews, and much more experienced officers. Their commander assured the army that with his ship alone he would take the whole American squadron; but that he was determined not to go to battle, or out of harbor, till his vessels were all ready. On the 8th of September, considering them so, he slowly moved along the lake, in that pride of strength which is often the forerunner of disaster, his vanity of prowess inflamed by uncommon supervision. A large British army occupied the circumjacent places, watching the naval operation, waiting only till it removed the sole obstacle to their triumphant progress. Commodore Downie's frigate, 160 feet long by 40 feet beam, with a crew of more than 300 picked seamen, and a first Lieutenant Robertson, who, after his commander's fall, fought the vessel at least as well as before that event, heavily armed with eleven guns more than the American Commodore, those guns larger, heavier, better sighted, on the smooth waters of the lake, was a formidable floating battery, and as she moved majestically into action, without returning a shot, till close aboard her despised antagonist, was fa-

vored by the breeze, which to all physical, superadded that natural advantage. Contrary to naval usage, if not honor, there was a furnace in the *Confiance* to prepare red-hot shot, several of which struck and set fire to the *Saratoga*. The British army and navy had reason to rely on the latter clearing the way for the former's capture of Macomb's two thousand recruits and convalescents, supported, as the haughty Britons contemptuously said, by a rabble of militia. It was said that the *Confiance* had many things on board for use ashore after her assured victory; even women, one of whom, the steward's wife, was killed in the action.

To the jealousy of corps between army and navy, and confidence of success, was added on the eve of battle a taunt, still further to goad Downie to indiscretion. As he moved gradually along the lake, Prevost sent an officer to apprise him of the resolution of the council of war, that the army depended on the navy for success in a simultaneous attack. To that rather overbearing communication, Captain Downie's lofty answer to the staff officer who bore this message was, that he considered himself, with his vessel alone, a match for the whole American squadron. At midnight on the 9th of September, he sent to inform the Governor-General that the fleet would get under way then, doubling Cumberland head next morning at sunrise, and attack the American flotilla, anchored in the bay off Plattsburg. Its anchorage was out of reach of land batteries, the vessels and barges so stationed along the shore that the enemy could not get between them and it. At break of day, on the 11th of September, the troops were all drawn out in expectation of the promised action on the water; but as the British ships did not appear, Sir George Prevost ordered the army to return to their quarters, and sent Commodore Downie the insulting message, that the army were all at their posts at the time appointed by the navy, and the General hoped that nothing but weather had prevented the Commodore being as good as his word. Stung by that unmerited and harsh reproach, Downie hastened his attack, as the only reply he deigned to give. The fine weather had disappeared before approaches of the inclemency frequent at that season. But the wind was fair for the British squadron, which, at seven o'clock on Sunday morning, doubled Cumberland head, the *Confiance* proudly leading far in advance of all her companions, and at eight, as her commander uniformly boasted, rushed forward alone to take the whole American squadron. Such was the assurance of that ability, that a British barge, filled with amateur spectators, accompanied the other sixteen vessels, which misled McDonough to sup-

pose that there were thirteen British barges, when there were but twelve; the thirteenth being filled with idlers, who came not to bear the brunt of battle, but witness, enjoy, and share the victory. The persons in the amateur barge, with her gay colors streaming, were among the many indications of that extreme naval confidence which that day turned to military alarm and panic, the sudden result of unlooked-for discomfiture: fright, flight, and consternation of the army at night succeeding contemptuous attack by the navy in the morning.

The position chosen by McDonough for his flotilla is agreed, by nautical judges, to have been admirable; in which he waited at anchor in perfect quiet and order, characteristic of American naval discipline, in contrast with the clamorous defiance of British sea fights. Nor was that taciturn composure the only national contrast. I am not able to state whether, like Colonel Short at Sandusky, and Colonel Drummond at Erie, Commodore Downie, to the overweening confidence of British valor, added the fuel of vulgar profanity. But like the Spartans at Thermopylae, and Cromwell's soldiers when an English army has never been surpassed in heroic courage, the young American commander, then thirty-one years of age, introduced his appeal to mortal combat by intercession to Almighty God; neither Pagan, as Leonidas, nor Puritan, as Cromwell's prayers. McDonough, a member of that denomination of American Christians who, with affectionate reverence for a mother country, are said to belong to the Church of England, solemnized the sacraments and sacrifices of that Sabbath by prayers; among other pious invocations, reading that ordained by the Protestant Episcopal ritual before a sea fight: "O! most powerful and glorious Lord God, we make our address to Thy divine Majesty in this necessity: that Thou wouldst take the cause into Thine hands, and judge between us and our enemies. Stir up Thy strength, O Lord, and come and help us; for Thou givest not always the battle to the strong, but canst save by many or by few. Make it appear that Thou art our Saviour and Mighty Deliverer, through Jesus Christ our Lord." While the Governor of Vermont, under the influence of the Governor of Massachusetts, and his abettors, held back from McDonough's help, denouncing the war as wickedly waged against the bulwark of our holy religion, a young lieutenant, in all the beauty of holiness, by prayers of the church of that country, against which his own was accused of iniquitous hostilities, sanctified his immolation, if so God willed it, on the altar of his church and country, with the prayers of the English Church for the safety of its American offspring.

Louis XVI. consumed in protracted prayer



precious moments required for preparation to meet death. McDonough's brief prayer was timely as it was earnest, when, comforted by its inspiration, he went to battle. At sunrise his guard boat announced the British approach, under full sail, and he ordered his vessels cleared, and prepared for action. In the solemn stillness of that awful preparation, when modern seamen, like old Romans, are extremely alive to signs, which the superstition natural to all sensitive and imaginative persons converts into auspicious or ominous occurrences, a cheerful indication animated the *Saratoga*, which *Cæsar* or *Napoleon* would have proclaimed to his soldiers with delight, and they would have hailed with enthusiasm. A cock flew upon a gunslide, clapped his wings, and crowed, whose signal of defiance and victory the men acknowledged with cheers, which broke the silence of anxious expectation. According to some accounts, that incident occurred after the battle began, when a cannon ball struck the coop from its place, and liberated the cock, who flew up the rigging.

Soon after eight o'clock, as the enemy approached, McDonough sighted the first gun fired from his ship, which struck the *Confiance* with great effect. Still *Downie* stood steadily on without returning the fire, sure that if he got the position he desired, the weight of his heavier metal must overpower his opponent. The better gunnery, greater agility, and greater intelligence of American ships, conspicuous on all occasions, manifested their superior capacity for annoyance on that. In all the naval battles of 1814, *Porter's* at *Valparaiso*, *Decatur's* when overpowered by a squadron of frigates, *Blakeley's*, according to all the accounts received of his cruise and loss, and *Biddle's* escape in a sloop from a line-of-battle ship, the other quality of courage, capacity for endurance, or passive fortitude, a British virtue more characteristic than active bravery, was displayed, but never more than in the combat on *Lake Champlain*, especially by the ship commanded by *McDonough*. The *Confiance* stood straight forward, taking the *Saratoga's* and other vessels' fire, without returning a shot, till more injured than was bearable, and less favored by the wind than at first, she was brought to anchor, not exactly as her captain intended, when the spectacle was intensely interesting. The surrounding hills were crowded with combatants or spectators. The British land batteries opened their bombardments on the American redoubts of bombs, shrapnells and rockets, which the forts returned with interest. Attempts at the fords and bridges to force a passage across the *Saranac* were repulsed; one at the village bridge, a second at an upper bridge, and a third at a fort three miles above. The British with scaling ladders trying all these approaches, were always

repulsed by the regulars or militia; and the few who got over instantly killed or taken. When the *Confiance*, under the fire of several of the American vessels, took her post, and turned her broadsides, the first discharge from a battery of sixteen long double-shotted cannon, deliberately aimed in smooth water, close to the *Saratoga*, struck her with a terrible crash, which killed or wounded one-fifth of her people, among the rest her only Lieutenant, *Gamble*, the other, now Captain *Lavallette*, merely acting as such. Thenceforward the cannonade of all the vessels was incessant and destructive, dismounting guns, disabling men and masts, and on both sides extremely fatal till every gun on the side of the *Saratoga* facing the enemy, was rendered useless. Her invincible commander and crew had no option but to strike their flag, or devise one of those extraordinary expedients which are the revelations of genius for emergency! Three times *McDonough* had been prostrated, by falling spars, senseless on the deck of his ship, fought almost to the water's edge, and incapable of further effort. An old seaman, named *Brum*, the master, at that critical moment suggested the contrivance, by means of an anchor to turn the ship round so as to bring into action the side remaining uninjured, instead of that entirely useless. That movement being effected, a fresh broadside soon silenced the *Confiance*, in vain striving to perform the same manœuvre, but struck by more than a hundred large balls in her hull, her captain killed, and half her crew killed or wounded, and her escape impossible, after more than two hours of the bravest, over-confident conflict, the first Lieutenant, *Robertson*, hauled down the British flag. The other British vessels, sufferers in nearly similar proportion, all struck their colors. Not one of the seventeen British ensigns streaming at eight o'clock was visible soon after ten; when the masts of the American vessels were too much injured to bear sail, pursue and capture the barges, which, having kept further off, all but three that sunk, made their escape.

The officer commanding the British barges was accused by his own countrymen of cowardice, and so far countenanced the accusation as to abscond after a court-martial was ordered for his trial. But to the Americans no such misconduct was evident. The barges, not anchored as the large vessels were, fought under sail and oars, but in close contact with our vessels, with no apparent indisposition to take their appropriate share of danger. The thirteenth barge, believed to contain persons not attached to the squadron, non-combatants, but amateurs, escaped with the rest, perhaps foremost, when it became manifest that the Americans were incapable of pursuing and overtaking the barges, which

throughout the contest performed bravely an effectual part, kept up an incessant and destructive fire, made frequent attempts to board some of the American vessels, and were not without difficulty beat off. No British official account was ever published of the losses borne by the enemy in the engagement; and several circumstances remain unexplained which probably would enhance the victor's merits and exhibit more fully the design, the management and the failure of the vanquished. All the American officers, Henley, Cassin and Budd, with Captains Breese and Smith, the only survivors at present, then in charge of gunboats, Captain Young, of the army, who served as a marine officer, all without exception or difference, emulated the cool and exemplary conduct of their noble leader.

With the attack by water, that ashore was continued. While part of the British army bombarded the forts from the opposite side of the Saranac, Major-General Robinson moved off with his brigade a column of attack toward a ford previously reconnoitered, there to cross the river, and through a wood approach the rear of Macomb's position; Major-General Brisbane's brigade was disposed so as to create a diversion in Robinson's favor. Of these two distinguished generals, destined now to strange reverse, Robinson had been twice wounded that year in Spain and France, and Brisbane was known as one of those called fire-eaters of Wellington's army. Robinson's guide misled his brigade, which missed the ford, and while under march to grope his way through the woods, he was arrested by loud shouts booming from the water. Already misled and perplexed, he halted, and suspended his march to send to head-quarters and ascertain the meaning of such suspicious shouts. His messenger was told to inform the general that all the British ships were taken, and he need proceed no further, but must return to camp. In little more than two hours after the battle began, soon after ten o'clock in the morning, this result was cheered from the American shipping to the army, from them to the militia, and numerous spectators of the conflict. Cries of exultation rent the air, and echoed from the surrounding hills, while amazement and stupefaction, soon amounting to dismay and unaccountable consternation, prevailed throughout the British camp. A storm of wind with rain began to fall in torrents, and the governor-general, panic struck, lest probably the roads, the weather, swarms of emboldened militia, the well known inclination of the British troops to desert, and other common inevitable disorganization of defeat should cause his to be much greater than it really was, at once resolved on precipitate flight to Canada.

After the lake victory no serious attempt was made on our batteries. The

commander-in-chief sat down in the midst of his fourteen thousand conquerors from another hemisphere to the painful task of officially explaining their incredible discomfiture in this. Sir George Prevost's letter to Earl Bathurst was instantly dated at Plattsburg, the 11th of September, 1814. Under the pelting of the storm which befriended, though perhaps it also hastened his sudden departure, as soon as the dusk of the evening added its pall, the renowned veterans of Wellington fled, with such haste and dread that they got back to Chazy, eight miles from Plattsburg, before their retreat was discovered. Leaving their sick and wounded, with a note requesting General Macomb's care of them, vast quantities of provisions and ammunition, entrenching tools of all sorts, tents, marquées, upon the ground, and considerable quantities buried under it, or thrown into the water, the strongest British army that ever invaded any part of the United States north of the Hudson, which was by that river to sunder the States, took to flight from less than 2500 recruits, many of them invalids of the American army, but bravely commanded, and reinforced by what were called a rabble of militia. As soon as their flight was discovered, the panic-struck British were pursued by the militia, with a few light troops of the regulars, altogether not one-fourth of their number, the rifle at their backs, and the bayonet almost in their reins, till they found sanctuary beyond their own borders. By such immense reverses of fortune, inscrutable fate fixes the destiny of nations, teaching the weak the folly of despair, and the mighty that of confidence. Without disparagement of worldly wisdom, the tides of fortune ebb and flow like those of the ocean, past man's finding out; and in 1814 ran as strong for as in 1813 they set against the United States.

On his retreat from Plattsburg, Prevost sent an officer to General Moer's house to inform his son, left in charge of it, that preliminaries of peace were signed at Ghent, as the governor-general had that day been apprised by advices from Halifax. Whether that was his belief, or a stratagem to soften militia pursuit, never transpired; but the circumstance of the message was credibly reported.

So amazing a defeat occasioned recriminations between the British navy and army, the latter full of distinguished officers, unused to discomfiture, and to whom Prevost's command was new. Yeo accused Prevost of gross misconduct. Pring was tried by a court martial. On the first of March, 1815, peace being announced in Canada, Governor General Prevost took leave of the Canadian Parliament, and left Quebec for England, succeeded in the provincial government by Sir Gordon Drummond. In April Prevost set off by land, through the frozen and in-



hospitable desert between Quebec and New Brunswick, to embark at Halifax. Arrived in London, he protested against Sir James Yeo's charges, and the injustice of the naval court martial on Captain Pring, which censured the commander of the army, who demanded a court martial to exculpate himself. But on the 5th of January, 1816, before his trial or vindication, he died, overcome by the weight of what he pronounced unjust accusation, and the severity of the journey he performed hastening home to repel it. Whatever may have been his military mishaps or errors, he was considered a prudent and efficient viceroy of Canada, and retired from its government with the good will of its inhabitants.

Macomb's countenance, firmness, alacrity, and labors day and night, before, during and after the exigency, industriously preparing for it by manly and cheerful constancy, his kind and politic welcome of the militia and volunteers, who flocked to his relief, his profuse encomiums of their good conduct, and gentle rebuke of their infirmities, all bespoke his fitness for the trial to which in his person and qualifications his country was subjected. His killed, wounded and missing were 140. The loss of the English army about the same, together with between three and five hundred deserters, who, during the retreat, in the darkness of night and cover of the woods, escaped from the severities of British military service to the freedom of American independence. General Macomb, brevetted major-general for his success, was, on the death of General Brown, appointed commander-in-chief of the army of the United States, and in that station died at Washington, where public obsequies attended his remains to the grave.

The modest lieutenant, victorious on the lake, in a short despatch on the 13th September, announced to the Secretary of the Navy that he sent him by Lieutenant Cassin, the flags of his Britannic majesty's late squadron taken by that of the United States; and in a remarkable spirit of the economy so much more recommended than practised, suggested that our squadron would bear considerable diminution, yet leave enough to repel any force the enemy could bring in that quarter. Captain Pring, the officer on whom devolved the command of the British squadron after Downie's death, disfigured his official report of his surrender by disingenuous account of "the decided advantage the enemy possessed, exclusive of their great superiority in point of force, a comparative statement of which he professed" to annex, but did not. Notwithstanding that paltry perversion, Pring's despatch closed with "much satisfaction in making known the humane treatment the wounded have received from Commodore McDonough. They were immediately removed to his own hospital on Coral Island, and furnished

with every requisite. His generous and polite attention to myself, the officers and men, will ever hereafter be gratefully remembered:" just homage, not to be impaired by unworthy misrepresentation of relative force, written at the desk of his generous conqueror, in the cabin of the *Saratoga*, surrounded by unquestionable proofs of the untruth there uttered.

The *Saratoga* was twice on fire by perfidious hot-shot from the *Confiance*. The American ship had fifty-five round shot in her hull, the English one hundred and five. The American loss was fifty-two killed and fifty-eight wounded; the British eighty-four killed and one hundred and ten wounded. As always, the American firing was much superior.

On the Sunday following Perry's Friday victory, a year before, the American and British dead were buried together with religious and military ceremonies. The Thursday after the Sunday of McDonough's victory was consecrated by him to the same pious and exemplary duty of interring together the Americans and British who fell on Lake Champlain. The officers of each, covered by the tattered flags of their respective countries; the proud standard of Great Britain, to which those of every European navy had been struck, till not one was left afloat upon the ocean, waved with the star-spangled banner, whose rising glory o'er the home of the brave and the land of the free, was first sung that night on board the British vessels bombarding Baltimore, in the national anthem composed by Francis Key. McDonough and his officers, with the remains of their honored dead, were rowed in their boats from the *Saratoga* to the *Confiance*, both ships scarred all over in their hulls, masts, spars, rigging and decks, by the ravages of their bloody encounters. The *Saratoga* fired minute guns as the boats with measured strokes of the oarsmen rowed from the victor to the vanquished ship. From the *Confiance* the British dead and surviving officers were received in the American boats with the attention and honors due to unfortunate brave men; and the procession of boats slowly moved to the place of interment ashore.

Numerous escorts of artillery and infantry from the army, waited their landing on the shore, and joined the procession, while minute guns from the fort accompanied the firing from the shipping. Crowds of the neighboring people followed, in respectful silence, to the public burial-ground, where the funeral service was performed, and closed by discharges of firearms over the graves, in which those who slew each other were laid together. The day was wet and gloomy when those simple and affecting ceremonies, religious and martial, consecrated an occasion and scene memorable for both nations. Men of the same blood,

on distant lakes, in the woods of America, destroyed each other as enemies fighting for gain upon the high seas, prosecuting strife which religious intolerance began, political dominion continued, commercial and industrial competition renewed, and, it would seem, nothing but the blood of brothers could put an end to.

To the official descriptions of the battles of Plattsburg, the reader will allow the addition of another by a volunteer who served on the occasion, whose brief and modest account is entitled to every credit:

"To persons who are not acquainted with the situation of Plattsburg, it would seem very strange, if not almost impossible, to believe that an army of fourteen thousand effective troops, well drilled, and provided with everything necessary to insure their success, should be defeated and compelled to make a hasty retreat, by a mere handful of regular troops, assisted by a small number of volunteers from the militia, hastily collected together; yet, strange as it may seem, it was a fact, clearly shown at the battle of Plattsburg, on the 11th of September, 1814; and to explain the cause of this strange defeat of the British army, it will be necessary here to state that the village of Plattsburg is situated on the westerly side of Lake Champlain; and a river, called Saranac, on its way easterly, passes through this village, dividing it into two parts, and empties its waters into the bay, being a part of Lake Champlain. This stream, for the distance of four miles, or more, in consequence of its rocky shores and bottom, is rendered impassable by fording, and at that time there were but two places where they crossed it on bridges. On the south side of this stream, a short distance from the lower bridge, was the place selected for the forts, it being on an eminence commanding a view of the whole village. In this situation we find it at the time of the invasion; we also find that Commodore McDonough, with his fleet, lay at Cumberland head, watching the motion of the enemy. On the 6th of September, 1814, the enemy made their appearance at that village. The inhabitants, together with our troops, on finding the enemy were near, threw down the upper bridge, and took the plank off from the lower one, and made every other arrangement to prevent the enemy from reaching the fort; and by their skill and bravery they prevented them crossing the river. General Macomb, knowing the situation that he was in, and judging from what he saw of their movements, what their future operations would be, although he was sanguine as to his being able to check them in his front, yet he clearly saw the need of a larger force than he then had, to check their right wing, which extended up the river, at which place the river might be forded. In this

situation he wisely took the precaution to send across the lake into the Green Mountain State for assistance. His call was quickly responded to, and by Saturday, the 10th, there were about two thousand volunteers, who had crossed the lake and reported themselves to him. They were ordered to encamp at the mouth of Salmon river, a few miles south of the fort, there to wait his order. During this time the enemy had brought up and mounted their artillery, and it was clearly ascertained that the battle would take place the next day. According to expectation, the enemy's fleet appeared at an early hour. The cannonading soon began, and it was soon found that the enemy were crossing at the upper ford with intent to come round on the rear of the fort. The militia were instantly ordered to meet them, which order was promptly obeyed, and the enemy were soon compelled to re-cross the river in great haste. During this time Commodore McDonough had conquered the enemy's fleet—the centre had been kept back by the force at the fort. General Prevost, finding himself completely checked and beaten at every point, ordered a retreat that night, and the next morning the enemy were all far on their way home."

In a most important result, the naval victory on Lake Champlain, in 1814, surpassed that on Lake Erie in 1813. The former enabled Harrison to recover lost ground, whereas the latter prevented the loss of any. In the then temper of Massachusetts, if not most of New England, it is difficult to estimate the danger to the Union of Prevost's penetrating with a conquering army to Crown Point, and taking up winter quarters in New York, near New England.

But perhaps no territorial or political consequence of that victory deserves attention so much as the great naval reformation, which may be not unreasonably ascribed to the religious exercises on board the commander's ship preliminary to the conflict. The primitive and edifying sublimity of the young commander of a squadron preparing for combat, by introducing it with devotional exercises, going to prayers before he ordered his crew to clear for action, which nothing but pure religious reverence could induce, instead of rousing his men by the animal excitements common on such occasions, was an act which victory recommends to great consequences. It was in strong contrast with English practice and seafaring character: of both men and officers of their naval and commercial marine. The British tar, familiarly and fondly so called, has been deemed incurably and excusably, if not laudably thoughtless; profane, inebriate, careless of danger, brave like a beast, addicted to conflict, and reckless of futurity. A few years before the battle on



Lake Champlain, the most eminent and learned of all the judges that have pronounced Admiralty law in England, Sir William Scott, afterwards Lord Stowell, in a suit for seamen's wages, in the year 1799, treated them as a peculiar race of mankind, beneath the rest. "Common mariners," he said, "come before the court with so strong a title to the indulgence and favorable attention of the court, from their ignorance and helpless state, placed in a peculiar manner under the protection of the court." "A sailor may remain a sailor to the end of his days, as it is not usual to be minute in the inquiry made into his character." After thus degrading seamen to a lower stage of humanity, the judge spoke of drunkenness, for which (it was the case of a mate) "the court will be no apologist," he said. "At the same time, it cannot entirely forget that, in a mode of life peculiarly exposed to severe peril and exertion, and therefore admitting, in seasons of repose, something of indulgence and refreshment, that indulgence and refreshment is naturally enough sought by such persons in grosser pleasures of that kind, and, therefore, that the proof of a single act of intemperance, committed in port, is no conclusive proof of disability for general maritime employment. Another rule would, I fear, disable very many useful men for the maritime service of their country."

Such philosophy for the sea, inculcated by the highest English authority, for officers, left the common mariner where, in both English and American marine affairs, he always was some years ago. The hardships, destitution, and privations of that large class of useful men, several millions, probably, of English and Americans, were much less than their utter want of religious instruction. Those "poor children of the sea," when ashore, inhabited the landlord's profligate den, frequented the brothel, and lived without either home, faith, or family. When McDonough introduced battle by prayers, there was not, in all the British dominions, or United States of America, a single place of worship appropriated to mariners. Naval chaplains said formal prayers, on certain occasions, on shipboard. But there was no religion; and "no Sundays off soundings" was a seaman's proverb. By universal opinion, as Lord Stowell reasoned, a sailor remained a sailor to the end of his days, and it was not usual to be minute in the inquiry made into his character. The Gospel was never preached to them, at sea or ashore, as they were deemed inaccessible to religious influence. A man-of-war was a floating Pandemonium, full of turbulent spirits, stimulated by ardent drinks, awed by iron severity, lashed and fettered for misconduct. The British veteran seamen on board the *Confiance*, impressed, perhaps years before, imprisoned

for life in floating barracks, habitually profane, inebriate and brutal, like nearly all seamen, were licentious, quarrelsome, and lawless, encouraged in bad, as if incapable of good habits; and, as fighting men, infinitely below soldiers in all the privileges and elevation of manhood.

Since 1814, a wonderful reformation has taken place in the American marine, both naval and commercial; and is it unreasonable to consider McDonough's example as having contributed to that change? Then there were not, it is said, more than one or two, now there are from fifty to one hundred officers of the American navy, professors of religion. In the American commercial marine, there are eight hundred masters and ten thousand common seamen, devout and sober, more than in 1814. No government interference has wrought this reform, which is the spontaneous growth of seed sown by individuals like McDonough, daring to be religious. Libraries and temperance contribute their, no doubt, valuable help. But individual piety has been the principal promoter of such a moral advance in the American over the British marine, that every person desirous of safe conveyance for himself or his property, on the ocean, prefers an American to a British vessel.

There are other, and still more interesting, views of this reformation which need but be glanced at. Of what utility were English or American missions to reclaim heathen countries while, with every minister of Christianity, went a hundred or more depraved and disgusting seamen, whose habitual misbehaviour more than counter-vailed all that missionaries could preach of a creed thus practically refuted and rendered odious? Wherever sober and religious crews accompany pious missionaries, their labors may be effectual, but not till then. And of what avail are clumsy annual attempts by act of Congress to abolish flogging and drinking till seamen are morally prepared for more humane and civilized treatment? A moral and religious marine, sober, civilized and christianized seamen, will be an American reformation, should it be accomplished, the benefits of which to mankind it is difficult to over-estimate. The lash will disappear with the grog; the seaman will be a gentleman; and there is no other way to make him so; all attempts by law, or other than moral means, must fail to get rid of brutal conduct and brutal discipline.

If, therefore, the example of the brave and modest lieutenant from the banks of the Delaware, who, without offence, rebuked the universal naval indifference to religion, in both the American and British marine, commercial as well as militant, and rising calmly from that pious rebuke, went to battle refreshed by it, to fight with the considerate valor which is far superior

to animal or factitious, above all, drunken courage—if that admirable example of true heroism is effectual—there was in Macdonough's victory on Lake Champlain an edifying result far exceeding the consequences for which triumphs in arms are commonly celebrated.

In the roused temper of the nation, the barbarian destruction of the metropolis by the enemy, far from alarming, did but excite public ardor for resistance, while every victory inspired the highest confidence. Everywhere defeated, by land and water, except at Washington, where government alone was thought to blame, and in Massachusetts, where treachery explained disaster, the mighty British became more odious than ever, and no longer feared, if not despised. Nowhere was the revolution in public sentiment more remarkable than in Vermont, by the victories of Plattsburg. The federal party carried the autumnal elections for Congress in that frontier State, where five federalists superseded as many republicans in the House of Representatives. The governor, Martin Chittenden, was an adherent of Governor Strong and his doctrines. On the first of September, when the British army began its advance to Plattsburg, and General Macomb sent an express, earnestly calling on Governor Chittenden for aid, not to invade Canada, but defend Vermont, he, then at Burlington, the State capital, resolved to do nothing, but go home to his residence at Jericho, and there disgracefully wait events. On the 4th of September, Macomb, by another express, renewed his instances, informing the governor that the enemy had that day marched to attack Plattsburg. An officer of the militia, Gen. Newell, tendered his brigade to the governor, to repair to Plattsburg, or anywhere else, to oppose the enemy: to which the governor's cold-blooded answer was, that he had no authority to order the militia to leave the State. On the 6th September, the cannonade, then begun, was distinctly audible at Burlington, and Governor Chittenden's residence at Jericho. But housed and recreant there, the chief magistrate still held off; when the people, on their own spontaneous motion, in numbers crossed the lake, and following the cannonade, hurried to Plattsburg, without distinction of party, to tender their services for their country. The reports at Jericho then were, that the enemy had forced his way over the Saranac, and Macomb, in imminent peril, was in great distress for reinforcements. On Sunday, the eleventh, when it was apprehended that Plattsburg had fallen, the governor was careful to say that he had neither ordered nor advised the volunteers to go there. He stood skulking behind constitutional demurrer and unmanly pretext, till the whole region was in a ferment of exultation, not only that the enemy was defeated and driven back to

Canada, but that Vermont volunteers, under General Strong, strictly and emphatically volunteers, for they had neither orders nor countenance from their commander-in-chief, had bravely resisted the attack at Plattsburg, shared in the pursuit to Chazy, and shared too in the plentiful spoils captured at every stage of hostile flight.

After part of the New York militia were dismissed by General Macomb, as no longer needed, the Vermont volunteers had all gone home, and it was notorious that the enemy had abandoned all idea of assailing any part of that region, on the 19th September, 1814, still tarrying at Jericho, Governor Chittenden's obeisance to the mighty mastery of success at last appeared in his proclamation:

"Whereas, it appears that the war in which our country is unfortunately engaged, has assumed an entirely different character since its first commencement, and has been almost exclusively defensive, and is prosecuted by the enemy with a spirit unexampled during pending negotiations of peace, which leaves no prospect of safety but in a manly and united determination to meet invasion at every point, and to expel the invader:

"And whereas, notwithstanding the signal and glorious naval victory lately achieved by our gallant commander, McDonough, and his brave officers and seamen over a superior naval force on Lake Champlain: and a like discomfiture of the enemy's whole land force, concentrated at Plattsburg, by General Macomb's small but valiant band of regular troops, aided and powerfully supported by our patriotic, virtuous, and brave volunteers, who flew to meet the invader with an alertness and spirit unexampled in this or any other country;—it is made known to me that the British army is still on the frontier of our sister State, collecting and concentrating a powerful force, indicating further operations of aggression:

"And whereas, the conflict has become a common and not a party concern, the time has now arrived when all degrading party distinctions and animosities, however we may have differed as to the policy of declaring, or the mode of prosecuting, the war, ought to be laid aside, that every heart may be stimulated and every arm nerved for the protection of our common country, our altars, and our firesides; in the defence of which we may, with a humble confidence, look to Heaven for assistance and protection.

"Now, therefore, I, Martin Chittenden, Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and over the State of Vermont, do issue this, my proclamation, earnestly exhorting all the good people of this State, by that love of country which so signally distinguished our fathers in their glorious and successful



struggle for our independence, to unite both heart and hand in defence of our common interest and everything dear to freemen.

"I do enjoin it upon all officers of divisions, brigades, regiments, and companies of the militia of this State, to exert themselves in the execution of their respective duties, in placing those under their command in a complete state of readiness, and without further order, to march at a moment's warning to meet any invasion which may be attempted, and to chastise and expel the invader.

"And I would earnestly recommend it to those, who, by the lenity of our laws, are exempt from ordinary military duty, where they have not already done it, to organize themselves into companies, and equip, and stand in readiness to meet the approaching crisis; reminding them that it is their property, themselves, and their families, that are, in common with others, to be protected.

"And more especially I would recommend it to the Select Men and civil authorities of the respective towns, to be vigilant in the execution of the duties enjoined on them, in providing ammunition, and in affording such assistance to the militia as their situations may require.

"After witnessing the severe and degrading terms imposed on many of our unfortunate fellow-citizens on the sea-board, no man who is mindful of what he owes to his country, and to his own character, can advocate submission while resistance is practicable. The fate of Alexandria forcibly appeals to the proud feelings of every American, to exert the augmented force and resources with which it has pleased a beneficial Providence to bless us for the defence and security of that soil and those rights rendered inestimable by having been purchased by the blood of our fathers."

In that complete conversion from faction to patriotism, Governor Chittenden did but follow a popular movement which was irresistible. The sovereign people of Vermont took the war in hand and to heart with a spirit which no State authority, much less individual dissenter, could withstand; strongly in contrast with the disgraceful inaction of Massachusetts. In almost every town in the western part of Vermont, military organization was perfected; arms, ammunition, and transportation, spontaneously provided, points of rendezvous designated, so as to repel any hostile attempt. Generals Strong and Orme cordially seconded the popular movement, and the whole pastoral commonwealth was afoot with martial energy: defensive, indeed, but patriotic and repulsive; and such as, if Massachusetts had not chilled it in Maine, would have recovered the conquered territory there, notwithstanding the enemy's marine

advantages. For the battle of Plattsburg, four thousand Vermonters, by forced marches, rushed from their native hills to action; and with some advantages of position, favorable to raw troops, repulsed the British veterans with admirable constancy. Mr. Samuel S. Phelps, now and long a distinguished Senator from Vermont, Mr. Jacob Collamer, of the present House of Representatives, and the father of Lucius P. Peck, another member of the House at present, all served, with many more citizens of that State, on that occasion. The whole people were up in arms and in spirit, so that no governor or constituted authority could hold back against the universal impulse.

From the commencement of that era of uninterrupted and wonderful American successes everywhere, by land and water, we may invoke the London journals as furnishing the best historical accounts that can be presented, of British views, plans, hopes, fears, confidence, disappointments, and mortifications, from the capture of Paris, 31st March, to the treaty of Ghent, 24th December, 1814.

France was hardly subdued before the conquerors were ordered to America. On the 29th of April, 1814, a number of the largest class of transports are fitting out—the Courier, official journal, published—with all speed at Portsmouth, as well as the troop ships at that port, for the purpose, it is suggested, of going to Bordeaux, to take the most effective regiments in Lord Wellington's army, to America. On the 19th of May, it added, "The expedition to America is upon a much larger scale than was originally imagined. 'A man attempts our life and fortune, and because he fails, he is to expect generosity and forbearance from us! Why, what drivelling doctrine! Let us insist upon a full indemnity. Let us interdict them from the Newfoundland fisheries. As to Louisiana, that is the business of Spain, in which we should support her. Let us insist upon their recantation of their new-fangled law, by which they would debauch our subjects from their allegiance; and let us demand their adoption of the law of nations as recognized in Europe. This is what we have a right to demand. This is not vengeance, but justice. Anything short of this will neither satisfy the demands of a wise policy, nor the expectations of the British empire.'"

On the 21st of May, it said, We were glad to find in the palace yard meeting yesterday, a true British feeling with regard to America. *Vigorous war with America*, we repeat, with the hard hands and honest hearts that applauded that sentiment yesterday; vigorous war! till America accedes to the following demands: A new boundary line for Canada; a new boundary for the Indians. The independence of the Indians, and the integ-

city of their boundaries, to be guaranteed by Great Britain; the Americans to be excluded from the fisheries, &c.; the Americans to be excluded from all intercourse with the British West India islands; the Americans to be excluded from trading with our East India possessions; and their pretended right to the northwest coast of America to be extinguished forever; "the Americans not to be allowed to incorporate the Floridas with their republic; and the cession of New Orleans to be required, in order to insure us the due payment of a privilege to navigate the Mississippi. Finally, the distinct abandonment of the new-fangled American public law; the admission of the international law as it is at present received in Europe; and the recognition of our right to search.

Again, 31st May. "It is computed that the reinforcements which have joined Sir George Prevost, since the last campaign, will enable him to take the field with an army of twenty thousand effective men. This force will move against the American army from the Canadian frontiers, whilst twelve thousand of the best troops of the Duke of Wellington's army will be landed on the American shores. The regiments which are to go from the south of France, have all arrived at Bordeaux to embark."

29th September. "Peace they may make, but it must be on the condition that America has not a foot of land on the waters of the St. Lawrence. Our Canada frontier must be secured by an extension of territory; the Americans must have no settlement on the lakes."

13th October. "From the American coast we are in hourly expectation of receiving new successes. A letter from St. Johns, about twelve miles distant from Lake Champlain, announces the rapid advance of the British army in that direction, and holds out a hope that the American flotilla on that lake will be captured or burnt in its harbor."

A month before that vain hope, the American flotilla had captured that of Great Britain; and within a week, the London official press was constrained to dole out the melancholy reverses of high-wrought expectations.

On the 17th October, the death of General Ross (described as one of the brightest ornaments of his profession) was announced.

On the 18th October. "American papers have been received to the 17th September. We regret to state that they are of an unfavorable nature. Our flotilla upon Lake Champlain has been attacked, and, according to the American papers, taken or destroyed. Sir George Prevost had advanced from Odletown to Plattsburg, which he attacked. The American general, Macomb, was stationed there with a strong force, and

a battle is said to have been fought on the 10th September."

22d October. "We have received some more details from Montreal papers, and private letters, relative to the late operations on Lake Champlain and at Plattsburg; and it is with infinite regret that we state, that the picture they draw is very different from what we had expected. These journals and private letters assert that the most ample preparations were made for the expedition against Plattsburg, and that a force of not less than 14,000 men, under the command of General Sir George Prevost, and immediately led by Major-General Brisbane, Power, &c., had proceeded to Lake Champlain for this purpose."

24th October. "Major-General the Hon. Sir Edward Pakenham is, we understand, appointed to succeed the late lamented General Ross in the command which he held in our American army. This gallant officer is brother-in-law to the Duke of Wellington and brother of the Earl of Longford. He was adjutant-general of the British army in the late Peninsular war, and is an officer of distinguished merit."

On the 25th October, with the account of the defeat of the army and fleet at Plattsburg, it is added, "One impression, we presume, is made upon every mind, that peace with America is neither practicable nor desirable until we have wiped away this last disgrace."

27th October. "The Hon. Major-General Sir E. Pakenham transacted business yesterday with Lord Bathurst at his office in Downing Street. He is expected to leave town on Saturday to take a command in America. The hostile mind of the Jefferson party against this country is not only not moderated, but it is become more malignant than ever."

28th October. "We have made some extracts from the Boston papers. They are loud in their exultation at their success at Plattsburg. Sorry are we to say that they have but too much reason."

29th October. "There was a report last night that the negotiation at Ghent had finally broken off. We do not believe this, but peace with America is neither desirable nor practicable till we have wiped away, by fresh successes, the late disasters on Lake Champlain. Major-General Gibbs accompanies the Hon. Sir E. M. Pakenham to America, in the *Statira* frigate."

By November, the mercury sunk from fever, above blood heat, to below the freezing point; and then it was semi-officially published, that "Great preparations are making to send out to India all the troops that can be spared from the increased exigencies of the war in America; and not a single disposable corps in the country will be left unsent to one of these situations or the other."



The official press, with its ministerial disclosures, is not the only *vade mecum* for these British acknowledgments of American triumphs. To the *Courier* we can add the *Times* newspaper, with its extensive impression on the whole European as well as English mind. That journal enjoyed a high reputation for fairness, and exemption from a mere factious spirit of opposition to the government, its ambition being rather to utter independently the language of British feeling and British interests. The following are extracts from it.

17th May, 1814. "We shall inquire a little into the American title to Louisiana, &c." "When they behold such an importation as they never before witnessed, from Bordeaux, it is more than probable that they will hasten to show the sincerity of their repentance," &c.

24th May. "They are struck to the heart with terror for their impending punishment; and, oh, may no false liberality, no mistaken lenity, no weak and cowardly policy, interpose to save them from the blow. Strike! chastise the savages—for such they are in a much truer sense than the followers of Tecumseh or the Prophet. The prospect they present is so cheering, and we cannot but flatter ourselves, that if all our reinforcements reach the intended scene of operations in due time," &c. &c.

7th October. "This is not the language, indeed, of courtly negotiators, but it is that of conquerors, which, we trust, we shall be well entitled to use at the end of the present campaign."

14th October. "There is little doubt that the account of our troops being in possession of Plattsburg is correct. Letters are said to have reached town from thence, dated three days subsequent to the entry of the British. One of the writers speaks of the great alarm the Americans are in, and adds, with great good reason, for we are prepared to give them a tremendous good drubbing."

21st October. "The ship which brought over the account of the Champlain disaster, was the *Ajax*, a Dutch ship-of-war, which had carried out the Dutch minister to the United States, a measure which we think the Prince should not so hastily have adopted. They should have remembered that the fate of war was uncertain; that the present chiefs of the American Government have been subjects of the English crown, and rebels from their allegiance; and that it is no miracle in the present day to see nations throw off the galling yoke of rebel chiefs, and return to the paternal government of their natural sovereigns, &c. We do not wonder to hear sentiments of regard for these wretches expressed by the writers in the *Journal de Paris*, whose short-sighted policy leads them to consider everything that is pernicious to Great Britain is con-

ducive to the interests of France." "This writer says, 'we put up sincere vows that the country of Washington and Franklin may preserve its independence, and not fall again under the yoke of England.' What would the journalist say, if we were to declare we put up sincere vows that the country of Toussaint (a man equal in virtue to Washington, and far superior to Franklin) may preserve its independence, and not fall again under the yoke of France? Under the head of Vienna, the same journalist informs us, that Prince Talleyrand has presented, or was about to present, an important note to the Congress. It is, no doubt, meant to be insinuated, and, indeed, private accounts from Paris go to that effect, that the note is to urge the continental powers to adopt some principle hostile to our naval preponderance, under the pretence of establishing some improvement in the law of nations, some code of maritime law more lenient to neutral trade."

22d September. "It is true that at the other extremity of the United States, the war is becoming exceedingly odious. The Virginia farmer, a selfish mortal at the best, begins to feel the personal pressure of war, levies, and contributions, and is ready to execrate, &c. Alarms, too, are spread of British troops landing in Florida; of expeditions against Georgia; of distributions of arms to Indians in that quarter, &c."

25th October. "Now we have reduced ourselves to the dilemma of being obliged to carry our point by main force, or to retire from the contest ten times worse than we began it; with the mere postponement of an abstract question which has no reference to our present state of peace; with a fund of the bitterest animosity laid up against us in future; with our flag disgraced on the ocean and the lakes; and with the laurels withered at Plattsburg, which were so hardly, but so gloriously earned, in Portugal, Spain, and France."

Afterwards, on the 13th of November, 1814, deploring anticipated disgraceful peace, the *Times* said: "To have taught the Americans to beat us by land and water; to retire from the contest with the disgrace of Lake Champlain and Plattsburg on our backs."

3d December. "Suggestions are copied from the Canadian papers, as to the necessity of having all the country along the St. Lawrence, between Kingston and Montreal. These considerations will demand our most serious consideration when we come to be in a condition to conclude peace, without disgrace to our military and naval character, which cannot be till after we have wiped away some of those stains which the glory of Britain has so unaccountably endured."

6th December. "On a par with the folly

of aggrandizing Russia and Austria, would be the infamy of concluding a disgraceful peace with the United States of America; and yet any peace we can now conclude, must be disgraceful. We have not cured the wound sustained when the flag of the *Guerriere* was struck. The American navy is far greater at this day, and infinitely more proud, than it was when the war began. The American army, then a mere jest and burlesque, begins now to count its laurels. Nevertheless we are forced to acknowledge that the rumor of a speedy adjustment of difficulties (as they are delicately termed), between us and America, continues to acquire consistency. Its effect is felt in the state of the funds, and in the prices of American produce. The story is, that the English ministers have, in the vulgar phrase, 'knocked under;' in other words, having impolitely advanced terms which would have been justified only by a vigorous and successful campaign, they have, in consequence of the disaster on Lake Champlain, fallen, in an equal degree, below the just expectations of the nation. To all such tales, however, we are backward in giving credence."

13th December. "If we could give credit to reports circulated yesterday, with much confidence, we should believe that ministers had sacrificed the glory and best interests of the country by a premature peace with the Americans. Unfortunately, however, for the credit of this assertion, we at the same time hear that the most active measures are pursuing for detaching from the dominion of the enemy a very important part of his territory. Accounts from Bermuda to the 11th ultimo, inform us that all the disposable shipping in that quarter had been sent off to the Mississippi. Sir Alexander Cochrane left Halifax at the latter end of October, for the same destination; and a large body of troops from Jamaica were expected to assemble at the same point. It can hardly be supposed, that while they (the ministry), are so largely sacrificing the national resources, with the one hand, they will render the object of the sacrifice altogether null with the other. The American navy grows under the pressure of a contest with the greatest naval force that ever existed. Paradoxical as this appears, it is a simple fact; and it proves more than a thousand arguments, the utter impossibility there is of concluding a peace at the present moment, without rendering ourselves the contempt of our antagonists, and the ridicule of all the world besides. Shall we allow the *Guerriere* to go to sea with impunity, and to bear to every part of the world a visible record of our shame in that defeat which entailed on us so many subsequent disgraces? A new frigate of that name, mounting sixty-four guns, is at Philadel-

phia, nearly ready for sea. The *Washington*, another new ship, carrying ninety guns, is fitting very fast for sea, at Boston; and the *Independence*, of ninety guns, has been recently constructed at Portsmouth, in New Hampshire. The last mentioned vessel is considered to be more than a match for the largest man-of-war ever built in England."

"27th December. Peace with America is announced. Those who have attended to the observations which we have from time to time thought it our duty to make on the war so iniquitously waged against Great Britain by the dominant faction in America, may form some idea of the feelings with which we announce the fatal intelligence, that a treaty of peace was signed at Ghent, on Saturday last, the 24th instant, subject, of course, to the ratification of both governments. The terms of this deadly instrument are understood to be, in substance, nearly as follows, &c. &c.

"We do not mean to avoid the force of the great argument for peace, which is founded on the pressure of the existing taxes," &c. &c.

"28th December. Without entering into the details of the treaty (on which we have much to observe hereafter), we confess that we look anxiously to its non-ratification, because we hope an opportunity will be offered to our brave seamen to retire from the contest, not as they now are, beaten and disgraced, not with the loss of the trident, which Nelson, when dying, placed in his country's grasp, but with an ample and full revenge for the captures of the *Guerriere*, *Macedonian*, and *Java*, and the numerous other ships that have been surrendered on the ocean; besides the whole flotillas destroyed on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain. Let us not deceive ourselves: these victories have given birth to a spirit which, if not checked, will in a few years create an American navy truly formidable. They have excited in other nations who foolishly envy our maritime preponderance, an undissembled joy at beholding our course so powerfully arrested.

"As to the opinion that peace with America is necessary to preserve our European influence, anybody may see that political weight and influence can never be gained by submission; by abandoning what we proposed as a *sine qua non*; by waiving all question on our disputed maritime rights; or by patching up a hollow peace at the very moment when our adversary is doubling his military force, and threatens to push the war into our provinces.

"29th December. Public credit must eventually suffer; for it is the general opinion that nothing but the probability of a new war in Europe could have occasioned the disgraceful compromise of our transatlantic quarrel. Unable as we are to penetrate the thick veil which hangs over the



negotiation at Vienna, it is not for us to say what dark machinations against the honor and interest of England may be brewing there; but urgent and serious must these dangers be if they touch us closer than the defeats we have received, by sea and land, from the once despised arms of America. It may suit party writers to make very light of such considerations. The ministerialist may affect to forget that the British flag was ever struck to the American. The oppositionist may tell you that, in spite of national humiliation and the discredit brought on the country, he rejoices, because ministers have humbled themselves to the dust. With the principles which we have uniformly maintained, with a zealous affection for the interests of the country, and that which is its best interest, its honor, each of these modes of considering this important subject is alike inconsistent. It is inconsistent with common sense to deny that our naval reputation has been blasted in this short but disastrous war. It is inconsistent with the spirit and feelings of Englishmen not to regret that the means of retrieving that reputation are cut off by a premature and inglorious peace. Hostilities are not to cease. This part of the treaty, at least, we hope, will bereligiously attended to by government.

"30th December. Even yet, however, if we could but close the war with some great naval triumph, the reputation of our maritime greatness might be partially restored; but to say that it has not hitherto suffered in the estimation of all Europe, and what is worse, of America, is to belie common sense and universal experience. Two or three of our ships have struck to a force vastly superior. No: not two or three; but many on the ocean, and whole squadrons on the lakes; and their numbers are to be viewed with relation to the comparative magnitude of the two navies. Scarcely is there an American ship of war which has not to boast a victory over the British flag. Scarcely one British ship in thirty or forty that has beaten an American. Be it accident, or be it misconduct, we inquire not now into the cause. The certain, the inevitable consequences are what we look to, and those may be summed up in a few words,—the speedy growth of an American navy, and the recurrence of a new and much more formidable American war. From that fatal moment when the flag of the *Guerriere* was struck, there has been quite a rage for building ships of war in the United States. We are well convinced that every ship and every soldier employed in maintaining the vital contest for our maritime ascendancy, far from diminishing, will add a proportional weight to our influence at Vienna. But in truth, Vienna and all its fêtes and all its negotiations are infinitely insignificant to us now compared with," &c. &c.

"31st December. Whether Mr. Madison may or may not ratify the treaty of Ghent, will perhaps depend on the result of the expedition to New Orleans. The forces from Falmouth and Cork, supposed to have been destined for that expedition, appear, by letters brought by the *Amphion*, not to have touched at Bernuda, but to have proceeded direct to the mouth of the Mississippi, whither Admiral Cockburn followed them with such vessels as he could collect. The permanent occupation of New Orleans would be a fatal blow to the American views of aggrandizement on the side of Louisiana; but that blow Mr. Madison has it now in his power to parry by a mere stroke of the pen. On the other hand, if the expedition should encounter any serious obstacles, he would probably delay it, if not wholly refuse to ratify the treaty.

7th January, 1815. Referring to the capture of Pensacola by General Jackson, the *Times* says: "It is true that eight or ten thousand British troops will soon be in the neighborhood of the Floridas, and might with ease cut off General Jackson and his motley crew; but their operations will be doubtless paralyzed by the President's ratification of the treaty."

31st January. "By letters received yesterday from Jamaica, we learn that the force destined against New Orleans, consisting of about ten thousand men, sailed from Negril bay, in that island, on the 28th of November. The usual run from thence to New Orleans, scarcely ever exceeds a fortnight; so that the whole might be expected to be before that city on the 12th of December, and probably to have made themselves masters of it by the 24th, the day when the gratuitous cession of all our conquests to a barbarous enemy, was so magnanimously made at Ghent."

Were it necessary, a surfeit of similar confessions might be extracted from the British press, and superadded to the leading articles, thus somewhat copiously incorporated with my text; and that press will be again often called on to testify. But for the present, enough is presented to prove, without disparagement to our able ministers in Europe, whose merits shall not be overlooked or undervalued, that peace was not made exclusively at Ghent, nor by solicitation or negotiation; but that Chippewa, Erie, Bridgewater, and Plattsburg, were peace-makers more persuasive than the Congress at Vienna, the English income tax, the manufacturers' cry, or the pauper's wail. Love of peace, an American attachment as prevalent as European addiction to war—an American sentiment, too, to be cultivated as the European frequency, cruelties, and expenses of war are to be deprecated—American love of peace becomes an infirmity when it undervalues the science of indispensable hostilities, or the pacific im-

portance of demonstrated national capacity for war.

The colonial press reverberated, indeed preceded, the Metropolitan, in the universal British moan for the loss of naval dominion. The *Halifax Journal* of the 30th of October, 1814, republished from a Quebec paper:—

“The victory gained by the Americans on Lake Erie has excited enthusiastic joy throughout the United States. The two great political parties in that country are vying with each other for the honor of that victory; and all opposition to the war seems for a time to be forgotten in the gratification of national pride which it has afforded.

“The contest, if it ought ever to have been so called, between Great Britain and the United States on the water, has been indeed gratifying to the Americans, and mortifying to the British subjects beyond anything that could have been figured by the utmost stretch of imagination: vessels of an inferior class have been, as it were, thrown into the way of the enemy's vessels, fresh from port, fully prepared, and manned with picked seamen, so as at least to afford them a semblance of superiority over British officers and seamen beyond what was ever obtained by the most powerful and brave of the numerous nations with whom they have contended.

“How long this disgraceful state of things is to last, we cannot tell; but if it is not quickly remedied, we are sure that it will not only prove ruinous to these provinces, but dangerous to the naval existence of British greatness, which has arisen from the superiority of her naval officers and seamen over those of every other nation; for, although the Americans cannot, for the present, with their eight frigates, destroy the two hundred ships of the line of Great Britain, their success will infuse fresh vigor into all her enemies, which ought always to be counted as consisting, or likely to consist, of every nation that navigates the ocean. The good citizens of London may triumph in their victories in Spain and Portugal, but the conquerors of Vittoria, and the Pyrenees will no longer defend England, should she suffer the sceptre of the ocean to slip out of her hands. Then, in the insulting language of one who hates her, she must take the rank among nations to which her population and territorial resources entitle her—the rank from which her trade and seamen have raised her—we must receive governors from Rome, and kings from Normandy.”

It is not the public journals of England, however, on which we are to rely alone for the history of the Canadian campaign of 1814. Proofs of the highest and unquestionable authenticity remain to be accumulated. In the regent's before-mentioned speeches to Parliament, that of the 30th July, re-

fering to the United States as the only remaining enemy of Great Britain, added, “I am persuaded you will see the necessity of my availing myself of the means now at my disposal, to prosecute the war with increased vigor;” and in the speech of the 8th of November, 1814, referring to the accumulation of British troops, he said, “I availed myself of the earliest opportunity afforded by the state of affairs in Europe to detail a considerable military force to the St. Lawrence, notwithstanding the reverses which appeared to have occurred on Lake Champlain. I entertain the most confident expectation, as well from the amount as from the description of the British force in Canada, that the ascendancy of his majesty's arms throughout that part of North America will be effectually established.”

For the invasions of New York and Louisiana, what in the estimate of the best British officers was deemed the maximum of force necessary to overrun and subdue each, viz: fourteen thousand men, were organized of veteran troops, led by tried commanders, supported by superior naval squadrons, and altogether qualified, as was supposed, to effect the great end of British lesson to America, not again to venture upon war with that proud and mighty empire.

The regent himself was privy, and as far as so indolent an old voluptuary could be party to, the plan of campaign defeated at Plattsburg. English history is almost silent as to that invasion, of which no account is extant beyond the dry outline of Sir George Prevost's official dispatch, written in defeat and dismay the night of his retreat. But that, and doubtless therefore, in order to excuse himself and show that he had done all he could to execute his orders, expressly ascribes them to the ministry, pursuant to whose plans fourteen thousand men were sent from Europe for the invasion of New York, (and fourteen thousand more for the invasion of Louisiana.) Of the attack at Plattsburg, the commander-in-chief's official report is that “upon the arrival of the reinforcements from the Garonne, he lost no time in assembling the requisite force, plainly predicated a plan matured in London, for the purpose,” he adds, “of carrying into effect his royal highness, the prince regent's commands, which had been conveyed to me by your lordship in your dispatch of the 3d June last;” either merely to close the war by signal and tremendous blows of British vindictive power, or, as is more probable, by the conquest and permanent occupation of large portions of the United States, north, south, and west. Total and glorious every way was their defeat by an undisciplined and half-armed but martial people, of whom it was long a common military boast and nearly universal English sentiment that a



single regiment of British troops would cut their way from one end of the United States to the other.

It is true that in all these triumphs the United States merely defended themselves; and it may be objected that their undertaking by the declaration and their schemes of war was to do more. But just when those schemes were probably to be realised by another campaign, England made peace with precipitation. Napoleon's escape from Elba, and triumphant return to Paris, in March, 1815, occasioned the recall to Europe of most of the British troops sent thence to America in 1814; and must have required that recall, even though Canada and New Brunswick had been lost by it. The hostilities which closed with the battle of Waterloo in June, 1815, and that crowning victory of the British commander could not have taken place without the troops transported from America. At all events they could not have been reinforced in Canada; but left to themselves on this continent must have fallen an easy prey to the numerous American armies that would have marched under experienced leaders wherever a British enemy could be overtaken.

Having dwelt with some emphasis on the moral and even religious influences of the naval victory at Plattsburg, it still would be unjust to take leave of it, being the last time that American naval affairs will be mentioned in this volume, without some further notice likewise, of the belligerent results by which Macdonough's triumph fixed a final impression, not only American, but English, European and universal.

The ascendancy which foreign literature yet maintains in the United States, misleads numerous Americans to read with the utmost avidity and credulity, all that comes to us from England in the shape of history, memoir, and otherwise, not to mention the ship loads of trash by every vessel cast on our shores, of at least inappropriate, if not falsified science, law, and religion, with which American seminaries of learning, the press, and all information are contaminated. Accurate ideas of the memorable incidents, illustrating our own history, ancient or recent, are not only rare but vague, while European perversion persuades thousands of American minds, that their countrymen are prone to exaggerate with ridiculous misrepresentation, the trivial occurrences of this much abused continent. English publications abound, with many American believers in them, that in that contest, Great Britain did not even think of this country, although all the force she could collect, both military and naval, were sent across the Atlantic, and worsted in memorable conflicts with which too many Americans are less familiar, than with insignificant, simultaneous European events.

Mr. Canning's parliamentary acknow-

ledgment of the consternation and convulsion which shook Great Britain to the centre, when the flag of a single frigate was struck to American prowess, was made after the court martial on Captain Dacres, had ascertained and tacitly confessed the folly as well as falsehood of the various absurd excuses that were pleaded for British defeat; and surely, Mr. Canning's omission of all reference to those paltry pretences, was more manly, more British, and much wiser than their contemptible suggestion. But when he declared interminable war for naval ascendancy, and to restore the invincibility of the British trident, no British squadron had been captured, as not long after his speech, followed on Lake Erie, and again a twelvemonth later on Lake Champlain. Both American and British readers may be surprised to learn, as they may rest assured, for it is vouched by all the official dispatches and undeniable statements, that there was a greater loss of British lives in the naval conflict on Lake Champlain, than at the famous sea-fight of St. Vincent's, for which the Admiral Jervis was made an Earl, covered with honors, titles and pensions, with the usual profusion of British public favor. The captures of the Peacock, the Avon, the Reindeer, the Epervier, the Boxer, the Cyane, the Levant and the Penguin, all at different periods, followed Mr. Canning's speech, and to use his own remarkable word, *smothered* in American victories the spell of British invincibility, on every occasion shivered to atoms. No one, not even any Englishman, since claims *superiority* for an English over an American ship of war. No country or individual in any part of the world believes in that exploded notion since the war of 1812, throughout the whole of which, from its outset till some time after the ratified treaty of peace could be made known, British naval disasters continued to fall like the reports of minute guns from the ocean, in the midst of the gloom, consternation and convulsion, which Canning so eloquently described, and feelingly confessed. And that most impressive English orator of his day told no more than the truth. So late as during the year in which the war was declared, in 1812, a well-known English work, to which Mr. Canning contributed, and who may therefore be the author of what is now quoted from the Quarterly Review, held the following imperious language respecting the marine, destined, both naval and commercial, to supersede that of Great Britain.

"We will not stop to degrade the British navy by condescending to enter into any comparison of the high order, the discipline and comfort of an English man-of-war and an American frigate. We disdain any such comparison. No, let us rather renew with increased tenacity, and exact, from America

in particular, what in our opinion ought never to have been dropped, our demand of the acknowledgment of his Majesty's sovereignty in our own seas by the salute of the flag and topsails. We have already stated that the government has no desire for the services of American seamen in the British navy, and we believe that *our officers feel as little desire to be troubled with them.*"

Such authoritative vamping would be ridiculous, even in England, now. The thoughtless, happy and undoubting boast of invincibility, with which every British seaman till then heaved the capstan, and every workman in the dock and shipyard cheered his labor, has given way, together with the dry arithmetical calculations, by which their superiors at first attempted to explain their disasters, to the general British apprehension, the universal American confidence, and the common European, even Asiatic and African, belief, that the American is the better seaman.

Let America, however, beware of the overweening confidence which betrayed the British marine to its at least temporary overthrow. The navy of England has been a great gainer by the war of 1812, which taught the considerate of that country the necessity of radical reforms in both its moral and material condition. Seamen, no longer impressed, are better treated, clothed, fed, paid, pensioned, rewarded, and altogether cared for, than before their disastrous lessons of that war. Gunnery, in which they were, perhaps more than in anything else, inferior to the Americans, has been greatly improved.

The modern art of gunnery is an American invention. The rifle, the pistol, the cannon and the mortar, are managed by Americans with a dextrous destruction unknown and unattempted till of late by any other nation. When an English ship engaged a French, Spanish or Dutch ship of war, the aim was not the hull or deck, to destroy the men, but the spars, masts and rigging, by wounding them to disable the vessel. So, in battles ashore, the bayonet or artillery were more relied on by European armies than the musket, of which the volleys were mostly harmless. The deadly aim of gunnery, great and small, was exclusively American. But now the British practice by imitation of that peculiar American excellence is much more frequent, laudable and perfected than the American. The discipline and government of a British ship have become more American than they were. Nevertheless, the naturally superior aptitude, docility, sobriety, intelligence and self-possession of American mariners, since the war of 1812, are shown by their engrossing all the extensive sail packet trade between the United States and England, which till that time was exclusively English and extremely limited. With the

statement of these advantages, however, let us mix no unmeaning or misleading boast. Comparatively much nearer in numbers to the British marine, both commercial and naval, than in 1812, the American navy is not now so superior as it then was in all but numbers to that of Great Britain.

A respectable British historian, in his *Annals of the Reign of George the Third*, Dr. Aiken, mentions the British naval defeats as "unusual to the British navy, the source of as much mortification to one party as of triumph to the other." But it is from another source than either wary history or undivulged official orders that we become possessed of the most striking and mortifying proof of that timorous shrinking from conflict with American vessels of war, which was undoubtedly authorized by the admiralty and practised by the navy. Accounts frequently reached us of the shyness of British naval officers to engage Americans; and there was throughout the whole war palpable want of that enterprise and hardihood which had been claimed as the common and the superior attributes of the much boasted and dreaded British tar. A memoir of Admiral Durham, published by his nephew Captain Murray, in 1846, makes the important disclosure which is here quoted from that book.

"The only circumstance during his command that gave him (Admiral Durham) some disappointment, was the following:

"Having received information that a large American frigate was cruising about the islands, he dispatched an eighteen-gun brig, commanded by a Captain Stewart, to St. Thomas, where a thirty-eight-gun frigate and two brigs were stationed, requesting the officers commanding them to look-out, at Mona passage, in case she should pass that way, and immediately made sail himself for the other passage to leeward of Antigua.

"Captain Stewart found the English frigate and the brigs at St. Thomas, and delivered his dispatches.

"The frigate sailed, fell in with the American and did not engage her, but joined the admiral with the intelligence that she had left the islands.

"Admiral Durham inquired what reason he had for not engaging her; upon which he showed a memorandum, by which captains were allowed to use their discretion in engaging large American frigates. The admiral said, 'You had two brigs with you, you should have used them.' The captain replied, 'they were not under my orders.' This was quite unknown to the admiral."

From this disclosure it is at last indubitably manifested that the British government, after two years of nearly uninterrupted naval defeat, sent their vessels of war to sea with almost the identical orders with which the American government sent



theirs at first: so total was the change from British confidence to apprehension. Captain Hull's orders from the Secretary of the Navy were, in July, 1812: "If you should fall in with an enemy's vessel, you will be guided in your proceeding by your own judgment, bearing in mind, however, that you are not voluntarily to encounter a force superior to your own." In 1814, the captain of the British frigate pleaded "a memorandum, by which captains were allowed to use their discretion in engaging the large American frigates." Going to sea in disregard of timid orders, Captain Hull sought and vanquished the *Guerriere*. The British captain, whose dishonored name is concealed in Admiral Durham's memoir, with a frigate and two brigs shrunk from encountering the frigate *Constitution*, as appears by Captain Stewart's account of that occurrence in his letter to the navy department: "We also chased a frigate through the Mona passage, which escaped us by the wind changing in her favor, leaving us becalmed. The animation displayed by the officers and crew at so near a prospect of adding another laurel *constitutionally* to the naval wreath, leaves no doubt of the honorable result, had we been fortunate enough to bring her to action." On board the American frigate even jocular confidence prevailed, while the English frigate fled, to take refuge under the admiralty memorandum, which disarmed every vessel but a few line-of-battle ships, whenever they fell in with enemies whose superiority was officially given in orders to the once dauntless mariners of England.

When it was believed by the American officers that their government was about to lay up their frigates, from not unreasonable fear of their inevitable capture in the untried and dreadful issue of conflict with conquerors of all the navies in the world, Bainbridge and Stewart hastened to Washington to entreat permission to go to sea; and, when Hull, Morris, Read, Morgan and the others on board the *Constitution*, from her mast heads made out the *Guerriere*, there was not a sailor on board who did not desire battle. But when, after thirty odd years of secret naval apprehension and admiralty concealed orders, the British navy and admiralty come to be shriven, it is discovered, by confession, that a frigate with two brigs were afraid to engage a frigate, and for that act of sheer timidity, to give it no harder name, the commanding officer was allowed to excuse himself by a standing order of the admiralty not to engage an American frigate. If such were the orders to officers, what must have been the dread of the common seamen to encounter the once despised, impressed, and in every way maltreated Americans? The retribution was complete.

The Prince Regent himself supplied the material with which to conclude this chap-

ter. Childishly fond as that crapulous old man was of shows and pantomimes, he ordered a grand spectacle, at the cost of a hundred thousand dollars, by naval mummery on the little artificial water called the Serpentine River, in St. James's Park, near his own and his father's palaces, to celebrate peace and the centennial anniversary of the accession of the House of Brunswick to the British throne, on the 1st of August, 1814. Fireworks, temples, pagodas, bridges, mock fights, and other such gratifications for the populace, were displayed during the festival, which lasted several days. The principal foolery was a battle between two British and two American frigates; inappropriate and untoward contrivance to amuse and inspirit the English at that time, when the overthrow of Napoleon did not atone for their naval reverses. The official report of the affair in the *Courier* was, that "The naval display commenced by an action between two British and two American frigates. The first broadside was hardly fired, when ample testimony was borne to the propriety of choosing such a spectacle for the gratification of Englishmen. No sooner was the first shot heard, than the general anxiety for the honor of our trident was so great that the shops and booths poured out their myriads, who rushed upon the shores of the Serpentine to cheer our brave tars with their presence, and share the honor of the naval flag. The Yankee frigates lay at anchor," &c. Of course they were beaten. "The union-jack was hoisted over the stars and stripes of Jonathan; and thus ended the first part of the engagement; and so much a matter of course was the result, that the spectators did not allow their exultation to exhibit itself even by a single cheer."

Very different reasons were given by another London description of that spectacle for the absence of cheers for victory by British over American ships of war. The official ministerial account of these royal contrivances to heave up the spirit of the people, as it were with a capstan, was contradicted thus in other London accounts of it. "People no longer applaud at the theatres songs in honor of their gallant tars, hearing with indifference or disgust sentiments once listened to with pride. An attempt at a theatre to applaud one of these sentiments is overpowered by a hiss: a person in the boxes latterly exclaimed, 'That character is forfeited.' At the Prince Regent's late grand gala, a mock battle was represented on the Serpentine River, between an American and British frigate, when, after a hard struggle, the American struck her flags. 'They had better let that alone,' cried the populace. Such anecdotes," added the English commentator, "are omens, like the raven's croak, perched on the ruins of some magnificent pile, that the pillar of Eng-

land's glory, and foundation of her power, is monldering at the base." "Rule Britannia," croaked Cobbett, "has ceased to be the rabble's delight; the heroes in blue and buff hang their diminished heads." All maritime Europe looked to America with hope, and to England with fear, for relief from her ocean despotism, while industrial Great Britain began to count the cost of an English war in vain prolonged for territorial conquest, which was forcing American manufactures as the war of the Revolution precipitated colonial independence.

On the 25th August, 1814, while the British army were burning Washington, departed this life in London a once much applauded, but already forgotten author of no less than twelve hundred songs, dedicated to the glory of the British seaman, Charles Dibdin; with whose demise, certainly, much of British maritime glory also departed. Its decline by American discomfitures may not be irreparable. On the contrary, it is much improved in the school of misfortune. But vast will be the renown of the first British officer, who, in fair and equal fight, compels an American ship of war to strike her flag: and terrible the responsibility of the American who hauls it down, since all the moral superiority has been transferred from England to America.

British journals breathed loud groans and fears of American sea depredations. American sloops-of-war built after the war began, (whose cruises will be subjects of future descriptions,) filled the British and Continental journals with their own exaggerated accounts of really formidable American naval incursions and destructiveness. The admiralty secretary, Croker, found it necessary to print public assurances, that three frigates and fourteen smaller war vessels had been ordered to cruise in the British Channel, to protect that close sea of British dominion, where once every flag was to be vailed to it, from American craft, described as of peculiar build, extremely difficult of capture, or similar construction. Lloyds' lists of prizes, and the prices of insurance, fearfully told the story of American nautical enterprise and superiority. The admiralty had recourse to prosecutions instituted with loud public denunciations against shipmasters sailing without convoy, to which breach of law, of positive orders and common prudence, it was said, were ascribable, the multiplied increasing vexatious, ruinous and inexpressible losses of British commerce by American cruisers. Lloyds' list of the 23d September, 1814, published forty recent captures, some of great value. In the London Statesman, of the 29th September, 1814, an underwriter suggested, "to obviate the ruinous and daily spreading devastations of the American privateers," that a class of vessels like them should be built, to be commanded by merchant cap-

tains. So inefficient had the mighty marine of Great Britain become, that England wanted an aquatic militia to supersede it. The rates of their ships of war were altered and reduced, so as to represent them as carrying fewer cannons than they did, in order, as was said, to put them on a footing with American frigates and sloops-of-war; which gave rise to a witticism, spread throughout the whole British marine, by a language common to both nations, more withering than broadsides, as verified by the cruises of the Wasp, Peacock and Hornet, that American sloops-of-war could and would take British *at any rate*. Ridicule reinforced degradation of the British navy, whose chivalry so entirely disappeared from the great deep it so recently ruled, that English Gazettes published, without shame, that the ship New Castle of fifty-eight guns, and the Acasta of fifty, were cruising *in company* in pursuit of the Constitution. Incredible exploits of the American privateers, some of their commanders publishing on the British coast proclamations of extensive blockades to burlesque those proclaimed by British admirals of ours, sanguinary defeats and captures by our privateers of their ships of war, some of them of great force, (as will be shown in my account of the privateer war,) induced comparisons between the American private armed vessels and the national ships of England, much to the latter's disadvantage. The paltry and piratical depredations of ennobled admirals, with fleets of ships-of-the-line, were contrasted with the more extensive injuries inflicted on British commerce by little private cruisers of eight or ten guns, with none of the parade or pretension of regular service; and in no respect was the contrast more striking than between the generosity, humanity and gentlemanly deportment of the privateersmen, and the brutal rapacity of some of the titled veterans of British sea-warfare. Free-trade and sailors' rights were watch-words current and charming in every vessel and every seaport of every country, the device of a new and self-erected order of chivalry, springing self-armed from the sea, bailed with universal admiration by the maritime nations of Europe, smarting with recollections of British wrongs, and envious as all men are of overweening power. In vain the London Morning Chronicle reiterated the trite absurdity that the astonishing American victories were ascribable to British deserters. Why, was the natural reply, do British seamen fight so much harder, and with so much deadlier fire in American vessels than their own? But, rejoined the British press, they fought, being deserters, in dread of execution if taken. Must then, was the retort, the brave British tar have a halter on his neck, and dread of the gallows in view to make him fight? American ingenuity, stimulated by war, added what has been called sea-



cavalry to fleets. On the 21st November, 1814, the floating battery or armed steam-frigate *Fulton*, first experiment of what is now so common, was moved from her wharf on the East river, and towed to *Fulton's* works on the North river by the first steam-boat, the *Car of Neptune*, at the rate of between three and four miles an hour, which he hoped might be increased to five miles, because the power equalled that of a hundred horses.

At the same time, as before mentioned, European disinclination to English domination, kept pace with American successful resistance to it, and we had allies in the manufacturing interest of England, counteracting the army, navy, clergy, aristocracy, crown and other English promoters of war. Proofs multiplied every day, that in a war between that country and this, Great Britain suffers more injury than she inflicts: that American injuries by British blows, are superficial and temporary; but English injuries by American blows, permanent and incurable. The United States could dispense with foreign commerce. Their food is superabundant, and their manufactures were forced by war with England.

Two of the cardinal infirmities of mankind are ignorance and fear; and it is hardly conceivable how profoundly and stupidly perverse has always been the British ignorance of America. One of the greatest and best informed American admirers of England, John Adams, wrote, in 1784, from the Hague, to Joseph Reed, then in London, "There seems to be an utter incapacity in England of comprehending the

truth respecting America. They go on from generation to generation believing every false and discrediting every true account. Nothing is necessary, after a thousand experiences of their being deceived, but the trouble of inventing a new chimera to obtain afresh their confidence." To which letter Reed, from London, answering Adams, said, "They seem to labor under the insuperable curse of men profiting by no experience in everything which respects prejudices against America. I find myself much disappointed and deceived in my opinion of their conciliatory spirit." Such was the judgment then of well-disposed and well-associated American gentlemen, from intercourse, not with vulgar British, but gentlemen and statesmen, whose hopes of British amity were grievously disappointed. Paradoxical and revolting as the sentiment may seem, there have been, there yet live, Americans, who have represented their country in England, and been vanquished there to social admiration by the splendid hospitalities of English private life, becoming warm admirers of British power and national pre-eminence, who have come back to America convinced that nothing less than war, and victories achieved by Americans over the English, will ever teach them to understand or respect their republican offspring. But may not the hope be indulged, that by the present well-balanced state of naval power, numbers and physical superiority still British, but the moral and memorable recent ascendancy all American, the hostilities of that struggle will prevent any other war between the United States and Great Britain.

## CHAPTER VII.

## SIEGE AND ASSAULT OF, AND SORTIE FROM, FORT ERIE—IZARD'S MARCH FROM CHAMPLAIN TO THE NIAGARA—CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN.

AFTER the duplicate American victories near the Great Falls, the residue of the Canadian campaign was a bright tissue of American triumphs, in frequent conflicts on the Niagara and at Lake Champlain, the British in every engagement much superior in numbers; their tone gradually sinking, while ours rose; theirs to diffidence, ours to confidence of success; before the end of autumn, as established by land as water; invaluable result of American valor organized by discipline, the best, if not only, assurance of desirable and permanent peace. Thenceforth the American standard and cause were uniformly ascendant; and the solitary check by the capture of Washington, under such contrasting victories everywhere else, together with the barbarous warfare carried on, and the still more atrocious proclaimed by authority of Great Britain, tending, not to dismay, but to excite and unite the whole United States of America.

Our losses of the 25th July, at Bridgewater, did not prove so serious as were apprehended, many who strayed away under cover of night, having rejoined their columns, the British forces being greater sufferers than ours; and General Ripley need not have abandoned his position at Chippewa.

Monday, the 1st of August, Commodore Chauncey, partially recovered from illness, was carried on board his new ship, the *Superior*, and sailed from Sackett's Harbor with a fleet of ten sail to contend against a superior British fleet for the control of Lake Ontario; but then without service to Brown's army, cooped up in Fort Erie, nearly forty miles beyond the Lake. Two British brigs, however, and a schooner of Yeo's squadron were blockaded, at Fort Niagara, by the *Jefferson*, the *Sylph*, and the *Oneida* of Chauncey's fleet, under Captain Ridgley, commanding the *Jefferson*. The *Prince Regent*, another British vessel, mounting fourteen guns, was run ashore, and burned to prevent her capture; and Chauncey, with the rest of his shipping, blockaded Yeo at Kingston. Colonel Mitchell commanded at Sackett's Harbor, reinforced for thirty days by General Martin, with 1,500 New York militia.

Not till a whole week after being worsted at Bridgewater was Drummond able to move forward, on the 3d of August, when he stationed about four thousand troops

two miles east of Fort Erie, with a wood between the fort and his encampment, finding the fort too strong for assault, and determined to besiege it. Next day, 4th of August, he made an unsuccessful attempt on the American magazines, which Brown had transferred from Schlosser to Buffalo, providently guarded by Major Morgan, with part of the first rifle regiment, taken from Fort Erie for that purpose. Early on the morning of the 4th, Colonel Tucker, with twelve hundred men in twenty-three boats, undertaking to destroy or capture the magazines at Buffalo, was defeated by Major Morgan with two hundred and forty riflemen, killing and wounding some of the enemy, and putting the rest to flight. Morgan had advantages of situation, which he improved by superior vigilance, intrepidity, and coolness so much, that Colonel Tucker's party was reprimanded in general orders for his failure.

The effects of not only American courage, but of the formidable exertion of it by superior fire, was disclosed on this occasion, less in Tucker's defeat than the explanation which General Drummond's reproach betrayed. His orders of the 5th of August, at the camp before Fort Erie, expressed "the indignation excited by discovering that the failure of an expedition, the success of which, by destroying the enemy's means of subsistence on that side, would have compelled his force to surrender, or, by risking a battle on the plain on this side, encounter certain defeat, was attributable to the misbehavior of the troops employed. It is the duty of officers to punish the men they command who misbehave in face of the enemy by death on the spot. From the reports of officers and the general's own observation, men couch, duck, and lie down when advancing under fire." The American rifle had made deadly impressions to produce the evasion of soldiers and confession of their chief, thus proclaimed at the head of every British regiment.

On the 12th of August, by one of the casualties to which life, civil and military, is subject, Morgan was killed, like Major Holmes about the same time, in an unlucky skirmish; on which day our arms underwent a naval reverse where one of our first naval exploits took place. Captain Dobbs, of the royal navy, with his gig and some batteaux, conveyed over land from the Niagara river to Lake Erie, surprised by night



and captured two more of Perry's squadron, the schooners Ohio and Somers, moored close to Fort Erie to prevent water approach to it. Mistaken for provision boats with supplies from Buffalo for the fort, they were suffered to drift on the hawsers of the American schooners, which they cut, boarded and seized, each mounting three long twelve pounders, and manned by thirty-five men, without a shot fired from either of the American schooners, or from a third, the Porcupine, anchored close by, who cut her cables and escaped, or from the fort; although the British boarders proclaimed themselves by firing a number of muskets and pistols, and other commotion, yet were suffered to drift to Black Rock without molestation, when it was easy to subdue them. Without disparaging the gallantry of the assailants in this enterprise, their success was much owing to the negligent supineness of our people.

During several days Drummond was busy in preparations to take Fort Erie, which Gaines was equally active putting in order for vigorous defence. Both sides were reinforced. Ripley was with Gaines, with the remnants of Ripley's and Scott's brigades, and General Porter with additional volunteers from New York and Pennsylvania. At sunrise on the 13th of August, Drummond's arrangements being completed, the cannonade began by a severe bombardment, reverberated from the fort with equal animation, and some loss on both sides. About sunset, on the evening of the 14th, a British shell burst in the magazine of the battery commanded by Captain Williams, and blew up the magazine with tremendous explosion, doing, however, no damage. The enemy, supposing from the noise that it must be very injurious, raised exulting shouts, which Williams not only sent back in louder cheers, but accompanied by repeated discharges from his battery. Still the British commander, encouraged by that supposed diminution of ammunition, and by Dobbs' capture of the schooners, and having, as he thought, made sufficient impression otherwise by his bombardment, resolved to storm the fort that night. General Gaines, a vigilant and spirited officer, inferring the probability of the design from the same cause, was on the alert, and kept one-third of his men at their posts the whole of a dark, wet night in that humid, unhealthy region. At two o'clock in the morning of the 15th of September, the British troops, in three columns of some fifteen hundred each, moved in obscurity and silence to the assault. Their watchword was *Steel*. General Drummond's written orders of attack recommended a free use of the bayonet against the merely fifteen hundred men fit for duty, and they much dispirited, whom he estimated to his troops as the American garrison. Colonel Drummond, executing that severe

order, was often heard by General Gaines, his officers and men, shouting, in the midnight conflict, with profane brutality, to give the damned Yankees no quarter. Lieutenant McDonough, entreating quarter, was refused it by Drummond, and murdered defending his life with a hand-spike in a desperate encounter. Lieutenant Fontaine, another young officer, taken prisoner by the Indians, rejoiced that he fortunately fell into hands less sanguinary than the English. These revolting facts, officially authenticated, belong to the record of history, certifying to American idolatry how providential and indispensable was the armed repulsion, overthrow and punishment of British masters, who would have been monsters of tyranny unresisted, instead of being subdued into respectful amity.

General Gaines' position on the margin of the lake, where the river Niagara empties into it, a horizontal plain a few feet above the water, was strengthened by breastworks in front, entrenchments and batteries. The small unfinished Fort Erie was defended by Captain Williams, supported by Major Trimble's infantry; the front batteries by Captains Biddle and Fanning, the left by a redoubt of which Captain Towson had charge, all the artillery commanded by Major Hindman. Lieutenant-Colonel Aspinwall was at the head of the 9th, 11th and 22d regiments of infantry, from a few weeks' admirable service become the veteran brigade of Scott. General Ripley commanded his own brigade, the 21st and 23d regiments. General Porter, with his brigade of New York and Pennsylvania volunteers, occupied the centre. Colonel Fischer, of De Wetteville's regiment, led one of the British columns; Colonel Drummond a second, Lieutenant-Colonel Scott the third. The first point assaulted was defended by Major Wood of the engineers, volunteering to head the 21st regiment of infantry, and by Captain Towson. Wading breast deep through the water, the British column advanced in the dark within ten feet of the American line again and again, but was constantly repulsed. The left, attacked by Scott, was defended by Major M'Ree, with the 9th regiment, under Captain Foster, and New York and Pennsylvania volunteers, under Captains Boughton and Harding. Colonel Drummond, with his column and the seamen under Captain Dobbs, assaulted the centre with a daring courage, of which humanity was no part. With scaling ladders he led his sanguinary followers up the parapet of the old fort, but was driven back with great carnage. Again twice mounting after being thrice repelled, they moved round by the ditch in total darkness, and once more mounting with scaling ladders, overpowered and killed with pikes and bay-

nets Williams and McDonough, with several men, severely wounded Lieutenant Watmough, and carried the bastion, of which for more than an hour they held possession, defeating reiterated efforts of our people to dislodge them. There it was that McDonough, overcome, entreating quarter in vain, and desperately defending his life with a handspike, was murdered by Drummond, who himself was shot in the breast by a soldier, and put to death with *no quarter* expiring on his lips as he fell. Repulsed on the left, master of the fort in the centre, and strenuously contending for foothold on the right, the enemy for a long time maintained the battle fiercely raging. General Gaines, while striving to regain the bastion, ordered reinforcements also to the right, which were promptly sent by Generals Ripley and Porter, both of whom were constantly active and sagacious to face every danger and supply every want. The victory was in no small measure ascribable to the infantry covering the artillery and protecting them at their guns. While Majors Hindman and Trimble, Captains Foster and Byrdsall, repeatedly failed by many devices of dauntless courage to recover the bastion, of which the enemy kept possession for more than an hour, and the conflict on the right was still undetermined, an accident fixed the fate of the night as and nearly where a similar occurrence brought it on. Some cartridges deposited in a stone building occupied by the Americans near the bastion held by the British, exploded with terrific uproar, which struck the latter with panic. In vain their surviving officers assured their men that it was an accident, not a mine, and endeavored to rally them to renewed contest. Captain Biddle, at that crisis, by General Gaines' direction, wounded as the captain was by a shell contusion, enfiladed with his piece the exterior plain and glacis, while Captain Fanning from his battery dealt execution upon the enemy, who all fled, towards dawn, in complete disorder and dismay, leaving Colonels Drummond and Scott with 222 dead, 174 wounded, 186 prisoners, and a great many more killed and wounded fallen into the water not enumerated, altogether a loss of 962 men, while that of the Americans was only 84. Disparity of not one to ten attested not only the superior gunnery, but riveted a conviction, grown strong in both armies and both countries, that disciplined valor, which saves much bloodshed, was the only need and indubitable warranty of American success. Foiled in his first attack on Towson's battery, supported by the 25th infantry, again repulsed by Ripley and Wood, attempting to turn the western batteries, and though for a while in possession of an exterior central bastion, at length driven from every point in panic and confusion, with the loss of a fourth of their force, the

enemy by this defeat suffered a lesson of lasting impression, which was not disguised in the official dispatches of Colonel Fischer, General Drummond and Governor Prevost. Gaines' official accounts were the first tidings of victory to counteract the disastrous rout of Bladensburg and fall of Washington, for which a third triumph on the Niagara was some consolation; welcomed as the forerunner of still greater in that quarter, confidently anticipated, but never realized by the march of General Izard to the rescue of General Brown's division. The effect of Gaines' victory was to inspire the neighboring militia with such confidence instead of the panic formerly prevalent among them, that thousands were willing to volunteer for service at Fort Erie, where the aid of that portion of the war faculties was soon after manifested in Brown's sortie, the success of which was largely attributable to militia volunteers. General Gaines, Captains Biddle, Fanning, Byrdsall, and Lieutenant Hall, were brevetted for their conduct at Fort Erie the 15th August.

More regiments being added to the British force on the Niagara, and the Secretary of War's inclination for attacking Kingston remaining unchanged, about the middle of July, 1814, General Izard was ordered from Lake Champlain, with four thousand men, to Sackett's Harbor. His own admiration of what he called Brown's heroic efforts, and the Secretary's natural desire to succor them, induced an alternative plan for Izard; if he should find at Sackett's Harbor Kingston unassailable, then he was to land his division on the western shore of Ontario, and co-operate with Brown against Drummond.

On the first of May, 1814, Izard, elder of the junior major-generals, an officer of great promise, withdrawn by the Secretary of War from the court martial for Wilkinson's trial, was ordered to Plattsburg; and on the 4th of that month assumed command of the north military district, which had proved fatal to Dearborn, Wilkinson, and Hampton; and injurious to Chandler, Winder, Boyd, and the secretary himself. Izard was one of the very few Americans whose only vocation had been war, for which he was educated in Europe, and served long in America. In the meridian of life, with many excellent military qualifications, however, he wanted the adaptation or pliancy indispensable to unavoidable circumstances. Brave, ambitious, and honorable, European education, manners, habits, and ideas unfitted him, if not for the situation he was called upon to fill, at any rate for the part, at the time, he had to perform. An old soldier in theory and garrison service, scientific and well-informed, rigid in discipline, and laudably stricter with officers than privates, he despised militia volunteers, political popularity, and more than



confessing, he boasted that Gen. Brown was better qualified than he to command the irregular levies of which an American army is the composite order. If war had lasted long enough to organize large armies of regular soldiers, under veteran officers, Izard might have proved a superior leader. But for the conjuncture he was placed in, his education was a disadvantage; and he incurred more odium, particularly in the malediction of General Armstrong, than General Izard deserved. Discord, the military distemper among our northern commanders, by which Wilkinson, Hampton, and Armstrong suffered, affected Izard, Armstrong, and Brown, whose dislike of each other not only deteriorated their measures, but renders it difficult to describe them with impartiality and justice. Assuming the command of the division of the right of the north district on Lake Champlain, General Izard found what he represented to the Secretary of War a deplorable state of almost total inefficiency; forces extremely few in number, not paid for a long arrearage, many officers absent on furlough, those present mostly incapable, men undisciplined, unclothed, altogether unfit for service. If Brown had been allotted to that station, unaccustomed to the perfection of military organization, and willing to make the best of things, he probably would have found, instead of reason for complaint, motive for greater activity: for his and Jackson's raw and motley recruits were worse when led to victory in Canada and Louisiana. Ignorant officers, and vagabond privates, diseases, desertion, the common disorders of camp are not more inevitable embarrassments to an American general than the superadded want of unity, often the timidity, and penury of his government. Izard's first review could not produce, he complained, an aggregate force of more than two thousand effectives, and those raw, ill clad, and worse disciplined; the dragoons and riflemen deserting for want of pay. When the troops were paid, he regretted their receipt of so much money at one time, and would rejoice when it was all spent. "Yes," said the secretary, "our armies are very great when estimated for pay, but very small in the field." The number of soldiers taken to serve in the navy was considerable. The clothing was of very bad quality; some of the men literally naked; the artillery was all light pieces; the funds in the quartermaster-general's hands very low, at one time not more than one thousand dollars: the state of things, acknowledged by Armstrong to Izard, was truly degrading and reproachful; and without discipline, order, and economy, he pronounced an army a nuisance. The enlistments were many of them for only one year, the climate frightful, the mortality prodigious; of 160 recruits, 26 deserted on their march from Greenbush to Plattsburg. Raw officers in

charge of raw recruits, were exhibitions in even the old regiments exciting ridicule as well as disgust. Duels among the officers were extremely frequent, and desertion by the privates, caused by blows unlawfully inflicted by inferior officers; time wasted in courts martial; from the St. Lawrence to the ocean open disregard of the law prohibiting intercourse with the enemy, destined for whom the road to St. Regis was covered with droves of cattle and the river with rafts; the high roads insufficient for the supplies of cattle pouring into Canada, like herds of buffaloes making paths for themselves through the woods; without which supplies the British forces would suffer from famine, or their government be at enormous expense to maintain them. Many of the officers from the eastward, General Izard assured the Secretary of War, sent in their resignations on the appearance of active service; and last, by no means the least grievance to a gentleman of Carolina, when recruited regiments from the east did come, many of their men were negroes, to the great annoyance of the officers and soldiers, who refused to do duty with them. This bitter decoction of Izard's grievances, Armstrong aggravated by adding to the ingredients; while Brown, with fewer and worse appointed levies, pursued his way to victory and glory. This contrast is not intended to disparage educated, or overvalue self-made, officers. But without conforming to the inevitable imperfections of American hostilities, the most accomplished officers will rarely succeed to carry them on. There is genius for circumstances, which war, however scientific and methodical, requires more than either education or experience.

By midsummer, Izard's division amounted to seven thousand, and more, of regular soldiers, as well officered, drilled, and prepared for action, as any portion of the American army; the officers, generally, eager for distinction. The regiment of light artillery, two squadrons of dragoons, a battalion of the first rifle regiment, and sixteen nominal regiments of infantry, the fourth, fifth, sixth, tenth, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, twenty-ninth, thirtieth, thirty-first, thirty-third, thirty-fourth, thirty-seventh, and forty-fifth, were disposed into three brigades, commanded by Brigadier-Generals Macomb, Smith, and Bissell, with Adjutant-General Cumming, Inspector-General Pinkney, and Major Totten as engineer. High expectations were entertained by the Executive, the country, and the army generally, of General Izard and his division; all of which were disappointed. Reserved, exclusive, and high tempered, the general, more respected than liked, failing to accomplish the important objects assigned to him, eclipsed by Brown, on his left, and Macomb, on his right, in

signal victories, was compared with them to his great disfavor. On the 11th of June, the Secretary of War advised General Izard of the plan of campaign, which sent Croghan to the northwest, and Brown into Canada, on the Niagara. When Brown's first success, by the battle of Chippewa, and his subsequent embarrassments became public, General Izard, on the 19th July, looking with uneasiness to that quarter, inquired whether he ought not to move to the St. Lawrence and threaten the rear of Kingston. On the 27th of July, the Secretary, between the affairs at Chippewa and Bridgewater, excited, gratified, yet uneasy at Brown's predicament, suggested to Izard, without ordering him, to try some enterprise menacing Montreal, or some other place higher up the St. Lawrence, a demonstration or attack on Kingston, or a junction with General Gaines. On the 12th of August, Izard was ordered, if the enemy carried his force from Montreal to Kingston, instead of the proposed attack there, to substitute the safer movement of expeditiously marching four thousand men to Sackett's Harbor, proceeding to the head of the lake, putting himself in communication with the division of the left (Brown) and throwing his whole force on Drummond's rear.

By that time large reinforcements from Europe were known to be in Canada; General Izard's belief was no doubt well founded that forces superior to his were immediately in his front; and the hostile incursion to Washington was so near its execution, that the Secretary of War, anxious for Brown, and incredulous to the last of any march upon Washington, was nevertheless much engaged in arrangements to prevent or repel it. Brown was a favorite with the Secretary—Izard considered him a pet. His own force become respectable; his position, as he thought, tenable; his opportunity for distinction, very promising; he revolted at being withdrawn from such a theatre, to be marched hundreds of miles to rescue his inferior from a predicament of his own making. "Three hundred miles," as he said, "*à vol d'oiseau*." Four hundred miles of what Napoleon in Poland called the new element of mud, of wilderness, and fatigue; with superior British forces in front and flank; to harass, intercept, perhaps defeat and capture him. Retirement from a field of glory for a pilgrimage which no expedition, he chose to think, would enable him to perform in time to be of any service; and that service, even if effected, to relieve his inferior, in a strait caused by his own rashness, were a task which Izard undertook with avowed reluctance and undissembled ill-humor. Although his movement to the west to succor Brown was Izard's own suggestion, shortly before, he obeyed, disclaiming all

responsibility for what he predicted must be the fatal consequences, only promising to execute his orders as well as he knew how. On the 29th of August, with the dragoons, light artillery, fourth, fifth, tenth, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, and forty-fifth regiments of infantry, about four thousand effectives, General Izard began his recalcitrant and procrastinating march towards Sackett's Harbor, with Brigadier-Generals Smith and Bissell; leaving General Macomb with about three thousand men—about twenty-five hundred of them fit for duty—at Plattsburg. Ordered from the theatre of anticipated renown; confident that the enemy would attack, and believing that he would be defeated, even one of serenest temper might lose his equanimity when the quarrel that ensued became acrimonious and inveterate between Izard, Armstrong, and Brown; though Brown took little part in it, and never quarreled with Armstrong. The latter, unfortunate in so many of his generals and plans, accused Izard of want of spirit. Fear of responsibility may have disturbed him; but no personal apprehension caused the tardy compliance by which he submitted to a provoking order, his non-execution of which in time to be of any avail, afforded his lieutenant Macomb and his inferior in rank, Brown, opportunity of distinction, which they improved to their own great advantage and General Izard's lasting mortification. Taking advice of a council of war as to the best way to go, all his superior officers were unanimously of opinion that the longest was the right way. To the Secretary's great annoyance, going that way, the general travelled but fifteen miles a day, which the Secretary condemned as unmilitary. But the roads were bad, the weather worse, and it was Izard's endeavor, he said, not to exhaust his men by fatigue or exposure. On the 13th of September, from Sackett's Harbor he advised Brown of his arrival there, and intention to proceed to the head of the lake to place himself in the rear of the British forces in Brown's front. On the 10th of September, from Erie, having, though wounded, resumed command there, Brown wrote to Izard, imploring help. His total effective force did not then much exceed two thousand, while that of the enemy was four thousand. "I will not conceal from you," said Brown, "that the fate of this army is very doubtful, unless speedy relief is afforded." Next day Brown again assured Izard, that, should he pass rapidly there, it would be in his power to carry everything in the peninsula. On the 16th of September, Izard's army reached Sackett's Harbor, where, that day, he had the mortification to learn Macomb's glorious defeat of Prevost, prefaced by Macdonough's still more glorious victory on the lake. At the same time, the murmur of



public sentiment censured his procrastination, and ascribed to his inferior the overthrow of a large British force by the few recruits and invalids which Izard was accused of having left with Macomb. On the 17th of September, one of the violent equinoctial storms of that tempestuous region began, with torrents of rain, and it was impossible to embark the troops. In the evening of the 19th, they were taken on board Chauncey's squadron, to the number of three thousand.

On the 29th of September the troops sailed from Sackett's Harbor, and next day were disembarked at the mouth of Genesee river, still far from Buffalo or Erie; nor was it till the 24th of September that wagons and horses, for the transportation of their camp equipage and provisions, could be procured in that thinly peopled quarter. Through excessively bad roads, and continual heavy rains, they marched to Batavia, nearly all the officers on foot: and there underwent the further mortification of learning that Brown, by his sortie of the 17th, had delivered himself from all need of Izard's help to defend him, then wanted only to enable them together to capture Drummond—a consummation universally and confidently anticipated at Washington and everywhere; which would have told in American annals and repute like Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga, which brought France to alliance with the United States; or the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, which produced the treaty of Independence.

Leaving General Izard at Batavia, we must return to General Brown, at Fort Erie, whither, before he went on the 2d of September, he wrote on the 31st August, gratefully to Armstrong, offensively to Izard, and manfully for himself, thanking the Secretary for having ordered Izard to his relief; but adding, "what I hear of General Izard's *habits, manners and intentions* is so unsatisfactory, that I hope nothing from him. Colonel Snelling, his most intimate and confidential friend, warns us against placing any confidence in his support, knowing his aversion to the service given him, and his uniform intention not to perform it. We must, therefore, if saved, do the business ourselves."

From the time Brown nobly devoted himself to fall or conquer with his brave comrades in the fort, the American and British commanders, Brown and Drummond, under torrents of incessant rain in that insalubrious climate, both disabled by wounds for the most active duties, nevertheless bestowed themselves day and night in constant preparations, one to capture, the other to defend, the corner of Canada so long and severely contested. As Drummond told his troops, to encourage them to the assault of the 15th of September, Brown had not

more than fifteen hundred regular soldiers, they fatigued by continual conflicts and inclement weather, and as much dispirited as such men could be by little hope of effectual relief or ultimate triumph. Capitulation seemed to be their doom: for though Izard was promised and even expected for their succor, yet when heard of, he was at Schenectady, Sackett's Harbor, or elsewhere far off, marching only fifteen miles a day, and many days not at all. General Brown, therefore, from the moment he resumed command, went to work, as he said, with an anxious hypothesis, *if* saved, to do the business themselves, without depending on help from any quarter. Another general, however, Peter B. Porter, was as indefatigable in his endeavors to raise volunteer militia as he was ardent, steadfast and exemplary in preparing them for action, and leading them into it on all occasions.

The British army, under Lieutenant-General Drummond, with Major-Generals De Watteville and Stovin, in three infantry brigades of from twelve to fifteen hundred men each, besides artillery, were encamped in a field surrounded by woods, nearly two miles from their batteries and entrenchments, in order to keep the working parties detailed for them out of reach of the American fire. A brigade of infantry attended the artillerists when at work. Two batteries were completed, a third was in rapid progress, all mounted with heavy guns, one of them a 68 pounder, and stored with large quantities of ammunition. During seven days preceding the sortie, there was a continual equinoctial storm of rain, which did not, however, prevent frequent skirmishes and affairs of posts, and favored many desertions from the English camp. For the last three days they were unusually quiet; from which portentous silence, added to all other indications, no doubt was entertained that their assault would soon be made. From the moment when General Brown assumed command, he carefully and thoroughly made himself acquainted with the topographical relations between the British covering parties, their men at work, their batteries and his, and came to the conclusion that by a sudden onslaught he might disturb, if not destroy, their fifty days' labors. Instead of a surprise by night, it was resolved to make the attack at midday, when so bold and hazardous an enterprise would be least guarded against, and might be most effectual. The volunteers and other soldiers of the fort were employed in secretly cutting roads through the wood, which took them unperceived close to the enemy, and taught them the way to his entrenchments. Leaving Colonel Jessup, with the 25th regiment, in charge of Fort Erie, Colonel Brady being posted at Black Rock to guard that fortification, soon after noon of the 17th September, the men were paraded and got ready for

the attack. The left column destined for Drummond's right were placed under General Porter, to penetrate circuitously between the British batteries and camp, thus to surprise and overpower the one-third at work before the other two-thirds off duty in camp could come to their help. Of Porter's three columns, Colonel Gibson with two hundred of his rifle regiment, and some Indians, led the advance. Lieut.-Col. Wood, with four hundred infantry, headed by Major, now General Brooke of the 23d, with that and the first regiment had the right, supported by five hundred militia of the regiments of Colonels Dobbin, McBurney and Flemming, which force was to attack the batteries. A left column of five hundred militia, comprising the commands of Colonels Hopkins, Churchill and Crosby, led by Brigadier-General Davis, of the militia, was intended to keep off succor from the British camp, while the two preceding columns stormed and destroyed the batteries. General Miller, with his men, were stationed in a ravine between the American fort and the British batteries. General Ripley was in command of the reserve between the two bastions of the fort, all under cover, out of view of the enemy.

There were three British batteries in charge at the moment of the King's and De Watteville's regiments, then on duty. Announced by tremendous fire from the fort, the rain falling in torrents, so as to render impossible the free use of firearms, Porter led his column close up to the enemy's entrenchments, turned their right without being perceived by their pickets, and soon carried by storm battery Number 3, together with a strong blockhouse. Thence instantly moving on battery Number 2, he there met a stouter resistance. Colonel Gibson was killed there; but after an obstinate combat, our people got possession of it, the second battery. The intrepid Miller, for whom batteries had no terrors, then by Brown's direction seized the moment to pierce the enemy's entrenchments, between the two captured batteries. Attacking the third battery, Davis and Wood fell, but again the enemy was overcome, and abandoned his last battery. In half an hour after the first shot the three batteries and two blockhouses were taken, the magazine blown up, all the guns rendered useless, and every object of the sortie accomplished, with considerable loss, indeed, but beyond General Brown's most sanguine expectations. Gen. Ripley was then ordered up to superintend the difficult operation which General Miller had begun, of withdrawing the troops from their conquest, and leading them back to Fort Erie; an operation which General Brown, with his staff, personally superintended. In the performance of that duty, Ripley, while speaking with Colonel Upham, received a severe wound in the neck,

from which he never recovered, though he survived many years, and served at one time in Congress from Louisiana.

As soon as Gen. Drummond heard the firing, leaving Gen. Stovin in charge of the reserve, he hastened to the scene of action, where he found Gen. De Watteville overpowered, batteries No. 2 and No. 3 in possession of the American assailants, and their assault begun on battery Number 1, both blockhouses and the magazine destroyed, and the British troops retreating. The coincident exertions of both commanders, Brown to withdraw his men from, and Drummond with his to recover, the British entrenchments, soon effected it. The Americans retired with 385 prisoners, many of them officers, and a total British loss of killed, wounded, taken and missing which Brown reckoned at a thousand men, near a fourth of their whole number. The weather, the woods, and the unavoidable mixture of men in such a combat, together with its inherent casualties, cost General Brown five hundred and eleven killed, wounded, missing and captured, of whom about two hundred were made prisoners in the obscurity of the forest, and mistakes of hostile parties. The rain prevented free use of those arms in which our people excel, the rifle and the musket. Most of the battle was fought hand to hand, with the bayonet and sabre. General Porter, who was wounded by a sword thrust in the hand, was at one time surrounded and summoned to surrender, but escaped by presence of mind and invincible courage.

Thus, said General Brown, with just exultation, one thousand regulars and an equal portion of militia in one hour of close action, blasted the hopes of the enemy, destroyed the fruits of fifty days' labor, and diminished his effective force one thousand men at least.

General Jessup's short account and opinion of the sortie from Fort Erie are as follows:

"General Brown believed that he must rely entirely upon his own resources; for though aid was promised him from another quarter, the daily casualties at Fort Erie were such, that it would not, he thought, reach him in time to save his division. Having obtained a perfect knowledge of the enemy's force and dispositions, he determined to attack him in the trenches as soon as a body of militia and volunteers, then arriving in Buffalo, could be passed over. Major Jessup having three wounds open and his right arm in a sling, and being, in consequence, unable to perform active duty, volunteered to join the army at Fort Erie. On his arrival he found that a council had been assembled, and had just broken up; and General Brown was evidently much disappointed at the result. In the course of the evening he expressed himself with



great warmth in regard to the conduct of some of the officers present at the council; but he added, in his peculiarly emphatic manner, 'We must keep our own counsels—the impression must be made that we are done with the affair; *but as sure as there is a God in heaven, the enemy shall be attacked in his works, and beaten too, so soon as all the volunteers shall have passed over.*'

"On the 13th and 14th there was heavy cannonading, as well as affairs of pickets; on the 15th, 16th, and the morning of the 17th there was a good deal of cannonading at intervals, and from about ten o'clock till twelve on the 17th it was incessant. When Major Jessup joined on the 9th, he was placed by General Brown in command of Fort Erie; on the morning of the 17th, the general sent for him and informed him that he would attack the enemy at once, and that he should leave him with the 25th, about one hundred and fifty strong, and the artillery and invalids, to protect the fort and camp, and cover the retreat of the army should it be repulsed. The general moved out with the troops about two o'clock P. M., attacked and carried the enemy's batteries and block-houses—captured or destroyed one-third of his whole force: and left him without a single heavy gun or howitzer. We had forty-five officers and several hundred men killed and wounded.

"The sortie from Fort Erie was by far the most splendid achievement of the campaign, whether we consider the boldness of the conception, the excellence of the plan, or the ability with which it was executed. No event, on the same scale, in the whole range of military history, has ever surpassed it. To General Brown the whole credit is due; he advised with, and had the enthusiastic support of, Porter and several of the younger field officers; but was opposed in his views by his second in command and all whom he could influence." J.

The influence of such a victory was even more political than military. The patriotic citizens who followed General Porter into Canada more effectually discredited militia fears, and rebuked militia constitutional scruples than human reason could by argument, or rebuke by disgrace. Gen. Drummond at once abandoned his entrenchments, officially paying Brown the homage of ascribing his success to five thousand combatants, when there were but two, to torrents of rain, dreadful weather and roads, by which he felt constrained immediately to withdraw to Chippewa, and even that he was not able to do till the 21st September. three days after that remarkable discomfiture of British fortitude by American alacrity; tried as their national properties had been, by four contests, in every kind of combat, always by superior numbers of British to inferior American numbers, uniformly attested by American triumph, whether at-

tacked or assailants, in fort or by sortie. Lieutenant-Colonel Aspinwall, who lost an arm in that sortie, and has almost ever since been the American consul at London; Major Trimble, of the 19th regiment, who was shot through the body, afterwards senator from Ohio in the Congress of the United States; Major Brooke, of the 23d regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel McDonald, on whom the command of the rifle corps devolved on Colonel Gibson's death; Colonel Upham, who took General Ripley's place when wounded; Colonel Snelling, Colonel Gardner, now Postmaster at Washington; Major Jones, now Adjutant-General; Major Hall, together with several other of the regular forces, and many of the militia, distinguished themselves on that occasion.

Drummond hastily retreated over Frenchman's Creek and the Chippewa, destroying the bridges over both those streams to protect his flight, besides covering his reduced and dispirited forces with field works beyond the latter stream, but claiming a victory by his despatches. The affair of Fort Erie may be compared with some of Wellington's most celebrated achievements. In a ponderous work of Lord Castlereagh's brother and titular successor, the Marquis of Londonderry, on the peninsular campaigns of the Duke of Wellington, where that noble author, then called Sir Charles Stewart, served as a gallant soldier, there is a grandiloquent description of the siege and storming of Ciudad Rodrigo. Amid rhetorical flights of fancy, the author says, "the troops poured forward with the coolness and impetuosity of which *British soldiers alone* are capable, and which *nothing* could successfully oppose." But Wellington's official account of that four days' siege and final storming, establishes the fact, that the British loss at Fort Erie was one hundred and fifty-eight more, than when some of the same British troops, transported from France, assaulted Gen. Gaines in that fort. In the course of a few hours' conflict, officer to officer, and man to man, the British loss was one hundred and fifty-eight more in Canada than in the four days contest in Spain. And what enhances this comparison is, that Fort Erie surrendered without resistance by its British garrison the 3d July, was put in a posture for such defence by the middle of September. The comparison is much stronger with Brown's sortie than with Gaines's defence. At the sortie the destruction was, comparatively, much greater. On another continent, the theatre of Wellington's first renown, twice as many English were destroyed at their attack on Fort Erie as at his celebrated assault of Seringapatam, including Sepoys and English, and still more at the sortie from Fort Erie.

To derogate from American victories, it has been said that they were merely stub-

born defence of positions (and what was Wellington's at Waterloo)? But at Chippewa and Bridgewater, the daring and irresistible charges of Scott were principal features, and Hindman's artillery were always superior to the British. At Chippewa, at Bridgewater, certainly at the sortie from Fort Erie, the British may be said to have been in position, and their works before it were carried at mid-day with great slaughter, at the point of the bayonet. Although Jackson's battles are reserved for description in another volume, they may be invoked to challenge the military annals of any country for a more brilliant or masterly exploit than his night attack of the British in position, leaving five hundred of their best officers and men on the field. In each of the five battles of Chippewa, Bridgewater, the storming of Fort Erie, the sortie from it, and the attack of the enemy on the 23d December, 1814, the English loss was heavier than at Seringapatam, British and Sepoys included, or Ciudad Rodrigo, British and Portuguese included. No memorial at St. Paul's Cathedral, London, mentions Chippewa, Bridgewater, or Fort Erie. But four splendid monuments, erected there by order of Parliament, in honor of four distinguished British generals, killed in America, within little more than two years of the war of 1812, are memorable renewals of the history of the first British attempt to conquer the United States. In the debate in the House of Commons in November, 1814, on the address to the prince regent, Sir Gilbert Heathcote said, "It appeared to him that we feared the rising power of America, and wished to crush it. We had tried thirty years ago, and had failed when she was nothing like as powerful as at present. In the contest of the last American war, it was boasted here that a battalion of British troops would march across the continent. The flower of our army was sent, and commanded by officers who had served in the German war under Ferdinand. The result was well known. Those troops, as brave as any in the world, were compelled, on two different occasions, to lay down their arms to the new raised levies in America."

Athenian renown, Sallust remarks, is due rather to excellent writers than great deeds; whereas Rome did not abound with writers to describe the actions of her heroes. Attractive written illustrations of modern British achievements overshadow even in America those of American soldiers, whose admirable exploits in the campaigns of 1814 have had no competent narrator of events of which the truth should be our national pride, property and security. But, as Sallust adds to that remark, the early Romans were men of business, who preferred doing to telling of it, and left to others the task of description, so it is

with this country. Such works as Lord Londonderry's, or other British chroniclers, engross American attention, and any attempt to do justice, by statements of facts, and by fair comparisons, have prejudices to encounter, not only in Europe, but America, more unconquerable than the army and navy of Great Britain.

On the 27th of September, General Brown, after seeking General Izard in vain by a messenger dispatched to Eighteen-mile Creek and Genesee river, met him by appointment at Batavia, to concert measures for further operations. Drummond's force was reduced to three thousand disheartened men, and there was little difficulty to capture it. By this time Armstrong had been expelled from the war department, which was undertaken by Monroe, who, on the 27th of September, directed Izard to take command of his and Brown's united forces, for whom reinforcements of militia were called for; and Izard was stimulated to action by assurances of full confidence that he would justify the high opinion the government cherished of his gallantry and confidence in his success. On the 1st of October, Izard moved from Batavia, through the wilderness and swamp which led toward Lewistown, where he arrived on the 5th; Generals Brown and Porter, extremely desirous of his co-operation over the Niagara, waited on him at Lewistown that evening. That censorious, often defamatory, but not always unjust sentinel of public servants, whether in the field or the cabinet, the press, had begun to assail General Izard for the procrastination of his march from Plattsburg, the insufficiency of force he left for its defence, and his indisposition either to succor Brown or to co-operate with him at all. Chafed by these censures, Izard's temper was inflamed, and, perhaps, disturbed by the loudly applauded successes of Macomb and Brown, in which he had no share. After an abortive effort to cross on the 8th of October from Cayuga creek, and land in the face of the enemy's batteries at Chippewa, which was deemed impracticable for want of the requisite transportation, marching thence to Black Rock, Izard took his division into Canada on the 10th and 11th of October, where they landed near Fort Erie. The 17th regiment of infantry, just arrived from the west, Porter's volunteers, and Brown's division united with Izard's, amounting altogether to six thousand excellent troops, were superior to any ten thousand British that could be brought against them. A commander who had been eighteen years in service, risen from a lieutenancy to be major-general, but had never established his promising reputation by any signal action, led them forth on the 13th October, as the whole army ardently desired, and the country confidently expected, to close the glori-



ous campaign on the Niagara by some exploit worthy of its constant career. On the 14th of October the army was encamped before the British entrenchments at Chippewa, the very spot of American distinction, enthusiasm and success. At Washington, and everywhere, the belief was universal that Izard would capture Drummond, of which considerate and enlightened officers in Izard's army felt sure. On the 15th October, Towson's and Archer's batteries were advanced through the open plain, in full view of the enemy's much heavier batteries, cannonaded them, and silenced one, demonstrating, as General Izard declared, to the most inexperienced eye the vast superiority of our artillerists.

On the 19th October, General Izard had proof of the superiority of his infantry, as well as artillery, over the disheartened enemy he unfortunately failed, by any general and decided engagement, to overcome. On the 18th, nine hundred men of his second brigade, commanded by General Bissell, the 5th infantry under Colonel Pinkney, a battalion of the 14th under Major Barnard, whose modest intrepidity and good conduct elevated him afterwards to the Senate of the United States from Pennsylvania, the 15th under Major Grindage, the 16th under Colonel Pearce, with rifle companies commanded by Captains Irvine and Dorman, and a small body of dragoons, were sent to Cook's mill, twelve miles north of Chippewa, to capture some flour there. Next day the Marquis of Tweedale, with a select corps of twelve hundred men from the British entrenchments, attacked Bissell, who defeated and put them to precipitate flight, in great confusion, driven to their fastnesses, after losing several killed, wounded, and prisoners. Daniel Bissell, one of the precious few American soldiers raised from the ranks to a general's station, was on that occasion the antagonist of the noble marquis, who represented the army of Great Britain. Another remarkable person distinguished among the American officers there was Brigade-Major Prestman, who, after the war, took holy orders; and, in an Episcopal church at Newcastle, Delaware, that worthy gentleman humbly and respectably officiated as pastor of a small congregation.

It is difficult, if possible, to justify Gen. Izard's prudery, or affectation of prudence, a virtue, like all others, injurious by excess. Taking twenty days to get from Plattsburg afloat on Lake Ontario, when it might have been done in ten; then causing his army to be landed, not in Canada, anywhere Izard chose, as Commodore Chauncey offered his fleet to land them, but choosing the north of Genesee river in New York, where they must unavoidably be detained for transportation; not reaching the Canadian shore, at last, till the 11th October, six weeks after he left Plattsburg; and then, instead of

planting his standard east of Drummond, taking station west, and when united with Brown, disappointing the unanimous and constant wish for an immediate attack of an enemy, who, though entrenched, was not more than half Izard's number, and much dispirited—all this delay and extreme discretion were, if not injudicious, at least untoward and insufferable. In vain Izard pleaded that he had repeatedly offered Drummond battle, and the approach of winter, severity of weather, diseases of camp, exposure, useless effusion of blood, and the wisdom of preserving the troops for another year's campaign. If General Izard had by many battles established his character, such conduct would have been less objectionable. But as an officer untried, known only by a few, he was unable to make head against the military and popular current, then irresistibly strong for action.

On the 21st October, General Izard broke up his encampment near Chippewa, and marched to Black Rock to prepare winter quarters. Next day the Secretary of War wrote to him that it would be a happy event, if practicable, to demolish the army before him. The good effect of it would be felt throughout the whole northern and western frontier, along the coast, and in Europe. But Izard was resolved on retreat and winter quarters. On the first of November, the last, Bissell's gallant brigade, was withdrawn from Canada. On the fifth, Major Hindman evacuated, by Gen. Izard's orders, Fort Erie, which Major Totten blew up, and thenceforth not a vestige of American soldiery, except ruins, remained in Canada. Although the President approved of what General Izard had done, yet, shortly after, he tendered his resignation which, however, was not accepted, and suggested the appointment of Gen. Brown to command the campaign of next year: "Certainly," said General Izard, "a brave, intelligent, and active officer; and when a portion of the forces is composed of irregular troops, better qualified than I to make them useful in the public service."

Indisposition or inability to command irregular troops, raw levies, and the kind of army, which, not peculiar to, must always be most prevalent in, this country, is a fatal infirmity here—a disadvantage everywhere. General Izard's invincible repugnance to them lost him public confidence. Still kindly sustained by Monroe, who appointed him governor of the territory of Arkansas, Izard closed, in the comparative solitude of Little Rock, among the sands of that frontier, a career begun with the advantages of European education, and the enjoyments of fashionable society, improved by extensive reading, observation, and intelligence. If he had captured Drummond, as with his army Brown would have done, in all pro-

bability Izard might have closed his career with a reputation for which, no doubt, he was anxious to lay down his life.

The Albany Argus, the principal republican paper of New York, in terms of censure, not the less severe for their forbearance, denounced "the tardy and indecisive measures of General Izard, and his sudden retrograde movement after he had forced a passage over the Chippewa, highly disappointing public expectation, and for which he is amenable to government."

For the third time, at that critical moment, Chauncey's squadron afforded an excuse, if not cause, for frustrating public expectation. Yeo having got a superior force afloat, Chauncey took refuge in Sackett's Harbor, weakly fortified and garrisoned, as General Izard urged with unbecoming disdain, by crowds of disorganized and unarmed militia, of more disadvantage than service. "These people," said he, "may be valued by General Brown, to whom they are personally known, and among whom he is popular." But Yeo's command of the waters defeated, in General Izard's apprehension, all operation by land in that quarter. For Drummond could fall back on Burlington Heights, and every step in Izard's pursuit of him would cut Izard off by the large reinforcements the enemy could in twenty-four hours throw upon his flank and rear.

Although Commodore Chauncey's absence from the lake, and remaining at Sackett's Harbor, were more than once extremely inopportune and prejudicial to the military operations on its borders, and his language to explain it to General Brown was much and deservedly censured, there were reasons for his confinement which he might have urged with much more propriety than his captious plea of naval dignity. During the whole month of July, 1814, he was ill and unable to go abroad: so much so that Decatur was designated to take his place. Many of the mechanics shipbuilding there were also disabled by illness. When at last Chauncey sailed on the first of August, it was necessary to carry him on board his ship, where the better air of the high lake and the hope of action, and excitement of discipline, restored his health; and while ascendant, the activity of his squadron was all that could be required. With it Chauncey not only blockaded Yeo for six weeks in Kingston, but by reducing the number and armament of his vessels, and even the number of men, to a precise equality with the British vessels in that port ready for action, by sailing close into the port, with colors flying, as is customary on going to battle, and by every other challenge that could with propriety be offered to his wary antagonist, Chauncey invited Yeo to battle, which he steadily declined; perhaps by order of his superiors, for it was said that he was mortified at be-

ing obliged to decline battle with an equal force, which his captains denounced as a disgraceful and dangerous novelty in the glorious naval annals of Great Britain, ever since their great commonwealth, seeking Dutch, French, Spanish, Swedish, Danish, and all other adversaries, under almost any disadvantage, and at that time, with inferior British force, blockading many French and Dutch vessels of war in several ports of Europe. Chauncey's fleet was disciplined by him on Lake Ontario to a perfection of manœuvre and gunnery never surpassed, seldom equalled, by any ships at sea. The stormy and perilous lake navigation tried their seamanship by the severest lessons of navigation. Prepared and anxious to contend on equal or inferior terms for mastery with the British, during many weeks the American commodore sought every opportunity of trial. If with such courage, conduct, crews and discipline he could have controlled the lake early in July, as was expected, or in October, it is more than probable that British discomfiture by land and water, upon and around Lake Ontario, would have been as complete as it was upon and around Champlain.

Returning to Kingston for the last time, the 29th September, after landing Gen. Izard's division at Genesee on the 22d, Chauncey found the British squadron preparing to sail, with their new 112 gunship, the *St. Lawrence*, manned by eleven hundred men, that one vessel by herself more than a match for all the American squadron. On the 5th of October that *Leviathan* of the lake being ready to take command of it, Commodore Chauncey was obliged to retire to Sackett's Harbor, with an admirable but useless naval force: laid up in a hamlet of the forest, only an inducement to the enemy to attack and destroy both the harbor and the fleet, the miserable hamlet in which it took extremely imperfect shelter, being scarcely defensible. For, after two years of war, that head quarters of our military and naval operations on the Canadian border was so ill fortified that, until General Brown's arrival there with two thousand regular troops, it was, if not at the mercy, at any rate in danger of a British attack, which was hourly and fearfully expected. In the rude apprenticeship to American art of war, not only was Sackett's Harbor feebly but so incorrectly fortified that an enterprising enemy might have probably taken it. Fortunately American progress in arms had taught our enemy forbearance. On the 15th October Commodore Yeo put forth on the lake with his immense flag-ship, one of the largest in the world, but never attempted Sackett's Harbor. At that time Drummond's reverses on the Niagara and Prevost's on the Saranac, had confirmed British caution, by reducing and disheartening their numerous troops in Canada. Commo-



dore Chauncey's ships were moored across the harbor for its protection, and neither Gen. Kempt's brigade, nor any other force the enemy could then bring against it, showed any inclination to attempt it, after General Brown's arrival there. His unknown name had become a tower of strength, in twelve months after its announcement from the woods, at Sackett's Harbor, then committed to his approved and celebrated generalship. Chauncey's fleet, in July expected to help Brown's division to Burlington Heights, in October was beholden to the brave survivors of that then contemplated adventure, to help save the fleet from capture. Kingston and Sackett's Harbor were remarkable testimonials of English and American necessities and superfluities. While scarcity of wood in England deprived Kingston of ship timber, not only Chauncey's ships, but the town of Sackett's Harbor, were built together from superabundant forests. And, soon after Chauncey, at immense expense and labor, with wonderful dispatch raised another huge ship from the green trees, that vast structure, together with his whole fleet, the prodigious line-of-battle-ship of Yeo's squadron, with all the rest of it, were doomed, American and English altogether, to rot on the shores of Ontario in the sunshine of peace.

On the 22d October, 1814, an expedition from Detroit into Upper Canada, consisting of some seven hundred mounted gunmen, and a company of rangers, and some Indians, led by Brigadier-General Duncan McArthur, of the regular army, marched for Burlington Heights, thence to join General Brown. Finding the waters impassable in places, and the Canadian authorities on the alert, General McArthur, after routing a body of five hundred Canadian militia at Malcomb's Mills, killing several and capturing more than a hundred, deemed it necessary to retrace his steps, which he did, without interruption, to Detroit. Subsistence being then scarce and dear in Canada, the destruction of several mills and considerable quantities of forage and provisions at the villages of Dover and Port Talbot, was the chief effect of this excursion; which the British loudly denounced as ruthless devastation by a horde of mounted ruffians from Kentucky, reducing settlements to ashes, the country to indiscriminate plunder, and leaving the miserable inhabitants to perish with hunger and cold. A party of the 103d regiment, of the 19th light dragoons, and some Indian warriors, were dispatched to repel and chastise McArthur, but did not come in contact with him.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON.

THROUGHOUT the waters and shores of the Chesapeake Admiral Cockburn reigned supreme, ubiquitous and irresistible, from Capes Charles and Henry to Havre-de-Grace. War authorizes mischievous, cruel, perhaps wanton injury, contributions exacted, devastations committed. But the burglaries, larcenies, incendiarism and mere marauding perpetrated by Admiral Cockburn from his 74 gun ship, the Albion, Commodore Barrie, from his ship of the same force, the Dragon, and all their co-operating officers in frigates, sloops-of-war and other public vessels on the shores of Virginia and Maryland were as odious and ignoble, though less bloody or horrible than the inhuman atrocities of the British savages in the west. Slaves in large numbers, large quantities of tobacco, furniture, and other private property, protected by the laws of war, and seldom taken, even if destroyed, by land troops, were seized upon by the seafaring warriors with a piratical rapacity, which execrable plunder would have been condemned, if known, in Eng-

land; for when the Earl of Denoughmore, in the House of Lords, in November, 1814, taxed the ministry with some of these despicable enormities, the Earl of Liverpool denied all knowledge, much less approval of them. American impotency and British impunity were flagrant in the Chesapeake before the naval commander-in-chief, Admiral Cochrane was officially instructed to give formal notice to our government of inhuman hostilities; and there was in the amphibious irruptions of the vaunted British navy a mixture of frolicksome, reckless destruction, with avaricious piracy, far more licentious and disgraceful than Lafitte's illegalities from Barrataria, for whose alliance at that haunt of contraband and depredation the British navy soon after applied. Cockburn was the very *beau idéal* of a jovial, indefatigable, rapacious freebooter, employed soon after his American misdemeanors as the marine jailor of Napoleon, and spending, if I am not mistaken, much of the after part of his life in the dignified enjoyment of social intimacy with King

George the Fourth. It was impracticable to guard against his fleeting incursions on the shores of the Chesapeake; to divine when or where they would occur, prepare to repel them, by any means retaliate or punish them. Norfolk, well fortified by a veteran of the regular army, General Moses Porter, and garrisoned by Virginia mountaineers, with a few regulars, Baltimore, Washington and Alexandria, cities soon doomed to assaults, not for some time attempted, or supposed they ever would be, the predatory and prize making annoyances of the enemy in the Chesapeake, were limited to isolated villages, poor farm houses, and other indefensible objects taken or destroyed. Destruction was the punishment proclaimed and executed for resistance. The house and barn were burned of whoever fired a shot or drew a sword in self-defence. Many respectable persons, in comfortable circumstances, were reduced to poverty by these depredations; heads of families kept continually on militia duty, had no time to attend to their crops. The poor were especial sufferers. With shores so indented by creeks and bays, the whole force of a state under arms would have been unequal to cope with such overwhelming aggressors. There were, therefore, loud cries of the public voice for some floating naval armament, to move about upon the waters and check the otherwise resistless mariners.

For that purpose a flotilla of barges, mounting heavy guns, and manned by some six hundred mostly watermen, was prepared at Baltimore, under command of Captain Joshua Barney, a bold and experienced seaman and enterprising privateersman, a gay, dressy and gallant specimen of the peculiarities of ocean life, active and dashing as Cockburn, and his efficient opponent, with very inferior means disputing the Maryland waters with Barrie, on whom the duty of capturing Barney was particularly devolved. In the latter part of April, 1814, moving abroad upon the bay and rivers as far as the mouth of the Potomac, he eluded and disconcerted a vastly superior British force in ships of the line, frigates, schooners, sloops and boats, pursuing and in vain endeavoring to overcome Barney, who, on the first, eighth, fifteenth and twenty-sixth of June, and on many other days, almost every day encountered them with various success, and the destruction of vessels and men on both sides, at least diverting the British from predatory incursions ashore. Meantime, however, Cockburn landed from his ships, and with marines and seamen penetrated several parts of Virginia, where General Taylor was wounded, and narrowly escaped, and General Hungerford was chased from place to place, the same gentleman who the year before contested Mr. Bayley's seat in the House of Representatives. Barney was obliged to take shelter

beyond reach of the British larger vessels in Leonard's creek, which flows into the Patuxent, near the town of St. Leonard's, where, on the 26th of June, a combined attack by the flotilla, reinforced by a detachment of regulars under Major Stuart, from Annapolis, and of marines, under Captain Miller, from Washington, the whole commanded by Colonel Decius Wadsworth, of the ordnance, compelled the British to retire with some loss, and enabled Barney to extricate his barges from the creek, and remove them high up the Patuxent to Pig's Point on Western Branch, near Upper Marlborough.

On that day, 26th June, 1814, the official, confidential advices from our ministers in Europe repeated to the President the vindictive determination of Great Britain, greatly alarming him with apprehensions, which his war secretary could not be made to share, that the seat of government itself, in its solitary vacuity, total want of preparation, but great national importance, was in danger; and, like the storm of destruction succeeding a calm of security, fear broke the tranquillity of the capital.

Maryland was a federal state, the governor, Levin Winder, a federalist, whose salutary arraignments of Madison's administration put it on trial. Still the idea of Washington being in danger, which General Wilkinson had suggested, and the federalists often urged, was treated as a mere chimaera, groundless, if not malicious accusation of government. "What," said the National Intelligencer, in May, 1814, "though the enemy has taken possession of some islands in the Chesapeake? It is absurd to suppose that government can fortify every point, island or nook along an extensive coast. The neighboring militia must protect them; and though their officers are principally federalists, yet they are not of the Boston stamp. Not long since one of our small privateers took possession of an island on the coast of Scotland, not perhaps one hundred miles from its capital, and held it for some weeks, notwithstanding the tremendous naval and military force of Great Britain. Captain Porter, with his small frigate, captured and fortified, and long held possession of three islands in the Pacific. There is nothing, then, miraculous or alarming in the enemy's large fleet seizing and holding a few islands in the Chesapeake; in some of them erecting hospitals, which, while he remains in our waters, we hope may be well filled. As to his near approach to the capital, which has been hinted at, we have no idea of his attempting to reach this vicinity; and if he does, we have no doubt he will meet such a reception as he did at Craney Island. The enemy knows better what he is about than to trust himself abreast or on this side of Fort Washington. There are no federalists



of the Boston stamp, or none to signify, hereabouts." Partly to promote confidence, but mostly in vain-glorious assurance, the press of Baltimore at the same time boasted of the perfect security on which that city and Washington might rely. The number of troops, their superior equipment and discipline, General Winder's exertions, government's vigilance, the many Pennsylvania and Maryland militia always at hand, were paraded in print with presumptuous vaunt. "We have powder and ball, muskets and prepared ammunition enough," said one paragraph, "to kill all the Englishmen in or coming to America. Madison's capital may be threatened, or the destruction of Baltimore talked of, but we guess they will not be *burnt* at present." Shortly after these publications, on the 13th of August, 1814, Assistant Adjutant General Hite, by order from General Winder, was obliged to announce to the militia who had refused to obey orders to march, that they would be tried and *fined* by court-martial on the 27th of August, three days after the capture of Washington.

In that strain of semi-official egregious misconception had public opinion been rocked to sleep, with assurance that Washington was in no danger. In July, 1813, as mentioned in the first volume of this sketch, page 119, Admirals Warren and Cockburn had felt the pulse and sounded the spirit of the somnolent rustic capital, with few people, and no public sentiment but the little officially imparted by the executive, through its organ of the press. Sailing on both sides of Washington up the Potomac and Chesapeake, with heavy ships in considerable squadrons at that time, they approached near enough to ascertain that a stroke of brilliant aggression might lay the political metropolis in ruins, or at least under martial contribution. Cockburn's long reign over all the waters and confluents of Chesapeake Bay, familiarized him with their obstacles and facilities, and imbued him with contempt for American resistance, as well as for the laws of civilized war, and the capture of Washington was a sudden mercenary suggestion, of which plunder more than glory or vengeance was the impulse.

Admiral Cochrane went to Bermuda, to superintend the reinforcements expected there for Canada, for Louisiana and the Chesapeake. On the 3d of August, 1814, on board his eighty gun ship, the *Tonnant*, one of England's great prizes from the demolished navy of France, the British naval commander-in-chief sailed from Bermuda for the Chesapeake; convoying three thousand land troops, just from France, led by a bold and adventurous young major-general, Robert Ross, who had learned in Spain the ways of those triumphant English campaigns, which, together with simultaneous successes

of the American navy over that of Great Britain, began the latter's ultimate and probably not distant deposition from the empire of the ocean. The British army bore off much of that undisputed, exceeding English attachment which, till Wellington's advent, belonged almost exclusively to the British navy, of which the American navy took away still more, and steam, and all maritime Europe will do the rest.

On the 14th August Cochrane's fleet, entering the Chesapeake through the pine forests, lowlands and barrens of that sultry, sandy region, were immediately joined by Cockburn, with three ships of the line, several frigates, sloops-of-war, and gun-brigs, so that no less than twenty British pennants floated from the mast-heads of the noble shipping which sailed up the bay. Seven hundred marines, one hundred negroes, lately armed and disciplined, and a division of marine artillery were then added to General Ross' command, making altogether an army of four thousand troops: all but the black slaves, who were stolen in America, transported from Europe, not for any permanent or rational conquest, but the avowed purpose of mere wanton devastation. With orders to destroy, they disobeyed that barbarous command, only when what they were in duty bound to annihilate might be turned to the account of disobedient avarice. Admiral Malcolm, Admiral Codrington, who afterwards commanded when the Turkish navy was destroyed at Navarino, captain of the fleet in the Chesapeake, and Captain Napier, now an English admiral, served under Admiral Cochrane on that occasion. The first day's sail carried them to the mouth of the James River, which received the first English emigrants to Virginia; the second to the Potomac; and the third to the Patuxent; where a thunder-gust denounced their arrival. On the 19th and 20th August, without hindrance or accident, not a shot fired against them, the army was debarked at Benedict, a small village on the east bank of the Patuxent. "Its banks," said an English officer of the expedition, "covered with fields of Indian corn and meadows of the most luxuriant pasture, the neat wooden houses, white, and surrounded with orchards and gardens, with backgrounds of boundless forests, differed in every respect from the country in France, the furze, heath and underwood skirting the similar pine forests, as if there had not been time to grub and clear the ground." The first sight these Britons had of one of the most insignificant rivers, and by no means the richest, best wooded, or best cultivated parts of this country, struck their imagination, accustomed to the smaller, greener, neater and moister scenery of their own island, as "forests and rivers sublime beyond descrip-

tion; whilst the tiny spots cultivated look like petty thefts from the wild beasts, and wilder savages, of those savannahs, which they care not to resent, because unworthy of their notice." Next day the forces were brigaded, eleven hundred men, a company of marines and party of disciplined negroes under Colonel Thornton, and fourteen hundred and sixty bayonets more under Col. Brook; the 21st regiment and battalion of marines, about fourteen hundred strong, under Col. Patterson, with one hundred artillerymen and one hundred drivers, but only one six-pound cannon and two small three-pounders, landed from the ships, for want of horses to draw them, drawn by one hundred seamen, one hundred more being employed in carrying stores, ammunition and other necessaries; also fifty sappers and miners: four thousand five hundred men altogether composing the force; none on horseback except the general and staff-officers; without cavalry or hardly any artillery. On the afternoon of the 21st August, this insignificant army, to invade a country and capture its capital, marched from the encampment of their debarkation; each man, besides the heavy arms carried by British troops, loaded with sixty rounds of ball cartridge, a knapsack containing shirts, shoes, stockings, and blanket: a haversack filled with three days' provisions and his drinking canteen. The weather was hot: the men long cooped up in ships, unused to such heavy burdens, enervated by inactivity, were overcome by the first short march of six miles, and many of them dropped out of the ranks, unable to keep up. The utmost caution, vigilance, and circumspection were practiced by their leaders, apprehensive of molestation, which, however, never harassed or impeded, seldom approached, and scarcely disturbed the uneasy and irresolute invaders' slow and timorous advance. The unmanly naval hostilities which, for more than twelve months, had distressed, wasted, maddened, and mortified those regions, provoked, by reaction, unprincipled exasperation to inhuman animosity. Unknown and obscure individuals, many of whose humble and harmless dwellings were robbed, burned, their slaves stolen, and their possessions devastated with merciless outrage, retaliated in like spirit of diabolical injury. Invasion by armies is regulated by a code which somewhat spares the unoffending: and territorial conquests are commonly intended to be preserved. But the sea laws of Great Britain are essentially rapacious and unsparing; and fugitive incursions ashore, whereby mariners, landing to ravage and then retreat to their shipping, frequently a mere handful of transitory incendiaries or depredators, always destroying more than capturing, provokes a sort of border warfare odious and implacable. The few militia

and half-armed individuals suddenly got together to save property from such attacks, and kept on the alert, take illegitimate vengeance, till hostilities degenerate from great operations to little personal and the most infuriated conflicts. Cochrane's proclamation from Bermuda, inviting the slaves to revolt, was a smothered firebrand in every household, more terrible and unpardonable than torpedoes under British ships. Slaves generally attached to their masters' families, in which they are never treated so harshly as soldiers in British armies, and less inclined to desert or revolt, were, nevertheless, an inert mass, in which one restive or incendiary spark might set the whole on fire. Brutalities on both sides were the inevitable result of the system perpetrated by the aggressor. Slaves, or ignorant and unprincipled freemen, whose property was wantonly ruined, resorted to what Commodore Barrie called the "bestial act" of retaliating the ruin of their homes, by placing barrels of poisoned whiskey in the way of enemies carrying fire and sword into smiling plantations, against which danger a gentleman risked his life to apprise Barrie. But murderous, cruel, assassinating contrivances were the natural, bitter products of the poisonous seeds broadcast in such hostilities: cowardly resorts on both sides. Fear was a prevailing sentiment. Brave British soldiers and high-spirited Americans, who, in regular battles, would have met without shrinking, were naturally afraid of some unusual and clandestine destruction, and panic was the genius, or demon, of every transaction from Ross' landing till he re-embarked. Panic palsied our men under arms, stimulated and hurried their assailants, unnerved and distracted the executive, sacked the capital, where, if Ross had been killed by the clandestine shot which killed his horse as he rode into it, after the battle of Bladensburg, and left Cockburn to command, there is little doubt that every house would have been consumed in one universal and final execution of the barbarian hostilities practiced by him.

Desirous, wherever it can be done, of making the enemy tell the story, I quote from an English officer, who was with Ross' army, the following account of the spirit and manner in which the expedition was conducted.

"Cruising about in every direction, they threatened the whole line of coast, from the entrance to the very bend of the bay; and thus kept the Americans in a constant state of alarm. Whenever a favorable opportunity presented itself, parties landed, plundered, or destroyed the government stores, laid towns and districts under contribution, and brought off all the shipping which could be reached. In a word, the hostilities carried on in the Chesapeake resembled the



expedition of the ancient Danes against Great Britain, rather than a modern war between civilized nations." Such being the apt similitude of an English plunderer himself, we have but to ask another English historian for a brief account of the Danish invasion to which he likens that of the modern English in America. "All straggling parties," says Hume, "whom necessity or a love of plunder had drawn to a distance from their chief, were cut off by the English. Having tried all the prisoners at Winchester, Alfred (the great) hanged them as pirates, the common enemies of mankind. The animosities between the inhabitants of English and Danish race had, from these repeated injuries, risen to a great height, when Ethelred, from a policy incident to weak princes, embraced the cruel resolution of massacring the latter throughout all his dominions. Secret orders were dispatched to commence the execution everywhere on the same day, and the festival of St. Brice, which fell on a Sunday, on which the Danes usually bathed themselves, was chosen for that purpose. It is needless to repeat the barbarity of the account transmitted to us concerning the cruelty of this massacre. The rage of the populace, excited by so many injuries, sanctified by authority, and stimulated by example, distinguished not between innocence and guilt, spared neither sex nor age, and was not satisfied without the torture as well as death of the unhappy victim." Of the narrator, who likens modern English invasion of this country to Danish invasion of England in a barbarous age, an authoritative English publication, the Quarterly Review, says: "Exhibiting in his pages an intimate acquaintance with the real occurrences, &c., while a vein of manly feeling and generous sentiment enhances, in a very special manner, some of the most distressing scenes to which the checkered course of a soldier's life is liable." "England," said the author thus commended, "was now at peace with all the world, except this, her most implacable enemy, against whom she has the justest cause of irritation; nor is it at all probable that she will let slip an opportunity so favorable of severely chastising her for her perfidy and ingratitude."

Hence, probably, for it is difficult to tell why, little or no resistance was made to the British in all their wary, hesitating, and apprehensive march from Benedict; when one hour's stout opposition anywhere would have deterred their further attempt to go to Washington. Dread and hatred depopulated the towns and country, from which the people fled in mass, when they should all have staid with Winder's troops and Barney's watermen to dispute every inch. Ross' first stage was to Nottingham, whither he marched in pursuit of

Barney's flotilla, which was gone to Pig's Point, near Marlborough; proving a most unlucky inducement for pursuit; and burned, as it was, by order of the Secretary of the Navy, when it might alone, certainly when covered by Winder's army, have withstood, if not defeated, Ross, proving a worse than useless obstacle to his advance, on the contrary masking his rush on Washington. The British officer before cited, in his narrative, says of Nottingham, that "it was a town containing from a thousand to fifteen hundred inhabitants, which we found completely deserted. Not an individual was to be seen in the streets, or remained in the houses; while the appearance of the furniture, &c., in some places the very bread left in the ovens, showed that it had been evacuated in great haste immediately before our arrival. The houses were little superior to cottages, but surrounded by others of far better description, good substantial farm-houses, the country for several miles round in a high state of cultivation, the fields covered with an abundant and luxuriant crop of tobacco, of which besides we found numerous barns filled with the remains of last year's crops, the whole of which was of course seized in the name of his majesty King George the Third."

A London Journal of the 9th August, 1814, mentioning "with pleasure that several detachments of the army of the Peninsula and France are arrived on the St. Lawrence," added, "our fleet on the Atlantic coast of America appears to have created great alarm, and done considerable mischief by a warfare of a *somewhat ambiguous* character." Those modest terms gently questioned the amphibious depredations on the shores of the Chesapeake, which a British officer, one of their perpetrators, described as revivals of the atrocities which in a barbarous age marked the Danish invasion of England.

The shocking simplicity of this English narrative attests that neither man, woman, child, nor slave staid, but all fled on the approach of foes formidable indeed, but still more horrible. Thus landing at their pleasure, and marching from Benedict to Nottingham without a show of hindrance, the enemy, surprised and perplexed by such unexampled and incomprehensible permission, encamped for the night at Nottingham, surrounding themselves with unusual precaution against the attack they supposed could not be long deferred. Next day they marched ten miles further, to Upper Marlborough, still in pursuit of Barney, but so much nearer Washington; not, however, without much doubt, increased hesitation, and General Ross' strong reluctance, overcome at last by Cockburn, instigator of the movement beyond that point. The general long paused before he would consent to follow even the flotilla any further, inclining

to return to the shipping in the Potomac. "There seemed," says the British narrator, "to be something like hesitation as to the course to be pursued, whether to follow the gun-boats, or return to the shipping. But at last the former proceeding was resolved upon, and the column set forward about eight o'clock in the direction of Marlborough, another village about ten miles beyond Nottingham, marching through the heart of thick forests well covered from the rays of the sun." "During our progress the same caution was observed which we had practiced yesterday. Nor was it altogether unnecessary, several bodies of the enemy's horse occasionally showing themselves; and what appeared to be the rear guard of a column of infantry, evacuating Marlborough as our advance entered. There was, however, little or no skirmishing, and we were allowed to remain in that village all night without molestation."

The biographer of Admiral Cockburn claims for him exclusive credit, whilst a land officer, Col. Evans, deems it impossible that a seaman could have thought of preparing a campaign for the guidance of a general "second only in successful experience and reputation to the Duke of Wellington." But the official letter of Gen. Ross says: "To Rear-Admiral Cockburn, who suggested the attack on Washington, and who accompanied the army, I confess the greatest obligations for his cordial co-operation and advice," which seems decisive as to the authorship of the scheme, and with regard to the execution of it, the following statement of Colonel Evans himself is as explicit as to the influence of the admiral in reassuring and urging on the army at a moment evidently of great irresolution. "The column having diverged some miles from the river towards the interior, intimation, however, was brought in that the force collecting in front was very strongly posted, and considerably more numerous than had been anticipated. Doubts then may have arisen as to the course most eligible to pursue; whether to persist in the offensive, or to abandon that intention; and a portion of the morning, it is quite true, elapsed in discussing these points. But as it became necessary on the following day to engage in an affair of rather more than ordinary risk, that of forcing a bridge, defended by three or four times the number of the assailants, and by the fire of twenty-four pieces of cannon, a little time for reflection will not, perhaps, be deemed to have been unreasonably spent. The point for final consideration was this. Whether or not the aspect of affairs warranted attempting that which completely overstepped the intentions of, and was wholly un contemplated by, government. While the decision, however, was pending, it occurred, that if the rear-admiral were on the spot to repeat the opinions previously discussed,

as to the unprepared state of the enemy, &c., his presence might have the effect of inclining the scale in favor of a forward movement, so earnestly desired. Under this impression, two individuals of the staff proceeded to the river side, some few miles off, where the admiral then was; and having submitted to him their views and wishes on the subject, proposed that he should mount a led horse, they had for the purpose brought with them, in order to facilitate his getting to the bivouac, to tender to the major-general his services and presence on the occasion. This, with his characteristic zeal, he agreed to; the offer was accepted by the major-general, and as the advance subsequently took place, it is perfectly fair to conclude that the presence of the rear-admiral may not have been, as in fact it was not, without a favorable bias."

Thus, Cockburn's knowledge of the country, and contempt for its capacity of resistance, led Ross on, from step to step, emboldened all the way by almost absolute non-resistance, till at length the first salute of American panic enabled the admiral to take the general to Washington.

"But," says the English narrator, "if we were not harassed, we were at least startled on the march by several heavy explosions. The cause of this we were at first unable to discover; but we soon learned that they were occasioned by the blowing up of the very squadron of which we were in pursuit; which Commodore Barney, perceiving the impossibility of preserving, prudently destroyed, in order to prevent its falling into our hands. In Marlborough we remained, not only during the night, but till noon on the following day. The hesitation which had caused the loss of a few hours at Nottingham again interposed, and produced a serious delay, which might have been attended with serious consequences. At length, however, orders were given to form, and we quitted Marlborough about two in the afternoon, taking the road to Washington."

Barney's flotilla was destroyed, not by him. With nearly all his officers and men, by order of the Secretary of the Navy, he had joined General Winder, leaving only five men with each boat to blow it up: and that strange sacrifice, by superior orders from Washington, of a force that might have defied the whole British army, was one of the many acts of inexplicable terror which precluded all hope of saving the capital. The explosion of Barney's flotilla was a salute to induce, invite, almost to welcome what the Secretary of War characterized as the *Cossack rush* upon Washington. At Marlborough the British army was within eighteen miles of it, having marched some twenty almost unresisted. They were, it might be said, between the American army at the woodyard, a short



distance south of the British and the capital. Ross' scruples, daily combated by Cockburn, yielded to the force of circumstances. Victory, fame, plunder, promotion, titles, honors, disgrace if he retired after having advanced so far and so well, combined to quell the judicious scruples of a brave young general, accustomed to obey but not to lead, who had never before borne the responsibility of a military enterprise, of which the personal dangers were nothing compared to the public amenability, which was a burden assumed with much hesitation.

Mr. Gallatin's alarm from Europe, received the 26th June, 1814, was preceded by a stream of turbid disquietudes by every arrival, continually perplexing the solitary confidence of the seat of government. At a cabinet council, on the 7th June, the President called on the Secretary of War for a report of the regular troops and militia in the fifth military district, of which Washington was part. The total was but two thousand one hundred and fifty-four enlisted men, stationed at Norfolk, Baltimore, St. Mary's and Fort Warburton, or Washington, six miles below Alexandria, on the Potomac; and one company of marines at the city of Washington. The whole enlisted army of the United States, on the 1st July, 1814, amounted to no more than thirty-one thousand five hundred and three regular soldiers, twenty-seven thousand and ten effectives. Five hundred recruited in North Carolina by Lieutenant-Colonel Clinch, encamped for drill and discipline at Greenleaf's Point, one of the alluvial flats of the city of Washington, were marched to the northern frontier, on the 15th June, 1814: a force that might have saved from capture a city, slumbering in false security, where the Secretary of War rebuked all apprehension of its danger as idle dreams.

Two days after the cabinet council, on the 9th June, 1814, the royal French brig-of-war, *Olivier* (Olive Branch), arrived at New York, under the white flag and cockades of the departed Bourbons, for more than twenty years driven almost from the earth, unknown on the waters, now sending dispatches to their minister at Washington, that the child and champion of French liberty, equality and empire, was overthrown; and the United States, without any counteracting power, influence or sympathy in the world, left single-handed to make head against the gigantic means, vengeance and aggrandizement of Great Britain. The royal French brig-of-war saluted Castle Williams, at New York, with twenty-one guns, which were returned by eighteen; and at the cannon's mouth the American Republic confessed the restoration of a king by divine right, proclaiming that, during his long exile, he had never ceased to reign.

The executive government of the United

States had been extremely and fortunately, if not providently and wisely, abstemious not only of alliance but even amity with the immense Emperor of the French, whose prodigious dictatorship broke down by his abdication, at Fontainebleau, the 6th April, after the allied conquerors entered Paris, the 31st March, 1814, and seduced some of his marshals. The heart of all people is with heroes: and that of the American as well as the French nation was with the child and champion of equality, though he trampled upon liberty, by marvellous acts of greatness and renown impressing his image on popular admiration and personal regard. The American sensation of his downfall was disappointment to the war party, delight to the peace party. When conquest and treason, civil and military, found their way into the French capital, an old soldier, Marshal Scruier, then governor of the Hospital of Invalids, hastily collected the flags suspended from its glorious dome, trophies of innumerable victories, committed them to the flames and threw their ashes into the Seine. His nephew and sole male heir, the French minister at Washington, was the only one of all the foreign ministers of Napoleon whom Louis the Eighteenth did not displace. His Secretary of Legation, George Caraman, son of the Duke of Caraman, who adhered to the dethroned Bourbons in all their hard fortunes, on the 13th June, 1814, by M. Scruier's direction, published in the *National Intelligencer*, a call on all French subjects in the United States to repair to their consuls, and "give adhesion to the great revolution, by which the white cockade was thenceforth the rallying sign of all friends of the throne and their country."

A semi-official article in the *National Intelligencer* of the 18th June, 1814, announced that "Bonaparte had been put down, not by the Bourbons, but the revolutionary party which put him up. On the friends of liberty, in whatever country, he had no claims, but was an object of their jealousy and mistrust. Weak at sea, his policy was the rights of neutral nations. Every power felt and abhorred the usurpations of England. To the United States he never was an object of alarm, who so keenly felt his depredations, that much hesitation was experienced as to the course to pursue. It would have been folly to go to war with a power which had not a ship at sea. We pursued a course from which, whatever may be the alarm which now agitates weak nerves, the happiest results are to be anticipated." In these cautious terms Madison's administration vindicated their medium policy, steering warily between imputed French influence and English enmity. On the 29th June, 1814, the "delivery of Europe from the yoke of military despotism was celebrated in the blockaded, and almost besieged by English

enemies, city of New York, by one of the earliest representatives of the United States in France, a bold statesman, orator and founder of American government, Gouverneur Morris, a stately and imposing personage, whose powdered hair, wooden leg, and commanding manners, figured both in Europe and America. His discourse, of much public sensation, affirming kings' divine right, began, "'Tis done; the long agony is over, France reposes in the arms of her legitimate prince;" repose on the subjugation of France and overthrow of Napoleon, which liberated the towering power of Great Britain, and was strained by Castlereagh to vindictive and inhuman hostilities against the United States. English misapprehension is natural, inveterate and intractable, that for America between England and France, not to be English is to be French. But so strong is the feeling of kindred in American filiation, the colonial veneration of offspring for patristic supremacy, that American impartiality between English and French is condemned as unnatural by Americans as well as English. Alarmed by every gust from the East, after the conquest of France, Madison, disconcerted, beheld the world at peace, and Great Britain at the head of it. Yet, from that overwhelming pacification British grandeur began its decline, sinking under exertions, debts, taxes and triumphs, such as freedom, commerce and credit only could extort from factitious power; and from that jeopard these United States have been ever since ascending in power, character, resources and high-toned nationality. Dread of French despotism was Madison's sentiment; though his unwarlike nature was disturbed by a crisis, unexpected and fearful cast on his administration, without funds, commerce, a small army, scarcely any navy. European revolutions of empires disheartened his adherents, and roused his opponents to second the English clamor that Madison, the tool of Bonaparte, must be deposed like him, some American Elba be his exile, the conquered portion of New England annexed to Canada, of which it was part, the French fraudulent possession of Louisiana restored to Spain, to whom it belonged, and these terms of peace dictated in the metropolis of the United States, as the legitimate restorations of Europe had been in the capital of revolutionary France, first the ally, then imitator and finally instigator of rebellious, unnatural America.

Under the rank growth of universal menace, apprehensions and forebodings sprang up, the specific and exotic terror that the metropolitan wilderness was in peril: affright more strange and unwelcome than that by which Wellington strives to convince England that steam exposes London to French capture. Large military embarkations for America, from Spain,

France, Ireland, England; the great captain Wellington, or his greatest lieutenant, Lord Hill, said to be coming to command them; increased naval squadrons; an American seaman, Admiral Sir Isaac Coffin, to take charge of the British fleet on Lake Ontario; armies and navies shooting like baleful meteors across the Atlantic in rapid transit from the Old World, restored to ancient limits by kingdoms and legitimate principles to reform, recolonize, and refetter the new.

Transcendant contempt for this country, coupled with malicious vengeance to be inflicted for hostilities commenced by order of the French usurper, and naval triumphs to be obliterated in blood, were the dogs of war let loose from Europe on America. Admiral Warren told our American minister, Levitt Harris, in London, that the orders of Admiral Cochrane were very different from his; and 1814 was to far exceed 1813, in hostilities. Cochrane, therefore, pre-faced the sack of Washington by official announcement to our government from his Britannic Majesty's ship *Tonnant*, in the Patuxent, within a day's march, and almost within cannon sound of Washington; that, contrary, as his official letter stated, if it did not boast, to the usages of civilized war, all the assailable places on the coast were to be laid waste, which inhuman threat was brought forth in fraud, the 18th of August, the day before the British army landed at Benedict. For Cochrane's official letter was not sent ashore from his ship till ten days after its date on the 28th, then in the envelope of another letter from Admiral Codrington to Captain Gordon, to be mentioned hereafter. When landed, the letter was not sent by a flag of truce, or by any regular method of communication, but merely given to an idle person who happened to be on the Patuxent shore, from whom, through various accidental channels, it found its way not till the 31st of August, to the department of State, a week after the outrage it announced was perpetrated, and ten days after the perpetrators returned from burning Washington had re-embarked on board Cochrane's fleet at Benedict. By such a fraud was that barbarous notice brought to its address.

Beleagured, menaced, perhaps terrified, but unsubdued and constant in his meek fortitude, President Madison convened his cabinet for lugubrious consultation how to save the seat of government. The American Congress, driven from captured Philadelphia to Yorktown; New York, Charleston and Savannah garrisoned by British troops, revolution precedents of present dangers, forced themselves on the recollection of Madison, Monroe and Armstrong, who had experienced what were now again to be apprehended: our homes and honor, the national capital and cha-



racter in danger of the hoofs and torches of ruthless enemies, scorning the laws of war and hating the liberties of America. Serene, however alarmed, the President adjourned the cabinet on the 4th of July, 1814, to meet him again at dinner, as was his wont, in the freedom of conviviality to resume deliberation. The resolves of that cabinet council were, at least in theory, commensurate with the emergency: the creation of a metropolitan military district, the tenth, to consist of the city, northern Virginia, and Maryland; a requisition for ninety-three thousand five hundred militia to be held ready; fifteen thousand of them, if necessary, to be forthwith mustered into service, and embodied with about one thousand regulars, the thirty-sixth and thirty-eighth regiments of infantry; Barney's flotilla men, a company of marines, two troops of cavalry, at Carlisle, not yet horsed, a sprinkling of artillerymen at Baltimore, Annapolis, and Fort Washington, scattered over an area of fifty or sixty miles. There were no funds; though the city banks proffered a few hundred thousand dollars of their depreciated, and in a very few days unconvertible paper, as with the fall of Washington all banks south of New England stopped payments in coin. There were no rifles; not flints enough; American gunpowder was inferior to English; there was not a cannon mounted for defence of the seat of government; not a regular soldier there; not a fortress breastwork or military fortification of any kind within twelve miles. The neighboring militia of Maryland and Virginia were worn down by disastrous and mortifying service, routed, and disheartened. The proportion of regular troops, all of them mere recruits, never tried in fire, was like that of coin to paper in the wretched currency, so small an infusion of precious metal, that there was scarcely any substance to rely upon. These were disadvantages of a contest with enemies winged with ubiquitous shipping, by which a few thousand soldiers, speedily transported from place to place, could strike with the force of superior numbers wherever least expected, and retire before new levies could be collected to meet them; for such incursive naval armaments are as formidable, as they are unfit for permanent conquests.

General Armstrong, the war Secretary, an old soldier well informed in the practice and science of war, was not waiting to prompt compliance with the resolutions of the council of the first of July. On the anniversary day of that month and year, as if the 4th of July would consecrate the call and organize the force, in the midst of the national festivities his order issued for the nearly one hundred thousand militia to be ready, and the fifteen thousand to be soon embodied. But neither the passive

many nor the active few turned out or even prepared for it; nearly all remained at home, and the whole demonstration appeared only in the papers that published it. Of the five thousand required at once from Pennsylvania, not one could be ordered out, owing to remediless defect in the law of that State. From General Winder's delay in giving notice to the Executive of Virginia, it was only five days before Washington fell, that the two thousand of that State were summoned, too late for being mustered. Of the Marylanders only two of the six thousand ever appeared; most of them volunteers from Baltimore, who did not reach Bladensburg till, much jaded and disorganized, the day before their defeat, with a few hundred from Annapolis, who arrived less than a half an hour before the battle began, fatigued by a forced march of twelve miles in excessive heat, that morning, hurried to the top of a high hill, a mile beyond the front rank, there to flank Barney, and as he officially reported in a few minutes, to his great mortification, making no resistance, but giving a fire or two and retreating.

The officer selected to command the new military district was General Winder, lately exchanged and returned from Quebec, where he had been kept a prisoner after his unlucky, if not discreditable capture in June, 1813. Being a relative of Levin Winder, the Governor of Maryland, federal governor of a federal State, Mr. Madison and Mr. Monroe deemed it politic to conciliate opposition by appointing him to that responsible and arduous command, rather than General Moses Porter, a veteran soldier commanding at Norfolk, who was preferred by General Armstrong, and who would not have been deterred, like Winder, from exposing the lives and limbs of his neighbors and friends in battle with the vagabond mercenaries of the English army, which General Winder felt as a cruel necessity to be humanely avoided, if possible. On the 27th of June, 1814, General Winder arrived at Washington with General Wilkinson, accidentally his companion, estranged from the President and Secretary of War, who urged that the total unpreparedness of the capital, the *éclat* of its capture, the depreciation of American character abroad, and aggravation of American divisions at home, would induce the enemy to attempt it, and suggested a camp of observation and practice; three or four thousand men encamped near the city, which Winder likewise desired; but the Secretary of War objected to, because he considered militia only available on sudden emergencies, and the expense of their being encamped till needed, would be an onerous charge on an empty treasury. Winder's was an arduous perplexity and harassing task; to arm and fortify a military district with-

out magazines or troops, controlled by a cabinet of older soldiers than himself, not coincident in their own opinions, whom it would be disrespectful in him to contradict, and almost insubordinate to overrule; to lead undisciplined neighbors to battle, in whose martial prowess he could not confide, of whose blood he was humanely sparing, overlooked by several superiors, and distracted by a host of advisers. William Pinkney described General Winder in the disgraceful commencement of the rout at Bladensburg as "manifesting the courage that became a soldier and a gentleman." But in addition to that courage, which no one denied General Winder, there were wanting the strenuous fortitude and self-possession, confidence in himself and in his troops, if led to victory or death by a commander unscrupulous of bloodshed for either. General Armstrong, the Secretary of War, oldest, if not only soldier in the administration, who had served long and with distinction, overruled in his choice of a General to command the new military district, was furthermore reduced to mere advisory authority by written direction from the President, as early as the 13th of August, that the Secretary of War should give no order to any officer commanding a district without previously receiving the Executive sanction. Armstrong never enjoyed Madison's confidence, with whom Monroe was in friendly intimacy: and accompanied, superintended, and deranged Winder's movements, while Armstrong was reduced to a cipher. Winder, overwhelmed by the complication and magnitude of his duties, fell behindhand with his official correspondence. His orders to the governors of Pennsylvania and Virginia for their contingents of militia, were not given till it was too late to comply with them, and an order from the War Department to Gen. Winder, when but forty miles distant, was not received by him for nearly three weeks after it issued, owing, as was said, to the continual movements to which he was subjected from place to place. From first to last the elements of the tenth military district were out of order.

On the morning of Thursday, the 18th of August, 1814, before Cochrane's official announcement of that date was sent on its way to Washington, that, regardless of civilized warfare, his orders and movements were for indiscriminate destruction, intelligence arrived there by express, from our observatory at Point Look Out, where the River Potomac enters Chesapeake Bay, that the enemy were coming! Late that night of dismay, the commanding officer of the first Columbian brigade was ordered to assemble it on the bank of the Tiber next evening. But when paraded accordingly, the troops were deficient in so many essential articles, that they were unavoidably dismissed till

next morning. In the afternoon of that day, the 20th, two regiments numbering consolidated rather more than a thousand men, without baggage or stores, flints enough, or any rifles for the riflemen, 700 volunteers, the rest drafts, were marched a few miles towards the enemy, and slept on the ground, without tents, food, or any other comfortable provision for their short, hot, inglorious campaign. The Secretary of State preceded them, escorted by a troop of horse, reconnoitered the enemy as well as he could, and returned, reporting six thousand men debarked. Sunday, the 21st, the volunteers and militia were mustered into service; and, by the 22d, Winder was at the head of 3,200 men in arms, with seventeen pieces of artillery, including a few troops of cavalry. That day an advance corps was constituted, 350 regulars, under Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, of two troops of United States dragoons, under Lieutenant-Colonel Laval, and three select companies of volunteer artillery and infantry, commanded by Major Peter: which vanguard was, for the first time, brought into the sight of, but not allowed, though the men were eager for action, to get into collision with the British, which Colonel Monroe discountenanced, and General Winder deemed too great a risk with untried troops, only three days from home, unorganized, their officers unpracticed—a crowd of advisers rather than an army of soldiers. The enemy, who, with doubt and hesitation, had marched from Benedict to Nottingham, with increased diffidence, thence were marching to Marlborough, whom the least check would have turned back to their shipping, which Ross left with great uneasiness, were allowed, without cavalry, and scarcely a cannon, to move forward, unresisted, flushed with passive victory, by unmolested progress, through a well-settled country, abounding in defiles, ravines, streams, woods, and natural obstacles, of which their antagonists took no advantage, but fell back, encouraging Cockburn to urge Ross onward, and discouraging raw troops, disappointed of even a trial for exploit.

This first inauspicious hostile confrontation was soon made worse by more striking misadventure. As Ross advanced, and Winder retreated, perplexed whether Annapolis or Alexandria was the hostile aim, which had not then settled on Washington, orders despatched thence by the Secretary of the Navy were executed, which astonished both armies. Before a man marched from the capital, in the first paroxysm of a long fit of trepidation, an order, on the 20th, to Barney, preceded the troops: "Should the enemy dash for this place, *destroy the flotilla*, and proceed with the men to this place." On receipt of which positive command of self-destruction, Barney prepared his barges for their fate, by



leaving six men in each to blow it up, and with the other 400 joined Winder, taking with him into the army, the executive and universal dread that the British were irresistible. With 500, many of them not even watermen, in fourteen open row boats, and one tender, he had long eluded and worsted 47 ships of the line, frigates, sloops, and brigs-of-war, bomb-vessels, tenders, and transports, manned by 8,000 British mariners, reinforced latterly by 4,000 veteran troops, whom, with artillery, of which they had none, and covered by Winder's 2,500 men, he might have kept at bay, till British diffidence sunk to despondency and American rose to hope. But, while our force was retreating and their's pursuing the deserted flotilla, its explosions, as barge after barge was set fire to, rent the air, confounding one army with increased chagrin, and cheering the other with renewed assurance. When Cortez burned his vessels, how different the motive from this sacrifice to despair! despair communicated from London to Washington, from Washington throughout the shores of the Chesapeake! despair, which, from the first tidings of alarm, seized like a plague upon the government, distracted its actions, and paralyzed its instruments!

Major-General Van Ness, commander of the division of militia of the District of Columbia, a gentleman of large property in Washington, president of the bank of the metropolis, naturally extremely solicitous to ward off the blow he foretold, a man vigorous of body and spirit, had appealed to the President against being persupersed by Gen. Winder, who, as brigadier-general, was his inferior in rank, and strongly remonstrated against what he pronounced injustice. General Wilkinson, too, proffered his services, if his arrest could be suspended for the occasion, to take command of the militia, and lead them against the enemy in the place of his birth, whose localities were familiar to him. But neither of these applications was countenanced. Van Ness resigned, and served in the battle as a volunteer. Wilkinson's military experience, and unquestioned bravery, might have been important, if he had tendered them in that capacity.

The flotilla in flames, and Winder retreating, still Ross doubted; there were chances still for Washington. It required all Cockburn's reckless hardihood, contempt for the country, and lust for plunder, to overcome the general's scruples, anxiously discussed all the night of the 22d and morning of the 23d, at Marlborough; and, as Cockburn afterwards confessed, at Washington, the balance was at last struck, not like that of the Gaul at Rome, by the sword, but by booty. "The government," said he, "will ransom their public buildings and homes, and we shall be enriched

by contribution:" which sordid calculation carried the final resolve to march on Washington. "As general of brigade under Lord Wellington," says the English narrative, "General Ross had, no doubt, learned the art of war in an excellent school: but only to obey, with no more responsibility than a colonel commanding a battalion. But, at the head of an independent army, upon his determination depend, he feels, not only the success, but the lives and safety of the troops. This diffidence General Ross exhibited in the loss, first, of three hours in Nottingham, and, again, of eight at Marlborough. The truth is, that *the capture of Washington was not the original end of the expedition*. To destroy the flotilla was the sole object of the disembarkation, and, *but for the instigations of Admiral Cockburn*, who accompanied the army, the capital of the enemy would probably have escaped its visitation. It was he who, on the retreat of the flotilla from Nottingham, urged the necessity of a pursuit; and it was he who also suggested the attack on Washington, and, finally, prevailed on General Ross to venture so far from the shipping." Strong evidence this, borne by an army officer against his military leader, in favor of the naval genius of the foray. As the general himself, in his official report of his success, already quoted, says, "To Rear-Admiral Cockburn, who suggested the attack on Washington, and accompanied the army, I confess the greatest obligation for his cordial co-operation and advice." The rear-admiral's official dispatch states, that the flotilla was a pretext, while the ultimate destination of the combined force was Washington, only should it be found that the attempt might be made with any prospect of success. Nullity of resistance, panic-struck retreat before them without a blow struck, and thirst of plunder more than fame, carried forward the invaders to the fall of Washington, which, like the Dutch fleet taken by a charge of Pichegru's cavalry, though captured by land forces, was a nautical conquest.

Stealing fifty or sixty horses from the fields and stables, on which to mount what they called their *Cossacks*, the bold seaman who suggested, planned, superintended, and executed the hazardous enterprise, turned his back on his own ships, after ours were burned in affright, and drove headlong, instead of deserved defeat, to fortunate triumph. Ross, a brave and active young general, unbroken to independent command, revolted at marching without cavalry or artillery, ammunition or provisions, except on the backs of his men, without baggage or military chest, through an enemy's country, to attack a capital of which, but for Cockburn's assurance, the general could form no adequate idea of the naked-

ness and weakness. Nor was the Scots rear-admiral without the aid and comfort of treason. Not only had he spies in Washington, more than twelve months' familiarity with all the vicinages of the Chesapeake, but, in his train, traitors to show, lead, and encourage the way. There was no police or precaution at Washington against clandestine hostile visitation and overt commorancy there. The American force, positions, designs, and movements, were all well known in the British camp. A young Scotsman, of idle and vicious habits, accompanied the enemy's advance toward the capital, where his two respectable brothers were both in public employment. Among other strange oversights in that dark period, our government suffered a spy on them to reside at Bladensburg, in the person of a young Englishman, brother to the consul-general, and clerk to Barclay, the English commissary of prisoners, who was removed, I believe, from Bladensburg, where he had been living. But his clerk was allowed to remain; and, no doubt, kept the enemy constantly advised of all the designs of government and movements of troops, and whatever else it was useful for them to know, and for us to keep from their knowledge.

Monday, 22d August, was a day of unfortunate and unpromising American inaction. The timidity of Winder's army, keeping aloof from that of Ross, avoiding collision when in sight of it, retreating almost without a shot, throwing no impediment in its way, invited aggression, while the fatal sacrifice of the doomed flotilla sounded like the orders of capitulation to the dejected Americans, and the signal to charge for the emboldened Britons. Dismal as that day's disaster and retrograde were, however, to inexperienced citizen soldiers, impressionable, thinking for themselves, and tumultuous in the utterance of their own opinions of what ought and ought not to be done, freemen with homes hard by, thoughts, and undisciplined republican emotions, next day, Tuesday, the 23d, was a still and much more eventful eve to the fatal morrow of battle.

On the night of the 22d August, while Winder's army lay at Battalion Old Fields, the President, with his Secretaries of War and Navy, and the Attorney-General, visited Winder's camp, where the Secretary of State was already; all sleeping there that night. Next morning the President reviewed the troops, disturbed by contradictory rumors and agitated by noisy preconceptions, whether the British, whose numbers were multiplied by apprehensions to twelve thousand, would attack Winder's army, or Annapolis, Alexandria or Washington, or return to their shipping; all was wild conjecture and disorderly disquiet.

Such were the laxity of discipline, insubordination and turbulence, probably unavoidable in a heterogeneous assemblage on a sudden of citizens armed and unarmed, that an old officer present described the camp as open as a race field, and noisy as a fair, the militia and sailors boisterous with mirth or quarrels, the countersign given so loudly by the sentinels that it might be heard fifty yards. In the midst of such a scene, about one o'clock at night the Secretary of the Navy and Attorney-General called on General Winder to let him know that the President was in the neighborhood, for whom a company of regulars was sent as a guard. During the following day of the review, a most alarming report became prevalent, unquestionably true, that the general was missing. Absent the whole day, the fear was universal that he must have fallen into the hands of the enemy. In that emergency, the President, who inclined to risk an action, and at all events, with his cabinet, deemed it necessary to prepare for one, by a sort of extemporaneous requirement, prevailed on General Walter Smith, of the Georgetown brigade, to take the command. During this disturbance, Colonel Monroe left the camp, and rode back to Washington to see whether the Baltimore wing of the army had arrived. About sunset, however, Gen. Winder returned from a day spent in reconnoitering; for it was one of his misfortunes that the cavalry and light troops, all unpracticed, could not be got near enough to the enemy to reconnoiter, who with more experience kept their sharpshooters out to prevent approach. General Winder found General Smith and Commodore Barney in battle array, awaiting an attack, which Major Peter, from the advance, reported as probable by six thousand men. So confident was General Smith in his three thousand combatants, their position and disposition, that he feared the British would not risk an action. Winder, with more experience and less confidence, apprehending an attack after night, when his men would be deprived of their superiority in artillery, confounded, if not cut to pieces by veteran assailants, ordered an evening retreat to Washington. In the judgment of experienced military men, that retreat saved the little army from total defeat, with great loss, and Washington from capture more sanguinary, tragical and fatal than even its deplorable fate next day. If put to flight, and many of them to death that night, there would have been scarcely any American force left to act on even the prudence of the British. "On the 23d," says the English narrator, "we fell in with a strong body of the enemy, to deceive whom we wheeled off from the main road and took the direction of Alexandria. The bait took completely; for this party was in fact the



advanced guard of the main army. Thinking that Alexandria, and not Washington, was threatened, the American general abandoned a strong position which he had seized on the main road, harassed his troops by a heedless march toward that town, and discovered his mistake only in time enough to occupy the heights of Bladensburg a very few minutes before we came in sight."

The retreat that evening, and the manner of it, like the recoil from the enemy the day before, and destruction of the flotilla, was extremely detrimental to our troops. The retreat, almost a flight, was hasty and terrified. About five o'clock, P.M., Mr. John Law's report to the committee of investigation was: "After having remained some time in order of battle, we were ordered to retreat to Washington, and although our march on the retreat was extremely rapid, yet orders were occasionally given to the captains of companies to hurry on their men. The march, therefore, literally became a run of eight miles."

After three or four days of extreme fatigue and disappointment, without a gun fired with any effect, not a man killed or wounded on either side, harassed, mortified and prepared for defeat, Winder's army encamped near the navy yard; many of them going home to their affrighted families for rest and food, and change of clothing. General Winder, completely jaded on a borrowed horse, rode to the President's, with whom he had a brief conference, necessarily despondent, then called on the Secretary of War, whom he found abed, and his borrowed horse giving out, returned on foot to his camp at the navy yard, bruised and hurt by falling into a ditch in the dark. Commodore Tingey, commander of the navy yard, and Colonel Wharton, of the marines, the general found there without a single man in the barracks, and with them concerted additional preparations for destroying the bridges over the Potomac, the vessels and armament at the navy yard; for destruction by ourselves to prevent it by the enemy was the chief care, though the general still thought that Annapolis was Ross's object. Although the British frigates in the Potomac had then passed the kettle bottoms, and General Winder always pronounced Fort Washington untenable, yet he deemed the naval advance up the Potomac a mere demonstration to draw off his attention from Annapolis, whence Baltimore and Washington would be both equally assailable from a central position, safe for the shipping and unapproachable by us. In that conviction the Secretary of War concurred, although he intimated that their might be a transitory rush, what he called a "Cossack hurrah" upon Washington; where, however, till the dust of the invader's feet was seen from Bladensburg, amid a cloud

of fears, no distinct impression ever prevailed that Washington would be the end or Bladensburg the mean of the enterprise. To the multitudinous expressions of alarm that such *might* be their design, while giving instruction to Winder to guard against the possibility of it, by harassing and impeding their march, and throwing every obstacle in their way at every step, the Secretary of War, looking contemptuous incredulity through his spectacles, would say, "have they artillery? No. Have they cavalry? No. Then don't tell an old soldier that any regular army will or can come. We are more frightened than hurt, or like to be. What do they want, what can they get in this *sheep walk*, as, to the implacable disgust of its inhabitants, he designated their federal city. If they want to do anything they must go to Baltimore, not come to this barren wilderness."

At seven o'clock in the sultry evening of the 22d of August, Gen. Stansbury's brigade of fourteen hundred drafted militia reached Bladensburg from Baltimore; followed, at sunset next evening, by Colonel Sterrett's fine regiment, five hundred of the men of property, substantial mechanics and high-spirited young gentlemen of Baltimore, in showy regimentals, well organized and disciplined volunteers, with Major Pinkney's (the late Attorney-General of the United States), battalion of one hundred and fifty riflemen and two companies of artillery, all attached to Stansbury's brigade, thus some twenty-one hundred men in arms. General Young's Virginia brigade, four hundred and fifty men from Alexandria and its environs, on the Maryland side of the Potomac, informed that on the 23d General Smith's brigade was retreating to Washington, and the enemy pursuing rapidly, was directed by General Winder to cross the river if compelled to retreat, and on the morning of the 24th was about doing so pursuant to another similar order from General Winder, when stopped by a countermand from General Armstrong, also dated the 24th, to remain on the Maryland side till further orders, which never came, so that this brigade, well disposed, their commander thought, for conflict, remained a few miles from the scene of it, inactive, listening to the cannonade, till finally ordered by Gen. Winder to cross the river and join his retreat to Montgomery court house. Colonel Beall's eight hundred militia arrived at Bladensburg from Annapolis, just half an hour before the battle began. Col. Minor's six or eight hundred from Virginia, without arms or equipments, reached Washington the night before, but never got into action, owing to delay, first in ordering them arms, and then in stupidly counting slowly the flints distributed to them while the battle was raging. The Americans had thus more than seven thousand men in or near

position, the British not more than four thousand, of whom less than fifteen hundred began, and not exceeding three thousand gained the battle, driving the Marylanders in the twinkling of an eye from their commanding ground.

After the Secretary of State returned from Winder's camp to Washington, he rode out to Stansbury's encampment, and thence again back to Washington. Soon after his departure, the advance pickets on the Marlborough road gave the alarm by firing, and roused the wearied brigade from sleep to be hastily put under arms. The alarm proving unfounded, they were dismissed to rest again, when at two o'clock at night, an express from Winder informed Stansbury of his retreat into Washington, over the bridge, which he had ordered to be burned, directing Stansbury alone to fight the enemy, if they came by Bladensburg, though which way they would come, if at all, was wholly uncertain. Colonel Monroe had shortly before informed General Stansbury of General Winder's alarming disappearance from his camp at Battalion Old Fields, the universal apprehension that he must have fallen into the hands of the enemy, and the election by which General Smith had been chosen to command in Winder's stead. With two thousand weary and sleepy raw militia, ordered to fight the whole British army, variously reported at from six to twelve thousand Wellington veterans, Stansbury called a nocturnal and hasty council of war, at which Major Pinkney, Colonels Sterrett, Ragan and Shutz were unanimously of opinion with their general, that Stansbury's position was wholly untenable by so few inexperienced men, worn down with fatigue and hunger; and that their own safety required their retiring beyond the Bladensburg bridge. Having done so, and fallen back about a mile towards Washington, while tired citizens under arms, covered with dust and sweat, and confounded by incessant alerts, counter-orders and counter-marches, and ignorant how to cook, hardly how to eat, their victuals in a camp, many of them gentlemen of large possessions and luxurious living, accustomed to regular repose and choice refreshments, were standing by the road side, breakfasting on bad salt beef and musty flour, a second order came from General Winder to encounter and withstand the enemy at Bladensburg; whereupon another council of war, by the same officers, was held, who again resolved that it was impossible; and Stansbury was about retiring still nearer toward Washington and Winder, when a third order peremptorily commanded him to give battle at Bladensburg; the discouraging signals for which were the explosions and conflagration of the two bridges near the navy-yard, audibly and visibly apprising every one in Stansbury's camp, that General Winder

was destroying the way by which the British might attack him, and compelling them to attack Stansbury alone, separated several miles from Winder, not only without union, but without any plan, concert or method of action.

Thus five preliminary days of that disastrous decameron have been imperfectly told, which it is impossible to describe satisfactorily, either to the persons implicated in such obnoxious and confused transactions, or the narrator who studies rectitude. Stimulated by hopes of plunder and conquest, and hurried by the exigency of an excursion extremely hazardous, but invited by American diffidence and inaction, the British rapidly moved forward, the military commander reluctant and anxious, while urged by the bold vice-admiral. The American general was distracted by counsellors, from privates in the ranks up to the commander-in-chief and his divided cabinet, the President probably desirous of a general engagement, as due to national honor and the importance of the stake, which General Winder, General Armstrong and Colonel Monroe dissuaded as too venturesome. Everywhere and everyhow unprepared for it, part of the army at Bladensburg, another part five miles off at the navy yard, and others still further off, jaded, disheartened and debilitated by hunger, lassitude, and all other physical as well as moral incapacity for strenuous conflict, the rout that ensued was the natural sequel of such unpromising antecedents. Everything seemed done to organize defeat, every preparation made to yield, no spirit shown or arrangements to conquer. "The truth is," says the British narrative, if we may be taught by that enemy, "that the capture was brought about more by the extreme folly of the American government, and their absurd confidence that it would not be attempted, than by any other course. Had the emergency been contemplated, and in a proper manner provided against; or had any skill and courage been displayed in retarding the progress of our troops, the design, if formed at all, would have been either abandoned immediately, or must have ended in the total destruction of the invaders."—These precious confessions are a volume of proof to which more must be superadded, that in one of those blighting panics to which all mankind are subject, like mortal epidemics, the political capital of the United States was captured by an enemy almost as much alarmed for his safety as the victims of his audacity and their own infatuation.

During the third and last session of the War Congress, specially convened in the pestilential heats of September, 1814, expelled from the half-finished splendor of their capitol, and compelled to assemble in the only fragment of a public building that escaped, not the torch, for that was applied



to it, but fortunately escaped the otherwise general conflagration—there in distemper and ill temper to marshal parties for acrimonious contest more odious than warfare, the disgraceful battle of Bladensburg and capture of the disconsolate metropolis, were the absorbing, almost exclusive topic. Fought every hour of every day and night by hundreds of partisans and sciolist tacticians, the issue of all such controversies was demonstrative how impossible it was to lose, how simple and easy to gain the day. To this hour, that national disgrace is still the subject there of angry and irreconcilable party and personal recrimination. The President, who survived to be a shrine of general reverence, was then a driveller beneath contempt, till victory elsewhere and peace crowned his administration with revived and enduring favor. The sarcastic Secretary of War, as soon as the conquerors withdrew to their ships, accused of treason, was driven away by what he called a village mob, and not suffered even to resign at Washington, but advised by the President, and forced by popular indignation, to fly to Baltimore to do it. General Winder was reprobated as a federalist and a fool; brave men were stigmatized as cowards; each detachment of the army accused the other of misbehavior; and the blasting catastrophe has left till now, 1848, such incurable wounds of vanity and shame, that, when gleaning from survivors, from simultaneous recollections, official documents, public journals and all other sources of authentic belief, it is still difficult, if not impossible, to find an impartial person or proof, or settle on the truth. Even that eternal cause of American misintelligence, presidential aspirations, the other also sempiternal jealousy between north and south, conspire to aggravate a remembrance of homes destroyed and reputations disparaged; for Monroe was then the prominent candidate to succeed Madison, and Armstrong's northern adherents began to claim his better northern right to that overvalued succession; so that angry publications, even while I write, still emit contradictory statements, which it is impossible to reconcile and difficult to explain.

Congress could not ascertain the truth. Within a week after our session began, a soldier, covered with wounds and resting on crutches, Col. Richard M. Johnson, moved, on the 23d of Sept., 1814, for a select committee, modifying his motion next day, for inquiring into the causes of the success of the enemy in his recent enterprise against this metropolis and the neighboring town of Alexandria, and into the manner in which the public buildings and property were destroyed, and the amount thereof, with power to send for persons and papers. The original resolution as moved the day before called for the *value* of the property public

and *private*; in which two particulars, it was, some of us thought, improved by modification, and then adopted. The Speaker, Mr. Cheves, of course, placed Col. Johnson at the head of the committee, by which a brave man, averse to censure and prone to universal kindness, was put where the administration much desired such a one; with whom were associated some of the most respectable members of both parties, William Lowndes, Richard Stockton, Morris S. Miller, Charles Goldsborough, Philip Barbour and Israel Pickens. On the 19th of Oct. Mr. Webster and William Cox were substituted for Stockton and Miller, absent on leave. The committee soon found that judgment could not be passed in such a case; and after two months' investigation, during which, every prominent actor in the sorry affair, except the chief magistrate, who could not be subjected to interrogation, was called on to plead his own cause—on the 29th of November, 1814, a discreet report was made of all the many contradictory statements, committed to a committee of the whole House and ordered for consideration the third Monday of December. Col. Johnson declared that the committee, with great labor, had collected all the facts in relation to the military movement, but expressed no opinion on it, leaving it to all to judge for themselves, what ought to have been done. Mr. Webster, as one of the committee, acknowledging the great labor of the report, pronounced it a mere chronicle, answering no one of the purposes for which the committee was appointed. So far from clearing up the causes of our failure, it covered up a most disgraceful transaction, in a mass of prolixity and detail. Although the enemy landed within fifty miles of Washington, and 1200 of their army overcame all the force collected there, after two months' notice no opinion was expressed of these circumstances. The report did not explain whether the navy yard was destroyed by order or mere infatuation. While proceeding in this strain, he was checked by the Speaker, and the papers were ordered to be printed, which was the last heard of them in Congress. For the House could no more discuss than the committee pronounce upon transactions implicating so many marked personages, and such conflicting evidence of occurrences unquestionably disgraceful to the government and the country. Wherefore, on Saturday the 4th of February, 1815, on Colonel Johnson's significant motion, without dissent or a word said, it was resolved that the order of the day on the report should be postponed indefinitely. Like repudiated continental money, suffered to expire in the hands of the soldiers of the Revolution, the fall of Washington was put to rest, as one of those overwhelming and incurable evils which cannot be redressed, explained or dwelt upon, but must be con-

signed to contemptuous amnesty or merciful oblivion. Thirty-three years of annual efflux of time having mellowed that national bitterness, still Washington burns with shame and passion on the subject. From first to last the conjuncture was unfortunate; the capital was doomed; fatality attended everything attempted, from the landing of the invaders on the 19th to their re-embarkation on the 29th of August, ten days of wonderful and inexplicable trepidation and ill-luck. With the President and his cabinet, the general and his troops, and in the British army too, it was a usurpation of panic. Ross hastened forward and backward, conquered, burned the capital; Winder retired, was routed and his army dispersed, all in groundless alarm. Five hundred British soldiers killed or wounded and many more deserting, while not one American soldier was slain, and but few wounded, except some twenty or thirty watermen and marines, were the casualties of a battle which, if not fought at all, might have saved Washington and compelled the enemy to surrender. Fear disarmed force, and fortune, in a fit of lust, gave herself up to the rash seaman who was the demon of the enterprise.

The day after the final report on the subject was indefinitely postponed, we received, on Sunday the 5th of February, 1815, the grateful news of Jackson's saving victories. Seldom, says Voltaire, is anything great done in the world, except by the genius and firmness of some one man, contending with the prejudices of the multitude and overcoming them. Perhaps a stern, sanguinary and unyielding chief might have organized victory even from the materials Winder had to deal with; but no such genius appeared, either in the field or the cabinet. Two days after the intelligence of Jackson's triumph, General Brown arrived in Washington, to confer with the Secretary of War, Monroe, how to carry the war, under the auspices of Brown and Jackson, through Canada to Nova Scotia. Congress voted thanks to Jackson as to Brown, and seats within their halls to officers for gallantry and good conduct displayed in the service of their country. An effort, which the destruction of Washington was near accomplishing, to remove the seat of government to some other place, was put a stop to. We began to trust with Jackson, that single handed this country could resist Great Britain, that Eastern disaffection was less to be feared, that war, vigorously waged, was the best way to peace, when, on the 14th of February, 1815, it broke upon us with superabundant consolations from the momentary loss and lasting disgrace of Washington. But this sketch, or any history, would shrink from duty not to describe, without fear or favor, the events of that memorable mishap, to which, however invidious the undertaking, I am the more impelled, because diaries have been

burned and narrations suppressed of its incredible consternation. Washington is still full of the survivors, but scarce one who remained in it that day, after the flight from Bladensburg. Cockburn had done his work of destruction and terror so effectually, that, together with those who were among the troops and thereby prevented seeing their conquerors after the battle, scarce any are to be met with who saw or heard what the conquerors did when in possession of their conquest. Among them all, two opinions are prevalent, first, that General Ross was less rapacious, more element, and stricter in punishing military excesses, than, secondly, Admiral Cockburn, who was the evil genius, delighting in pillage and destruction. If the murderous shot fired at Ross, as he rode into Washington, and killed his mare, had killed the rider, it seems to be universally believed, that, instead of the public buildings burned, Cockburn would not have left a house standing, public or private, but Congress would have been obliged to seek another place for their session than a seat of government entirely consumed.

Resuming the narrative for description of the battle and its immediate consequences, let us, first, take the enemy's lesson in an effort to state impartially the occurrences of a day for which every arrangement had been taken to yield to an attack not made without much hesitation, even after the armies were in sight of each other, which ten minutes' early resistance must have repulsed, and which, with a firm countenance, avoiding any battle at all, would have defeated.

An English military account of the affair says: "The Americans thus hastily collected together were commanded by a Baltimore lawyer. Several very able arguments of this gentleman at the bar, will be found in the reports of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and probably might be referred to as rather more creditable to his fame than the disposition he made of the citizens who were placed under his charge. Let the English reader imagine Mr. Brougham or Mr. Scarlett or Mr. Denman called upon to discharge such military functions, and surely he will have a proper feeling of charity while he reads the following severe but probably merited criticism.

"To bring an army of raw militia men, however excellent they might be as shots, into a fair field against regular troops, *could* end in nothing but defeat. Had they left all clear and permitted us to advance as far as Nottingham, then broke up the roads and covered them with trees, it would have been impossible for us to go a step beyond. As soon as this was effected, they might have skirmished with us in front and kept our attention alive with part of their troops,



while the rest, acquainted as they doubtless were, with every inch of the country, had got into our rear, and by a similar mode of proceeding cut off our retreat. Thus we should have been taken in a snare from which we could not extricate ourselves, and should have been obliged, in all probability, to surrender at discretion. But this obvious and natural plan of defence they chose to reject, and determined to trust all to the fate of a battle. And here again they were guilty of a monstrous error in not occupying the town of Bladensburg with part of their forces. The most open village, if resolutely defended, will cost many men before it falls; whereas Bladensburg being composed of substantial brick houses, might have been maintained for hours against all our efforts. In the next place, they displayed great want of military knowledge in the disposition of both their infantry and artillery. There was not in the whole space of their line a single point where an enemy would be exposed to a cross fire. The troops were drawn up in three straight lines, like so many regiments upon a gala parade; while the guns were used as connecting links to a chain being posted in the same order by ones and twos, at every interval. Of the personal courage of the Americans, there can be no doubt; they are, individually taken, as brave a nation as any in the world. But they are not soldiers; they have not *the experience nor the habits* of soldiers. It was the height of folly, therefore, to bring them into a *situation where nothing but that experience and those habits will avail*. When two lines oppose each other very little depends upon the accuracy with which individuals take aim. It is then that the habit of acting in concert, the confidence which each man feels in his companions, and the rapidity and good order in which different movements can be executed, can alone be of service."

Another officer of the British force has published his military opinion, as follows: "After a night, during which the outposts were kept in a state of constant anxiety, we started on our march at an early hour on the 24th. Not a cloud in the sky, but a damp and fetid atmosphere from the heavy moisture emitted by the grass and weeds. The sun beat on us in full force; the dust, without a breath of air to disperse it, occasioned the greatest inconvenience both to eyes and respiration. Never did I suffer more from heat and fatigue. The enemy did not employ his cavalry to harass us. Numbers of exhausted men fell in the rear, many more could with difficulty be kept up. Halted in the woods near a stream to refresh; but so oppressive was the heat that when our march was resumed, the road was again covered with stragglers. As noon ap-

proached, turning an angle in the road, the two armies came in sight of each other. Their position was strong, and attitude commanding. Immediately on arriving in the streets of Bladensburg, within range of the American artillery, several of their guns opened on us, with a quick, sustained and well-directed cannonade. We halted; but soon again pushed on at double quick time towards the bridge. When covered with our people, the two-gun battery on the road began to play with tremendous effect. At the first discharge almost an entire company was swept down; the succeeding discharges were much less fatal. The riflemen, too, galled us with a running fire; and it was not without trampling upon many of their dead and dying comrades that the light brigade established itself on the opposite side of the stream. When once there, however, everything else was easy. Wheeling off to the right and left, they dashed into the thicket and quickly cleared it of the American skirmishers, who, falling back upon the first line with precipitation, threw it into disorder before it had fired a shot. Our troops had hardly shown themselves when the whole of that line gave way and fled in the greatest confusion, leaving the two guns upon the road in possession of the victors. Instead of pausing till the rest of the army got up, the light brigade, disencumbering themselves of their knapsacks and haversacks, and extending their ranks so as to show an equal front with the enemy, pushed on to attack the second line. The Americans stood firm, and with their whole artillery, except the two captured guns, first checked the ardor of the assailants by a heavy fire, and then in their turn advanced to recover their lost ground, driving back the British troops to the very thicket on the river's brink, where they repelled all attempts to drive them through it, and following to within a short distance of the cannon's mouth such parts of the enemy's line as gave way. In this state the action continued till the second brigade crossed the bridge and formed on the right, when the 44th regiment debouched on the American left flank and completely turned it. In that quarter the battle was won; the raw militia men stationed there, once broken, could not be rallied. But on their right the enemy still kept their ground with much resolution; nor was it till the arrival of the 4th regiment to the charge that they began to waver. Then, indeed, seeing their left in full flight, and the 44th getting in their rear, they lost all order and dispersed. The rout was general throughout the whole line. The battle began at one o'clock in the afternoon and lasted till four. The loss on the part of the English was severe. Out of two-thirds of the army engaged upwards of 500 were killed and wounded. Colonel Thornton, who commanded the light bri-

gade, Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, commanding the 85th regiment, and Major Brown, who led the advanced guard, were all severely wounded, and General Ross himself had a horse shot under him."

If this hostile were the only account of an unfortunate battle, there would be nothing to make an American blush for the issue of an ill-planned but well-contested action, in which his countrymen were defeated, and many fled in disorder, but others fought so bravely, that, upon the whole, there was nothing disgraceful to the vanquished altogether. As Cockburn rode through Washington on his white mare, or mule, followed by a black foal, next day, entitled to pronounce judgment, he did so, when heard to say, "Many of your men fought well, though some did not."

The thermometer marked blood heat on the fatal 24th of August, even early in the morning. General Winder dispatched a messenger with a note to General Armstrong, that the accounts were more and more serious, desiring the Secretary's advice what to do in so critical an emergency. Vidette after vidette was continually arriving from scouts, with alarming reports of the enemy's approach. Yet every one was still perplexed to discover whether they would come by Alexandria, Bladensburg, or the navy yard; near which contrivances to prevent their crossing the Potomac, by placing barrels of gunpowder under the bridge, and upon it piles of fence rails, together with the toll-house torn to pieces for that purpose, anticipating the destruction the British were expected to commit, contrivances for escaping, not repelling, an attack, were busily executed by Winder's portion of the army, not less disquieted than Stanbury's at Bladensburg at the same time—united and sympathetic in nothing but alarms. The President, with his faithful black servant Jim, and the Secretary of State, repaired on horseback to Winder's quarters in fear of consequences. Among the rumors came one, that Ross was marching for Bladensburg; whereupon Col. Monroe, with the President's approbation and General Winder's, rode there, as it was not known whether General Stanbury was aware of his jeopardy. At nine o'clock, the Attorney-General, calling on the Secretary of War for the latest intelligence, was calmly shown Gen. Winder's dejected note, asking counsel. Mr. Rush, the Attorney-General, then rode to the navy yard, where he found Commodore Tingey, the commander of it, the Secretary of the Navy, Gen. Winder, and the President, in perturbed debate, still inclined to flatter themselves that Alexandria would be first attacked. The Secretary of the Navy, with the melancholy determination of a disappointed lover who kills himself, was busied with plans for destroying the public property at the navy

yard, the vessels, stores, provisions, and costly armaments collected there.

At, or near, the house of the chaplain, Dr. Hunter, these gloomy measures of self-destruction were in agitation and action too, when all pangs of suspense were at length relieved by certain tidings that Ross was advancing by Bladensburg, whither Winder forthwith directed his troops and proceeded himself, but left Barney with five hundred of the best fighting men to blow up the bridge, which then it was scarcely necessary to destroy. About that time, first the Secretary of the Treasury, then the Secretary of War, came up. Mr. Campbell, considering it an exigency where personal delicacy and jealousy should not interfere with public duty, suggested to the President that the presence and advice of General Armstrong in the field might be very useful, to which Madison assented; and Armstrong, who had never taken any part in the active command or field operations, immediately rode towards the scene of action, to reconnoiter and communicate with Winder. Before Mr. Madison and Mr. Rush rode over toward Bladensburg, and while Mr. Jones was on horseback with them at the navy yard, Barney extorted leave to share in the battle. Gallant, talkative, turbulent, and chafing at his confinement to blow up a bridge some miles from the scene of action, between loud soliloquy and angry remonstrance to the crowd of boys, women, blacks, and idlers looking on, he aimed at his superiors within earshot an appeal against being "kept with five hundred," said he, "of the precious few fighting men to do what any d— corporal can better do with five." The Secretary of the Navy's elaborate acknowledgment of this reproachful expostulation, reported to the House of Representatives that the subject was *discussed* by the President, heads of departments, and Commodore Barney, which resulted in an order for his immediate and rapid march. The fact is, that saucy and boisterous complaint, without discussion, wrong prompt permission, and rapid departure from impulse much swifter than order. Barney, on his bay horse, hastening eager for the death he soon encountered, as his master for the wound of which he eventually died, trotted off at the head of his brave followers with their great guns, hurrying to the battle, where they arrived just as it began, which, without their participation, would have been the bloodless rout of their less resolute comrades in arms, put to flight by a harmless discharge of rockets. The Secretary of the Treasury (Mr. Campbell), dejected by the dismal condition of the finances, then near their lowest depression, which he had no turn for improving, after loaning his duelling pistols to the President, rode back from the navy yard to Wash-



ington, and soon after home to Tennessee, where he resigned a burden hard to bear. The Secretary of the Navy (Mr. Jones), bent on departmental suicide, remained to complete his darling project of destroying everything at the navy yard, as Barney's flotilla, by his order, had, in like manner, been saved from the enemy two days before. The President, Secretaries of State and War, with the Attorney-General, soon followed General Winder to Bladensburg, where Madison's first order was to revoke his first permission to Armstrong to be an actor, and reduce him to be a merely disgusted spectator of the fight, the President telling his Secretary that he had come to another determination, and that the military functionaries should be left to the discharge of their own duties on their own responsibilities.

Bladensburg, which immortalized that most unlucky of American memorable days, is an insignificant village of four hundred inhabitants, surrounded by two branches of the Potomac, there dwindling to narrow, shallow, and fordable streams, near the town, through which the highway from Baltimore to Washington passes, over a wooden bridge a few yards long, which was left as it was for the enemy's crossing, who did not know that the water was fordable; both armies omitting an advantage—ours to destroy the bridge—theirs to ford the stream. The Anacostie, or eastern branch of the Potomac, narrows to a shallow creek, on the east side of which stands the village of Bladensburg. West of the bridge is fine rising ground, with fences and bushes favorable for defence by good marksmen; and there was a small breastwork, hastily thrown up. After the vexatious and enervating alerts and countermarches of Stansbury's brigade of the previous night and morning, they were well posted by him in the arc of a circle on a slope near the river, close to the bridge, covered by artillery, with a mill to mask it, and Pinkney's battalion of rifles among the bushes on the margin of the waters; all having been dismissed for dinner and employed in preparing it when summoned to form for action. Colonel Monroe, indefatigable and anxious, resolved, as he said, to spill the last drop of blood to defend every inch of ground; but less skilful than intrepid, while General Stansbury and Smith, meeting on the field, were settling their relative rank, and before General Winder could arrange the order of battle, Colonel Monroe deranged the front rank, by an injudicious alteration, condemned by Stansbury, Sterrett, and Pinkney, scarcely owned by Monroe himself, and which General Armstrong stigmatized as the blunder of a busy tactician; for which, however, indubitably brave and invariably kind, Monroe was not much blamed, though that derangement of the front rank was a primary cause of its ex-

posure naked, and consequent instantaneous flight. He removed Sterrett's regiment nearly a quarter of a mile from where it originally stood, placing it behind an orchard which favored the enemy, out of supporting distance, to cover the drafted militia, thus left almost alone in front, with two or three companies of artillerists and a few of Pinkney's rifle battalion, one company of whom Colonel Monroe also took away from their original station, near the rest. Winder, who arrived during that unlucky change, had not time, if disposed, to prevent it; for the British were then in sight descending the opposite hill to Bladensburg; nor would Stansbury venture to object, because Winder was present. The Baltimore fifth, as Sterrett's regiment was called, which was deservedly most relied on, instead of being left near the stream, the riflemen, the protected batteries, and in line with the whole front, were thrown behind an orchard to a ridge five hundred yards off, completely exposed to the enemy, of whom the orchard intercepted their sight, and rendered entirely useless to the artillery and riflemen, left unprotected by that infantry regiment from the British assault. Aggravating this cardinal error; numerous self-constituted contributors of advice, suggesters of position, and intermeddlers with command; gentlemen of respectability and good will; committees, a whole democracy of commanders, industriously helped to mar all singleness of purpose and unity of action. Arriving at the bridge while Colonel Monroe was displacing the corner stones of the combat, General Winder met several gentlemen, among the rest, Mr. Francis S. Key, not only recommending, but showing where they thought the troops ought to be posted, riding to the spots designated and confounding the outset. Other bystanders were present at the spectacle as such, among them, Alexander McKim, the Baltimore member of Congress, on one of his fast trotting horses—a rich merchant who said that, having voted for war, he could not find it in his conscience, if not to fight for it, at least to stand by those who did.

In the midst of this confused preparation for battle, a body of troops marched into Bladensburg by another road than that by which Ross was coming, supposed to be his advance, who proved to be Colonel Beall's men from Annapolis, after a forced tramp of sixteen miles that sultry morning, led by a veteran of the Revolution; who, among the lamentable vicissitudes of the day, could not prevent his men from deserting an eminence, the possession of which was vital to the issue, and where they were posted far above and out of reach of every danger, excessively fatigued, but not too much so to run away at the gleam of a British musket, in spite of all their brave old

Colonel could say or do to prevail on them to stand fast.

Soon after the British bayonets glittered in the blazing sun, as loaded with thick woollen gray clothing, sixty pounds of ammunition on each man's back, and sinking with fatigue, Ross' little army slowly descended Lowndes hill in full view, without music or cannon, except three small pieces to which the sailors were harnessed, or cavalry more than fifty or sixty Cossack officers ill mounted on sorry horses, jaded and goaded along; altogether, however, approaching in the confident, orderly, and commanding attitude imparted by experience in the science of war, and confidence acquired by many victories. Winder and Monroe were surveying their approach with glasses, while several of the British officers from the opposite hills in like manner reconnoitered our forces, when a person rode hastily up to Winder with the glorious news that General Izard had totally defeated Drummond in Canada, killing and taking a thousand men—false tidings which General Winder immediately ordered to be made known to his dispirited, perplexed, and timid militia, whose faint cheer argued that their alacrity was no more to be relied on than intelligence which, whether really received, or one of the vagrant impostures of the hour, never appeared. The President, and Attorney-General with him, were in danger of being captured while riding briskly towards Bladensburg, without perceiving that the British were so near as to be almost within musket range. Turning into the orchard among our troops, they met the Secretaries of State and War, just before the battle began. Mr. Rush, addressing some words of encouragement to the troops, was sharply told by an officer that his men required no exhortation to fight.

The British commander hesitated when he saw the American troops formidably posted on the other side of a stream, the depth of which he did not know, with their front covered by artillery, enfilading the bridge, which was, as he supposed, his only way to cross. "On the opposite side of the river," says his official account, "the enemy were posted on *very commanding heights*. *Artillery covered the bridge over which the British army had to pass.*" Cockburn's account says, "the British troops, *almost exhausted with fatigue, and but a small proportion having got up*, did not hesitate to attack immediately the American force on a rising ground well protected with artillery." The British author of the campaign says, "the main body *paused till the advance should reconnoiter the American position of great strength and commanding attitude.*" During that pause, Ross hesitated, conferred with his officers, represented the risk of assaulting a force so superior, so strongly posted, and so many of them regular troops,

as he argued from the uniform of the Baltimore fifth, Pinkney's riflemen, at whose head he paraded in all the foppery of regimentals, the Washington artillery and riflemen, of whom Burch's and Stull's companies were with the front line. If the order of battle had not been deranged, and the Americans had stood their ground a very few minutes, that hesitation might have preface'd more; or, if General Winder had not, humanely, perhaps indispensably ordered a retreat when, disconcerted by the almost instantaneous confusion and disorderly flight of the uncovered drafted militia, followed soon by the Baltimore fifth, perhaps preceded by the riflemen. The English General, doubting whether to begin the battle, was asked by an officer, "What will be said of us in England if we stop now?" "If it rain militia, then," said Ross, "we will go on." On getting near the bridge, after the halt and consultation with his officers, Ross finding that he would have to pass a defile between the bridge and a marsh, in front of our battery, displayed in column to the right and passed some men over the ford higher up the creek, so as in a manner to turn the battery, and threaten to surround our weary, timid, and confounded people. The order to fire our cannon before the enemy approached the bridge, was given by Winder, as he thought himself, too soon; but he had to manage excited, impatient, and uneasy troops; and Stansbury's order to destroy the bridge had not been executed. General Winder's apprehension of the stability of his men was betrayed by an order to a Captain of the artillery; to whom, as he stationed him near the bridge, he said, "when you retreat, retreat by the Georgetown road:" ominous anticipation, like Armstrong's at the navy yard, where, before he went to take command, he said, in the same distrust of raw troops, particularly militia, "with their regulars and our militia we shall be beat." Fears of the brave predominated. The British advance, from twelve to fifteen hundred, began their movement against our twenty-five hundred people, to whom the machinery of subordination was unknown, and the multitude of commanders was distracting. The first discharges from our artillery were effectual, and the few fires of the riflemen, galling: the enemy driven back from the bridge, took refuge behind the houses, reposting volleys of rockets to our cannonade—military meteors streaming through the air—which, General Winder riding along the line, encouraged his men to disregard, as less dangerous than alarming; as they did, while those missiles flew over their heads, falling beyond them where the President and his cabinet stood, whom the General then advised to retire further back. Emerging from their cover, and urged forward by their officers, the stout British, over-



loaded, and panting with fatigue, were hastily driven over the bridge, at the loss of a good many killed; and throwing off their knapsacks, in small squads, or singly, pushed up the slope, spreading on both sides to outflank our men. The elevation of the rockets being changed, and they aimed at the faces of the drafted militia, in a few instants they broke and fled in the utmost precipitation and disorder; the riflemen, also, most of them, retreating. General Winder, with some few of the officers, in vain strove to rally and retain the fugitives; ordering the Baltimore fifth to advance, who gallantly hastened to their support and were in great danger of being surrounded, when General Winder made the experiment of ordering them to perform the difficult military evolution of retreating under pressure; indispensable then, probably, to save them from being surrounded: but when they, too, most of them, took to flight after the drafted militia. In a period of time incredibly short, the disorder became total; the flight universal, irreparable, ungovernable, bearing away, in its torrent of escape, all the front rank, with the artillery, cavalry, regulars, President, Secretaries, and Commander. From that fatal realization of all his worst fears and want of confidence in his troops, General Winder's hopes vanished, and his only and vain effort was to methodize retreat, for which he gave repeated orders, striving to no purpose to prevail on the fugitives not to disperse and fly across the fields, but fall back on the highroad, so as to be somewhere united with General Smith's reserve in the rear, and make with them another stand; though where that should be, had not been designated; no place of retreat having ever been fixed, or thought of, when retreat seemed to be the sole anticipation.

Brave freemen, many of them gentlemen who would not hesitate to risk their lives in deadly combat, without spectators or the excitements of battle, on a point of honor or trifle of controversy; athletic and independent mechanics, artisans or yeomen, like the stampede of a herd of buffaloes or wild horses in the prairie, snuffing or dreading distant, imaginary danger, took to their heels with the swiftness of delirium, and ran till overcome by the fatigue which exhausted and arrested them. The only death on the retreat was said to be that of a captain of the regular army, of approved courage, taken with the contagion of unanimous panic, who ran with the crowd till he fell, fainted and expired.

"We had scarcely fired three rounds," said an officer of the Washington artillery, Mr. John Law, "when the line of the Baltimore militia began to break; several of the fifth Baltimore regiment also fled. General Winder ordered us to retreat, in con-

sequence of the flight of the militia. The British column had just then begun to advance. Not a man of our company had been touched by the fire of the enemy; and I thought that the battle was only then seriously commencing. After retreating about a hundred yards, we were directed to continue the retreat, nor were we at any time told where to rally." Pinkney's riflemen fled, without his orders, simultaneously with the artillery, the whole falling back on the fifth regiment, which then stood alone to receive the enemy, outflanking them on both sides in a situation extremely critical, and kept its ground with steadiness until ordered by Winder to retreat, when the necessity for it was obvious. As Major Pinkney, without his horse, walked away, with five or six of the last, among whom was Mr. Jonathan Meredith, of the fifth, the enemy very close, his fire incessant though inaccurate, a musket ball broke Pinkney's arm when in imminent risk of capture. Except the President and Secretaries, Pinkney, if taken, would have been their *spolia opima*, for he had often represented his country at the court of St. James, and was the draftsman of the declaration of war against Great Britain, for intolerable excesses of that maritime domination, of which, in many of its postulates, he was at the Supreme Court of the United States the most eloquent and powerful advocate for their incorporation with the American code of prize law.

"The engagement was but short," in the unvernacular report of Lieutenant-Colonel Laval, a Frenchman who commanded two just mounted troops of United States cavalry, posted in a ravine whence they never issued but to be borne off the field in the deluge of flight. "All of a sudden our men seemed routed. A confused retreat appeared to be in almost every corner of the battle-ground. An artillery company drove through the gate near our ravine, crushing down several of our men and horses, nearly taking off and breaking my thigh by the blow of a wheel, hurrying away one of my troops without my orders, leaving me alone with Captain Burd and fifty-five dragoons." The regular infantry, when advancing to fight and ready to charge, were earnestly deterred, and told to save themselves. After a total route of the various fragmentary corps, some at last stopped at Tenlytown, two miles and a half beyond Georgetown, without going near Washington, which they left deserted, in its solitude and trepidation. "At Tenlytown," said General Winder, "such of them as *could be halted*, gave themselves up to the uncontrolled feelings which fatigue, exhaustion and privation produced, and many hundreds, in spite of all precautions and efforts, passed on and pursued their way, either towards home, or in search of refreshments and quarters." None slain,

few wounded, but all struck with terror, the flight from rockets, renewed limbs, wearied by sleepless nights and counter-marching days, and gave strength for disgrace when naught was lost but honor and self-possession.

On the straw, in the same tent, taken from their thrice driven beds of down and comfortable homes, among the Baltimore volunteers were William Cooke, Nicholas Brice, William Gilmore, Jonathan Meredith, Richard Dorsey, Richard Magruder and James McCulloch, gentlemen, whose lives and limbs their associate, General Winder, sincerely deplored the dire necessity of exposing in hostilities which he did not approve, reducing them to the level of the scum of British poor-houses, prisons and beer-shops. John Glenn served as a private in the ranks, both at the battles of Bladensburg and Baltimore. None of them, fortunately, were killed, and but few wounded. Of these, the present First Comptroller of the Treasury of the United States, Mr. McCulloch, receiving a musket-ball in the leg, was about to be carried off the field by his commander, first Lieutenant William Cooke, an estimable gentleman still living, and Mr. John P. Kennedy, since distinguished by his writings and public services as member of Congress representing Baltimore. While performing that act of kindness to Mr. McCulloch, both Mr. Cooke and Mr. Kennedy were wounded, and obliged to leave him to his fate when captured. Taken to Bladensburg, and laid with many other wounded in the same room at Ross' tavern, his private station was an object of incredulity to his British superintendents, surprised that one so well clad could be a common soldier. "I have been many, many years," said an English corporal, "in the army, all through Spain, part of France, and now brought over here to America. I envy you that wound, one like which, or death, is my only hope of retirement or a pension."

Not far west of Bladensburg, just beyond the line which separates the federal city from the State of Maryland, a short distance off the road from Washington, is a dingle, embosomed in a sunburnt amphitheatre of trees, secluded, and from associations no less than location, dismal shrine, consecrated to human sacrifices, to the vanity, which, however contrary to law, if not reason, neither has been able to suppress, and which in this country is more frequent, intolerant and ferocious than any other—a spot well-known as the duelling-ground. On that spot, not long before the battle of Bladensburg, the Secretary of the Treasury shot his antagonist, Mr. Gardenier, through the body, both members of Congress, in a party duel. Decatur, surrounded by brother naval officers, fell there. A senator of the United States, the father of a gallant young man, Captain Mason, lately killed in Mexico,

lost his life there, horribly fighting with muskets at pistol distance. Many more victims to that vanity of honor which provokes death to escape shame, have braved it in that cold shade, some of them in quarrels produced by the battle of Bladensburg, some, perchance, courting death there who were among the foremost in flight from the mere hiss of a rocket. Such is that wayward, antique virtue venerated as courage! near whose heathen temple, in the guise of duels, hundreds of votaries fled victims of unmanly timidity.

Before our troops broke, while showers of rockets were flying where the President stood, he was requested by General Winder to retire out of their reach, and with his cabinet he withdrew by inglorious but not ignominious retreat; although everything demonstrated that a field of battle was not Madison's theatre of action. Wilkinson's maligning account imputes to General Armstrong the assertion that the *little man*, as the aspersion is couched, said to the veteran whom he would not allow to fight. "Come, General Armstrong, come, Colonel Monroe, let us go and leave it to the commanding general"—words which may well have been used without inferring the gross imputation extorted from them. It is extremely uncommon for conspicuous men, surrounded as the President was, to betray apprehension, even if they feel it. Armstrong, when the troops fled, gave vent to his mortification in strong terms, addressed to the President, of disgust at so base and cowardly a flight, and no doubt the President, amazed and confounded by the trepidation of the troops, retired, as Colonel Monroe did, disheartened, General Armstrong indignant, and Mr. Rush, the youngest and only hoping one of the administration, ashamed, soon followed by General Winder, demoralized by the whole of the front line vanishing in wild disorder from the conflict. During the day Mr. Madison frequently despatched notes, penciled on horseback, to his wife, to keep her informed of its vicissitudes. The two months' abortive preparation and despondent mismanagement from the first cabinet council of the first of July seemed closing in a fit of despair. More than Winder feared and Armstrong predicted of inexperienced troops was realized in the twinkling of an eye.

The day was by no means lost, however. Many a memorable battle has ended well after a bad beginning; and there was no cause to despair. As our cannons and their rockets were filling the air with coruscations, and shaking the earth with commotion, Barney led his men full trot to a post between Stansbury and Smith, and with Miller's marines the great guns were arranged not far from the duelling-ground; where a force more inferior in numbers to



the enemy than theirs was to our front when they put it to flight, for more than an hour repulsed, baffled and defeated the British. If our flank had not been bared by the desertion of Beall's militia, the battle of Bladensburg might after all have been an American victory; won by enlisted men, without the individual bravery, intelligence or pride of the militia and volunteers, who so soon deserted their colors, but sustained by the courage of corps, practised to obey their officers. Some five hundred and sixty watermen and marines, well armed with artillery and musketry, commanded by determined leaders, with no other support than Colonel Beall's militia on a neighboring eminence, were enough, while their flank was covered, to retrieve the fortunes of the day, which for more than an hour they held in suspense. While the front were in full retreat across the fields, Barney and Miller, pointing their cannon and reserving their fire, watched Thornton's approach along the road, from which, again and again, they drove him by destructive volleys, strewing the road with British dead. When I passed along there three weeks afterwards, the side ditches were filled with numerous corpses, their forms plainly visible, barely covered with earth, and in the hospital and street at Bladensburg I saw many prisoners and wounded, in British regimentals, and the sides of the houses perforated by cannon balls. Repeated attempts by Colonel Thornton to advance were repulsed every time, till he and several other prominent officers being shot down, General Ross himself was obliged to lead on reinforcements from the second brigade, which he brought into action as it arrived. Still the day was ours, notwithstanding the flight of the front rank, and disappearance of generals, secretaries, President and a host of gentlemen counsellor combatants. Ross was compelled to abandon the road, when not a vestige remained of the twenty-five hundred Americans with whom the battle began, except Beall's eight hundred militia on their eminence covering the *marine* batteries of Barney and Miller, impregnable though unfortified. General Ross's official report confounds and misrepresents transactions at this crisis of the engagement, when it is not extravagant or irrational to aver that one hundred of the youth from the military academy of West Point, posted where Beall's militia were—one hundred well trained youths, armed with the mere power of military knowledge and scientific confidence, preserving Barney and Miller from being turned, would have changed American into British defeat.

"The American first line," says Ross, "giving way, was driven on the second, which yielding to the irresistible charge of the bayonet, and the well-directed discharge of rockets, got into confusion." But the con-

fusion is in his confounding the front rank with the second. There was no charge of bayonets on the second, no attempt at it; on the contrary, the 85th, 4th and 44th regiments repeatedly advancing *towards* Barney by the road, were as often driven back; and retreated quite as fast as the Maryland militia from Barney's overwhelming cannonade, mowing them down. But when Colonel Thornton, Lieutenant-Colonel Wood and Major Brown were disabled by wounds, Captain Hamilton, Lieutenants Codd and Staveland killed, with not less than two hundred men who were buried there after the action, the British veterans retreated in confusion, leaving for a considerable time the Americans masters of the field, deserted though it was by all those who commenced the engagement. The only approximation to a charge of bayonets was when the British were suffered by Captain Miller to approach within fifty yards, and then demolished by both great guns and musketry, admirably fired by the marines, from whose deadly discharges as many of the enemy as could escape ran back to a ravine covered with wood, in which they sought shelter. During a long hour's ineffectual effort to carry Barney and Miller's open position, after the whole of Stansbury's force had disappeared, that position was nobly maintained, till at length General Ross, leaving the porch where he stood in Bladensburg, put himself at the head of his fresh troops, the second brigade just arrived, and bravely led them to renew the assault, when his own horse was shot under him. Foiled in every attempt to carry the batteries in front, and abandoning the road, Ross finally succeeded by turning his attack upwards against Beall's covering party on Barney's flank. Beall insisted that his militia did not fly, as Barney stated, after a fire or two, but after several rounds, retreated by order of General Winder, delivered to Colonel Beall, by John E. Howard, volunteer aid of General Winder. If so, it was his most unfortunate order on that day of mistakes, for when Beall's men retreated, Barney and Miller were left entirely exposed in flank, where several hundred of the British mounted the hill, too high up for our artillery to reach them, whence overhanging Barney the enemy fired laterally down on him, shot his horse, which fell between two cannon, and eleven of his men, who all laid dead in a small circle around him. The gallant commodore, just as he was about reluctantly withdrawing from an untenable position, received a ball in the upper part of his thigh, which was never extracted, and of which wound he died several years afterwards. His ammunition nearly exhausted, his ammunition wagons having gone off in the general panic and flight of the front, two of his sailing masters, Warren and Martin, killed, and a third also named Martin wound-

ed, with eleven of his men killed—in such forlorn and desperate circumstances he ordered a retreat to save the remainder. His brave companions, taking their gallant leader from the ground, were carrying him away, which loss of blood rendered impossible; when he called a British soldier, and directed him to bring an officer, to whom Barney surrendered. Captain Wainwright, of the British navy, treating him with the generous courtesy which brave enemies rarely withhold from each other, soon introduced Barney, stretched on the earth, to two officers who came up, naming them General Ross and Admiral *Coburn*, as the British pronounce what is spelt *Cockburn*. Barney, who was acquainted with Admiral Cochrane, looked up and said, “that is not Admiral Cochrane?” “No, sir,” said Captain Wainwright, “it is Admiral *Coburn*.” “Oh,” said the commodore, gaily, “*Cockburn* is what you are called hereabouts,” with which merry greeting mutual civilities began, the captors soothing their lively prisoner with refined attentions; giving him his choice whether to be taken to Washington or Bladensburg; placing him on a litter, covering his face with a handkerchief to shield it from the scorching sunbeams, and Captain Wainwright substituting four sailors for the soldiers bearing the litter, “because,” said he, “my tars will carry you easier than those rough fellows;” sending a surgeon to examine his wound, and otherwise in all respects demonstrating their sense of his gallant and deadly resistance to them. For nothing removes national or personal animosity with brave foes more than courageous defiance, and never is English contumely towards Americans turned to respect by unmanly or unpatriotic reverence.

“Barney was a brave officer,” General Ross said afterwards when in Washington. “With only a handful of men he gave us a severe shock. I am sorry he was wounded, immediately gave him parole, and hope he will do well. Had half the army been such men as he commanded, with the American advantage in choosing position, we should never have got to Washington.” It cannot be said, however, that Barney chose his position. An English military witness further testifies, “Instead of pausing until the rest of the army came up, they lightened themselves by throwing away their knapsacks and haversacks, and extending their ranks so as to show an equal front with the enemy, pushed on to the attack of the second line. The Americans, however, saw their weakness and stood firm; and having the whole of their artillery, with the exception of those captured on the road, and the greater part of their infantry in this line, they first checked the ardor of the assailants by a heavy fire, and then, in their turn, advanced to recover the ground which was lost.

Against this charge the extended order of the British troops would not permit them to offer an effectual resistance, and they were accordingly borne back to the very thicket upon the river's brink, where they maintained themselves with determined obstinacy, repelling all attempts to drive them through it; and frequently following to within a short distance of the cannon's mouth such parts of the enemy's line as gave way. In this state the action continued till the second brigade had likewise crossed and formed upon the right bank of the river, when the 44th regiment, moving to the right and driving in the skirmishers, debouched upon the left flank of the Americans and completely turned it. In that quarter, therefore, the battle was won; because the raw militiamen, who were stationed there as being the least assailable point, when once broken could not be rallied. But on their right the enemy still kept their ground with much resolution, nor was it till the arrival of the 4th regiment, and the advance of the British forces in firm array to the charge, that they began to waver,” &c. Nor was the victory a cheap one, even over such a description of force, thus injudiciously placed. “The loss,” continues the English author, “on the part of the English was severe, since out of two-thirds of the army which were engaged, upwards of five hundred men were killed and wounded, and what rendered it doubly severe was that among these were numbered several officers of rank and distinction.

“Of the sailors it would be injustice not to speak in the terms that their conduct merits. They were employed as gunners, and not only did they serve the guns with a quickness and precision which astonished their assailants, but they stood until some of them were actually bayonnetted with fuses in their hands.”

It was stated by the British in Washington, that when Barney, grateful for the kindness of the English soldier whom he called to surrender to, offered the man his watch, the Englishman declined it, saying, “I can help a brave man without pay.”

Captain, now Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, of the marines, on that day, when bravery was so rare a virtue, was bravest of the brave. As in neither army was there a stouter heart, so neither was there a finer figure of his tall and well-formed countrymen; in the flower of manhood, erect, handsome, with an eagle eye, gracefully leading his highly disciplined company; his last exploit the unusual single combat in which he fell like a Roman. Unwilling to yield, even when the enemy from above were overhanging and about to surround him, ascending an elevation to reconnoiter, Captain Miller (from whom it need hardly be added that this account is not derived), came suddenly on a brave enemy. Each



levelled at his antagonist, fired and missed, in the unexpected duel fought without challenge, assistants, or malice. Both re-loaded their muskets: and while Miller was fixing his flint, he fell from a shot which broke his arm to pieces. His conqueror extolled his conduct, and he was treated, like Barney, with the utmost kindness. It was one of the strange features of that disfigured conflict that the only part of Gen. Winder's army who made any impression on the foe by effectual resistance, the watermen and marines, were *loaned* to the general by the Secretary of the Navy, under whose orders they formed a distinct corps. But by his permission, or the President's, these brave men, being neither soldiers nor sailors, could have had no part in the battle. The Secretary was disposed to station them all at Fort Warburton, where they might, perhaps, have saved Alexandria; but it was only at General Winder's earnest instance that they were allowed to make part of his movable force in the field. Of Miller's 110 men, six were killed and fifteen wounded, besides himself and Captain Sevier.

After Barney and Miller's defeat and retreat, Ross attempted nothing further. One-fifth of his army was killed, wounded, or missing, for they deserted whenever they could; and the rest were so entirely overcome by their labors and exertions, from early in the morning till four o'clock, that they were incapable of further effort. Rest was indispensable to them: and as they lay asleep on the ground, it was Barney's opinion, freely expressed, that 500 well disciplined cavalry could have rode through and taken them all, almost without waking them from their heavy slumbers.

“*Dulcis et alta quies placidæque simillima morti.*”

Cockburn's jocular and contemptuous official reason for not pursuing, was, that the victors were too weary, and the vanquished too swift.

The victory was won, however. After Barney and Miller were taken, scarce another shot was fired, or endeavor made to prevent the enemy's unopposed triumphant entry into Washington, which Ross adjourned till evening, only because his 3500 surviving men were unable, without repose, either to fight or march more. But General Winder did not intend, for some time, to abandon the city without another struggle. Dispatching a gentleman, Mr. Riggs, to inform the President, who had gone towards home, that he designed to try what would have been the third action of the day, he bent all his endeavors to concentrating as many of his remaining troops as could be collected, with General Smith's reserve, which, after some difficulty and partial engagement, remained entire in numbers, spirit, and great anxiety to defend their

families and dwellings from the apprehended horrors of Cockburn's occupation.

Soon after sunset of the 23d, while Winder was rallying his little army to Washington, a Virginia regiment, under Colonel Minor, reached there, eight hundred men, whose presence at the battle next day might have turned its fortune. Why they were not present, as told by an intelligent eye-witness, Dr. James Ewell, is a curious explanation of the whole transaction. Most of the regiment came without muskets! scarce an arm had these workmen without tools, or firemen without water, hastening to save a building from conflagration. Conducted by the President's direction to the Secretary of War to get arms and ammunition, General Armstrong directed Colonel Minor to make his men put in order the few guns they had brought with them, and to report himself next morning to Colonel Carberry, who would furnish additional arms. All that the regiment could do, therefore, on the eve of the battle, was to go to sleep in the Capitol. While Winder from below, and Ross were hastening to Washington, and Stansbury at Bladensburg passed the night in weary alerts, the Virginia auxiliaries, without muskets, powder, or ball, went to rest in the hall of the House of Representatives, next day to be laid in ashes by a force which 800 well armed and resolute men might have kept from approaching it without inevitable and utter discomfiture. Early next morning, when Colonel Minor sought Colonel Carberry for arms, he had gone the evening before to sleep at his country seat. After several hours of provoking delay, appealing to General Winder, Colonel Minor was at last able to find Colonel Carberry, who furnished the muskets; but without flints! Finally, the flints were obtained: but the clerk, who supplied, deemed it part of his untimely economy and official accountability to count them carefully, as delivered, one by one, as if they were dollars, and before delivering, to count them over again, lest there might be some mistake. The fire of the flint, sung as what warms the American people, never was so slow to kindle. Minor did not get his regiment to the last position of the American troops till the fighting was all over, and nothing but to retreat remained to be done. While the flints were counting the last cannon were fired. One of the retorts to the Virginia accusation of negligence, tardiness, and inefficiency of supplies, was, that their regiment did not wait to be armed in time, or take part in the action, but lingered on purpose. Minor's regiment, Brent's and Magruder's district regiments, and such other troops as could be kept together, altogether not less than two thousand well armed men, with Peter's artillery, remained unfrightened, and, as their commanding-general, Smith, in-

sisted, anxious to meet the enemy where they were, about two miles from Washington. But General Winder deemed it prudent to order them to fall back from the position they occupied, and reluctantly left, to another nearer the city, where he contemplated making a stand. Arrived and halted there, however, he ordered them again to retire to the Capitol, where they were finally to await the enemy. There General Armstrong suggested throwing them into the two wings of that stone, strong building, as, at the battle of Germantown, Colonel Musgrave, with 600 British troops in Chew's stone house, withstood and defeated Washington's whole army, much more numerous and better provided than Ross's. But General Winder, with warmth, rejected the proposal. His force was too much reduced and dispirited, he urged, for the desperate resistance required against assaults circumventing them in an isolated building, where in twenty-four hours they might be starved into unconditional surrender: Colonel Monroe coincided with General Winder's opinion. The Capitol, he feared, might prove a cul-de-sac, from which there would be no escape; the only safety was to rally on the heights of Georgetown, beyond Washington. For the seventh time that day a retreat, therefore, was once more commanded. In anguish, and with loud execrations, some of them in tears, the city troops, with the rest, for the last time, turned their backs on the enemy, then fast asleep on the parched earth, more than cannon shot from the capital. To desert their homes, families, and dwellings, to march degraded by their forsaken wives and children, leaving all they had or cherished to the barbarities of an enraged and inhuman invader, was insupportable. Both at their first order to retreat toward the Capitol, and their last to retreat from it, and march beyond the city, insubordinate protests, oaths, tears, and bitter complaints broke forth. To preserve order in ranks so demoralized and degraded, was impossible. Broken, scattered, licentious, and tumultuous, they wandered along the central, solitary avenue, which is the great entry of Washington; when arrived at Georgetown, were a mere mob, from whom it was preposterous to suppose that an army could be organized, to make a stand there, and in nearly as great disorder as the runagates who preceded them across the fields, without venturing into the city, the remnant of disgraced freemen reached Tenlytown in utter mortification; there to be disturbed and alarmed nearly all night by the conflagration, as they had reason to believe, of every house in Washington, whose lurid flames, with the detonations from the navy yard, were the shocking sights and sounds of all the surrounding country, filled with fugitives of both sexes, all ages, and thou-

sands of them men of courage, sleeping on their arms. Broken, scattered, and disgusted, most wended their way to Montgomery court-house, fifteen miles from Georgetown, where their unquestionably brave but ill-starred and ill-advised commander, stung with poignant sorrow, deplored that he had not, at Nottingham, at the old fields at Bladensburg, at Washington, somewhere, if not everywhere, less scrupulous of bloodshed, by freer expenditure of that of his fellow-citizens and neighbors, saved the capital of his country from profanation, and its national character from indelible disgrace.

The Cossack rush which Armstrong carelessly predicted, was realized in the shameful results now to be described.

Not exceeding fifty or sixty of the vanquished killed or wounded, against the singular contrast of five hundred of the victors, was reversal of the common odds of casualties on such occasions, proving that more American lives, unwisely hoarded, were the cheap price due for saving so much lost honor. But, from the 18th of June, when the autocrat of all the Russias counselled an American envoy in London to war for peace as safer than to beg for it, till the last tread of the hostile heel on American soil, terror disarmed the seat of government; dread of the vast resistless power of British arms.

From the first alarm, the Secretary of the Navy's constant care was, to destroy the new sloop-of-war, *Argus*, afloat, with ten guns mounted; a new schooner, the *Lynx*, also afloat; five barges completely equipped, two gun boats, the large frigate *Columbia*, on the stocks, nearly ready to be launched, numerous buildings, engines, fixtures, large quantities of cordage, canvass, saltpetre, copper, iron, block tin, lead, blocks, ship chandlery, naval and ordnance stores, beef, pork, whiskey, plank, timber, valuable armaments, which, at a full cabinet council held at the navy yard, in the morning before that battle, on the Secretary's earnest recommendation, were doomed to self-destruction in the event, little doubted, of the enemy's getting possession of the city, though that might have been without also capturing the navy yard, where the armaments were sufficient to beat him off; and, if not, it was impossible for him to carry them away: all he could do was what we did, to destroy them. In the same despondent hour, when General Winder declared there that Fort Warburton was not tenable, and General Armstrong, that our army must be beat, the same boding dejection pronounced sentence on the naval equipments. At four o'clock in the afternoon, more than three hours before Ross marched into the city, the commandant of the navy yard received a message from the Secretary of War, that he could



protect him no longer; and, accordingly, took immediate measures to execute his positive orders, against which the respectable inhabitants there remonstrated, entreating the commodore, at least to delay, if not relinquish it. Even a deputation of the women waited on him, with their prayer to spare the property. And Captain Creighton, of the navy, strenuously remonstrated, offering to defend the yard from any attempt to destroy or take it. The colonel of marines, of which there were none, crossed the river in a boat to Virginia. Captain Creighton having obtained a short respite, while he rode out on horseback to reconnoiter, returned at eight o'clock, still urging that the property might be saved by resistance. But Tingey's positive orders were then obeyed, the matches applied, and in a few minutes, the whole was in irretrievable conflagration, saluting, by loud detonations, sunset and the British march to the capital. So groundless was the terror, and mistaken the policy, dictating American destruction at the navy yard, that only two brass pieces were there spiked by the enemy, whose alarm was so near akin to our own, as, in his hurry, to leave several hundred iron cannons uninjured, and also the arsenal, not far off, an important repository, of which their views and orders especially required the demolition, but which escaped both American and British madness.

Having given his exhausted soldiers some indispensable repose, Ross, with Cockburn, attended by a body guard of two hundred bayonets, and saluted by the fulminations from the navy yard, rode slowly into the wilderness city, whose population was but eight thousand, scattered over large spaces, and of whom almost every male was then absent, either in arms, some distant hiding-place, or a few keeping close in their dwellings. Many passed the night in huts and corn fields around the town. The first considerable dwelling the enemy was to pass had been Mr. Gallatin's residence, the house of Mr. Sewall, some hundred yards east of the Capitol. From behind the side wall of that house, as is supposed, at all events from or near to it, a solitary musket, fired by some excited and perhaps intoxicated person, believed to be a well-known Irish barber, but never ascertained who was the perpetrator, no doubt aimed at General Ross, killed the bay mare he rode. In his official report, no mention is made of that wanton and indefensible outrage. But his naval companion, the admiral, in his, not only introduces, but exaggerates and falsifies the incident into what he denounces as "many similar acts of universal wanton enormity;" absurdly calling it a *heavy* fire from the *Capitol*, which was more than twice gunshot distant. The falsehood is at once palpable when he adds, that the *other houses* from which, as well as

the Capitol, he says, "the fire was opened by the *enemy*, were therefore almost immediately *stormed* and set on fire; after which the town submitted without further resistance." All of this is even more absurd than false. The other houses set on fire were not near Sewall's house. One of them was General Washington's house, the unprovoked destruction of which General Ross much regretted when informed of its ownership. The whole story is a pretext, disclaimed by the general; as it was, and still is, the unanimous impression of those who had any intercourse with him, that the less ungenerous and less rapacious young general disapproved much of the piratical misconduct of his naval instigator, whose official account of his barbarities is without example in modern warfare. His pretext for devastation is pleaded with uncivilized atrocity. "On taking possession of the city, we also set fire to the President's palace, the Treasury, and the War Office. In the morning, Captain Wainwright destroyed whatever stores and buildings had escaped the flames the preceding night. A large quantity of ammunition and ordnance stores was likewise destroyed by us in the arsenal, as were about two hundred pieces of artillery of different calibres, as well as a vast quantity of small arms. Two rope-walks of a very extensive nature, full of tar ropes, &c., situate a considerable distance from the yard, were likewise set fire to and consumed. In short, sir, I do not believe a vestige of public property, or a store of any kind which could be converted to the use of the government, escaped destruction. The bridges across the eastern branch of the Potomac were likewise destroyed. This *general devastation* being completed, we marched at night on the return to Marlborough." The *object* of the expedition, both General Ross and Admiral Cochrane officially reported to their government, was the complete destruction of the public buildings; barbarism which Vienna, Lisbon, Berlin, Amsterdam, Madrid, Munich, Moscow, and Paris, were not subjected to when captured in this century. But neither of those superior officers countenances Cockburn's false pretence, that a sporadic and sudden individual outrage, provoked and justified extemporaneous and general devastation. The author of the British campaign states, that before marching into the city, Ross sent in a flag of truce with terms, which was fired upon from the window of *one* of the houses, killing the general's horse, who accompanied the party. "Conduct so unjustifiable, so direct a breach of the law of nations, roused the indignation of every individual, from the general himself down to the private soldier. All thoughts of accommodation were instantly laid aside, troops advanced forthwith into the town, and having put to the sword all

who were found *in the house* from which the shots were fired, and reduced *it* to ashes, they proceeded, without a moment's delay, to burn and destroy everything in the most distant degree connected with government. In this general devastation," &c. "All this was as it should be, and had the arm of vengeance extended no further, there would not have been room given for so much as a whisper of disapprobation. But, unfortunately, it did not stop here; a noble library, several printing offices, and all the national archives, were likewise committed to the flames, which, though no doubt the property of government, might better have been spared. It is not, however, my intention to join the outcry which will probably be raised against what they will term a line of conduct at once barbarous and unprofitable. Far from it; I cannot help admiring the forbearance and humanity of the British troops, since, irritated as they had every right to be, they spared, as far as was possible, all private property; not a single house in the place being plundered or destroyed, except *that* from which the general's horse had been killed, and those which were accidentally thrown down by the explosion of the magazines."

As the absconding government, with crowds of their affrighted fugitives, covered with dust and enveloped in clouds of it, hurried into Washington, the cry, from all quarters, was, "the ruffians are coming!" Recollections of Hampton, Craney Island and Raisin, dismayed every breast. The unanimous effort was to escape anticipated and exaggerated horrors. Save the women and children, was the entreaty of some; but, as in such panics, self predominated over the ethics of kindred and proprieties of decorum. Women in convulsions, children wild with fear, and men paralyzed with it, slaves and servants escaping, carts bearing off whatever could be saved in mere delirious panic; such was the scene.

That the *complete destruction* of even only *public* buildings, officially reported by the commanding admiral and general to their government, was the *object* of the expedition, is of authentic and undeniable record. If the treaty signed at Ghent in December, was put off till then from the peace of Paris, in April, in order that the British government might, by its military and naval instruments, deliberately commit so atrocious a violation of civilized warfare, nothing since the Mussulman destruction of the Alexandrian library, even with Gibbon supposing that fabulous, has occurred so inhuman and infamous. The unknown catiff who attempted to assassinate General Ross is much less detestable and unpardonable than the member of the government, ministry, monarch, regent, or whoever the miscreant may be, guilty of the

infinitely greater outrage of postponing peace for several months, after the causes of war had ceased, in order to devastate the public edifices of an enemy's capital. Much more, however, than that was done. Many private houses were destroyed without the slightest pretext. Sewall's house was justly laid in ruins. But the other private dwellings burned were not near it. They were the residences of unoffending persons, at some distance from the place of the solitary shot fired by a concealed individual; one of them the property of Washington, which illustrates without aggravating the enormity; and the allegation of firing from the Capitol was worse than unfounded. Would it had been so! But not a human being, except the barbarians who set fire to that pile, dared to approach it or them. During the twenty-eight hours of his hostile occupation of Washington, General Ross was exemplarily careful of private property, punished his soldiers for violating it, and displayed just aversion to the piratical depredations of his naval associate, by whom pillage and private incendiarism were added to that ordered by the British government; habitual propensities of British seafaring rapacity, indulged during eighteen months of Cockburn's sway, throughout the waters of the Middle States. The general obeyed the order of his superiors when he applied the torch to public buildings. The admiral gratified his truculent instincts of brutality when, exceeding those incendiary orders, he set fire to ropewalks, printing presses and private habitations. Partners in the shame and meanness of these Vandalic offences, general, admiral, minister and government are all guilty: but there are shades of criminality, which entitle Ross to acknowledgment that he appeared averse to burn even the public buildings he was charged from London to destroy, that he revolted at the destruction of private property, and that his authority was exerted to punish the pilfering transgressions of his inferiors and check the unsparing devastations of his naval associate.

Misled, as I have reason, after careful and thorough investigation to believe, by the author of the English anonymous narrative of the campaign, and possibly biased by the feeling he could hardly fail imbibing against Monroe and Madison, General Armstrong, in his Notices of the War, a work generally accurate; however sometimes indulgent of animosity, asserts an important circumstance, concerning which his opportunities of information were good, but which, nevertheless, is not well founded. The statements, "that the two commanders, naval and military, visited the public buildings, *set a price on their ransom, and detached an agent to open a negotiation with some competent American authority on the subject.*" The return of the messenger with



a rejection of the terms, became a signal for destruction, when every national building, except the post-office, was consumed. The only American having any connection with this negotiation was Dr. Thornton, as the facts were *reported* to me. Of the proposition itself, the President spoke with becoming contempt."

Dr. Thornton, by birth English, and in politics extremely federal, a clerk in the State Department, having charge of the patent-office, then a much smaller public repository than it has since become, was a respectable man of scientific turn of mind, desirous of propitiating the commanders of the hostile incursion to Washington, and sometimes indiscreet in suggestions for that purpose, which may have subjected him to misapprehension as to a negotiation intimated by the Secretary of War. But no such overture as General Armstrong supposes was ever possible. Before the British marched into Washington the President had gone over the Potomac into Virginia, and could not be communicated with by friends, much less foes. The British mission of madness conveyed from London to the American shores was destruction, as the American superstition was panic, and desertion of the seat of government doomed to devastation. Cockburn flattered himself, probably, and counseled Ross, that their fortunes might be made by ransom money; that a contribution levied could be substituted for conflagration, and that all the honor of capturing the capital of the United States would be accomplished as well in money as in ruins. But, by information from all the most respectable sources, confirming impressions and recollections there near the time—this being written in Washington in 1848—I am confident, and have so written to the son of General Armstrong, that his assignment of a momentary and sordid motive for the burning of the seat of government, is a mistake. The most inexcusable parts of it were not done till the day after that to which he ascribes the *signal* of destruction. Gales and Seaton's printing-office, Ringgold's rope-walks, both private property, though in some connection with government, and the War Office, were not destroyed till the day after the capture, when it was also, that Dr. Thornton's entreaties, with the providential interposition of a violent storm of rain and wind, snatched the patents and models in the post-office from flames, which it was then difficult to kindle in a building soaked with wet. Hope of prevailing on the government to buy the preservation of their public buildings there probably was in the plundering calculations of the pirate admiral: but not even the proffer of that baseness was made, which, if made, must, to be sure, have been spurned with utter contempt by Madison.

"To the third brigade, that which was least fatigued by fighting, was assigned the task of destroying." "The sun set," says the English perpetrator in it, "before the different regiments were in a condition to move in the dark. Before they quitted their ground the work of destruction had begun in the city. The blazing of houses, ships and stores, the reports of exploding magazines, and the crash of falling roofs, informed them, as they proceeded, of what was going forward. You can conceive nothing finer than the sight which met them as they drew near the town. The sky was brilliantly illuminated by the different conflagrations; and a dark, red light was thrown upon the road sufficient to permit each man to view distinctly his comrade's face. The scene was striking and sublime, as the burning of St. Sebastian's. The first and second brigades advanced into the plain [meaning, no doubt, the table-land of the capital], halted, and in close column bivouacked for the night. Towards morning a violent storm of rain, accompanied with thunder and lightning, came on: whose flashes seemed to vie in brilliancy with the flames which seemed to burst from the roofs of burning houses, while the thunder drowned the noise of crumbling walls, and was only interrupted by the occasional roar of cannon, and of large depots of gunpowder, as they exploded one by one."

That magnificent pile of still imperfect building, the Capitol of Washington, built, burned, rebuilt, already the seat of government legislating for more than twenty millions of people, territories as extensive as any other realm in the world, foreign commerce hardly second, interior trade far the greatest, with glorious recollections of the past, and incalculable anticipations of an immense future, consisted, when the British Vandal torch was put to it, of only the two present wings in an unfinished external condition, without the central rotunda with its lofty dome, whispering gallery, paintings and sculptures, founded on a treble-colonnaded circular Doric crypt, the great eastern front and flight of steps, the Western Library and terrace, thirty acres of ground enclosed with iron railing, beautifully planted, and watered by several fountains and reservoirs. Nor was the interior the same of the then nearly completed Hall of the Representatives, Senate Chamber and Supreme Court room. The library was in the Senate wing, up stairs. The Representative Hall was then like the present: the Speaker's chair where it now is. But the fourteen columns were of the same freestone as the walls, instead of the present fancifully variegated and polished marble. The Senate Chamber was like that now; the Supreme Court room below with its massive groins—low, dark, and sepulchral as ever; the library not then

enlarged by Jefferson's, and the annual contributions since augmenting it.

The ancient secretary of the Senate, Samuel A. Otis died not long before. The clerks, door-keepers and officers were most of them absent under arms, or had fled. Two days before the capture, one of them, more provident than the rest, removed a cart-load of papers and documents out of town to a place of concealment in safety. But for the most part the halls of legislation, with their appurtenances, were derelict, without superintendent, occupant or care. The night before the battle, Minor's Virginia regiment bivouacked in the Representative Hall. The surrounding grounds, then uncultivated, were mere wastes. Some of the houses now standing east, north and south of the Capitol, were there then; but its general aspect was much less finished and interesting than rendered since, partly by hostile desecration endearing it to national recollections and pride. The naval monument now at the west front was then at the navy yard. Washington's sarcophagus under the crypt, the lofty flights of stairs, statues, fountains, terraces, iron railing encircling the grounds, their nine noble entrances, the lodges, gates, in a word, all the exterior decorations, have followed the British destruction of the first rude pile. Still the unfinished interior, particularly the Representative Hall, was then a noble structure. One of the architect, Latrobe's, bold attempts to ornament some of the smaller columns of the vestibules with two new American orders of architecture, the magnolia and the Indian corn, then as now occupied their almost unnoticed corners, demonstrating that to antiquity alone belongs exclusive superiority in architecture and sculpture. The Representative Hall, then as now, with its Grecian design and decorations, was one of the largest, most elegant and least convenient in the world. The English beheld, on entering it, an apartment incomparably more vast and splendid than their dark and crowded Commons chapel of St. Stephens, as the American Senate Chamber is a much more imposing spectacle than their old House of Lords. The interior outlines and general appearance were then much as at present. The elliptical Representative Hall, supported by a freestone colonnade, lighted by numerous apertures in the dome, a less inconvenient speaking and hearing room than now. The particulars of the destruction of the Capitol it is almost impossible to obtain. After diligent inquiry, I can find no one within sight, such was the terror of all. Drawing up their column on the east of the building, after a short consideration whether it should be exploded by gunpowder, or consumed by fire, the latter was resolved upon by the enemy, as was believed, lest the blowing up should injure adjacent

dwellings. The troops were ordered to fire a volley into the windows, after which the commanders led their followers into the interior. It was among the stories when Congress met near the ruins three weeks afterwards, that the admiral, in a strain of coarse levity, mounting the Speaker's chair, put the question, "Shall this harbor of Yankee democracy be burned? All for it will say aye," to which loud cries of assent being vociferated, he reversed the question, pronounced it carried unanimously, and the mock resolution was executed by rockets and other combustibles applied to the chairs and furniture heaped up in the centre, and fired wherever there was a fit place. The temporary wooden structure connecting the two wings, readily kindled. Doors, chairs, consumable parts, the library and its contents, in an upper room of the Senate wing, everything that would take fire, soon disappeared in sheets of flame, illuminating and consternating the environs for thirty miles round, whence the conflagration was visible. In a room adjoining the Senate Chamber, portraits of the King and Queen of France, Louis the Sixteenth, and his wife, were cut from the frames, by whom has never appeared. The frames were scorched, but not burned, and probably some pilferer snatched those pictures from destruction to steal them. The fugitive and mortified soldiery, the humbled, scattered and concealed cabinet, the affrighted and hiding few remaining in the town, looked on the conflagration of the Capitol, and some houses near it, as the beginning of the destruction of all the rest. No one dared hope that it would stop with public buildings. Terror, shame, dismay, disgust disturbed the broken slumbers of that dismal night, which closed with one of those thunder gusts that indicate the approach of autumn, and with excessive heat mixing extreme moisture, produce vegetable decay, animal disease, and mortal distempers.

The Capitol, wrapped in its winding sheet of fire, and the troops slightly refreshed after that first perpetration, were led by the general and admiral along then almost the only thoroughfare of Washington, the eternal Pennsylvania Avenue, without beat of drum or other martial sound than their ponderous tramp, a mile and a quarter towards the President's house, the Treasury and War Offices, to burn them. Arrived at the elbow where that main street curves from its straight course round the Treasury building, then a smaller edifice, where the present over-colonnaded range now stands, at the house in the bend in the southwest corner of the avenue, the conquerors halted to order their frugal and unquiet supper; for they too were uneasy, fearful of enemies armed and unarmed, of poisoned water and food, disquieted by the non-arrival of their



expected shipping at Alexandria, like burglars and robbers, dreading that they would be surprised and punished. The corner house is a long, low brick, then kept for lodgings by Mrs. Suter, an aged lady, from whom what occurred there, is derived. In a city little more than such nominally, nine-tenths of the inhabitants public incumbents, and their servants, mostly blacks, very few householders, but nearly all living at lodgings, Mrs. Suter's was the most convenient to the public offices and President's mansion, directly opposite at right angles to the Treasury, and close to the President's. Governor Meigs, the postmaster-general, though absent when Washington was captured, was one of Mrs. Suter's boarders, together with two others, both pursers of the navy. The family were at dinner a few days before the capture, when a British deserter, shabby and wretched, called at the door and begged for something to eat. Desertion from the British army and navy was too common to excite surprise; there was no police, either civil or military, at Washington; whence all came and went as they chose without superintendence or inquiry. Governor Meigs objected to his landlady's feeding the vagrant at the door, of whom, he said, there were too many about, and some of them impostors, why not spies? But the victuals were sent from the table, and thankfully devoured by the man, under the shade of a tree. Mrs. Suter's two sons were both in arms, one with Barney, the other in a volunteer company, during the battle, who that evening both returned, the flotilla man wounded but carried away by his comrades, the volunteer merely to see his mother and then continue his retreat. "It was a whole week," she said, "of great trouble, hardly sleeping at night, and all the day time spent in fright. About nine o'clock at night, after the terrors of that sad week and dreadful day, the Capitol and other buildings blazing, the navy yard fearfully exploding, Mrs. Suter's house, with no one in it but herself and one female servant, was surrounded by soldiers in gray clothing, whom she took for Americans. An officer entered and announced himself as General Ross—"come," said he, "madam, to sup with you;" which unwelcome intimation she could ill decline, but told him that she had nothing to eat in the house, and there was McLeod's tavern over the way, where she supposed he might be accommodated; but which did not admit, like Mrs. Suter's, of a view of the public buildings. The general replied, therefore, that he preferred her house, because he had some acquaintance with her, mentioning several familiar circumstances, and inquiring for the old gentleman who objected to giving something to eat to a poor British soldier in distress; insisting on supper there for himself and several officers,

with whom he should return after visiting the Treasury. Thus compelled by duress, and advised by the woman servant, when the general left them, to kill and cook the fowls in the yard, and warm some bread, the supper was hastily provided and ready when the party returned, altogether eleven officers, including General Ross, and one in blue, on a mule which he rode partly through the low front door into the house, introducing himself as the much abused Admiral Cockburn. Jocose, yet timorous, they snatched a short repast, for which Cockburn, blowing out the candles, said he preferred the light of the burning palace and Treasury, whose conflagration hard by illuminated the room, outshining the pale moonlight, also beaming in all its silver radiance. Much disappointment was expressed at the President's escape and his wife's, with many inquiries and conjectures as to their place of concealment. They wanted him to show in England, they said; but more disappointment was expressed at the non-arrival of the British shipping at Alexandria, on whose co-operation they appeared to place anxious reliance, and whose not coming, together with the two storms that night and next day of rain, wind and thunder, with much damage, occasioned their sudden and secret departure the next night. They were alarmed for the shipping and themselves, dependent on each other, which Captain Gordon, in the Seahorse frigate, and Captain Napier, in the Euryalus, with a squadron of small vessels, did not succeed in getting to Alexandria till Sunday, the 29th August, the day that Ross ended his retreat, begun on the 25th, re-embarking the 29th at Benedict. The general and admiral much regretted the absence of Gordon. While at supper, an officer came in and inquired if there was not another building to be burned—the War Office? "Certainly," said the admiral. "It will be time enough in the morning," said the general, "as it is now growing late, and the men require rest." After some further question, the general's opinion prevailed, and the burning of the War Office was adjourned till next day. "There is a bank too, near here," said Cockburn, "that ought to be burned." Ross asked Mrs. Suter whether the Bank of the Metropolis was a public or private bank? She thought private, she answered, because it was in a private house, and so it escaped. After a plain meal was despatched, without wine or liquor, nor vail to the woman who waited, the gentlemen left Mrs. Suter's: one of them, the deserter, a few days before begging at her door; another, who had been in Washington before the war, and was well acquainted with its localities. It was the opinion of many persons that Cockburn himself had been in Washington often.

Mrs. Madison's recollection, still unimpaired, attributes to Admiral Cockburn,

when his followers halted at the pump, near the Treasury, to slake their burning thirst, before they proceeded to the President's house, his only act of gallantry and humanity, which ought to be mentioned, however inconsistent with the general brutality of his conduct, and with the dates of other occurrences that afternoon or evening. "He sent," she says, "a message, offering her an escort to whatever place of safety she might choose." As she left the President's house between three and four o'clock, and the enemy did not enter Washington till about sundown, there is incongruity in the dates. General Ross told Dr. Ewell, that he would not have burned the President's house, if Mrs. Madison had remained at home. "I make no war," said he, uttering a fine sentiment, "on *letters or ladies*, and I have heard so much in praise of Mrs. Madison, that I would rather protect than burn a house which sheltered so excellent a lady." At the pump near the Treasury, the men were warned against poisoned water, as poisoned whiskey had been placed in their way. And at the President's, the more considerable and considerate refrained from eating, leaving to the half starved and thoughtless soldiery whatever food invited their appetites. The President's mansion then, not so complete as now, the large east room unfinished and unoccupied, the front vestibule, garden stairs, and several of the decorative parts since added to the building, within and without, was, in Mr. Madison's occupation, the seat of substantial and perennial entertainment, plenty without stint and welcome unbounded, less elegant, European or ostentatious than since, plain and negligent even to rustic absence of display, but the scene of daily and profuse hospitality. Thronged as Washington was with officers, and many transient persons, the tables were set every day during the week of the invasion, with abundance for a hundred guests, provided from the stores of the family, when the markets of Washington were less plentiful than since, but Mr. Madison's well stored cellars of provisions and liquors amply supplied every want. The English author of the British campaign, without allusion to any objection to enjoying what the enemy found there, states that they arrived "to a dinner table spread, and covers laid for forty guests. Several kinds of wine, in handsome cut glass decanters, were cooling on the sideboard; plate holders stood by the fire place, filled with dishes and plates; knives, forks, and spoons, were arranged for immediate use; in short, everything was ready for the entertainment of a ceremonious party," as this narrative tells, when the preparation, not for ceremony after anticipated victory, was made to receive those who, it was despondingly feared, were to go forth to defeat. "In the kitchen," adds

the English narrative, "spits loaded with joints of various sorts, turned before the fire; pots, saucepans, and other culinary utensils stood upon the grate, [there were no grates, but a large fire of hickory wood,] and all the other requisites for an elegant and substantial repast, were exactly in a state which indicated that they had been lately and precipitately abandoned." Mr. John Siousa, Mr. Madison's porter, a respectable Frenchman, who still survives, pronounces all this account of food, a fable. There was, he says, no preparation for dinner or eating, beyond a small quantity of meat in the kitchen, which he found there after the house was burned, still unconsumed. If there had been food, he says the British would not have eaten it, such was their fear of poison. "But this was a night of dismay to the inhabitants," adds the English narrator, "taken completely by surprise: the streets crowded, all hastening towards a wooden bridge, which crosses the Potomac, on which the crowd was such, as to endanger its giving way."

At a small beer house opposite to the Treasury kept by a drunken Frenchman, named Nardin, fire was procured, with which the Treasury and then the President's house, were set fire to.

Before setting fire to the house, it was ransacked for booty, especially objects of curiosity to be carried off as spoils; but few were found; some pictures and books chosen from Mr. Madison's library, were all that were deemed worth preserving, except a small parcel of the pencil notes received from her husband by Mrs. Madison, while he was with the troops, which she had rolled up together, and put in a table-drawer. To all the rest of the contents of the building; furniture, wines, provisions, groceries, and family stores, which cost Mr. Madison twelve thousand dollars, together with an excellent library, (treasures of the cures for the soul, as libraries were originally called by their first collectors, the Egyptians,) the torch was applied. After incendiarianism had done its worst, both at the President's house, and the navy yard, indiscriminate pillage closed the scene; less by the British soldiers, who were restrained by their officers, than by negroes, vagrants, and catiffs of various kinds and hues, freed from all restriction on their proneness to steal and drink, consume and waste.

The day's victory and night's devastation brought the conquerors to a pause and retirement. The general, circumspect, and apparently disgusted with his own exploits, troubled, if not with remorse or shame, at least with the responsibilities of his situation, after the misdeeds of a shocking night, superadded to the perilous adventure of the day, repaired to his encampment on



Capitol Hill. The admiral, belonging to the race of seamen—"a nation," says Clarendon, "by themselves, a humorous and fantastic people, fierce and rude, and resolute, in whatsoever they resolve, or are inclined to"—concluded his victorious and destructive orgies of that memorable day and night, with the coarse luxury of lust in a brothel, from which he emerged next morning to further devastations. When the victorious crusaders sacked Constantinople, French conquerors danced with lewd women in the sanctuary of St. Sophia, while other prostitutes sang obscene songs in the Patriarch's chair. During their two evenings' occupation of the detached hamlets, constituting the federal seat of government, most of the city pastured by cows and sheep, and much of its wilds overgrown with thickets, with few inhabitants to be found, a martial curfew was enforced, which forbade them to appear after night. But British dominion never extended beyond a line of sentinels between the Treasury and President's house; to the latter of which, on the night of the 24th, and to the War Office on the morning of the 25th, excursions were pushed by detachments sent to destroy them. Further west the conquerors never ventured, leaving Georgetown undisturbed: its heights supposed to be crowned with American troops, reorganizing, and burning for retaliation, when no such ardor was kindled, for no troops were there. The only assailant of the British army in Washington was a grand nephew by the mother's side of General Washington, John Lewis. Whether his death, which ensued, was the result of his own rashness or mistake, was never ascertained; for he, too, belonged to the peculiar nation of seamen. His uncle endeavored to bring him up to better life and death. But roving and untameable, he escaped from home to sea, and before the mast volunteered apprenticeship to its rough education. Impressed by insolent Britons forcibly taking him from an American vessel, the descendant of Washington was compelled by blows to shed his proud blood in conflict against his own countrymen. Not many months before the capture of the city named after his great uncle, Lewis made his escape, vowing eternal and signal vengeance against the tyrants who had enslaved and scourged him; against the press-gang and his taskmasters. On the night of the capture, armed with pistols, and his indignant spirit perhaps inflamed by drink, he approached the British sentries, whether by mistake or in passion did not appear. Shots were exchanged by him with one or more of them; and he fell dead in the street near Mr. Adams' house, where his body lay till removed next morning.

With the sultry dawn of the 25th August, Ross arose to anxious and still disappointed

expectation of the squadron in the Potomac, of which no tidings came, and Cockburn from the bed of debauch, thirsting for more destruction; the general, having accomplished nearly all that could, and much more than should be done, indisposed to further outrage and solicitous of retiring with laurels already tarnished, which would be blasted by interception of his retreat, and revenging on his army the outrages they had committed. A sacrifice, almost ludicrous, to preposterous panic, ensued in the burning, at the same time, of both ends of the long wooden bridge over the Potomac from Washington to Virginia; the end held by the British on the east to prevent the Americans from returning to attack them, the end by the Americans on the west to hinder the British from coming to attack us. The American official report to Congress of this immolation, was, that the tornado of the night between the 24th and 25th, having ruptured the draw, a corporal in charge of it, perceiving, as he apprehended, a body of the enemy about to cross from Washington, set fire to the west end, burning all the ammunition and stores deposited there; while, at the same moment the British set fire to their east end, apprehending that American troops were about crossing to recapture Washington, which terror, the day before, by that bridge, emptied of its inhabitants, except a few females and two clergymen, Dr. Lowrie, pastor of the Presbyterian church, and Mr. Matthews of the Roman Catholic, both still living, the latter near eighty years old, who remained to protect their places of worship, of which then there were but four of the twenty odd now. After breakfast, a detachment of troops marched from the Capitol hill to the War Office, which they burned. Thence they returned along F. street to the post-office, the only public building left standing, where its elegant marble successor has been since erected, the handsomest, cheapest, but worst located, for want of space to display its attractions, of any edifice in Washington. The Patent Office was then under the post-office roof, in our cheap government of cumulated services, a clerkship of the State Department, as still, with a noble building supported from the large income of scientific ingenuity, its important functions are performed by the Secretary of State and Register of the Treasury, in committee with the Superintendent of Patents. Dr. Thornton, then chief of the Patent Office, accompanied the detachment to the locked door of the repository, the key having been taken away by another clerk watching out of night. Axes and other implements of force were used to break in, Thornton entreating, remonstrating, and finally prevailing on Major Waters, superintending the destruction, to postpone it till Thornton could see Colonel Jones, then

engaged with Admiral Cockburn in destroying the office of the National Intelligencer, not far off in Pennsylvania Avenue. Colonel Jones had declared that it was not designed to destroy private property, which Dr. Thornton assured Major Waters, most of that in the patent office was. A curious musical instrument, of his own construction, which he particularly strove to snatch from ruin, with a providential gust soon after, saved the seat of government from removal for want of any building in which Congress could assemble, when they met at Washington three weeks afterwards. Hundreds of models of the useful arts preserved in the office were of no avail to save it; but music softened the rugged breasts of the least musical of civilized people. Major Waters agreed at least to respite the patents and the musical instrument till his return from Greenleaf's Point, where other objects were to be laid in ruins.

The admiral was merry in his grotesque rambles about Washington, mounted on a white, uncurried, long switch-tail brood mare, followed by a black foal neighing after its dam, in which caricature of horsemanship that harlequin of havoc paraded the streets, and laughed at the terrified women imploring him not to destroy their homes. "Never fear," said he, "you shall be much safer under my administration than Madison's." Aware that the editors of the National Intelligencer, the same respectable gentlemen who yet conduct that excellent journal, were obnoxious to British vengeance, Dr. Thornton, under cover of the darkness, posted on Mr. Gales, the senior editor's house, a large printed placard, to signify that the house was unoccupied—"This house to let, inquire at the office of the National Intelligencer." At that office, Cockburn, as at every other incendiary act, presided with characteristic brutality; not aware that the types were then set for a proclamation, intended to be issued by General Winder, denouncing British barbarities and rousing the people in mass to rally to his standard, and inflict that punishment on such inhuman enemies as the general himself failed to enforce. "Be sure," said the admiral, superintending the destruction of the types with Vandal vengeance, "that all the C's are destroyed, so that the rascals can have no further means of abusing my name as they have done." Then, nearly quoting language applied by the Federal Republican newspaper to the senior editor of the National Intelligencer, Joseph Gales, Esq., "I'll punish Madison's man, Joe," said the admiral, "as I have his master, Jim." Three thousand dollars' worth of types and printing materials were thrown out of the windows to be destroyed, for the most part, however, recovered, and still in use by a press in North Carolina.

Meanwhile, Captain Wainwright, by Admiral Cockburn's direction, went with another detachment of troops, both soldiers and sailors, to complete the destruction of the navy-yard, and add to it a rope-yard, far off. The rear-admiral's official report is, that Captain Wainwright went to see "that the destruction was *complete*, when he destroyed whatever stores and buildings had escaped the flames of the preceding night. Two rope-walks, at a considerable distance from the yard, were likewise set fire to and consumed. In short, sir, I do not believe a vestige of public property, or a store of any kind, which could be *converted* to the use of government, escaped destruction; the bridges were likewise destroyed. This *general decastation* being completed, we marched, on our return at nine o'clock at night." Such savage enormities, land piracies which soldiers are seldom guilty of, requiring the unbridled licentiousness of the British sea code to make prize of and destroy everything *convertible* to public use, which is everything whatever, did not entirely escape immediate retribution, foreshadowing the burst of universal rebuke by which all Christendom united to stigmatize the ruthless sack of the American capital. On the bank of the Potomac, near a few houses called Greenleaf's Point, not far from the national arsenal now there, was an empty, dry well, in which large quantities of gunpowder had been thrown with antiquated arms and munitions of war, said to be, some of them, remnants of the American revolution, removed with the seat of government to Washington. Into that volcano of combustibles an officer, who had burned the rope-walks, when all was done, and there was no more occasion for fire, pitched his torch, as into a safe place of extinguishment. With terrible crash the mine instantly exploded, flinging missiles of death and mutilation wide around, killing and cruelly wounding near a hundred of the surrounding destroyers, with a concussion like an earthquake, shaking distant houses, felt in the heart of the city, whence bodies and limbs thrown aloft, with smoke, flame, dust and fragmentary materials were discernible from the post-office, still and alone rescued from conflagration. The sufferers, begrimed with powder and writhing in torture, were saluted by blasphemous ribaldry from some surviving sailors, amused while astounded at what one of them called his comrades' exaltation toward heaven, "nearer than he could get in any other way." Mutilated officers in gay regimentals were carried to the hospital, which General Ross had established in a house near the Capitol; by this shocking calamity urged to hasten his departure—accident and omen of adversity, which shook even the admiral's iron nerves.

Scarcely had it occurred to interrupt their



nearly completed devastation, when they were overtaken by a much more terrific, providential, as it were, judgment on their stay, which forthwith precipitated immediate and clandestine, nocturnal and affrighted departure, in even greater and more foolish consternation than the vanquished Americans deserted Washington the day before. The British narrative shall tell in what wild confusion fleeing from imaginary dangers and superstitious terrors, the bold invaders, cowering at a storm of tropical violence, abandoned their conquest without even completing their orders and mission for the destruction of all the public buildings, but leaving unharmed that in which Congress soon rose with their country to power and prosperity, the more striking because of momentary degradation.

Ross continually deplored the tragedy which he said he had to perform, occasioned, he added, by the Americans burning the British capital in Canada. He likewise much lamented the destruction of the Congress library. "Had I known it in time," said he, "the books most certainly should have been saved." He was distressed, too, when informed that one of the houses burned was General Washington's. Sentimental soldier as he was, an inhabitant of the city, in whose house he lodged, declared that the sunbeam of a cheerful smile was never seen in the anxious and ashamed, if not remorseful, general's countenance, while executing the barbarous duty he was ordered to fulfil. His countenance was constantly shrouded in close shades of thought, and he expressed the deepest regret at the war itself; "war," said he, "between two nations so nearly allied by consanguinity and interest." During their stay in Washington, while the admiral, in his rough way, and with a sharp piercing voice, was continually coarse and abusive, not a word against the American government, the President, the country, or any one, was heard from the general. "What alarmed you? Did you take us for savages?" said Cockburn, roughly, to a lady, who had been much terrified by the British irruption; and, she not knowing what to answer, he added, "I account for your terror by seeing you with newspapers, which delight to make devils of us." Dr. Ewell, entreating Ross to spare his house, the general answered, with an amiable embarrassment, "that is the house we had pitched on for my head-quarters, but I cannot think of trespassing on the repose of a private family, and will order my baggage out of the house immediately." Yielding, however, to Dr. Ewell's repeated instances to stay, he promised to try and give as little trouble as possible. Reluctantly taking possession of Mrs. Ewell's bedroom, he requested her husband to bring her home, with assurances of security for all the fami-

ly. "I am a married man myself," said he, "with several sweet children, and venerate the sanctities of the conjugal and domestic relations." General Ross prevented the destruction of the Capitol by gunpowder explosion, at the entreaty of persons who said it would injure, perhaps destroy, the neighboring houses; and he countermanded the order for burning the marine barracks, when told that it could not be done without endangering the houses around. He appeared deeply affected by the calamitous accident at Greenleaf's Point, and at leaving wounded men behind when he evacuated Washington. From the whole conduct of the Irish general, he seemed to be a kind-hearted gentleman, reluctantly fulfilling painful orders, which the Scots admiral executed with unfeeling delight.

"I have stated above," says the English chronicler, "that our troops were this day kept as much together as possible upon the Capitol Hill. But it was not alone on account of the completion of their destructive labors, that this was done. A powerful army of Americans already began to show themselves upon some heights, at the distance of two or three miles from the city; and as they sent out detachments of horse, even to the very suburbs, for the purpose of watching our motions, it would have been unsafe to permit more straggling than was absolutely necessary. The army which we had overthrown the day before, though defeated, was far from annihilated; and having by this time recovered its panic, began to concentrate itself on our front, and presented quite as formidable an appearance as ever. We learnt, also, that it was joined by a considerable force from the back settlements, which had arrived too late to take part in the action, and the report was, that both combined, amounted to nearly twelve thousand men."

All this, if not the coinage of fear, was ridiculous exaggeration. There was no American army on any heights, at any distance; the army overthrown the day before was totally annihilated; had recovered none of its panic: was concentrated nowhere; the considerable force from the back settlements was no more than Minor's neighboring Virginia regiment; and the twelve thousand men were the same false exaggeration, which, as British dreaded by Winder's army, compelled them without striking a blow, to retire into Washington, and then as Americans, dreaded by British, drove them affrighted out of it, when they might have remained in perfect safety many days. The dreaded twelve thousand had no existence but in dread on either side.

"Whether or not it was their intention to attack," the British narrative continues, "I cannot pretend to say, because it was noon before they showed themselves; and soon after, when something like a movement could

be discerned in their ranks, the sky grew suddenly dark, and the most tremendous hurricane, ever remembered by the oldest inhabitant in the place, came on. Of the prodigious force of the wind, it is impossible for you to form any conception. Roofs of houses were torn off by it, and whisked into the air like sheets of paper; while the rain which accompanied it, resembled the rushing of a mighty cataract, rather than the dropping of a shower. The darkness was as great as if the sun had long set, and the last remains of twilight had come on, occasionally relieved by flashes of vivid lightning streaming through it, which, together with the noise of the wind and the thunder, the crash of falling buildings, and the tearing of roofs as they were stript from the walls, produced the most appalling effect I ever have, and probably ever shall, witness. This lasted for nearly two hours without intermission; during which time, many of the houses spared by us, were blown down, and thirty of our men, besides several of the inhabitants, buried beneath their ruins. Our column was as completely dispersed, as if it had received a total defeat; some of the men flying for shelter behind walls and buildings, and others falling flat upon the ground to prevent themselves from being carried away by the tempest; nay, such was the violence of the wind, that two pieces of cannon which stood upon the eminence, were fairly lifted from the ground, and borne several yards to the rear."

The gust was a serious reality, traces of whose ravages I saw three weeks afterwards among the trees, broken and dismembered, nearly all the way from Baltimore to Washington. To English ideas of the frequent weeping of gentle showers, the magnitude of American falls of rain are in strong contrast, like Niagara, the rivers, forests, weather, and Titan features of this country, compared to their own pigmy configuration. About one o'clock in the afternoon of the 25th August, the second storm followed that which accompanied the night before the arrival of the enemy. The musical instrument in the Patent Office, the roof drenched, and the approaches flooded with wet, became the palladium of Washington. The chimneys of the building partially unroofed, were blown down; the destroyers themselves soaked and terrified, stout hearts quailing, and the timid giving way to superstitious fears, a common infirmity of the bravest men. The post-office was left undisturbed, after a tempest without which it must have shared the fate of the others, by complete destruction destined for all public buildings of Washington, and Congress been driven to Georgetown or Frederick, to sit in some church or court house, if not to Baltimore or Philadelphia, under the tumultuous in-

fluences of a large commercial town. From the disaster at Greenleaf's Point, and storm soon following it, all the general's arrangements were bestowed on departure as soon as night protected a clandestine retreat.

After my account of the capture of Washington was compiled, I was kindly furnished with another by a gentleman of Bladensburg, which is here added. The reader will hardly object to some repetition of circumstances much perplexed by contradictory statements, especially as the Bladensburg narrative is by a gentleman with all the recollections of the very spot, confirmed by the important testimony of a highly respectable English officer who was in the battle, to the facts of Ross's hesitation to attack, and Barney's excellent resistance.

"Many of the facts in the following narrative have been received from ———, residing near Bladensburg, Maryland, as being derived, principally, from accounts communicated verbally by Colonel, now General, Wood, of the British army; and the residue have been received, from time to time, *from other authentic sources.*

"The British army, under the command of General Roßs, landed from their shipping in the Patuxent River, near to the village of Benedict, in Charles county, Maryland, on the 21st August, 1814, and took up the line of march for Washington, making from eighteen to twenty miles per day, and encamping, at night, at whatever point it might happen to reach, without reference to its eligibility for defence; and being in an enemy's country, the officers unacquainted with the localities surrounding them on the termination of each day's march, which took place in the shades of the evening, the troops arriving at bivouac, wearied and overcome with the heat of the weather, the fatigues of the march, and the weight of their arms, eighty rounds of ammunition, provisions, knapsacks and accoutrements, all of which they were obliged to carry, for the want of a baggage train, apprehensions of the most serious nature were entertained by the officers, in which Colonel Wood was acknowledged to have largely participated, that they would be surrounded at night by the American army, cut off or cut up, and compelled to surrender at discretion; and this is represented to have been more especially the case at the termination of the third day's march, which brought the British army to the 'Long Old Fields,' about eight miles from Washington, their advanced guard having previously received a severe check from a battalion of volunteers from the district of Columbia, under the command of Major Peter, and consisting of his company of artillery and those of light infantry and riflemen, commanded by Captains Stull and Davidson. The apprehensions of the British being increased by the circumstance of their army having been separated into two



divisions at a particular fork of the road, by which it was intended that those divisions would approach by different routes, and again assemble, at the close of the day, where the roads would again join; and one of those divisions not having arrived at the field of bivouac for some hours after the expected time. And it was the opinion of Colonel Wood that a comparatively small, but steady and efficient, force would have been able, at that time, to have reduced their jaded forces to extremities. They were permitted to bivouac unmolested, and to repose quietly and securely, for an entire night, within eight miles of an army of double their number, entrusted with the guardianship of the national honor and the national metropolis.

"On the morning of the 24th of August, 1814, the British army took up the line of march from the Long Old Fields, encumbered, as before stated, with an oppressive luggage. The American general being ignorant of the route intended by the British army, had, in the evening of the 23d, made every disposition deemed necessary for the defence of the approaches by the bridges over the Eastern Branch River; first, by the action of the artillery under Commodore Barney; and that failing, the ultimate resort to blowing up an abutment of one bridge and destroying the other. But the general commanding the British army had too well considered his measures to trust the execution of his determined purpose to the puerile idea of attempting to cross a river of that width and not to be forded, over two narrow bridges entirely commanded by a heavy weight of artillery, and subject to destruction, at any moment, by a serjeant's guard. The American general, therefore, totally deceiving himself, expended the precious time of the morning in arranging the troops in order of battle, on the high banks of Eastern Branch, leaving, as a secondary consideration, the certain and unobstructed route by the way of Bladensburg, and appeared to be ignorant of the real intentions or actual advances of the British columns until they had gone far on their way on the road to Bladensburg. When the fact became known, everything was bustle and confusion; the light troops were hastened off, and a part of them met at the first entrenchment, on a small rising ground on that side of Bladensburg nearest to Washington, the brigade of volunteers and militia just arriving from Baltimore. At this entrenchment was formed the first line of defence, consisting of the Baltimore brigade and Maryland militia, and two companies of Washington volunteers, viz., one company of artillery, under Captain Benjamin Burch, and a company of riflemen, armed with muskets, under Captain William Doughty; which line was hastily formed, about the time of the appearance of the

British column, on the high ground south-east of Bladensburg. The enemy advanced slowly but steadily, and, as Colonel Wood has stated, the soldiers fainting and falling, and being left by the way-side, from the excessive heat of the day and their oppressive burthens. The head of their column arrived at the village of Bladensburg between eleven and twelve o'clock, and while the troops were ordered to halt for a momentary relief preparatory to further movement, General Ross assembled around him some of his principal officers, and ascending a hill within the village, occupied a building then the residence of Colonel Bowie, and from the upper part of that building, which completely overlooked the first line of American troops, with the reserves then in sight. These troops making a formidable appearance, and supposed to be quite fresh and ready for battle, and being perfectly aware of the exhausted condition of his own troops, the general and his officers considered that the event of a conflict could hardly be doubted, and even mooted the question of retreat, which, however, was immediately decided to be not only repugnant to the character of the British army, but more likely to produce its ruin than a forward movement; so, upon further consultation, supposing that a large portion of the American army was composed of raw militia, and might be frightened by the proximate exhibition of the noisy congreve field rockets, and the application of the 'invincible British bayonet,' hopes were entertained, that, notwithstanding the gloomy prospects before them, chance might decide in their favor. With this conclusion, having the field of operation in full view, orders for the advance and disposition of the forces were immediately given. The British column was then put in motion, and as it advanced down the street in front and full view of the American line, the artillery of that line, consisting of four or five six-pounders, opened its fire; but being at first badly directed, the balls passed over the heads of the advancing column until it arrived on the bridge between Bladensburg and the American line, where several balls did some execution, but caused no interruption to the advancing column, whose progress across the bridge and fording-place, the water being then quite shallow, although slow, was steady and determined, and after crossing, the column began to deploy to the right and left of the main road from Bladensburg to Washington, in the middle of which was stationed one of the six-pounders. After crossing the creek, the enemy were within fair musket range of the American line, which then opened its fire upon them, but with (comparative) little effect, while the congreve rockets were producing their desired effect in striking terror and dismay into the militia, which, together with the

steady and constant advance and near proximity of the *gleaming bayonet*, caused the precipitate flight of the Baltimore brigade, leaving the two companies of Washington volunteers before-mentioned to maintain a momentary stand against such fearful odds. An unfortunate mistake having been made in placing the wadding in the gun before the powder, the men were ordered to depress the muzzle of the piece to get it out, in doing which, under the fire of the enemy, the gun capsized and tumbled into a ditch on the side of the road, and the British being then upon them, the section in charge of the gun were obliged to abandon it and fly for their lives. Another of these pieces of artillery, stationed in an apple orchard near to the piece lost, was operating with some effect on the advancing enemy, whose heavy force and near approach admonished the officer in command, Captain Burch, to order an immediate retreat, which was instantly obeyed by all except a soldier named *Barney Parsons*. (the same man who was removed a few years since from the place of a messenger in the House of Representatives;) but Barney, with coat off and shirt sleeves rolled up, told his captain to excuse him until he poured another charge of canister shot into the 'red coats.' The captain then ordered him peremptorily to retreat, but to no purpose, and he was obliged to abandon him to save himself. Barney was not to be foiled in his determination, and succeeded in charging, pointing, discharging and spiking the piece, the British bayonets being nearly up to its muzzle, and, covered by the smoke of the discharge, made good his retreat, and yet lives to remember the events in which he bore his part like a true patriot and good soldier. While this scene was enacting, Captain Doughty, with his company, was warmly engaged with the right flank of the British army, near the old barn yet standing, which was on the left of the American line, and the British advancing between his position and the barn, received his repeated discharges, of which many balls, not striking the enemy, penetrated the sides of the barn, and were afterwards to be seen. But this brave corps, being in turn overpowered, were forced to retreat, which was effected in good order, and terminated the resistance of the first line. The comparative ease with which this line was *put to flight* inspired the British troops with fresh ardor, and they marched boldly on in solid column, on the main road, and crossing Turnecliffe's bridge over a run in a ravine (celebrated as the Bladensburg duelling-ground), were advancing up the gradual ascent of a long hill, where Commodore Barney's force of four hundred and fifty sailors, with two eighteen-pounders and two twelve-pounders and one hundred and twenty marines, under Colonel, then Captain, Miller, had just

arrived by a forced march from the Eastern Branch, and were hastily forming the second line of defence, supported on the right by a regiment of Maryland militia, under the command of Colonel William Dent Beall, (an officer of the Revolution,) and on the left by the militia of the District of Columbia and a regiment of regular infantry, composed partly of the thirty-sixth and thirty-eighth regiments.

Colonel Wood stated that the British column advanced to within a few hundred yards of Barney's battery before he opened upon them, when it burst forth with the most destructive effect, sweeping the road and staggering the column; but so determined were they to advance by the road, that they renewed the advance in the face of Barney's battery three several times, and were as often swept from the earth, till at length the carnage became so great that they were obliged to desist from the direct attack and flank off to the right and left under the cover, from Barney's fire, afforded by the ravine parallel to, and at the distance of four or five hundred yards from, Barney's line, or the second line of defence. It became the duty of Colonel Wood to lead a portion of the left with orders to turn the right of the American army, and on proceeding towards the right, and emerging from the ravine, they approached within striking distance of the right of the American line, consisting of a regiment of Maryland militia under the command of Colonel William Dent Beall, an officer of the old Maryland line of the Revolution, as before stated, from whom they received a shower of musket balls, which the gallant Colonel said he had scarcely known to be equalled in all the battles in which he participated in the peninsula of Spain. From this discharge Colonel Wood was severely wounded, and being borne to a place of supposed safety, the concussion of a grape shot, as he arrived there, from one of Barney's pieces, passing so near the Colonel's head as to scrape his whisker, laid him prostrate on the ground. The gallant old veteran Colonel Beall, having only a body of raw militia under his command, could not induce them to stand the shock of the bayonet to which the British troops had been ordered to bring the contest, and the militia was forced to retire, leaving the right and rear of the marines and Barney's battery completely exposed to a heavy column of British infantry, which could now approach under cover of a wood of heavy timber. While these operations were going on at Barney's right, the right flank of the British army had pursued the ravine with the view of turning the left of the American line, and at the western debouche of the ravine, the head of the British column approached the front of a regiment of regu-



lars, composed of battalions of the thirty-sixth and thirty-eighth United States infantry, who remained, without orders to fire, until the enemy approached within pistol range, when the officers and men expected every moment to receive orders to charge to the front; but, astounding and mortifying as it was to them, and unaccountable and inexplicable to the public, the spell was broken and the critical moment passed, to the dishonor of the American arms, by a peremptory order to this regiment to retreat. The British right then approached the American left—came in contact with the small battalion of Washington and Georgetown volunteers, commanded by Major Peter, who made a spirited resistance; but being overpowered, were forced to withdraw, leaving Barney's left under the protection of a regiment of raw militia, who in turn retired before the bayonet, exposing Barney's battery to the left and rear entirely to the British infantry. The old Commodore, being himself wounded and on the ground, and discovering that the right and left flanks of the British army were about closing in his rear, he ordered his guns spiked, and the remaining sailors and marines of his small, but gallant band, with arms in hand, to cut their way through and make good their retreat, remaining himself in his disabled condition a prisoner of war; and being treated by the enemy in a manner becoming the condition of a gallant, but fallen enemy, and afterwards conveyed by them to Washington. His sailors and marines retreating reluctantly, were burning with anxiety to have another brush with the enemy, but were marched off by their officers, their rear being closely followed by the British troops until they entered the suburbs of Washington, when a party of the sailors entered a three story brick dwelling-house belonging to Robert Sewall, and awaited the near approach of the enemy's column, which was led by General Ross in person, when they fired a volley which killed or disabled the horse upon which the General was mounted. The sailors then retreated by the rear of the building, and the British set fire to and destroyed the house. The British column continued its march, and in a few moments more were on the eastern front of the Capitol, when they deployed into line facing that building, and directing a volley of musketry at the edifice, took formal possession in the name of their king. The interior was examined, with a view to its destruction, but finding that it would be tedious to fire it in all its parts, some of which were partially fire-proof, they determined and had announced their intention to the inhabitants nearest the building, to blow it up, whose expostulations, together with the entreaties of the ladies, prevailed upon the General to order

it to be set fire to in every vulnerable point, and it was soon enveloped in flames, and continued burning all night, presenting, at the distance of three miles, to the eyes that are now engaged tracing these lines, an awful and melancholy picture. During the night of the 24th of August, the British army occupied the vantage-ground of the Capitol Hill, and next day dispatched a column to destroy the fort and arsenal at Greenleaf's Point; and while busily engaged in the work of destruction, many barrels of powder having been removed from the magazine and thrown into the well within the fort, so as to fill it above the water, and one of the soldiers having a burning brand or match in his hand, seeing the top of the well, and not knowing of the powder there, threw it in, when a tremendous explosion took place, which laid open the ground in the form of a volcanic eruption. This destroyed a number of the soldiers, and caused the immediate recall of the column to the Capitol Hill. Another column had been dispatched to destroy the public buildings, which had escaped the previous night, which column was met in front, in the centre of Pennsylvania Avenue, by a young man claiming relationship to General Washington, who, single-handed, in the boldest and most reckless manner, charged the head of the column, and fired a pistol into it, which was immediately returned by the discharge of several muskets in succession, when his horse wheeled and retreated some distance before the young man fell. It was said that, on coming up to the young man, and finding him mortally wounded, the officer in command had him carefully borne to a house in the vicinity, with a surgeon to attend him, and while condemning the rashness, did honor to the boldness and noble daring of the unfortunate *American knight*.

"During the 25th of August, a violent tornado came over the city of Washington, seeming to exert its utmost rage on the Capitol Hill, which was occupied by the British army, and where several of their soldiers were killed by the blowing down of houses and chimneys. The British fleet not having arrived at Washington, as was expected by General Ross, and not knowing the position or intentions of the American army, it appears that he determined on a retreat that night, and leaving his wounded in 'Carroll's Long Row,' which he had used as a barrack and hospital, and leaving seventy or eighty men to take care of the wounded and keep up that night many large camp fires as a *ruse de guerre*, he withdrew his army under cover of the night, and industriously pursued his retrograde movement towards the place of disembarkation, without perhaps giving rise to any particular incident worthy of notice, save one—which in itself may be consider-

ed unimportant; but, leading as it did, directly, to a noble effort and display of American genius, may secure a passing notice.

"The army having passed the village of Upper Marlborough *en route* for their shipping, leaving several stragglers to follow, several gentlemen of that village formed the determination to cut some of them off and make them prisoners of war. The principal of these gentlemen were Dr. William Beans, as prime mover, and General Robert Bowie and John Hodgders, who succeeded in making several prisoners, who were confined. The British officers, hearing of the occurrence, however, that night sent back a strong party to the village, who liberated the prisoners, and taking those gentlemen out of their beds, hurried them off without allowing them a moment to clothe themselves, and thus placing them on old horses, carried them, no doubt, amid the jeers of the soldiery, to the shipping. After many entreaties and expostulations, two of the gentlemen were let off and permitted to return to Upper Marlborough, but they considered Dr. Beans a fair prize, and determined to take him to Halifax or England. Having the Doctor on board, the fleet left the Patuxent river, and ascending the Chesapeake bay, appeared off Fort McHenry. The numerous and influential friends of Dr. Beans immediately set to work to devise some plan by which an effort might be made to obtain his release from the fleet: accordingly, a petition was got up, signed by some of the most respectable citizens of Prince George's county, among whom were individuals who had acted very kindly towards Colonel Wood and other British officers and soldiers who had been left in Bladensburg on the return of the British army, of which the commander of the army or fleet was no doubt aware. These preparations being made, the eloquent and talented Francis S. Key, the friend of Doctor Beans, was appointed as the messenger and champion to go to the rescue. He accordingly proceeded to Annapolis, and by means of a small craft and the white flag, he boarded the admiral's ship, to make known his mission. The fleet being about to make an attack on Fort McHenry, while the army effected a landing at North Point, Mr. Key was detained on board, and compelled, from his position, to witness the furious bombardment of Fort McHenry. The novelty of his situation, a near view of the powerful means then operating for the reduction of Baltimore to the power of the enemy, and the further desecration of the American flag, his solicitude for the successful resistance of his countrymen, and noble emotions of a patriot heart thus excited and warmed, produced, amid the storm and strife by which he was surrounded, a memento wor-

thy of the man, and honorable to his country; and long will the 'Star-Spangled Banner' be sung to light up in every American bosom the sacred fire of patriotic devotion to the flag of his country.

"So ardent, so accomplished an advocate at the bar of humanity, supported by testimonials and evidence so unequivocally proving the exercise of the most generous and delicate offices of humanity towards their wounded companions in arms, yet enjoying the alleviating attentions and cares of generous enemies in a foreign land, could not be resisted by the commander of the British forces, and the distinguished ambassador experienced the happy termination of his mission, in the simultaneous repulse of the British forces at every point, the glorious triumph and continued waving of the star-spangled banner, the release of his friend, Doctor Beans, and their happy landing on their native shore.

"It appears that the kind and generous attention to Colonel Wood by the people of Bladensburg and its vicinity, made so deep an impression upon his feelings, that even at this distant day (1848), several of those families from whom he received personal attention have had the strongest evidence of the continued and unfaltering friendship and gratitude of that gallant and noble-hearted man. Immediately after his return to England, he opened a correspondence with the family of Richard Tasker Lowndes, Esq., of Bladensburg, which up to this time has not been broken on his part. He made a visit to the United States in 1825, and did not fail to visit the old battle-ground, collecting walking canes from the spot where he fell from Barney's fire, visiting the old willow tree under whose friendly shades he was laid to revive, and renewing his acquaintance with those kind Americans who had, in the hour of suffering and affliction, administered to him those kind offices of humanity that stop not to relieve even an enemy in distress. He remained several weeks in the village of Bladensburg, making his friends there acquainted with the strong sense of obligation he was under to them, made excursions with them to the neighboring grounds, and pointed out the different positions of the contending armies, and related the opinions and actions of individuals within the range of his observation and the events of that memorable campaign. General Jackson being then in the Senate, the friends of Colonel Wood, at his request, provided him with an appropriate introduction to that American soldier, who, on becoming acquainted with the gallant British soldier, gave him a handsome entertainment in company with several of his military and other friends.

"Colonel Wood had formed so favorable an opinion of the American people and their institutions that he invested a part of his fortune in American stocks, and has con-



tinued, with much feeling and intelligence, his correspondence with his Bladensburg friends, in which his amiable lady has sympathetically joined, and expressed her pleasure in the anticipation of seeing her husband's American friends, on their arrival in this country, her husband (now General Wood) expecting to be ordered to the Canada station."

Generous British sentiment revolted at the destruction of the American capital; which might not have been branded with universal infamy, if confined to navy yards, warlike implements, vessels of war and even private rope-walks or printing offices, whatever, in the licentious construction of British hostility, like their blockade, impressment, search, contraband, is even *convertible* to belligerent uses—if the enormity had stopped there. But no warfare can satiate its abominable lust with impunity on libraries, public and private, halls of legislation, residences of magistrates, buildings of civil government, objects of art, seats of peace and embodiment of rational patriotic pride. The account of it in the British Annual Register of 1814 confesses that none but evils necessary to success are justifiable; which comprehends a wide scope of mischief, but excludes destruction of useful or ornamental works, whose purpose is pacific. It confesses that retribution had been made for the Canadian injuries, which were alleged to be severe retaliation. It hints at the deep and durable resentment that must be left in the bosoms of a people with whom peace is so desirable, whose vengeance, it may well be added, can hardly be condemned, if, at any stage of British decrepitude and American virility, London, as assailable as Washington, be subjected to similar fate by Americans, which the great British commander, Wellington, warns his countrymen is by no means invulnerable. The naval reputation and military prowess of Great Britain are equally discredited by recollections of Washington. France, Holland, Denmark, Spain, every maritime power of Europe is America's natural ally to revenge the wrongs of British injustice, and teach the policy of at least civilized hostilities.

The public property destroyed at Washington exceeded two millions of dollars worth. The private houses and the stores pillaged were those of Messrs. B. Sprigg, Boon, Burch, Long, Rapine, Watterson, McCormick, Caldwell, Elliott, B. and G. Burns, Ricks, Crampton, and Gen. Washington. The dwellings burnt were those of Messrs. Sewall, Ball, Frost, Phillips, Tomlinson, and Mrs. Hamilton, the printing office of Gales & Seaton, rope-walk of Ringgold & Chalmers, and the rope-walk of Mr. Heath.

The great conqueror of modern times, Napoleon, vilified by English tradition in every conceivable term of reproach and op-

probrium, captured nearly every capital in Europe, without the wanton destruction committed by his English revilers. His transfer to Paris of the ornaments of Italian cities was reversed by their restoration. When the justly provoked Prussians, captors of Paris, threatened to burn the bridge of Jena, because the name recalled their misfortune, Louis XVIII. prevented it by a vow that he would be destroyed with that public monument if attempted. All civilized nations recognize these principles. Great Britain confessed them in reiterated falsifications of facts, in order to excuse her atrocities. Cochrane's letter of the 18th, not delivered till the 31st August, 1814, alleged that he had been called upon by the Governor-General of Canada for measures of retaliation against the inhabitants of the United States, for the wanton destruction committed by their army in Upper Canada; in compliance with which request he resorted to severities contrary to the usages of civilized warfare. But Monroe's answer of the 6th September, refuted that pretext by a summary of British outrages prior to the burning of Newark, in Canada, which was a merely military act, and disavowed by our government. The chancellor of the exchequer, in November, 1814, stated in the House of Commons that the Americans at York not only burned the house of the governor, but also every house, even to a shed, which was wholly untrue, and no doubt a misrepresentation of the burning of Newark, mistaken for York. The Governor-General of Canada, too, in his address to the provincial parliament, the 24th January, 1815, asserted that, as a just retribution, the proud capital at Washington had experienced a fate similar to that inflicted by an American force on the seat of government in Upper Canada. But all these excuses were unfounded. Nothing was destroyed at York but barracks and public store-houses, except buildings which the British themselves blew up, as was believed, by an inhuman contrivance to destroy General Pike and the Americans who perished there with him. One public building, called the parliament house, which was not the government house, and in which an American scalp was part of the decoration of the Speaker's chair, was indeed burned; but whether by accident, by the British themselves in the explosion they set off, or how, did not appear. It was undeniable, however, that the American officers set guards with positive orders to prevent plunder and fire, and that when departing, the provincial Chief Justice Scott addressed them a letter of thanks for their humane treatment of the inhabitants and particular attention to property and persons. Nor were complaints of destruction ever made till long after, when deemed necessary to answer the British ac-

cused by all the world of enormities at Washington. What was done by General McClure's order at Newark, in December, 1813, besides its immediate disavowal, was much more than expiated by the revengeful devastation of Lewistown, Manchester, Tuscarora, Buffalo, Blackrock, and that whole region laid in ruins. The Governor-General of Canada, Prevost, by his proclamation of the 12th January, 1814, declared that punishment had been inflicted for the burning of Newark, a full measure, he said, of retaliation; and it was not his intention to pursue further a system of warfare so revolting, unless future measures of the enemy should compel resort to it. There is thus every reason to believe that Cochrane's assertion was false of Prevost's having called on him to retaliate Canadian sufferings by American irregularities. Cochrane's official letter of the 18th August, in all its statements and circumstances, was utterly unfounded and fraudulent, and the outrages it *officially announced after their perpetration*, wholly unjustifiable. To palliate British devastations at Washington, moreover, does not excuse their pillage at Alexandria, their systematic depredations and piratical career from the first moment of their appearance in the Chesapeake. To plunder, sack and burn private houses is as unlawful as to destroy public buildings. Naval hostilities, as waged by the British, are indeed indiscriminate and universal robbery. Landing in America with their profligate practices, they spoiled unresisting villages, farms and persons, in 1813, to which, in 1814, by specific orders from their government, were superadded the desolation of whole districts, plunder of towns and sack of the metropolis.

The immediate and enthusiastic effect of the fall of Washington, was electric revival of national spirit and universal energy. A parody of Lawrence's noble dying sentiment when defeated, became the well nigh universal rally, and "*Save the soil*," "Don't give up the soil," resounded from one extremity to another of the United States. The smouldering fires of the Capitol were spices of the Phoenix bed, from which arose offspring more vigorous, beautiful and long lived. On the 26th August, Governor James Barbour of Virginia, on the 27th Governor Simon Snyder of Pennsylvania, on the 3d September, President Madison by proclamation, called forth the people in mass to resist an enemy, said the latter, who disregards deliberately the principles of humanity and rules of civilized warfare, and gives to warfare an extended character of devastation and barbarism, while negotiations for peace of his own invitation are pending. All the local authorities of all the Atlantic cities and towns, Boston included, united with the whole American population, in erecting works of defence, and preparing means of indomita-

ble hostility. The American nation was in ecstacy of vindication, much of it in arms. The fall of Washington proved fortunate for the country, with glorious accompaniments and early sequels. Peace crowned in Louisiana by great victories, raised Madison's administration to the pinnacle of renown. American nationality struck down in the political metropolis, what was it, in a military point of view, but the capture of an open town, without walls, citadel, garrison or any kind of fortification? Berlin, Vienna, Madrid, Lisbon, Moscow, Munich and Paris; nearly every capital in Europe had yielded to invaders not long before the fall of Washington; all defended by monarchs, with large standing armies, long established military means, and none more exposed by geographical position than the republican seat of government. From the extremities of Asia to the shores of Peru, from Jenghis Khan to Pizarro, what capital throughout the world has not been trampled upon by conqueror's hoof? London has often passed under the yoke, must and will again, peradventure to a combined military and naval American invasion. Rome several times almost annihilated by subjugation, rose again to dictate laws to the universe. Canton, and well nigh Peking, submitted to a few thousand English; Mexico to a few much more adventurous Americans. And since steam adds a new element to warfare, the insular security of England is annulled. There is nothing so despairingly shameful to us, or indelibly disgraceful in the momentary loss of our capital, that is not mitigated by similar misfortunes, and may not be atoned for by the retaliation it undoubtedly warrants.

One of the first and minor retaliations of the Washington outrage, was thus mentioned in the London Times, of the 14th December, 1814:—"A privateer from Savannah had the audacity to land on the Bahamas, and plunder and burn twenty-seven private houses. The pretence set up by this public-spirited privateer was, that of retaliation for our operations at Washington."

What was there in the privateer's incendiary more audacious than that of the English admiral who gloated over the ruins of Washington? the ashes of which seat of government in its infancy, and almost without private dwellings, when the public edifices were burnt, may keep alive smothered cinders to be rekindled for the conflagration of London with two millions of inhabitants. A few years ago, Mr. Adams having said in Congress that a British vessel of war might sail three hundred miles up the Mississippi and burn Natchez, I replied that, so might an American vessel of war burn London, which was said on the authority of one of the most experienced and least sanguine or boastful officers of



the American navy. And as some apology for the respectable gentlemen of our government, whose unfortunate expulsion from Washington I have not hesitated to record with painful truth, I am tempted to insert here the account from an authoritative English historian, (Clarendon,) of the successful attack of London by the Dutch, which, in some of its ludicrous and more of its disgraceful particulars, resembles the capture of the federal city.

"They had good intelligence how loosely all things were left in the river, and, therefore, as soon as the tide came to help them, they stood full up the river without any consideration of the chain, which their ships immediately broke to pieces and passed without the least pause. All men were so confounded to see the Dutch fleet advance over the chain, which they looked upon as a wall of brass, that they knew not what they were to do. The people of Chatham, which is naturally an army of seamen, and officers of the navy, who might, and ought to have secured all those ships which they had time enough to have done, were in distraction, their chief officers having applied all their boats and lighter vessels to carry away their own goods and household stuff, and given what they left behind for lost. But the noise of this, and the flame of the ships that were burned, made it easily believed in the city of London, that the enemy had done all that they conceived they might have done. Nor was the confusion there greater than it was in the Court itself, where they who had most advanced the war, and reproached all those who had been or were thought to be against it, as men who had no public spirit, and were not solicitous for the honor and glory of the nation, and who had never spoken of the Dutch but with scorn and contempt, were now the most dejected men that can be imagined, railed very bitterly at those who had advised the king to enter into that war which had already consumed so many gallant men, and would probably ruin the kingdom, and wished that peace as the only hope were made upon any terms. In a word, the distraction and consternation were so great in court and city, &c. But there remained still such a chagrin in the minds of many as if they would return again, in which they were confirmed when they heard that they were still upon the coasts, and gave the same alarm now to Essex and Suffolk as they had to Kent. Then the train bands which had been drawn together had continued for one month, which was as long as the law required, and now they required, or were said to require, to be relieved or dismissed, or that they might receive their pay. There were discontents and emulations upon command, and they who had usually professed that they would willingly serve the king in the offices of

corporals or sergeants, whatever command they formerly had, now disputed all the punctilios and would not receive orders from any who had formerly been in inferior offices. And all these waywardnesses were brought to the king as matters of the highest consequence, who found difficulty enough in determining points of more importance."

A military work of great reputation, Jomini's "Summary of the Art of War," says of the expedition to Washington, "The English performed an enterprise which may be ranged among the most extraordinary, that against the capital of the United States of America. To the great astonishment of the world, a handful of seven or eight thousand English were seen to descend in the midst of a state of ten millions of souls, penetrate a considerable distance, seize the capital, and destroy the public establishments there; results which history may be searched in vain for another example of. We might be tempted to accuse the republican and anti-military habits of the inhabitants of this, if we had not seen the militia of Greece, Rome and Switzerland, better defend their homes against much more formidable aggressions, and if, in the same year, a more numerous English expedition had not been totally defeated by the militia of Louisiana, under the orders of General Jackson."

But even as a military incursion, what was there in four thousand veterans surprising six thousand mere unpractised levies, with their officers bewildered, at a loss who commanded among the crowd of apparent leaders, some of the men but half armed, all exhausted by heat, fatigue and hunger, and more than prepared for defeat?

And what must Christendom say of the British conquerors? Their own Parliament house heard, without possibility of reply, explanation, or apology, from one of its most eloquent and enlightened statesmen and historians, Mackintosh, that by the attack on Washington, the British arms were disgraced by victorious outrage upon the peaceful seat of a great government, upon halls of senates and palaces of justice, by an enterprise which most exasperated a people, and least weakened a government of any recorded in the annals of war. In the debate on the Treaty of Ghent, Mackintosh declared that "he lamented and reprobated those vulgar prejudices, and that insolent language against the people of America, of late so prevalent in England, which had reached so extravagant a height, that men respectable in character and station had spoken in Parliament of the deposition of Mr. Madison as a *justifiable object of war*, and had treated a gentleman of English extraction and education with a scurrility which they must now be the first to regret,

from no better reason than that we happened to be at war with the great republic over which he presides." "It was impossible to explain the delay between peace with Louis XVIII., in April, but on the miserable policy of protracting war for the sake of striking a blow against America. The disgrace of the local wars, of balanced success between the British navy and the new-born marine of America, was to be redeemed by protracted warfare, and by pouring our victorious armies upon the American continent. That opportunity, fatally for us, arose. If the Congress at Ghent had opened in June, it was impossible that we should have *sent out orders for the attack on Washington*. We should have been saved from that success, a thousand times more disgraceful and disastrous than the worst defeat, and chargeable on the delay of negotiations. It was a success which made our naval power hateful and alarming to all Europe; which gave the hearts of the American people to every enemy who might rise against England; an enterprise which *most exasperated a people, and least weakened a government of any recorded in the annals of war*."

"For every justifiable purpose of present warfare, it was almost impotent. To every wise object of prospective policy, it was hostile. It was an attack, not against the strength or the resources of a state, but against the national honor and public affections of a people. After twenty-five years of the fiercest warfare, in which every great capital of Europe had been spared, almost respected by enemies, it was reserved for England to violate all that decent courtesy towards the seats of national dignity which, in the midst of enmity, manifests the respect of nations for each other, by an expedition deliberately and principally directed against palaces of government, halls of legislation, tribunals of justice, repositories of the muniments of property, and of the records of history—objects, among civilized nations, exempted from the ravages of war, and secured, as far as possible, even from its accidental operation, because they contribute nothing to the means of hostility, but are consecrated to purposes of peace, and minister to the common and perpetual interest of all human society. It seemed an aggravation of this atrocious measure, that ministers had attempted to justify the destruction of a distinguished capital, as a retaliation for some violences of imperious American officers, unauthorized and disavowed by their government, against some unknown village in Canada. To make such retaliation just, there must always be clear proof of the outrage; in general, also, sufficient evidence that the adverse government refused to make due reparation for it, and at least some proportion of the punishment to the offence. Here there was very imperfect evidence of the outrage, no proof of refusal

to repair, and demonstration of the excessive and monstrous iniquity of what was falsely called retaliation. The value of a capital is not to be estimated by its houses, and warehouses, and shops. It consisted chiefly in what could be neither numbered nor weighed. It was not even by the elegance or grandeur of its monuments that it was most dear to a generous people. They looked upon it with affection and pride as the seat of legislation, as the sanctuary of public justice—often as linked with the memory of past times—sometimes still more as connected with their fondest and proudest hopes of greatness to come. To put all these respectable feelings of a great people, sanctified by the illustrious name of Washington, on a level with half a dozen wooden sheds in the temporary seat of a provincial government, was an act of intolerable insolence, and implied as much contempt for the feelings of America as for the common sense of mankind."

To make the enemy himself tell as much as possible of these events, let us resume here, from the author of the British campaign, what took place on the retreat of the conquerors after the ruin of Washington, of their own reputation and the historical dishonor of their great country.

"When the hurricane had blown over, the camp of the Americans appeared to be in as great a state of confusion as our own; nor could either party recover themselves sufficiently, during the rest of the day, to try the fortune of a battle. Of this General Ross did not fail to take advantage. He had already attained all that he could hope, and perhaps more than he originally expected to attain; consequently, to risk another action would only be to spill blood for no purpose. Whatever might be the issue of the contest, he could derive from it no advantage. If he were victorious, it would not destroy the necessity which existed of evacuating Washington; if defeated, his ruin was certain. To avoid fighting was, therefore, his object; and perhaps he owed its accomplishment to the fortunate occurrence of the storm. Be that, however, as it may, a retreat was resolved upon; and we now only waited for night, to put the resolution into practice.

"As soon as these arrangements were completed, and darkness had come on, the third brigade, which was posted in the rear of our army, began its retreat. Then followed the guns; afterwards the second, and, last of all, the light brigade, exactly reversing the order which had been maintained during the advance. Instead of an advanced guard, this last now furnished a party to cover the retreat, and the whole procession was closed by the mounted drivers.

"It being matter of great importance to deceive the enemy, and to prevent pursuit, the rear of the column did not quit its



ground upon the capital till a late hour. During the day an order had been issued that none of the inhabitants should be seen in the streets after eight o'clock; and as fear renders most men obedient, this order was punctually attended to. All the horses belonging to different officers had likewise been removed to drag the guns; nor was any one allowed to ride, lest a neigh, or even the trampling of hoofs, should excite suspicion. The fires were trimmed, and made to blaze bright, and fuel enough left to keep them so for some hours; and finally, about half past nine o'clock, the troops formed in marching order, and moved off in the most profound silence. Not a word was spoken, nor a single individual permitted to step one inch out of his place; and thus they passed along the streets perfectly unnoticed, and cleared the town without any alarm being given. You will imagine that our pace was none of the most tardy; consequently, it was not long before we reached the ground which had been occupied by the other brigades. Here we found a second line of fires, blazing in the same manner as those deserted by ourselves, and the same precautions, in every respect, adopted to induce a belief that our army was still quiet. Beyond these, again, we found two or three solitary fires, placed in such order as to resemble those of a chain of pickets. In short, the deception was so well managed that even we, ourselves, were at first doubtful whether the rest of the troops had withdrawn.

"By the time we reached the ground where yesterday's battle had been fought, the moon rose, and exhibited a spectacle by no means enlivening. The dead were still unburied, and lay about in every direction, completely naked. They had been stripped even of their shirts; and, having been exposed in this state to the violent rain in the morning, they appeared to be bleached to a most unnatural degree of whiteness. The heat and rain together had likewise affected them in a different manner; and the smell which arose upon the night air was horrible.

"In Bladensburg the brigade halted for an hour, while those men who had thrown away their knapsacks endeavored to recover them. During this interval, I strolled up to a house which had been converted into an hospital, and paid a hasty visit to the wounded. I found them in great pain, and some of them deeply affected at the thought of being abandoned by their comrades, and left to the mercy of their enemies. Yet, in their apprehension of evil treatment from the Americans, the event proved that they had done injustice to that people, who were found to possess at least one generous trait in their character, namely, that of behaving kindly and attentively to their prisoners. As soon as the strag-

glers had returned to their ranks, we again moved on, continuing to march without once stopping to rest during the whole of the night. Of the fatigue of a night march none but those who have experienced it can form the smallest conception.

"Oppressed with the most intolerable drowsiness, we were absolutely dozing upon our legs; and if any check at the head of the column caused a momentary delay, the road was instantly covered with men fast asleep. It is generally acknowledged, that no inclination is so difficult to resist, as the inclination to sleep; but when you are compelled not only to bear up against this, but to struggle also with weariness, and to walk at the same time, it is scarcely possible to hold out long. By seven o'clock in the morning, it was therefore absolutely necessary to pause, because numbers had already fallen behind, and numbers more were ready to follow their example; when, throwing ourselves upon the ground, almost in the same order in which we had marched, in less than five minutes there was not a single unclosed eye throughout the whole brigade. Pickets were of course stationed, and sentinels placed, to whom no rest was granted, but except these, the entire army resembled a heap of dead bodies on a field of battle, rather than living men.

"In this situation we remained till noon, when we were again roused to continue the retreat. Though the sun was oppressively powerful, we moved on without resting till dark, when, having arrived at our old position near Marlborough, we halted for the night. During this day's march, we were joined by numbers of negro slaves, who implored us to take them along with us, offering to serve either as soldiers or sailors, if we would but give them their liberty; but as General Ross persisted in protecting private property of every description, few of them were fortunate enough to obtain their wishes."

Another English witness adds, what is quoted to show how extremely insignificant that collection of hamlets called a city was, of which the spoilers destroyed all that was at all city-like.

"Of the city of Washington, I have purposely declined attempting any minute description, because it possessed no leading features, by which one might convey to a person who has not seen it, something like an accurate notion of the whole. It is as you are well aware, *completely in its infancy*, few of the streets being finished, and many not containing more than three or four houses, at wide intervals from each other. Like all other infant towns, it is but little ornamented with fine buildings," &c.

Such was the affair of Bladensburg, less derogatory in its military than in most other respects, to American character. Under all the circumstances, it is rather surprising

that so obstinate a stand was made, as certainly was, by part of our people. "Every military man knows," says an English review of the affair, "how little comparatively formidable, an imperfectly disciplined body of men, however numerous, is usually found to be when put to the test." Such was no doubt General Armstrong's opinion as he expressed it, and General Winder's apprehension. History is full of instances in which an enemy commanding the sea has made successful inroads at selected points of attack. In the advance of a column of regular troops there is something in the steadiness and precision, which, before the actual shock, puts irregular levies to fear, if not flight. When taken just from the bosom of civil life, and thrown together for battle, ignorant how far they may rely on their comrades or their leaders, they can seldom be inaccessible to misgivings, which at the critical moment manifest themselves in faltering, panic, and flight. The misfortune was that our raw troops had never been made to feel their foes and rouse their blood by an exchange of bloodshed. Hence the admirable judgment, no less than daring courage of Jackson's plan of operations, when, by becoming the assailant on the 23d December, every man was prepared for the 8th January. "To undertake the duty of a picket, was as dangerous" (says the same narrator of the Washington campaign), as to go into action. Parties of American sharpshooters harassed and disturbed the one appointed to that service from the time they took possession of their post till they were relieved, while to light fires at night was impossible, because they seemed but as certain marks for the enemy's gunmen. From sunset till towards dawn we were kept in a constant state of anxiety and agitation. The entire night was spent in watching, or in broken slumbers, than which nothing is more trying both to the health and spirits of the army. Night and day were we harassed by danger, against which there was no fortifying ourselves. We never closed our eyes in peace, for we were sure to be awakened before many minutes elapsed, by the splash of a round shot or shell in the mud beside us. With the outposts again there was constant skirmishing. Every day they were attacked, and compelled to maintain their ground by dint of hard fighting."

At New Orleans all the fear was English, and all the activity American. From the first moment incessant and tormenting assaults, planned and executed by a commander, who, though not a Baltimore lawyer, was but a Tennessee planter, less versed in the theory and science of warfare than the commander at Bladensburg, and with much less experience of military operations. But by his admirable plan every man under his command had been brought into contact

with the enemy, so as to remove every feeling of American inferiority, and dissipate all confidence of British superiority.

While the trembling commanders rioted in devastation of public property, which the military leader appeared solicitous, more perhaps for the maintenance of discipline, than respect to private things, to preserve from the pillage of his soldiery, the churches were undisturbed, although their destruction would be no more sacrilegious than that of the Capitol and public offices. Mr. Matthews, the aged priest of St. Patrick's Roman Catholic Church, and Dr. Lowrie, pastor of the Presbyterian, kept their dwellings open near their churches, bravely abiding whatever might betide themselves or their altars. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Kentucky, Dr. Fenwick, generously remonstrating against the plunder of a farm house, where he happened to be, on the advance of the British, after the battle, toward the city, was rudely seized, denying his assurances that he was a clergyman, and sent on foot in custody of four of the negro British troops to confinement with other prisoners at Bladensburg. On the retreat next night, he applied for release to General Ross, halting at Bladensburg, who liberated him. The bishop requesting a written safe conduct to protect him from recapture on his way to Washington, the general, who, overheated, had thrown off his coat, snatched it hastily from a chair, and taking the first piece of paper from the pocket, penciled the desired passport on what proved to be a note to him from Mr. Serurier, the French minister in Washington, bespeaking safety for his residence and the French embassy during the British stay there. To protect Colonel Tayloe's, the most elegant house in Washington, from plunder or burning, Mr. Serurier took possession of it for a few days during the invasion. From the roof floated a large sheet on a pole, the white flag of the Bourbons and sign of peace between France and England; to which symbol of good will the French minister added an invitation to the British general and admiral to honor him with their company at dinner; attention which, if tendered, was declined. The note of the minister to the general was soon restored by Mr. Matthews to Mr. Serurier, with the joocular remark that his excellency for a Frenchman and Bonapartist was very intimate with the captors of Paris and Washington. "Not more so than you," replied Mr. Serurier, "if you got my note from the British general?" which reply produced the explanation that Mr. Matthews received the equivocal paper from Dr. Fenwick, and how he became possessed of what it was thought best to restore to the French minister. A few months afterwards, during the hundred days of Napoleon's short lived restoration to his



imperial throne, an untoward official note from Mr. Serurier, addressed from Washington to the imperial, was received after his elimination, by the royal secretary for foreign affairs, who superseded him, and displaced the only foreign minister of the imperial government of France left till then by the royal restoration. Mr. Serurier, by impulsive declaration of his sentiments, lost his place and incurred many years of penurious disgrace, for violating Talleyrand's rule of diplomacy, never to do to-day what can be put off till to-morrow; dogma of the sober second thought more extolled than deserving. And while writing this paragraph at Washington, in March, 1848, by another French Revolution Mr. Serurier ceases to be a French peer, his American born son to be the accredited agent of another French dynasty in South America, his American born brother-in-law Pageot, to be the accredited minister of France in the United States. Always in salutary commotion, but never in sanguinary revolution, this country peaceably contemplates the throes of the Old World agonized by endless civil and foreign wars.

The retreating British army, worn down with loss of rest and flight, was so much more panic-stricken and disorderly than as described in the account of one of the fugitives, that almost any intrepid American force must have overpowered them. Dr. Kent, of the Maryland delegation in Congress, whose residence was near Bladensburg, with his slaves pursued and captured several weary stragglers from the column, returning bootless and discontented, ready to submit with gratitude to any American rescue of them from the rigors of British thralldom. One of the fugitive slaves, confessed by the English narrative as purloined by General Ross, was of that peculiar race of bright mulatto girls, resplendent with physical loveliness, sculptured form, beautiful countenance, caressing humility, amorous diffidence and winning grace, who, notwithstanding the want of that silk-flowing hair which is so charming a feature of female attraction, and even in spite of the bodily impurities which mark that race, seem, in the Eastern eloquence of scriptural description as if "the dew of their birth is of the womb of the morning." She became the wife of an English sergeant, a well-favored and respectable man, who had none of the American repugnance to African connection which the fetid degradation of slavery at least contributes to create, but in England is subdued into almost preference of black rather than white. Another of those fugitive slaves changed bondage for better fortune: an extremely black negro, shining like polished ebony, with the musical talent common to men deprived of civil enjoyments and political privileges, for which softer pleasures be-

come an alternative. Taken into a regimental band, the untutored slave learned to be a proficient on several instruments, and the admiration of all for his remarkable figure, which won the heart of an English Desdemona, as fair and ruddy as her husband was dark and colorless; the sooty bosom, African secretions, and other American objections to connubial union of the white and black blood, having no force with a decent English woman, proud of a husband for whom she would in this country have been the scorn of her own sex and the aversion of all. Is this owing to slavery, to prejudice, to nature—to what may philosophy ascribe the aristocracy of the skin in a democratic country which has no existence in one so aristocratic as England?

The two episodes to the Washington epic may be soon told. Captain Gordon in the Seahorse frigate, with the Euryalus, Captain Napier, and some smaller vessels, on the 17th August, 1814, left the British fleet to work a difficult and slow passage, without pilots, up the Potomac to Alexandria. They did not pass Mount Vernon, the residence and burial-place of Washington, or reach Fort Warburton between it and Alexandria, till the 27th August, three days after the fall of, and one after the British retirement from, Washington. On the evening of the 27th, after a slight bombardment of that fort, and a powder magazine in it exploded, the garrison hastily evacuated, and next morning the enemy took possession of it; for which the captain commanding was tried by a court martial, of which General Scott was president, and cashiered. On Sunday, the 29th August, the British squadron buoyed up the river and anchored at Alexandria, when the common council, unprovided with means of defence, and extremely inimical to Madison's administration, at once surrendered by capitulation, stipulating that the inhabitants should not be molested, nor the town, except public works, destroyed: but merchandize of every description, with vessels to lade it in, including all removed during the prior ten days, given up. Twenty-one merchant vessels were accordingly taken, loaded with sixteen thousand barrels of flour, a thousand hogsheads of tobacco, some cotton, and a considerable quantity of other goods. After securing this booty before Gordon's purposes of either plunder or devastation were fully effected, he was obliged to retire from Alexandria, both by an order from Admiral Cochrane, and the attacks of Commodores Rodgers, Porter, and Perry, with a party of Virginia militia under General Hungerford, who all harassed his retreat down the river.

Admiral Cochrane's letter of the 18th August, 1814, to the Secretary of State, officially announcing the British resolve of

uncivilized and inhuman devastation, not only did not reach Mr. Monroe till the 31st August, a week after the sack of Washington, but was not sent from the admiral's ship till the 29th August, and then irregularly transmitted, not by a flag of truce, which would not have comported with so atrocious a message; but surreptitiously through the instrumentality of an irresponsible, indeed unknown, American go-between, the object of charging whom with it was probably to send another illicit communication, an open note, from Codrington, captain of the fleet, ordering Gordon to retire from Alexandria. Landed from the admiral's ship in the Patuxent, and there delivered to an American unknown, were a sealed packet to General Mason, American commissary of prisoners, accompanying the letter of the 18th August to Mr. Monroe, and Captain Codrington's open note to Captain Gordon. The countryman, to whom these letters were handed by some British officer on the Patuxent shore, delivered them to an American officer, who dispatched the sealed note to General Mason, and the open note (to Gordon) to the acting Secretary of War, Monroe. Some hours before day, on the 31st August, General Mason received the sealed packet in an envelope addressed to him, which he forthwith carried to Mr. Monroe, who that day afterwards received the open note, thus suspiciously couched: "Iphigenia, 28th August, 1814. The object of the expedition being accomplished, and the inhabitants of the country, on the banks of the Potomac, being alarmed for their property, on account of the presence of the British squadron in that river, the commander-in-chief has directed me to forward openly, by the hands of one of the inhabitants, this order for the ships in the Potomac to retire and re-join his flag. Edward Codrington, rear-admiral and captain of the fleet."

That such a communication, instead of being sent by water, which the enemy commanded, should be sent furtively by land, where they had hardly a foothold, expressive of concern for the fears of inhabitants which the same enemy had been, during two years, harassing by uninterrupted brigandage; and when they were at the very moment stripping Alexandria of all the property Gordon could lay hands on, caused Mr. Monroe to suspect some occult design in Codrington's note, which General Mason was, therefore, directed to make known to the inhabitants of Alexandria in such a way as to conceal from the enemy any knowledge that our government had possession of it. General Mason accordingly gave it for that purpose to a gentleman of Alexandria, who deposited it at the post-office, removed some miles out of Alexandria, with a direction which, to the irritated disaffection of the inhabitants there-

abouts, caused their suspicion that the department of state was playing false. On Friday, the 2d September, the postmaster found in his box Codrington's strange letter, enclosed in another, without name, date, or postmark, addressed to "The committee of vigilance or safety of the town of Alexandria," containing these words: "Gentlemen, motives of a personal nature prevent my delivering the enclosure. You will judge of the propriety of doing it in your official character *without loss of time*." In the feverish condition of people, till explained, these notes were subjects of recrimination between the Alexandrians and the government, and as such, came before the investigating committee of the House of Representatives.

Gordon and his squadron were hurried into retreat, probably as well by such orders as by the attacks of the naval officers and Virginia militia. The British squadron ascended the Potomac twelve days without a shot fired at them. But beginning their descent with a fleet of vessels, loaded with spoil, on the 2d September, they were continually harassed, impeded, and considerably injured every day of the five it took them to effect their return by the 9th to the British fleet. Cannon on the bluff, and hills, fire vessels on the waters, barges manned by sailors and Virginia militia, who gallantly braved the British bombardment, indefatigably, by day and night, attacked the enemy, doing all that men could do to prevent their escape. Twelve men were killed and several wounded at one of Porter's imperfect batteries, one wounded at Perry's, nine at Rodgers', who, in barges and with fire vessels, attempted to reach the British. Gordon, nevertheless, succeeded, by courageous and skilful seamanship, to conduct all his booty in safety to the fleet, which he reached on the 9th of September with more wealth, though less renown, than the captors of Washington; whose ignominy as incendiaries eclipsed their glory, as disappointment of plunder mortified its rabid thirst.

The other collateral accompaniment of the Cossack incursion to Washington was the only occurrence of British disaster. On the 20th of August, the Menelaus frigate, Captain Sir Peter Parker, sailing up the Chesapeake, hove in sight of Rockhall, and from that vessel executed a series of predatory descents extremely vexatious and unwarrantable. On Sunday, the 28th, a detachment landed and burned the dwelling, barn, outhouses, wheatstacks, and granaries of Henry Waller; on the 30th, Tuesday, repeated the same devastations on the farm of Richard Frisby, where everything was totally destroyed by marauders who immediately thereafter fled to their ship. Near midnight they landed again, in the same spirit of drunken depredation,



headed by the baronet commanding, who compelled one of Mr. Frisby's slaves he had stolen to conduct the enemy, 230 men, to the encampment of Colonel Philip Reed, who, with 170 militia of the 21st Maryland regiment, aware of the attack, repulsed it with trifling loss on his part, killing Parker, and killing or wounding forty of his officers and men. The bodies of Captain Parker, son and grandson of British admirals, and General Ross, killed a few days afterwards near Baltimore, were conveyed in the admiral's ship the *Tonnant*, to Halifax, where Ross was buried, and whence Parker was sent to Europe for interment, both elevated British officers, slain in violations of the laws of war and principles of civilization—Parker put to death in the fact of burglary. Ross killed soon after one of its perpetrations, and attempting another.

The English narrator, from whose pages I have so copiously borrowed, and who, from being chosen to prepare the Marquis of Londonderry's work for the press, should be a person of credit, did not leave America without one of the common English calumnies concerning the "low cunning which," he says, "forms so leading a trait in the American character as to have become proverbial, and that the desire to overreach and deceive is so universal among the people of that nation, is no less notorious." Having had no American experience but during the few days of his enterprizes against Washington and New Orleans, the notoriety he mentions must be English, like the proverb. "The Americans," he adds, are "as brave as any people in the world;" of their humanity to the captured and wounded he speaks with strong eulogy; and the only American officer who at Bladensburg fell into British hands, he characterizes as one "of much gallantry and high sense of honor." The vulgar malevolence of his aspersions must therefore be altogether gratuitous. Ruthless marauders might have supposed that cunning and cruelty would have been returned for their barbarous ravages, violating, as he confessed, "every rule of modern civilized warfare." We may ask, what should have been the conduct of the injured party to such invaders when thrown on their charity, after having, by fire and sword, laid waste their country? Should they imitate the English example to the Danes, and massacre all their English invaders? Thank God, the annals of American hostilities are unstained by cruelty. And no American should hesitate to stigmatize English malevolence, which, acknowledging the kindness and humanity shown to wounded, captured, and abandoned plunderers, cannot omit the parting taunt, that "in their apprehensions (the English prisoners) of evil treatment from the Americans, the event proved

that they had done injustice to that people, who were found to possess *at least one* generous trait in their character, namely, that of behaving kindly and attentively to their prisoners."

The day before the fall of Washington, a day of extreme alarm, on the 23d of August, 1814, the Secretary of State wrote to the President: "The enemy are advanced six miles on the road to the woodyard, and our troops retreating; our troops on the march to meet them, but in too small a body to engage, General Winder proposes to retire till he can collect them in a body. The enemy are in full march for Washington, and have the materials prepared to destroy the bridge.—Tuesday, nine o'clock. You had better remove the records." Before that note was received, Mr. John Graham, Chief Clerk in the Department of State, and another clerk, Mr. Stephen Pleasanton, now fifth Auditor of the Treasury, bestirred themselves providentially to save the precious public records of that department, many of which have been since deposited, and are now kept in, the building of the Patent Office, a more convenient and safe place than the State Department. The clerk then in personal charge of most of those archives, was Josiah King, who accompanied the government from Philadelphia to Washington, and whose son succeeding to his clerkship, now holds it in that department. By the exertions of those clerks, principally Mr. Pleasanton, coarse linen bags were purchased, enough to contain the papers. The original Declaration of Independence, the articles of confederation, the federal constitution, many treaties and laws as enrolled, General Washington's commission as Commander-in-Chief of the army of the Revolution, which he relinquished when he resigned it at Annapolis, (found among the rubbish of a garret,) together with many other papers, the loss of which would have deeply blackened our disgrace, and deposited in the Tower at London, as much illustrated the British triumph—all were carefully secured in linen bags, hung round the room, ready, at a moment's warning, for removal to some place of safety. Wagons, carts, and vehicles of all sorts were in such demand for the army, whose officers took the right of seizing them whenever necessary, to carry their baggage, provisions, and other conveniences, that it was difficult to procure one in which to load the documents. That done, however, Mr. Pleasanton took them to a mill over the Potomac, about three miles beyond Georgetown, where they were concealed. But, as General Mason's cannon foundry was not far from the mill, though on the Maryland side of the river, apprehension arose that the cannon foundry, which the enemy would of course seek to destroy, might

bring them too near the mill, and endanger its deposits. They were, therefore, removed as far as Leesburg, a small town in Virginia, thirty-five miles from Washington, whither Mr. Pleasanton, on horseback, accompanied the wagon during the battle of Bladensburg. From Leesburg, where he slept that night, the burning city was discernible, in whose blaze the fate of his charge, if left there, was told on the horizon. Official letters from Mr. Monroe, Secretary of War, and Mr. Jones, Secretary of the Navy, to Col. Johnson, Chairman of the Committee of Investigation, stated, that they each directed their clerks, some days before the capture of Washington, to secure the papers of the State and the Navy Departments. Mr. Pleasanton took them in several carts to the mill, where the carts were discharged; he slept at the Rev. Mr. Maffitt's, two miles from the mill, and next morning got country wagons in which he on horseback attended the papers to Leesburg, where they were put in a vacant stone house prepared for him by the Rev. Mr. Littlejohn.—That fearful night was followed by next day's tornado, which at Leesburg, as at Washington, uprooted trees, unroofed tenements, and everywhere around superadded tempestuous to belligerent destruction and alarm.

Many of the records of the War, Treasury and Navy Departments were destroyed; some were saved, less by any care than by the tempest which arrested hostile destruction before its completion, and drove the enemy from the capital. After their departure several of the written books of the departments were found in the mud, soaked with water from the rain which so opportunely fell, which, by drying them in the sun and rebinding them, were recovered. Great numbers of books and papers, however, were irrecoverably lost, which caused some confusion in public accounts. A consul, who had settled his and received full payment, believing that his receipt and other proof of payment were lost, presented his demands anew, but was confounded by sufficient evidence of his attempted fraud. An American foreign minister against whom before the war a small balance was reported, paid, though he denied its justice. The proofs of its payment being lost, it was debited to him again after the war, in the inflexible routine of fiscal accountability, and he paid the balance a second time rather than submit to the discredit of being registered and published a public delinquent.

The condition of the President's house and family is best depicted in the following letters from the lady, who there, with a spirit of gentle fortitude, presided: a sort of hourly diary written by Mrs. Madison to her sister Mrs. Washington, then at Mount

Vernon, the seat of General Washington, eighteen miles from the federal city.

*Tuesday, Aug. 23d, 1814.*

DEAR SISTER,

My husband left me yesterday morning to join General Winder.—He inquired anxiously whether I had courage or firmness to remain in the President's house until his return on the morrow, or succeeding day; and on my assurance that I had no fear but for him and the success of our army, he left me, beseeching me to take care of myself, and of the cabinet papers, public and private. I have since received two dispatches from him, written with a pencil; the last is alarming, because he desires I should be ready at a moment's warning to enter my carriage and leave the city; that the enemy seemed stronger than had been reported, and that it might happen that they would reach the city, with intention to destroy it. \* \* \* \* I am accordingly ready; I have pressed as many cabinet papers into trunks as to fill one carriage; our private property must be sacrificed, as it is impossible to procure wagons for its transportation. I am determined not to go myself until I see Mr. Madison safe, and he can accompany me—as I hear of much hostility towards him \* \* \* \* disaffection stalks around us. \* \* \* \* My friends and acquaintances are all gone,—even Colonel C—— with his hundred men, who were stationed as a guard in the enclosure. \* \* French John, (a faithful domestic,) with his usual activity and resolution, offers to spike the cannon at the gates, and to lay a train of powder which would blow up the British, should they enter the house. To the last proposition I positively object, without being able, however, to make him understand why all advantages in war may not be taken.

*Wednesday morning, 12 o'clock.*

Since sunrise I have been turning my spyglass in every direction, and watching with unwearied anxiety, hoping to discern the approach of my dear husband and his friends; but, alas, I can deserv only groups of military wandering in all directions as if there was a lack of arms, or of spirit to fight for their own firesides!

*3 o'clock.*

Will you believe it, my sister? We have had a battle or skirmish near Bladensburg, and I am still here within sound of the cannons! Mr. Madison comes not; may God protect him! Two messengers covered with dust, come to bid me fly; but I wait for him. \* \* \* \* At this late hour a wagon has been procured; I have had it filled with the plate and most valuable portable articles belonging to the house; whether it will reach its destination, the



Bank of Maryland, or fall into the hands of British soldiery, events must determine.

*August 24th, 1814.*

Our kind friend, Mr. Carroll, has come to hasten my departure, and is in a very bad humor with me because I insisted on waiting until the large picture of General Washington is secured, and it requires to be unscrewed from the wall. This process was found too tedious for these perilous moments; I have ordered the frame to be broken, and the canvass taken out; it is done—and the precious portrait placed in the hands of two gentlemen of New York, for safe keeping. And now, dear sister, I must leave this house, or the retreating army will make me a prisoner in it, by filling up the road I am directed to take. When I shall again write to you, or where I shall be to-morrow, I cannot tell!!

Part of Col. Carberry's regiment of regulars was quartered not far from the President's house, in the large hall of which were stored munitions of war. Two cannon, served by four artillerists, were planted before the front door. Mrs. Madison gathered the most precious cabinet papers, some clothing and other important articles, packed in a carriage, and made ready for what always all anticipated—flight. Dr. Blake, the Mayor of Washington, twice called to warn her of the peril of her situation, and urge her departure. The four artillerists fled, leaving her alone in the house, with no attendants but servants; the most intelligent and reliable of whom was one called French John, Mr. John Siousa, a native of Paris, who came to this country as a seaman, on board the French frigate *Didon*, accompanied by the *Cybele*, another frigate, in 1804 commissioned to take back Jerome Bonaparte, whose marriage with a beautiful American wife gave umbrage to his ambitious and imperious, and soon to be imperial, brother. Talleyrand addressed his master, the Emperor, when crowned, deploring the "terrible degradation of a whole family of American consins;" and then Mr. Siousa, with several others of the French crews of the two frigates, deserted from an imperial navy to establish himself in this country, and become the father of sixteen republican children. Living first in the service of Mr. Merry, when British minister to the United States, and afterwards of Mr. Erskine, from his family Mr. Siousa went to that of Mr. Madison, as his porter, and is yet living, messenger of the Metropolis Bank of Washington. Not long after the Mayor's second call on Mrs. Madison, pressing her departure, she still lingering for tidings of her husband, his faithful, brave young slave, Jim, returned with his master's last note, in pencil, directing her to fly at once. The horses, already harnessed

to the carriages, were ordered to the door, and, with her female servants in one, and only a little black girl in her own, Mrs. Madison drove off.

The afternoon before, Mr. George W. P. Custis, of Arlington, on the other side of the Potomac, opposite to Washington—grandson of Mrs. Custis, General Washington's wife, in whose family he was brought up—a gentleman fond of painting, and of all memorials of his grandmother's husband, particularly every variety of portraits of Washington—called at the President's to save a full-length picture which has been among the few ornaments of the presidential mansion during its ten incumbencies, from that of the first Adams, on the removal of the seat of government, in 1800, to the District of Columbia. The picture, in 1814, hung on the west wall of the large dining-room, instead of the east wall of the small parlor, where it is now. The President promised Mr. Custis that it should be taken care of, and Mrs. Madison deemed it her duty not to leave such a trophy for the captors. It is one of Washington's likenesses, by Stuart, stamped with his superiority as a portrait-painter, the head and face strongly resembling the original. Negligent as Stuart was of all but the face of his pictures, the person of Washington was left for another artist, Winstanley, to whom President John Adams's son-in-law, William Smith, stood for the body, limbs, posture and manner of this parody; so that Washington's tall, gaunt person, his shape, air and attitude are much better given by Trumbull's representation of him in the several historical pictures which fill panels in the rotunda at the Capitol. Mrs. Madison, with the carving-knife in her hand, stood by while French John and others strove to detach the picture uninjured from its heavy external gilt frame, and preserve it whole on the inner wooden work, by which it was kept distended and screwed to the wall. Charles Carroll, of Bellevue, a gentleman intimate in the President's family, entered from the affair of Bladensburg, while the French porter, John Siousa, and Irish gardener, Thomas McGaw, were laboring with a hatchet to take down the picture, and remonstrated against Mrs. Madison risking capture for such an object, which, Mr. Carroll urged, ought not to delay her departure. Her letter to her sister, Mrs. Washington, states that the picture was secured before she left the house. Mr. Siousa, who is highly worthy of credit, thinks she was gone before it was *done*, as her letter expresses the accomplishment. The Irish gardener, to whose aid, in the midst of the work, Mr. Jacob Barker came in, according to Siousa's recollection, while he was gone to bring an axe, got the picture down from the wall, and placed it in the hands of Mr. Barker; with whom,

according to Siousa's statement, there was no other person except a black man, whom Siousa took for Mr. Barker's servant. Carried off, upheld whole in the inner wooden frame, beyond Georgetown, the picture was deposited by Mr. Barker in a place of safety. The presidential household god, the image of the father of his country—by whom its chief city was fixed near his home, and by whose name it was called—was thus snatched from the clutch or torch of the barbarian captors. Such, as near as it can be ascertained, is the truth of its rescue, which has been embroiled in newspaper polemics by several claimants to part of the honor.

Mrs. Madison, driving to Georgetown, went first to the residence of the Secretary of the Navy, then to Bellevue, and, joined by the families of Mr. Jones and Mr. Carroll, returned to the town, insisting that her terrified coachman should take her back towards the President's house, to look for him; whom she unexpectedly found near the lower bridge, attended by Mr. Monroe and Mr. Rush, who all reached the President's house soon after she left it, and stopped there a few minutes for refreshments. Col. Laval, with some of his dragoons, the regulars, and a company or two of the volunteers, also stopped there, thirsting for drink, which was furnished in buckets of water and bottles of wine, set before the door for a hurried draught: during which short stay many things were taken out of the house by individuals; most of them, probably, to be secured and restored, as some were, but not all; for the Secretary of the Treasury's fine duelling pistols, which the President took from his holsters and laid on a table, were carried off, and never recovered. As soon as the executive and military fugitives disappeared, Siousa, solitary and alone in the house, who had before secured the gold and silver mounted carbines and pistols of the Algerine minister, which are now in the patent office, carried the parrot to Col. Tayloe's residence, and left it there, in charge of the French minister's cook; and then, returning, shut all the doors and windows of the President's house, and, taking away the key with him, went, for security, to the residence of Daschkoff, the Russian minister, then at Philadelphia. The British broke open the house and burned it, as before stated, without discovering, as is believed, anything they deemed worth preserving. If they found a feast there, as one of them relates, like harpy's food, it was consumed in the orgies of their filthy debauch.

While the ladies of Mr. Jones and Mr. Carroll's families lingered in Georgetown for Mrs. Madison, she accompanied her husband to the bank of the Potomac, where one small boat was kept ready, of the many others all sunk or removed but that one, to transport the President, Mr. Monroe, Mr.

Rush, Mr. Mason and Mr. Carroll to the Virginia shore. The boat was too small to carry all at once, so that several trips were necessary, as the shades of night set in upon them, like departing spirits leaving the world behind, to be ferried over an inevitable Styx. President, Secretary, Attorney and Commissary General seemed condemned to an immortality of at least contempt and malediction in the world. About that time it must have been, if ever, as Mrs. Madison is clear in her recollection was the case at some time, that Cockburn's proffer reached them of an escort for her to a place of safety; for it was impossible till night-fall, till when he did not enter the city: imperfect remembrance of which event may give color to General Armstrong's impression, derived from Dr. Thornton, that Ross and Cockburn tendered the President a proposal for a ransom of the public buildings; two distinct proposals, if any such were made, of which the escort for her was declined, and the ransom of the city repulsed with disdain.

Mrs. Madison, after seeing her husband over the river, drove back, attended by John Graham and nine volunteer cavalry, to her female companions, the families of Mr. Jones and Mr. Carroll, in Georgetown. The President's orders were to pass the night wherever she could find a convenient, safe place, in Virginia, and join him next day at a tavern sixteen miles from Georgetown, which was the appointed place of meeting. Moving slowly onward, the road encumbered with baggage wagons and other hindrances, their progress was so tedious that the ladies sometimes left their carriages, and walked, as the least irksome and dangerous mode of proceeding, in the midst of tumult, till they reached after nightfall the residence of Mr. Love, two miles and a-half beyond Georgetown, on the Virginia side of the Potomac, where they begged a night's rest. Mr. Love was abroad with the troops, but soon returned. His lady, indisposed, made the best arrangements practicable for so large an irruption of unexpected inmates, for whom sofas and other substitutes for beds were arranged as well as could be; and they passed a frightful, miserable night, all disconsolate, several in tears, Mrs. Madison sitting at an open window gazing on the lurid flames and listening to the hoarse murmurs of the smouldering city, while several hundred disorderly militia around the house aggravated the din and begrimed the gloomy scene. Before daylight the next morning, the caravan of affrighted ladies, in sad procession, took their departure under Mrs. Madison's lead, for the rendezvous appointed with the President. Consternation was at its uttermost; the whole region filled with panic-struck people, terrified scouts roaming about and spreading alarm that the enemy were com-



ing from Washington and Alexandria, and that there was safety nowhere. Among the terrific rumors, one predominated that Cockburn's proclamation was executed by Cockburn, inducing the slaves to revolt, and that thousands of infuriated negroes, drunk with liquor and mad with emancipation, were committing excesses worse than those at Hampton the year before, subjecting the whole country to their horrid outrages. About noon the air was charged with the two-fold electricity of panic and of a storm, as the ladies pursued their weary and disconsolate retreat. Gen. Young, commanding a brigade of Virginia militia, in his official report to the investigating committee of the House of Representatives, says that they were delayed on their march to join General Winder, "by an alarm of a *domestic nature*, which he was so credulous as to believe, from the respectability of the country people, who came to him for protection; he halted his brigade and sent out light troops and one troop of cavalry to ascertain the fact, which finally proved erroneous." The terror of Cockburn's formidable enormities was more conquering than arms. Gen. Young next day actually stopped Mrs. Madison, insisting that she must not be suffered to go without an escort.

About the hour when Cockburn's *complete* destruction was realizing at Washington on the rope-walks, printing offices, and Patent Office, Mrs. Madison, with her female party, reached the tavern sixteen miles from the city, appointed for her meeting with the President. The horizon was overcast, the heavens portentously black, thunder muttered, forked lightning flashed, hurricane blasts announced the tornado which soon broke forth with tropical fury, desolating many miles round. The tavern in which Mrs. Madison was seeking shelter, and her vagrant husband, was filled with ladies, also fugitives from dreaded hostilities, who insisted that the wife of him who caused them, by his abominable war, should not be received under the same roof with its innocent victims; the wife of a President who had brought such calamities on the country had no claim to admission under the same roof with ladies driven from their own, but deserved to be expelled from all doors. Ladies who had partaken, at Mrs. Madison's drawing-room, the welcome of the President's mansion, and who lived to become sensible of their error, prejudiced by party, embittered by hostilities, and maddened by expulsion from their homes, to seek shelter in a country inn, combined to refuse her admission there. The tavern-keeper and his wife were of opposite politics; he for the war, and she vehement against it and its abominable author. While this storm of passion raged with the tornado beginning its desolations, the men of Mrs. Madison's escort were

obliged to overcome the ungracious and unladylike resistance to her shelter in an inn, which stood in the midst of an apple orchard, heavily laden with ripe fruit, torn by the tempest from the trees, and dashed with noisy force against the windows and doors of the house. At length admitted only just in time to escape the hail of apples, tongues and tempest, the ladies were allowed the comfort of a plain meal, of which Mrs. Madison saved enough for the President whenever he might arrive. Obligated to seek shelter from the rain, he was delayed, and did not join her till the evening, when, with Mr. Monroe, General Mason, Mr. Carroll and Mr. Rush, he reached the tavern, drenched with wet, famished and exhausted. After devouring the cold victuals put aside for them, the gentlemen went to rest, of which they had enjoyed but little since they crossed the Potomac the evening before. That uneasy and humiliating repose, not the last of Madison's degradations, was, however, the turning-point of his fortunes; for while he slept, Ross hastily and clandestinely evacuated Washington; victors and vanquished alike victims of and fugitives from imagined perils. The deluge of the depopulated seat of government drove its conquerors away when there was as little danger in their remaining at Washington as there was in the President and his suite safely resting in Georgetown. But terror was the order of the day and incubus of the night of both Americans and Britons, without the slightest cause for either. At midnight the President and his party were roused from their disturbed slumber by a report that the British were coming! Ross was then beyond Bladensburg on his retreat. Gordon did not reach Alexandria till three days afterwards. While an armed Englishman was not within twenty miles, the propagandism of dread that they were everywhere, determined to capture Madison, drove him from his hiding-place in the inn, to pass the rest of that moist and wretched night in a hovel in the woods, while the British were toiling along the way to their shipping.

Before he left Mrs. Madison, she was told to disguise herself, use another carriage than her own, leave all her female companions, and fly further. Her nine troopers that night were reduced to one by the fatigues of escort and the cheer of the tavern. Leaving her own carriage and four horses, having put on other female attire than her own, and got the carriage of Mr. Parrott, of Georgetown, with no attendant but Mr. Duvall, nephew of the judge, the single individual to whom her slender body-guard dwindled, at the dawn of day she set off almost alone. Soon afterwards tidings reached her and Mr. Madison, who did not meet again till their return to Washington, that it was evacuated by the

British, soon followed by assurances that there was no danger in going there. Still precautions were deemed necessary. At the Long Bridge, burned at both ends, Colonel Fenwick, who commanded there, busy transporting munitions of war over the Potomac in the only boat left at his disposal, peremptorily refused to let any unknown woman in the boat cross with her carriage. At the unfortunate battle of Queenstown, Colonel Fenwick, in a boat exposed to the enemy's fire from a bluff, lost an eye, the use of a hand, and his whole body was drilled with musket balls. Positively refused a passage, Mrs. Madison was obliged to send for and request him to come to her carriage, where she confidentially made herself known, and was then driven in her carriage into the frail boat, which bore her homewards. Her person disguised, in a strange carriage, she found Washington a heap of deserted ruins, and stopped at her sister's, Mrs. Cutts' house, whose husband was then one of the New Hampshire senators; the same house occupied and owned by Mr. Adams, for many years, while Secretary of State, and till the time of his death; where Mr. Madison resided for a few weeks after his return till he engaged the mansion of Colonel Tayloe, called the Octagon, in which the President's family passed the winter, and where he signed the treaty of peace.

Emerging from his last hiding-place in the hovel, and soon informed of the enemy's precipitate departure, the President likewise turned his steps towards deserted Washington, where his presence was the signal of universal recuperation—his own, the capital, and the country—risen like Anteus from his fall. Such are war's vicissitudes and compensations. At Georgetown, at the tavern, in the apple orchard, and at the hovel in the woods, the commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into actual service, forces then afoot exceeding one hundred and fifty thousand men, drank the bitter lees of public disgrace, and suffered many of the pains and penalties inflicted on power degraded: encompassed by crowds of his countrymen, flying from their desolated dwellings, many of them in arms, crying aloud for his downfall, begrudging even his wife the sanctuary of a common inn; both the reviled and revilers pursued by resistless foes, bent on the indiscriminate destruction of all alike. The night following came some compensation for such punishment—the last night of Madison's exile, and eve of his restoration to almost universal favor. It was spent in the family of Quaker hosts, strangers to him, and conscientious adversaries of all war, who, with primitive hospitality, welcomed friend Madison, entertaining him and his outcast comrades in

misfortune with the kindest and most touching attentions. Refreshed by sweet repose under the Quaker roof, they returned next day to Washington; and on the way were joined by General Armstrong. After his suggestion to fortify and defend the Capitol was, with his own acquiescence, overruled by General Winder and Colonel Monroe, the Secretary of War rode to his lodgings in the city, provided himself with a change of clothes and one of Scott's novels, with which he withdrew to a farm-house in Maryland, where he was found next morning, quietly enjoying his romance. Coldly accosted by every one of the President's party, except Mr. Madison, whose behavior was as usual, the war secretary felt the first symptoms of that nearly universal aversion which marked his return to Washington, and protested against his continuance in the war department. Never well liked by Madison, who yielded to the political, local, and critical inducements which took Gen. Armstrong, from commanding the garrison and important station of the city of New York, into the cabinet, his contempt for all but regular troops, and for party, if not popularity, his military and aristocratic democracy, supine and sarcastic deportment and conversation, habitual disparagement of the wilderness capital, the negligence imputed to him of its defences, and his opinion, frequently expressed, that it was too insignificant to be in danger, fomenting the desire men have of a sacrifice, filled Washington with his enemies, then fevered to animosity by its destruction, and festered to rancorous hate. Men require victims, and it was natural to make them of Armstrong and Winder, as alone guilty of what all the rest were to blame for, and, in fact, infirmities of republican institutions. The fall of Washington endangered the removal of the seat of government from a place which both east and west began to disparage. Leading men there, Charles Carroll, of Bellevue, whose hospitable villa stood on the picturesque heights of Georgetown; John Mason, with his elegant residence on Analostan island, on the Potomac, at their feet; John Van Ness, a large landlord in the heart of the city, with many more whose property was threatened with sudden and ruinous depreciation, intimates and supporters of Madison, to personal, party, and patriotic attachments, joined solicitude for their homesteads, instinctive and irrepressible beyond all reason. The district militia swore that they would break their swords rather than wield them, directed by such a Secretary of War; and Georgetown sent a deputation to the President to tell him so, consisting of three remonstrants, one of whom was Hanson, editor of the newspaper most abusive of his administration; and another, McKenny, then contriving to promote Monroe's election as



Madison's successor. Refusing to receive such envoys, too wise and just to give way to local clamor, but too mild and forbearing to spurn or rebuke it, the President compromised with what Armstrong stigmatized as a village mob, by advising him to withdraw temporarily from its vengeance, if he did not even intimate a wish that the Secretary of War would relinquish his official superintendence of the District of Columbia, promising shortly to restore him to all his faculties. General Armstrong could not remain, under such disadvantages, a member of his administration. The averted countenances of all the President's associates, when first met after the defeat, all cold, and one of them, Mr. Carroll, insulting, told the secretary that he could not stay, even though his life had not been threatened by the military mob he defied, without forfeiting the independence he maintained. Retiring, therefore, after his interview with the President, and by his advice, to Baltimore, on the 3d September, 1814, in the federal journal of that city, he published an indignant resignation of a place, which, throughout his incumbency, was one of continual quarrels with the generals he superintended, and of their disastrous miscarriages of the campaigns he projected. At his residence on the North River he survived till more than eighty years old. Having bravely served in the army of the Revolution, been the organ

of its almost rebellious complaints by the Newberg letters which he wrote, appointed to high public trusts at home and abroad by Presidents Washington, Jefferson, and Madison, he closed his life, by military annals of the war of 1812, remarkable for accurate narrative, polished diction, and manly tone.

Such was the desolation of Washington when the President returned, that even the provision markets were suspended, and one of his two cows was killed to supply beef for the family. A few hams and some wine carried, the wine rolled away in casks from the house, were all that remained of the President's establishment, except the walls of the building. Nor did the reign of terror subside with the enemy's departure. Gordon's squadron had passed Fort Warburton, on his way to Alexandria. Many persons, particularly Dr. Thornton, objected to disarming the British invalids who were left in possession of the capital, to overcome which pusillanimous obsequiousness, the mayor, Dr. Blake, had to resort to a town meeting, which became the subject of newspaper controversy between him and Dr. Thornton. Almost the first words Monroe was obliged to utter, as he rode into the city, were a severe rebuke to Thornton, suggesting that the citizens of Washington would do well to follow the example intended to be set by those of Alexandria, and deprecate ruin by submission.

## CHAPTER IX.

DEFENCE OF BALTIMORE—BATTLE OF NORTH POINT—BOMBARDMENT OF FORT M'HENRY—DEATH OF GENERAL ROSS—RETREAT OF THE ENEMY—GENERAL SMITH.

CONSTANTINOPLE and St. Petersburg give metropolitan tone to the vast empires of Turkey and Russia, seldom troubled with provincial dissidence or popular independence. Everything governmental and national is the work of an event in the capital, acknowledged without hesitation by all the rest of the country, while persons distant rise in the morning and go to bed at night as has been determined in the chief city. Paris and Vienna have in like manner governed France and Germany. Reasoning from such European premises, the British captors of Washington were not to be persuaded that they did not infer the submission of the United States. Mr. Francis Key, who went on board the British fleet concerning the liberation of a prisoner, and was detained in it till after the attack on Baltimore, could not convince the commanders that the upshot of their ephemeral triumph would not be as they flattered

themselves and insisted, submission of the country, when its capital fell; as they argued, incapable of estimating the American polity, federative and free of a union not consolidated, hardly centralized, resting on the transcendental basis of sovereign States and local independence. Confident that their seizure of a weak head must paralyze by sympathetic panic the vigorous limbs, when they had hardly wounded and only provoked the whole body to fierce resistance, the defeat of their next attempt, which the British official accounts termed *demonstration* on Baltimore, signal and complete by land and water, simultaneously with that of their naval and military discomfiture at Plattsburg, was the beginning of a series of disasters providentially punishing their iniquitous prolongation of hostilities. Reasons for attacking Washington and Baltimore were stated in a London paper to be, pursuant to Coch-

rane's letter, that "if any towns are to suffer, they should be the objects, in order to crush a large body of privateer shipping in Baltimore, and in Washington to destroy a pretty well supplied arsenal, and thus prevent Congress meeting there again, an event much and generally wished for by the people of New York, Philadelphia and the Eastern States. Let the arsenal and naval storehouses be blown up, and no government will be able to get a majority in Congress to vote for their re-erection. To the assembly of the legislature at Washington, the influences of the southern legislators may be ascribed:" so argued the London press.

On the 6th of September, 1814, the whole fleet, between forty and fifty vessels of war, got under way, and stood up the Chesapeake, with more than five thousand soldiers, marines, black and white, and seamen, to be landed as infantry, under Admirals Cochrane, Cockburn, Malcolm, Codrington, Captain, now Admiral Napier, and many other distinguished leaders. On the 9th, sailing by Annapolis, on the 11th, reaching the Patapsco, early in the morning of the 12th of September, 1814, they landed at North Point, while several vessels of light draft attempted to ascend the Patapsco, intending to capture or silence Fort M'Henry, an open fortification, two miles from Baltimore, and two other water batteries adjacent. General Ross, accompanied by Admiral Cochrane in the van, proceeded without resistance, about four miles, when gallantly encountered by two companies of Sterrett's fine regiment, led by Captains Levering and Howard, and Captain Aisquith's rifle company, composing an advance, detached under Major Richard Heath, accompanied as a volunteer by Robert Goodloe Harper, long one of the most distinguished members of Congress, bringing on what was called the battle of North Point by fortunately killing General Ross. Soon overwhelmed by superior numbers, our advance was driven back on their main body, the Baltimore brigade, rather more than three thousand men, commanded by General John Stricker, with whom served three companies of Pennsylvania volunteers under Captains Spangler, Metegar and Dixon, and a company of Maryland volunteers under Captain Quantill, the whole led by Colonels Sterrett, McDonald, Long, Fowler, and Amey, with Pinkney's rifle battalion under Captain Dyer, some cavalry, commanded by Colonel Biays, and six four-pounders, managed by Captain Montgomery. These troops were well posted by General Stricker, and fifteen hundred of them, the only portion actually engaged, for more than an hour bravely withstood the British onset. "We were drawing near," says the English narrative, "the scene of action, when another officer

came at full speed towards us, with horror and dismay in his countenance, and calling aloud for a surgeon. Every man felt within himself that all was not right, though none was willing to believe the whispers of his own terror. But what at first we could not guess at, because we dreaded it so much, was soon realized; for the aid-de-camp had scarcely passed, when the General's horse, without its rider, and with the saddle and housings stained with blood, came plunging onwards. Nor was much time given for fearful surmise as to the extent of our misfortune. In a few minutes we reached the ground where the skirmishing had taken place, and beheld poor Ross laid by the side of the road, under a canopy of blankets, and apparently in the agonies of death. As soon as the firing began, he had ridden to the front, that he might ascertain from whence it originated, and mingling with the skirmishers, was shot in the side by a rifleman. The wound was mortal; he fell into the arms of his aid-de-camp, and lived only long enough to name his wife, and to commend his family to the protection of his country. He was removed towards the fleet, and expired before his bearers could reach the boats." By this death the command of the British army devolved on Colonel Brooke, whose well composed official report of their speedy and clandestine abandonment of the attempt on Baltimore, attributes it to the failure of the naval attack on Fort M'Henry. But the fact was that, discouraged by Ross's death, the promptitude of Heath's assault, and the bravery of Stricker's contest, the enemy were still more disconcerted when they discovered the preparations made by General Samuel Smith for the defence of Baltimore. During more than an hour the battle of North Point was well contested by but fifteen hundred of the Baltimore volunteers against superior numbers of veteran regular troops. The misconduct of one regiment, Colonel Amey's, caused some confusion, and forced General Stricker to yield the field of battle. But most of his inexperienced troops, especially the 5th and 27th regiments, (the latter well trained by Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Moore,) behaved with a spirit to redeem the dishonor of Bladensburg. The British, who lost more than officially reported, confessed thirty-nine killed and two hundred and twenty-nine wounded, while our loss was twenty-one killed and a hundred and thirty-nine wounded, and fifty taken; the most distinguished of our slain, James Lowry Donaldson, a city member of the State legislature, who fell bravely animating the 27th regiment, of which he was adjutant, to manly combat, and Lieutenant Andre. General Stricker took his first position, maintained it, and fell back to the second, with such spirit that Brooke did not venture to



pursue. About the time of Stricker's last stand, he was joined by General Winder with General Douglas' brigade of Virginia militia, and Captain Burd's troop of regular cavalry. The Maryland brigades of Generals Stansbury and Foreman, the seamen and marines under Commodore Rodgers, the Pennsylvania volunteers under Colonels Cobean and Findley, the Baltimore artillery under Colonel Harris, and the marine artillery under Captain Stiles, manned the trenches and batteries, at which they remained all night under arms, ready for any assault the enemy might undertake. Sleeping on the battle-ground, Colonel Brooke next day approached Baltimore, whose defences he closely reconnoitered and found bristling with cannon fortifying the hills, manned by not less than twelve thousand men, whom he showed no disposition to attack, well prepared and resolved as they were to vindicate their firesides by repulsing, capturing or destroying their invaders, who escaped by nocturnal flight.

Arrangements were made to cut off Brooke's retreat by General Winder, with General Douglas's Virginia brigade and some regular troops; but Brooke precipitately made his escape under cover of night, and uncomfortable weather, to the shipping, leaving a few prisoners in our hands.

A grand but shy attack was made by the fleet on Fort McHenry, on the 13th. Formed in a half circle in front of it, but keeping out of range of its batteries, bomb and other vessels fired, during that day and night, eighteen hundred bomb-shells, with multitudes of round shot and rockets, not less altogether than one hundred and sixty tons of iron engines of destruction, with no effect of intimidation or success, and without much destruction, owing to the distance at which the masters of the seas kept from the well-known gunnery of the Americans. Major Armistead, of the artillery, who commanded Fort McHenry, with his comrades there, were a target for British practice, for the fort returned but few shots, when they found that they fell short of the enemy. Many of the British bombs weighed two hundred and twenty pounds; the uproar of whose reverberations was as terrific as the spectacle of night cannonade was imposing. After firing these missiles into the fort from six in the morning till three in the afternoon, Cochrane moved some of his vessels nearer, and their shot hailed fire on the defendants. But in very few moments, as soon as Armistead's guns reposted within a distance which brought them into contact with their assailants, the latter slipped their cables, hoisted their sails, and fell back beyond the range of our largest guns. About midnight, screened by total darkness and lighted by the flame of their own artillery, a few bomb vessels and rocket boats, with a large squadron of barges, manned by

twelve hundred men, pushed up the cove beyond Fort McHenry, to assail it in the rear, effect a landing, and try the city; with loud cheers moving on, and flattering themselves that success awaited their last effort, on which the British admiral confidently relied. Fatigue, want of rest and comfort, bad weather and exposure, unprotected by good works from the enemy's fire, without the excitement of returning it, as they were beyond reach of ours, tried the fortitude of the mixed garrison of Fort McHenry. Three companies of Baltimore artillery, commanded by Captains Berry, Judge Nicholson and Lieutenant Pennington, parts of the thirty-sixth and thirty-eighth regiments of United States infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart, with Major Lane, of the fourteenth United States regiment, serving as a volunteer, composed Major Armistead's force in the fort: of whom the clumsy gunnery of the British shipping killed but four, among whom were two respectable merchants, Lieutenant Claggett and Sergeant Clemm; wounding only twenty. Two American ship-masters, prisoners on board the frigate *Menelaus* during the attack, stated, when afterwards liberated, as told to them by British officers, that the attempt was made by eighty boats, carrying each twenty-five men, and defeated with a loss of between four and five hundred. The several water batteries, not only Fort McHenry but Fort Covington, where Commodore Rodgers was stationed with his sailors, and Lieutenant Newcomb of the navy, and the flotilla men from the city battery, under Lieutenant Webster, as well as that of the *Lazaretto*, deluged the assailants with such torrents of hot shot, as not merely to repulse, but, with great loss, quickly drive them back to their original anchorage out of reach. Baltimore, shaken to its foundations by these tremendous explosions, stood firm in spirit: and it was during the striking concussions of that night conflict, that the song of the "Star-spangled Banner" was composed in the admiral's ship.

Soon after the morning attack on Fort McHenry began, Brooke led his forces within a mile of Baltimore, skilfully followed, however, and judiciously threatened by Winder. The British commander concentrated his force ostensibly for storming the town that night. General Smith, perfectly prepared for it, posted Winder and Stricker so advantageously for attacking Brooke next morning, that, together with the night failure on the water fortifications, the British decamped, about midnight, with great precipitation, favored by total darkness, heavy rain, and the exhausted condition of the Americans, who, during the three days and nights' campaign, had suffered from fatigue, inclement weather and want of rest. The bomb vessels and barges which passed beyond Fort McHenry, after losing many men

and suffering considerable damage, saved from annihilation by the total darkness, retreated to their distant positions, out of reach of shot, whence they kept up the ineffectual bombardment till six o'clock next morning, when they, like the army, drew off, both worsted and convinced of the much greater probability of their own capture or destruction, than that of Baltimore. After the army had effected its escape, the cannonade of Fort McHenry ceased, at six o'clock, on the morning of the 14th, having continued twenty-four hours. Completely foiled by water and land, the invaders officially apologized for their retreat, by stating that, as the river did not admit of near approach to the fort, storming the city, without first taking Fort McHenry, might have cost more than it would come to. British admirals and colonels, therefore, withdrew from that last hostile demonstration of the mistress of the sea in the waters of the Chesapeake, with the sorry consolation of what Admiral Cochrane's dispatch to Secretary Croker recapitulated as the fruits of the abortion, "the burning of an extensive rope-walk and other public erections, causing their inhabitants to remove their property from the city, above all, the collecting and *harassing* them around from the surrounding country, producing a total stagnation of their commerce, and heaping upon them considerable expenses, at the same time effectually drawing off their attention and support from other important quarters."

On the last day of October, 1814, an officer, with a boat's crew from the British sloop-of-war *Saracen*, landed at the garden of St. Inigoe's, the manor-house of a Roman Catholic establishment, near the mouth of the Potomac, built, in 1705, of bricks brought from England, rifled the chapel, the tabernacle and sacred ornaments of the altar, stole the beds, clock, knives, forks, plate, glass, the missionary's watch, the books, medicines, the clothes hung out to dry and from the wash-tubs. On the 18th November, 1814, Captain Alexander Dixie, commander of the *Saracen*, sent an officer with a flag of truce, and letter addressed to the clergyman belonging to the chapel at St. Inigoe's, and the other residents there, acknowledging the robbery from the house and chapel, declaring the proceeding unauthorized, and restoring some of the articles taken, "hoping this justice will efface prejudicial sentiments towards the British;" — rare confession and poor atonement for the common rapine practised by the British navy in the waters of the Chesapeake.

On the same day, Captain Burd, accompanied by Colonel John Francis Mercer, a respectable gentleman of Maryland, and Mr. John Nelson, at the head of Burd's troop of United States dragoons, surprised by a dashing charge and overcame a much su-

perior number of some three hundred British seamen and marines, on the shore near Snowden's, on the Chesapeake Bay. After ineffectually discharging their muskets in their usual way, the seamen, terrified by the horses close upon them, dispersed and fled, and would have been all taken, but that the riding-master of the troop, a Scotsman named Craig, who was a deserter from the British, became frightened and called out to retreat, which Captain Burd, who was wounded, in vain strove to prevent. Craig's fear was that, if taken, he would be executed as a deserter, and his voice with the troop proved irresistible by its commander, whose conduct on the occasion was exceedingly gallant. Mr. Mercer charged with his riding-whip in his hand. In these frequent little contests the military spirit of the country was educated, while the piratical mischief of the enemy roused it everywhere to indignant resistance. To this hour, all along the shores of the Chesapeake to the ocean, British barbarity continues to be borne in mind, and among that portion of the people then charged by political opponents with British attachments, the memory of their brutalities is fresh. Any one of whom there remains the least tradition of omission to resist them, and much more, of affording them aid or succor, is despised to the third generation. These sentiments grow stronger nearer the ocean, and the primitive people of Accomac, Virginian by State allegiance, Marylanders in locality, were remarkable for strenuous warfare, while represented in Congress, in 1814, by Thomas W. Bayley, whose son, of the same name, now represents that district.

Among the volunteers from Pennsylvania, repairing in masses and great numbers to be organized, armed, equipped, and disciplined for the rescue of Baltimore, was Mr. James Buchanan, the present (1848) Secretary of State of the United States. Like Mr. Harper, a federalist, condemning the war, Mr. Buchanan was among the young men of Lancaster, where he lived, to volunteer to fight for it; and as a private dragoon in the troop of Captain, afterwards Judge, Henry Shippen, hastened to the scene of action. Without commissions or orders, those citizens of a neighbor State flocked to the post of danger, and organized themselves into regiments with the ardor which has often surpassed enlisted, and more orderly embodiment, chose their own officers, and throughout their brief service faced danger with a constancy which neither discipline nor pay can always produce. The present Secretary of State mounted guard, at one time, a stalwart sentinel, with naked sabre in his hand, at the door of General Smith.

As before stated in the Bladensburg narrative, that fine national anthem, "The



Star-Spangled Banner," was a stroke of lyrical genius, by another federal gentleman, from the Baltimore conflict. Among the British prisoners at Bladensburg was a Sergeant Hutchinson, of the sappers and miners, an intelligent young man, grateful for the kindness and attention which he and his wounded companions received when left behind at Ross's departure from Washington. A respectable physician of Marlborough, Dr. Beans, with some of his servants, having captured some English stragglers on the retreat of the British army; when informed of it, a detachment was sent back to retaliate by capturing him and take him on board their shipping as a prisoner, to be sent to Bermuda. Mr. Francis Key went with a flag of truce on board the British fleet to solicit Dr. Beans' release, provided with letters from Serg. Hutchinson and other British prisoners, strongly representing the humane treatment they had all enjoyed, and Gen. Ross, with characteristic generosity, restored Dr. Beans, at Mr. Key's solicitation. But as the fleet was then about proceeding to attack Baltimore, Mr. Key was detained till after that event. Taken with the British to the mouth of the Patuxent, his little vessel was kept under the guns of a frigate during the bombardment, watching the shells and listening to the cannonade, which the admiral boasted would soon reduce the fort and the city to surrender. All day Mr. Key watched the American flag on the fort; and when the wet, gloomy, and terrible night rendered the star-spangled banner invisible, the bomb-shells were Mr. Key's signs till daylight once more revealed the flag of his country, proudly waving defiance to the discomfited enemy. Under these circumstances he composed the stanzas which have become a national anthem.

General Samuel Smith, who, as major-general of the Maryland militia, ably commanded at Baltimore, was an opulent merchant, for thirty years member of Congress, in both branches, and from the time of the Revolution had been prominent in American annals. As commander of Fort Mifflin, then Mud Fort, in the war of the Revolution, he was distinguished for its courageous and successful defence against an English water attack; on which occasion his lieutenant, Plunkett, a Baltimore merchant, who emigrated, for love of liberty, from Ireland to America, was brother of the Irish chancellor, eminent in the British House of Lords, as Lord Plunkett, for the Irish talent of eloquence, and for liberal politics. General Smith's niece became the wife of the younger brother of the Emperor Napoleon, and his daughter married the eldest son of the English Chief Justice, Sir James Mansfield. The general's son-in-law, Mr. Christopher Hughes, represented the United States, longer than any other American, at

several European courts, in successful diplomatic intercourse and uncommon personal familiarity with many of the monarchs and great numbers of elevated personages, from the commencement of his valuable services in that capacity, as secretary of the American commission at Ghent. Of the republican party, General Smith was temperate and conservative in the support of its principles throughout his long public career; never held an office by Executive appointment, or otherwise than by popular or legislative election; and at the advanced age of eighty-six years laid down, at last, his life in Baltimore, a city of a hundred thousand people, which he had inhabited when little more than a village.

Corps of letter writers, since become part of American public intelligence and influence, then did not exist; though there were occasional fabrications of that kind, one of which published in a Boston journal, reported from Baltimore, that there was "a contest there between the civil and military powers; the former are for a capitulating embassy, but the military men will not consent." A London paper, of the 17th June, stated that "the grand expedition preparing at Bourdeaux for America, under the gallant Lord Hill, is destined for the Chesapeake direct. Our little army in Canada will, at the same instant, be directed to make a movement in the direction of the Susquehanna; and both armies will, therefore, in all probability, meet at Washington, Philadelphia, or Baltimore. The seat of the American government, but more particularly Baltimore, is to be the immediate object of attack. In the diplomatic circles it is also rumored that our naval and military commanders on the American station have no power to conclude any armistice or suspension of arms. They carry with them certain terms, which will be offered to the American government at the point of the bayonet. The terms, of course, are not made public; but there is reason to believe that America will be left in a much worse situation, as a naval and commercial power, than she was at the commencement of the war." Thus infatuated were London and Boston, when Baltimore repelled the menaces, contrivances, and expectations, regarded, no doubt, with unmanly fear by some of the inhabitants of the Atlantic seaports, countenanced by disaffection, but indignantly and strenuously repelled by nearly the whole Union, and crushed forever in the newest, weakest, and least Americanized part of it—Louisiana. The invading British army, from Canada, was chased from Plattsburg at the same moment that the army from France was driven from Baltimore, and the third and greater division, striking at New Orleans, was demolished there with still more impressive overthrow.

By a coincidence so remarkable, that it requires not much superstition to deem it providential, the terms ultimately accepted by the British negotiators as the basis of the treaty of peace, were presented by the American ministers at Ghent the day of the sack of Washington—24th August, 1814. The course of the negotiation always was for the British commissioners to postpone answering our notes till they had time to transmit them from Ghent to London, and get the minister's instructions from Downing Street how to answer. During one of the intervals, occasioned by these postponements, Mr. Clay, Mr. Russell, and Mr. Hughes made a visit to Brussels, then, like all that region, occupied by British troops. At Brussels they went to the theatre, where the Secretary of Legation, Mr. Hughes, accidentally overheard in the lobby a loud boast by one British officer to another, that news had just come from London of the capture and burning of Washington. "Have you heard the news?" said he, in a high tone of not unnatural gratification. "We have taken and burned the Yankee capital, and thrown those American rebels back half a century." Disconcerted by such distressing intelligence, Mr. Hughes returned to the box where he left Mr. Clay and Mr. Russell, and without letting them know why, told them there was a reason why they should not remain in the theatre, where some of the British Legation at Ghent were also present, having, like the Americans, taken advantage of the interval for an excursion to Brussels. Mr. Clay and Mr. Russell reluctantly accompanied Mr. Hughes to their hotel, to be there told the tidings from Washington. Next morning the gentlemen of the English mission sent them a London newspaper with the official dispatches, which induced the American party to return to Ghent much mortified. In a few days, however, arrived the account of the affair at Baltimore, British repulse, Ross' death, and precipitate departure of the invading army, which intelligence was sent by the American to the British commissioners, with compliments as gratifying as those sent to them at Brussels on the capture of Washington.

On the 27th of September, the London Courier published the letter of Lord Melville to the Lord Mayor, announcing the success of the army under General Ross, adding, "that the Park and Tower guns were fired at noon in honor of the victory, which is surely worth an illumination."

The London Gazette, officially announcing the capture of Washington as a great and decisive victory, was translated, by order of the British ministry, into French, German, and Italian, and industriously scattered broadcast over all Europe. But the French and continental press generally expressed horror at an outrage such as had

not been perpetrated in any of the capitals of that continent, nearly all recently captured. Even the London Statesman queried, "Is it quite clear that the expedition to Washington will meet universal approbation? The Cossacks spared Paris, but we spared not the Capitol at Washington." At the head of social, literary, fashionable, and political influence in the saloons of Paris, in the presence of the viceroy, Duke of Wellington, Madame de Stael denounced the conflagration of Washington as an unexampled enormity. At London she had become intimate with her fellow-countryman, Mr. Gallatin, who sometimes accompanied her in her drives about that city, and with whose highly intellectual conversation she was much pleased. A Brussels Journal of the 8th October, 1814, in the midst of British armies of occupation, published, that "by the last accounts from Ghent, the late events in North America, destruction of Washington, &c., have made a very deep impression on the American negotiators. After a short absence they returned to Ghent, and expect with impatience instructions from their government that will probably decide the fate of the negotiations."

Hostilities had done their worst in America. Thenceforth they ceased to be disastrous or terrible. The spirit, energy, and resources of the United States were in development; the impotency of Great Britain to inflict fatal blows on this country demonstrated. Its foreign commerce was, indeed, for the moment suspended. But amid all the vicissitudes and difficulties of military operations, the great work and need of American independence steadily and rapidly advanced, by the establishment of manufactures, for which theretofore the people of the United States were dependent on England. Even while arms were silent, foreign commerce languished, and muskets and cannons were idle, thousands of shuttles and millions of spindles were in motion, every one contributing to the independence and wealth of the American people. War did the work of prosperous peace. The industry, ingenuity, machinery, and manufactures, which enabled every workman in England to perform the labor of five men, and every child that of a man, were by English war forced in America by premature commencement to rapid maturity.

These were moral and political European reinforcements to our cause which, from that crisis, carried it onward to wonderful success; and if, for the conflagration of the semblance of a capital at Washington, and wasting with fire and sword the United States from Plattsburg to New Orleans, peace was procrastinated by the English government rejecting disdainfully the simple terms of settlement to which they afterwards came, was there not a just retribu-



tion and terrible vengeance inflicted by the carnage their troops underwent before New Orleans? The God of battles seemed to be with us from the moment when, after the pacification of Europe, and all practical

cause of war at an end, our humble entreaties for peace were coldly rejected; and, from April, 1814, until December, war was prolonged by Great Britain for havoc and revenge.

## CHAPTER X.

### THE HARTFORD CONVENTION.

THE abortion of an enigma which, in 1814, as the Hartford Convention, became execrable and contemptible, was the most alarming occurrence of that year. Like the capture of Washington, its reaction on its authors was terribly disgraceful; like our Canadian and southern victories, it invigorated the American Union, hastened and ameliorated peace, and to the New Orleans triumphs, its ridiculous catastrophe rendered inevitable by them, was mainly attributable.

After passing a night in August, 1809, catching codfish on his favorite Banks of Newfoundland, retiring from trouble in Massachusetts to a Russian mission, John Quincy Adams, by what he deemed the natural transition from codfish to the history of the United States, writing concerning the alleged treason of New England, to his associate informer against it, William Plumer, expressed his belief, that there would be no impartial chronicle, no true history of their time, in their age, but only federal histories or republican histories, New England histories or Virginian histories. Yet, if not developed by some contemporary annalist, but left to posterior speculation, must it not be mere theory and fable? less historical, philosophical or veritable than the narrative of even a biased contemporary; confessing, as I do, the difficulty of discovering, appreciating, or telling the truth of that abominated conclave, whose first resolution was, that their meetings should be opened by prayer, the next, intensely cabalistic, that the most inviolable secrecy should be observed by each member of the convention, including the secretary, as to all propositions, debates and proceedings; and the third, that not even the doorkeeper, messenger, or assistant should be made acquainted with the proceedings. Wrapped in such dark suspicious secrecy, of which the seal, if ever broke, was not pretended to be opened till several years afterwards, when a bare journal was unveiled to face the universal odium by that time fastened on the convention, become a proverb of reproach, even contemporaries are left to grope in the obscurity of mere circumstantial testi-

mony, perplexed by contradictions and prejudices, involving the design whether merely partisan or criminally treasonable, the sectional animosities peculiar to New England conflicting with each other, confronting and confounding prepossessions of the rest of the United States, whose national character and existence the Hartford Convention implicated. Of positive proof of treason, so seldom attainable that it is not to be expected, there is none. But Mr. Adams insisted on the fact, overpowered by denials, though supported by circumstances. Posterity has acquitted and immortalized many Sydneys executed for treason, and condemned Burrs acquitted of the charge. Was Burr guilty of what Jefferson brought him to trial for, and, with his killing Hamilton, sentenced to irrevocable condemnation, like the Hartford Convention, without conviction of any offence? Adams accused Hamilton of complicity with the convention, whose primary meeting at Boston, Adams believed, was postponed by Burr's killing Hamilton, without preventing, however, its final catastrophe at Hartford. But Adams was prejudiced by hereditary hatred of Hamilton, and his suspicious credulity was as unquestionable as his veracity: formidable as an accuser, but fallible as a witness.

Not till ten years after the moral public execution of that ill-fated cabal, appeared its first and best apology, in twelve letters, addressed to the people of Massachusetts, by Harrison Gray Otis, called by Mr. Adams its putative father, followed, nine years later, by a history of the convention, by its secretary, Theodore Dwight, who may be considered its voluntary executor in his own wrong. In a dull work of more than four hundred irksome pages, Dwight attempted its defence by repeating the superannuated and egregious absurdities of Jefferson's hostility to the Federal Constitution and subservience to France, and Madison's subjection to Jefferson, as causes and excuses of the Hartford Convention! Without method, scarcely chronology, and with few authentic documents, the argument of that feeble attempt is, that a score of New England lawyers, locked up in clandestine cabal, foment-

ing the unnatural and unwise antipathies and narrow prejudices of an eastern party against southern fellow-countrymen, inasmuch as they were well reputed as lawyers, punctual in the payment of their debts and performance of their religious exercises, therefore could not be inimical to the American Union, but served it faithfully, by resisting what many New England acts of authority, with almost insane dread, denounced as Jefferson and Madison's coalition with Bonaparte to overcome Great Britain and enslave America, together with all mankind. Tinctured, but not stultified, with that infatuation, Mr. Otis' twelve letters to the people of Massachusetts, preceding Dwight's history nine years, even then tardy in their appearance, are the eloquent and best defence of the Hartford Convention, on which its humbled apologists must chiefly rely for pardon. With the beginning of Monroe's conciliatory presidency, in March 1817, Mr. Otis was chosen by Massachusetts to the Senate of the United States to represent her degraded national character, diminished influence, and almost repudiated claims for militia services in the war. With fine talents, fascinating manners, southern predilections, and great experience in legislation, he bore up, during some time of tribulation, against the disadvantages besetting a member of the Hartford Convention in Congress, till, at length, unable to endure such mortification to the end of his term, Mr. Otis resigned his seat in the Senate, in June 1822, to be succeeded by one of the most acceptable and high-spirited of eastern legislators, the late James Lloyd. The twelve letters published at Boston in 1824, were then Mr. Otis's testamentary political disposition, leaving the once commanding State of Massachusetts to the mercy of the Union in which he deplores its annihilation, Mr. Otis's letters being called forth by Governor Eustis, the Secretary of War in 1812, in his first public address as Governor of Massachusetts, when chosen to that place over Mr. Otis as his competitor, denouncing the Hartford Convention as a danger and dishonor to New England.

Memorably admonishing are his confessions, that the "history of human credulity affords no example of a more general illusion than prevails in relation to the origin and objects of the Hartford Convention. A deep-rooted and indefinable prejudice is formed among thousands whose distempered imaginations resist the prescriptions of truth and reason, choose to believe that it was organized first for some bad purposes, or that it spontaneously brooded over some atrocious conspiracy, heresy, or schism. The rising generation," add his precious compunctions, "must be taught to believe that the convention was a cabal menacing the integrity of the Union, and disgraceful

to the State its parent." Mr. Otis, to this edifying confession, adds, "that hereafter similar associations for political purposes will be inexpedient, unwise, and impolitic. Public opinion," he says, "has become consolidated in disapprobation of such conventions for political objects." It is a principle conceded, he thinks, that all meetings of delegates from State Legislatures to consult on political objects confided to the national government are, in their nature, inexpedient. Such invaluable acknowledgment wrung from the conscience of one brought to the confessional, attests the wisdom of Washington's farewell advice on union. Another, and more celebrated Massachusetts senator went still further than Mr. Otis to exculpate himself from the much dreaded stigma of being suspected of the established infamy, whether well or ill founded, of the Hartford Convention. Not only in the Senate did Mr. Webster repel that insinuation, but when a Boston gentleman, of respectable family, fortune, and character, and of the federal party, Mr. Theodore Lyman, published there Mr. Adams' impeachment of the Hartford Convention, and connected Mr. Webster's name with it, he instantly prosecuted the charge as a libellous calumny, and in open court, as a witness, testified against Mr. Lyman.

Whatever the perhaps inscrutable truth may be, the salutary and certain results are more important than ascertaining the fact of guilt or innocence. A secret assembly of State representatives, in time of war, to counteract the national government, incurs punishment more severe than by legal prosecution. Through all the doubts and darkness under which the Hartford Convention is doomed to lie buried, penetrates the clear and cheering truth, that American love of union is a national sentiment beyond question, which, with overwhelming power, consigns to infamy those even suspected of designing its destruction. Hamilton and Jefferson, before that power, laid down, the one his fears of anarchy, the other of monarchy, at Washington's feet, in obedience to the Federal Constitution, which certainly the two, perhaps all three, doubted. Burr's unproved conspiracy and the undetected Hartford Convention daily dishonor their authors, while foreign wars, intestine controversies, accessions by purchase and conquest of vast territories, have corroborated a union becoming the republican empire of all America, which it is criminal to be suspected of a design to dismember.

Jefferson's election to the presidency in 1800, and purchase of Louisiana from Bonaparte in 1803, caused unquestionably great discontent in New England. During the long and eventful session of Congress in 1803-4, William Plumer, a senator from



New Hampshire, was, as he afterwards confessed, one of several federal members of Congress from the New England States who projected the establishment of a separate government there. They complained that the slave-holding States had acquired by means of their slaves a greater increase of the slaveholding representatives in the House of Representatives, than was just; too much revenue was raised in the Northern States and spent in the Southern and Western; and the states to be formed out of Louisiana would annihilate the influence of the Northern States in the government. Mr. Plumer was informed, he said, by one of the parties to this project, that there was to be a select meeting of the leading Federalists of New England at Boston, in the autumn of 1804, to consider and recommend measures for a government for the Northern States, and that Alexander Hamilton had consented to attend it. But Mr. Plumer found, on his return to New Hampshire, a great majority of the leading Federalists there opposed to the project, as appeared to be the result of his limited inquiries in Massachusetts, and Hamilton's death, he says he was told, prevented the meeting in Boston, though the project was not abandoned. Convinced of his own error, Mr. Plumer abandoned it, and did all he could to defeat the attempt when he avers it was made during the restrictive system in 1809, and the war of 1812. Such is the positive testimony, and all there is positive, by a respectable witness, who, convinced of his error, informed against his own participation in the alleged offence.

The design of dismemberment thus faintly and briefly breathed in 1803, slumbered, Mr. Adams said, till 1807, when revived by the embargo to prevent a war, which it provoked and aggravated, grievously fomenting the morbid discontent of New England. A letter from the Governor of Nova Scotia, never published, whence or to whom addressed not divulged, but shown at the time, Mr. Adams said, to him and others, just before the seizure of the frigate *Chesapeake*, aroused in his mind almost unnatural fears of treasonable designs in Massachusetts, which haunted him ever afterwards, as those suspected of such designs thought with as little reason as all must now consider their irrational dread of French interference in America, a fear natural to Englishmen, but which their influence succeeded in spreading throughout America. That Mr. Adams was not in 1807 aware of Mr. Plumer's avowals, is more than probable, so that his decided movement, beginning from the British governor's undivulged letter, must be ascribed to his own unfavorable impressions of his recent party associates. The governor's letter alone can hardly account for what Mr. Adams did. It imported that the British government

had information of a design of the Emperor of the French to invade and conquer the British American provinces, and with Mr. Jefferson's instrumentality bring about war by the United States against Great Britain. The attack of the *Chesapeake* by the *Leopard*, the 22d June, British orders in council against neutral commerce the 11th November to retort French decrees to the same purpose, all counteracted, as Jefferson preferred to do, by his permanent embargo of the 22d December, of that same year, 1807, annihilated the commercial means of the United States, even the coasting trade, and almost the subsistence of New England, convulsed the whole American nation, and especially embittered the already discontented and always intolerant east. Mr. Adams, a senator of the United States, elected by the Federal party of Massachusetts, having vehemently opposed Jefferson's administration, and indecently aspersed his private character, introduced by Wilson Carey Nicholas, William B. Giles and Jonathan Robinson, Democratic members of Congress, waited on President Jefferson, at Washington, the 15th March, 1808, and confidentially informed him that a dangerous spirit was abroad in the State Mr. Adams represented. That decisive step was soon followed by his resignation from the Senate in May, 1808, estrangement from and denunciation by the Federal party, and his taking office soon after from Madison, who succeeded Jefferson in the presidency in March, 1809.

Mr. Adams' fears of treason by impulsive feelings must have been wrought to a great excitement, for in the following winter, in answer from Quincy to letters from William B. Giles, and other Democratic members of Congress, he earnestly recommended repeal of the embargo, and substitution of acts of non-intercourse, because, he averred, continuance of the embargo would certainly be met by forcible resistance, supported by the legislature and probably the judiciary of the State of Massachusetts. To quell that resistance, if force should be resorted to by the government, it would produce a civil war, and in that event Mr. Adams had no doubt the leaders of the party would secure the co-operation, with the aid of Great Britain. Their object was, he averred, and had been for several years, "a dissolution of the Union and the establishment of a separate confederation, which he affirmed that he knew from unequivocal evidence, although not provable in a court of law, and in the case of civil war the aid of Great Britain to effect that purpose, would be as surely resorted to as it would be indispensably necessary to the design." Accusation of disunion by civil war and an eastern confederacy, united with England, were Mr. Adams' valedictory to New England, when he went abroad. "The

interposition of a kind Providence restoring peace to our country and the world, averted the most deplorable of catastrophes, and turning to the receptacle of things lost upon earth, the adjourned convention from Hartford to Boston extinguished (by the mercy of Heaven may it be forever!) the projected New England confederacy,"—such was his farewell and solemn testament.

In August of that year, Mr. Adams embarked for his Russian mission, leaving his testamentary curse on those he anathematized as certain leading Federalists of Massachusetts; and three successive Virginia presidents, Jefferson, Madison and Monroe, with their political adherents, with a large majority of the American people, fully impressed with his own bitter belief, which might be mere credulity, that treason was rife in his native state, where, undoubtedly as he long after with truth affirmed, "the people were constantly instigated to resistance against the embargo, juries acquitted violations of it, on the ground of its unconstitutionality, assumed in the face of a solemn decision of the federal court, a separation of the Union was openly stimulated in the public prints, and a convention of delegates of the New England States, to meet at New Haven, was intended and proposed." It is due to Mr. Adams to add that other respectable gentlemen of New England now coincide in his belief that there was treason in the Hartford Convention. The Nova Scotia governor's letter of 1807, was soon followed by Sir James H. Craig's, the Governor-General of Canada, vile attempt on New England. By his authority, in January, 1809, an idler at Montreal, English or Irish by birth, probably naturalized as an American, who had been a captain in the army raised by President John Adams for a war with France, a well favored man, with plausible address, not wanting in courteous behavior, named John Henry, who, from his whole instrumentality in the affair, must have been a sordid, worthless, low-bred fellow, was clandestinely sent with a cipher and other disguises, from Quebec through Vermont and New Hampshire to Boston, where he remained till June, when President Madison's pacific arrangement with the British minister Erskine, dissipated all immediate fears of a rupture between the United States and England, and constrained Henry to return to Quebec without having, as his letters state, accomplished anything, or been encouraged even to disclose his credentials to any of the traitors he was to find or to make in New England. His correspondence, according to President Madison's message of March 9, 1812, communicating it to Congress, affirms the guilt of not only the colonial Governor Craig, but that of Lord Liverpool, the prime minister, and Robert Peel, the secretary of the British government, during peace and pending ne-

gotiations with the United States, by fomenting disaffection and intrigues for resistance to the laws, in concert with a British force to destroy the Union, and form the eastern part of it into a political connection with Great Britain. Disgusting as that detection of a British nobleman, the ministerial head of England, and his surpassing successor, then secretary of the ministry, conspiring to undermine the American Union by civil war, should be, the guilt of whatever Federal leaders Henry dealt with, is not so apparent as that of his English constituents. Undoubtedly Henry contemplated some treasonable transaction, like the Hartford Convention. "Should Congress," he wrote to his employers, "venture to declare war, the legislature of Massachusetts would give the tone to the neighboring States, and invite a congress to be composed of delegates from the federal States, and erect a separate government for their common defence; in a condition to make or receive proposals from Great Britain, when scarce any other aid would be necessary than a few vessels of war from the Halifax station to protect the maritime towns from the little American navy. He was careful," he said, "not to make an impression analogous to the enthusiastic confidence of the opposition, nor the hopes and expectations that animate the friends of an alliance between the Northern States and Great Britain." Such and other equally derogatory proof of his belief in treasonable disaffection is the tissue of Henry's correspondence; like Mr. Otis's vindication, pregnant with precious and conclusive evidence that, whatever a few leading Federalists may have been, those that spy mis-called the rabble, the giddy multitude, were inflexible national republican Americans. "The opposition party," say his letters, "do not freely entertain the project of withdrawing the Eastern States from the Union, *finding it a very unpopular topic. The truth is, the common people have so long regarded the Constitution of the United States with complacency, that they are now only disposed to treat it like a truant mistress, whom they would for a time put away on a separate maintenance, but, without further or greater provocation, not absolutely repudiate.*" What Mr. Otis, with eloquent horror, nine years after, recollected as the appalling cry, raised to what he calls the yell, that the Union was in danger, rent the eastern welkin, as he complains, and confounded its sages with popular proof, that if restless, ambitious, selfish, avaricious, speculating leaders machinated the dismemberment of Massachusetts from the American Union, her honest yeomen and common people stood immovably fast and true to it with all the States, in all their immensity and diversity, bond and free: French, Spanish, and English, Catholic and Puritan—Louisiana and New Eng-



land, the whole Union one and indivisible; the voice of the people was the voice of God proclaiming that affection.

A well-dressed, well-mannered counterfeited English gentleman, like Henry, passed current for more than his worth among underebred, well to do, vulgar Americans, obsequious to English fashion. The English consul at Boston, when Henry was there, like a Russian consul, in 1812, was a personage; and may have flattered Henry's hopes of American disaffection. Henry, with his ill-got wealth, the largest bribe ever paid by our government, fled to Europe; whither the Federal Republican newspaper published that he went recommended by letters of introduction from President Madison, among others, to his minister in Russia. If so, Mr. Adams may have made Henry welcome among the palaces of St. Petersburg as a witness of the treason of New England.

In 1799, the American minister in England, Rufus King, little dreamed that in ten years the British government would cause its provincial governors of Nova Scotia and Canada to undertake to separate Mr. King's native State from the rest of the Union, to which he bound it by a constitution. After, in 1802, during the temporary peace between England and France, visiting Paris, Mr. King, in 1803, returned to America, and brought home the first news of the great American purchase from France of Louisiana, and of war renewed between England and France. Negotiations for the former were completed by three separate treaties, signed the tenth day of the Floreal, or flowery month, in the eleventh year of the French Republic, 3d of April, 1803, by Marbois, who married, while Secretary of the French legation at Philadelphia, the American wife, whose daughter became the Emperor Napoleon's Duchess of Placentia, and whose father's History of Louisiana discloses the First Consul's anti-English inducement to sell that rich possession to the United States rather than let it be subdued by England. The First Consul of the French Republic, says the preamble of the first of the three treaties of cession, "desirous to give the United States a strong proof of his friendship," ceded to them the colony or province of Louisiana; for which, by the second treaty, the government of the United States engaged to pay the French government sixty millions of francs in a stock of eleven millions two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, the dollar estimated at five livres eight sous tournois, bearing interest at six per cent., payable half yearly at London, Amsterdam or Paris, at the option of the French government, the principal to be reimbursed at the United States Treasury in annual payments of not less than three millions of dollars each, the

first to commence fifteen years after the exchange of the ratifications. By that purchase, unexampled in the multifarious dealings of bargain and sale, and memorable as an exploit of diplomacy, what would have cost more to conquer than the United States could afford of either treasure or blood, if it could have been conquered at all, was obtained for not much more than the private fortunes of two living American merchants. Like all acquisitions, it required more. The United States, whose people have dispossessed the original nomadic inhabitants of the American soil, have, ever since 1803, been adding more territory to cover and secure the acquisition of Louisiana, unexpected and vast beyond calculation, big with embryo offspring of new States, whose number, growth and wealth rapidly transcended Jefferson's and all other human foresight. Acknowledging that the incorporation of foreign territory with the original United States, is not provided for by their constitution, President Jefferson, supported successively by Presidents Madison, Monroe, and John Quincy Adams, nevertheless took that boundless possession into territorial occupation in 1804, and President Madison part of it as Louisiana in 1812 into the condition of a State, by force of the overruling necessity which, knowing no law, organizes and destroys empires. The United States, without constitutional power to acquire territory, either by purchase or conquest, have, by the laws of necessity and progress, absorbed more than their original dominions.

By that great stretch of unconstitutional power, like the permanent embargo and other acts of his administration, with vigor beyond law to preserve peace, Jefferson reached, before his re-election in 1804, the summit of popular potentiality, casting his opponents into a helpless minority. The most strenuous of them, the Eastern people, mortified and provoked, taught by no irrational casuistry that obedience is not due to unconstitutional acts of government, diminishing the national influence of New England, undermining its ascendancy, and with their own contentious co-operation destroying it, meditated schemes of desperate relief.

Louisiana was the disputed ground on which they raised plans of disunion, by civil war, if not alliance with Great Britain, against the rest of the Union: plans which New York, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, and peace prevented. The most extraordinary man of New England, the only American with talents, good fortune and indefatigable labor enough to succeed his father in the Presidency, bred mostly in Europe, where long residence confirmed youthful predilections, few of whose American sentiments could be imbibed in New England, where little of his life was spent, while a Senator

from Massachusetts representing in Congress, the angriest Eastern discontent, John Quincy Adams, the responsible author, accused New England of breeding that canker at the root of the American Union, which corroded till it convulsed the national trunk, but disappeared in the victorious pacification, which, from Louisiana and Ghent, providentially met at Washington to bind the most distant parts of the United States together in one great continental cordiality. After serving a first term in the Presidency, when anxiously struggling for another, his first public appearance after the loss of it was in a letter the 6th March 1829, in all the responsibility of his character and position, defying eastern sympathies of which he then stood in need. That provocation was rendered indispensable by a prior public appeal in October 1828, when, as the candidate for re-election, Mr. Adams proclaimed that, during the session of Congress following the purchase of Louisiana, in the spring of 1804, he was informed by Uriah Tracy, then Senator from Connecticut, or another member of Congress, or both, for Mr. Adams was not sure whether one or both, but entertained no doubt of being told by one or both of them—both dead before he published the information—of a project by Federalist members of Congress from New England, to establish a separate government there, extending it, if found practicable, as far south as to include Pennsylvania, but at all events to establish one in New England. William Plumer, then a Senator from New Hampshire, of which State he was afterwards governor, had written to Mr. Adams in 1828, (it does not appear by either of their statements, whether Mr. Plumer communicated this to Mr. Adams in 1803-4, or at any time before Mr. Adams' presidency in 1828,) that he was party to the New England project of disunion; that he was informed by one of the parties to it, during the session of Congress of 1803-4, that arrangements had been made for a select meeting of the Federalists of New England, the next autumn at Boston, to consider and recommend the measures necessary to form a system of government in the Northern States, and that Alexander Hamilton of New York had consented to attend the meeting. In New York on the close of that session of Congress, about the 7th April 1804, Rufus King, who also was dead before Mr. Adams published it, informed him, Mr. Adams said, that a person had been that day conversing with him and with General Hamilton, as Mr. Adams said he understood Mr. King, in favor of the project, which both Mr. King, and as he told Mr. Adams, General Hamilton, entirely disapproved. While Mr. Adams, therefore, believed that Hamilton consented to attend the Boston meeting, he also believed that his purpose was to dis-

suade the parties concerned from the undertaking, and to prevail on them to abandon it.

As soon as the associates of Uriah Tracy in the Congress of 1803-4, were made acquainted with this charge in 1829, James Millhouse, John Davenport, John Cotton Smith, Simeon Baldwin, Benjamin Tallmadge and Calvin Goddard, with a relative speaking for Uriah Tracy deceased, all men of character, as respectable as Mr. Adams, peremptorily and unequivocally denied his assertion, disproving, as far as a negative can, the positive imputation. William Plumer, a Senator from New Hampshire in 1803-4, and afterwards governor of that State in 1828, informed Mr. Adams, that Plumer participated in 1803-4, in the project of disunion, for which the primary meeting at Boston, in the autumn of 1804, was prevented by Hamilton's death in June of that year, as Mr. Plumer was told at Washington during the subsequent session of Congress, 1804-5, by one of his fellow conspirators; but, that the arrangements for a meeting there to consider and reconsider the measures necessary to form a system of government for the Northern States so far as, if practicable, to include Pennsylvania, though interrupted by Hamilton's death, were not at an end; that the project was not and would not be abandoned. When, therefore, as he stated in 1828 to President Adams, the project was revived in 1808-9, during the embargo and non-intercourse, and afterwards during the war of 1812, Mr. Plumer used, he says, every effort in his power, both privately and publicly, to defeat the attempt then made to establish a separate independent government in the Northern States.

Thus from one credible confession, supported by imposing accusation, predicating another confession, that of Plumer unequivocal, that of Tracy only averred by Adams, after Tracy's death, came what he positively and uniformly to the last declared, proved the origin of the Hartford Convention. Notwithstanding Mr. Adams' hereditary hatred of Hamilton, whom with Timothy Pickering, Fisher Ames, and other Federalists, he charged with the defeat of his father's re-election, and publicly acquitted Hamilton of participation in the scheme of disunion; he still, when President, harbored suspicions of Hamilton; disclosed, Adams thought, by that paragraph of Hamilton's mortuary in June 1804, before his fatal duel, mentioning, among reasons for avoiding it, his ability to be useful in future, whether in resisting mischief or doing good "*in the crises of our public affairs which seem likely to happen.*" Connected with Plumer's assertion, that he was told, the winter after Hamilton's fall, that his death had postponed, but not put an end to, the project of disunion, Mr.



Adams was believed to suspect that General Hamilton was the military leader designated for the northern confederacy, of which no meeting took place till that at Hartford in 1814. Mr. Adams' posterior belief, not made public till the misleading conjuncture of his presidential re-election, may be attributable to his first accusation ten years before, when, in 1808, by confidential letters from Massachusetts to William B. Giles and other Democratic members of Congress, he urged repeal of the embargo on Jefferson, who yielded it because Adams declared that it would certainly be met by forcible resistance, civil war and co-operation with Great Britain.

Yet his denunciation of Eastern treason, in 1807-8, was, soon after he went to Europe, confirmed by Henry's disclosure, in 1812, of at least English machinations in 1809, to prevail on the morbid discontent of New England, from all the pores of public indignation constantly perspiring with such violence as to produce natural conviction of distemper. When, therefore, Henry proffered his tale for a bribe, Madison's administration, consisting of Monroe, Paul Hamilton and Pinkney—Monroe and Pinkney, with European proneness to suspicion of European government—all with southern opinions of eastern people, eagerly caught at the disclosure, at any price, and counselled the importance of its solemn publicity. The only eastern member of that cabinet, Eustis, who had represented Boston in Congress, ten years afterwards, when elected Governor of Massachusetts, flung in the face of Massachusetts, in his first communication to the legislature, his settled conviction at all times, in 1814, and in 1824, that "at the portentous crisis when our liberties and independence were at hazard, an unhallowed spirit of party was permitted to prevail over the vital interests of the country, an unauthorized combination was formed, and meetings held in a neighboring State, which, whatever may have been the professed object, had the certain effect of encouraging the enemy, &c., and cast a reproach on the good name of the State." Henry's undeniable proof of at any rate English reliance on the disloyalty of New England, was profusely paid for and published, by emptying the whole secret service fund into his lap; for which inordinate bribe his original receipt, lately found among Monroe's papers, is as follows:

*February 10, 1812.*

Received of John Graham, Esq., fifty thousand dollars, on account of public services.

\$50,000.

JOHN HENRY.

John Graham was Monroe's chief clerk in the State Department, whom the Treasury record of the 10th February, 1812, debits with \$49,000, drawn that day, the

remaining \$1000, to eke out the sum total of the bribe, perhaps made up elsewhere.

Whether wise or prudent to preface the declaration of war with that blasting accusation of part of New England, to provoke opposition, when general, and if possible universal, support was so desirable, it may be affirmed from the circumstances thus far considered—

1. That the acquisition of Louisiana caused a design in the east to dismember the Union.

2. But that it never was executed by any overt act of treason, however intemperate the violence of the press, the opposition of the bar and State judiciary, the virulence of the pulpit, and the unconstitutional resistance of State government.

3. That the great mass of the people were inflexibly opposed to disunion, and resolved to maintain the national government, notwithstanding their aversion to the federal administration.

4. That the British government frequently, if not continually, labored to separate the United States. Of their guilt there could be no doubt.

5. Whether the certain Federal leaders Mr. Adams denounced as traitors were so, is the difficult problem to be solved.

With Plumer's confession of American design of disunion, Adams' argumentative confirmation of it, and Henry's betrayal of the British attempt, extrinsic proof beyond circumstantial ends; and, except in its acknowledged acts, we grope the way through a cloud of ambiguities for the real intentions of the Hartford Convention, authorized, whatever they were, by the constituted authorities of Massachusetts and Rhode Island, perhaps countenanced by those of Connecticut, denounced by Governor Eustis as a dangerous and reproachful combination, defended by its most conspicuous member, Mr. Otis, as a patriotic council of war, assembled lawfully to confer for defence of the country from invasion. The mass of the population were attached to the Union, and averse to the Convention. But an indefatigable conspiracy of politicians, favored by the embargo, restrictive system and war, all bearing with peculiar severity on New England, had worked their poisonous leaven into the whole lump, which was so far tainted, that a section of the American Union, more than any other dependent on its preservation, and benefited by its advantages, in the course of 1814, got possession of the State governments and congressional delegations of the whole five New England States, and madened them with disaffection.

In May, 1643, the first American Consociation was established between the colonies of Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, (excluding Rhode Island) and New Haven, who all came to America to advance the

kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ, and enjoy the liberties of the Gospel with impunity and peace, by reason of the sad distractions then in England, hindered from that humble way of seeking advice or reaping the comfortable fruits of protection, therefore confederated as the United Colonies of New England, by a perpetual league of offence and defence, mutual advice and succor on all just occasions, both for preserving and propagating the truth and liberties of the Gospel, and for their mutual safety. By that propagating offspring of the sturdy British revolution, no two colonies could join in one jurisdiction; nor other colony be received into the confederation without the consent of the whole; the charge of all was to be borne in proportion to the male inhabitants of each, and on notice of invasion by three magistrates of any colony, the confederates were to furnish their respective quota of men, without further meeting or expostulation: primitive lessons of the Puritan and pilgrim fathers renounced or perverted by their progeny in 1814.

At Albany, in 1755, a provincial assembly preceded the confederation of 1778; and in 1779, the contrasting resemblance to 1814 is too remarkable to be overlooked. In 1779, distress and depreciation were the proclaimed British means, as in 1814, for rendering the American colonies of as little avail as possible to their new French connections. Collyer's and Matthew's desolations in Virginia, inhuman precursors of Cockburn's and Beckwith's there; Tryon's and Garth's in Connecticut, Maclean's on the Penobscot; British incursions, with infuriated Tory reinforcements, in the South, in the first war; savage allies, North and South, in the second; were natural enormities of the rancor of family strife, inflicted by over-ruling Providence to extirpate colonial reverence, and raise up another great British empire in America, to supplant the old one of Europe. In 1779, hatred of England and attachment to all America were predominant, and burning American aspirations branded in revolted filial attachments by what the constituted authorities of Massachusetts stigmatized as the butcheries and devastations of implacable British enemies. On the 2d of June, 1779, by the journals of Congress, the President laid before the Continental Congress a letter from the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts Bay, dated May 16th, which was read, setting forth the difficulties they labored under, for want of a regular form of government, and as the other colonies are now compelled to raise an army to defend themselves from the butcheries and devastations of their implacable enemies, which renders it still more necessary to have regularly established government, requesting the Congress to favor them with explicit advice respecting

the taking up and exercising the power of civil government, and declaring their readiness to submit to such general plan as the Congress may direct for the colonies, or make it their great study to establish such a form of government there, as shall not only promote their advantage, but the union and interest of *all America*.

It is true that, in 1779, all united republican America did not extend beyond the river Ohio, if the Alleghany mountains; and the union, as reconstituted in 1787, deprived no freeman or State of all freemen's unquestionable rights of angry complaint, strong remonstrance and vehement opposition to oppressive, much more unconstitutional, national government. As an act constitutionally so questionable as the annexation of Louisiana to the original union, might lawfully be resisted by either State or individuals, as was conceded by Presidents Jefferson and John Quincy Adams, so the constitutionality of any indefinite embargo was questioned by able jurists. But sanctioned, as it was, by judicature, and received into the Union, as Louisiana had been, by act of Congress, in 1812, after several years of territorial government, forcible resistance to either the embargo or the new State was unwarrantable, and not less so, if by contrivance, plotted in secret machination, to withhold from the federal government, by State authority or popular transaction in stress of war, the means in men and taxes indispensable for belligerent operations. Conceived in 1803, at the purchase of Louisiana, essayed in 1808 and 1809 to frustrate the embargo and restrictive system, matured to extreme resorts in the war of 1812, a treasonable anti-federal spirit lurked in Massachusetts till self sacrificed at Hartford, in 1815, for the long premeditated schemes of disunion concentrated there, could not, if they would, have stopped short of violent treason.

Massachusetts, long so largely represented in the national councils, had reduced her Democratic influence there to one Senator, Joseph Varnum, and one member of the House of Representatives, James Parker, from the Kennebeck district in Maine, connected by marriage with General Dearborn, neither of them, by aptitude for debate or command, prominent in Congress, while all their Federal colleagues were foremost in anti-federal opposition to the war and Madison's administration, some of them among their ablest and most violent antagonists. If not degenerate, theirs were, at least, totally changed from the national sentiments of their forefathers, in 1779; the sons apparently as devoted to England as the sires were hostile, and ungenerously inimical to the descendants of those southern fellow-countrymen, whose fathers, with Washington, rushed to their rescue, when the standard of resistance was raised at Boston against Great Britain in 1775, as in 1812, it was raised there



to the Union. Novel and crafty contrivance was enacted by law, not less treacherous and more dangerous than avowed treason, if disunion was its object. Dismemberment or emasculation of the Union by withdrawal of soldiers and taxes in war, confining troops raised by a State to its own selfish defence, and rejecting the national disposal of its militia, in order to bring about sectional peace with the common enemy, was, if punishable, therefore the more dangerous, and even though so intended, impracticable without bloodshed. Sanguinary results were inevitable, civil war, fragmentary states, the early and convulsive end of American and republican entirety.

Disorganizing juries, the basis of legal administration, by inducing them to violate the enactments of law, and their judicial interpretation by verdicts annulling both, was the introduction of that system of executive, legislative and judicial State revolt, spurning national requirements and encouraging their individual rejection; proclaiming repudiation of federal loans and debts by eminent statesmen. Altogether, it was insurrection by abuse of personal freedom and State sovereignty. The people readily paid taxes, but the politicians resisted loss of power. A family quarrel ensued, intractable as such feuds are, cold-blooded, indecent and rapacious, venting rancor in outrageous malediction which provoked estrangement and circumvented legal coercion by the craftiest chicanery. State and individual animosity fortified themselves by the denunciations of the licentious press and pulpit virulence, all urging violence, till the whole Eastern atmosphere burned with malignant defiance of federal authority, and vindication of English hostility. Inaction under such excitement was creditable, if practicable. Some vent for it, beside language, was indispensable to save its authors from disgrace. But that there was no general collusion with England, except for illicit trade, and ill got wealth, appeared not only by public sentiment which prevailed in New England, but by Great Britain in 1814 no longer excepting that part of the United States from the blockade proclaimed the year before, or her most offensive hostilities. Governors of Nova Scotia and Canada, British ministers, Henry and other English interlopers, flattered their employers with the armed and forcible separation of the Eastern States from the rest; which, encouraged by Eastern opposition to the war, the British attempted. But, though such might have been the end, it was not the means. History and posterity may be sure that such treason did not produce the Hartford Convention, into which, there is reason to believe that some of its members went to prevent the disunion they feared others or their instigators provoked and intended. As very few of the

common people could be seduced to that treachery, even by color of law and pretext of State right, by the pressure of general distress or the inflammatory appeals of some few traitors, so among the members of the Hartford Convention, there were probably none in British connivance. Mr. Otis, who never joined with Pickering to decry the national credit, went to Hartford, as he afterwards published, with extreme reluctance; though throughout the restrictive system no one was more active or efficient in demoralizing the due course of law or engendering those indefensible violations of it, which he, with Governor Strong, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts and the legislature, which, at length, in special session, authorized the Hartford Convention, were for several years bringing about. Perhaps some of them wished to quell the commotion they were constrained to countenance in order to prevent its worse explosion. When what Mr. Adams denounced as the original design was conceived in 1803, it embraced New York and contemplated Pennsylvania. But those large States repelled it with horror; and nearly, if not quite, unanimous support of the war and the Union reduced what was contemptuously disdained as the kingdom of New England, to its own narrow limits. The States of that Eastern affiliation likewise, several of them, openly discountenanced any segregation from the Union, so that finally the Massachusetts, if not Boston and Hampshire county movement was reduced to its own few, and they bound by overruling orders to avoid all projects of dismemberment. Still, not only the licentious press, but the yet more licentious pulpit proclaimed disunion with atrocious violence; and there must have been individuals contemplating separation from the Union and alliance with England.

"If," preached a Boston clergyman, in known social and partisan fellowship with the prime movers of the Convention, "you do not wish to become the slaves of those who are slaves, and are themselves the slaves of French slaves, you must cut the connection, or so far alter the Constitution as to secure yourselves a share in the government. The Union has long since been virtually dissolved, and it is full time that the portion of the disunited States should take care of itself. But this high matter must be left to a Northern and Eastern Convention. To continue to suffer as we have is more than can be expected from human patience or Christian resignation. The time has arrived when common prudence is pusillanimity, and moderation has ceased to be a virtue."

"To the cry of disunion," said one Boston Journal, "the plain and obvious answer is that the States are already separated; the bond of union is broken by President Madi-

son. As we are now going on, we shall certainly be brought to irretrievable ruin. The Convention cannot do a more popular act, not only in New England, but throughout the Atlantic States, than to make a peace for the good of the whole. The Convention must report to their constituents on the subject of peace and war. If they find that it is to continue, it is to be hoped that they will recommend, and that the States will adopt the recommendation, that no men or money shall be permitted to go out of New England, until the militia expenses already incurred are reimbursed, nor until the most ample provision is made for the defence of the New England States, during the continuance of the war."

"If," said another journal there, "all the States south of the Delaware were struck out of being, the Northern States would soon forget the loss of them. The Western States beyond the mountains are not taken into view, in this connection, for any other purpose than to show, that they do not, ought not, and never can, belong to the Union. Let the Western States go off and take care of themselves. Let them have as many Indian wars as they please, and take with them all the lands, which the United States own in that quarter, to pay their debts, and let us thank them into the bargain. Then let us, who belonged to the old family, try, by the agency of such men as are to meet at Hartford, and such men as met for a similar purpose at Philadelphia in 1787, revise our family compact; provide for all the *old* creditors of the United States in the funded debt, who fall within our limits. Suppose that the State government should pass a law, that whoever should attempt, in the name of the United States, to class citizens of that State for the purpose of selecting one from every twenty-five to conquer Canada or Mexico, should be deemed a public enemy and guilty of a high misdemeanor against the sovereignty of the State, and should assign as a reason for such law, that no article of her *treaty* with the United States had given such power over her citizens, to whom is the sovereign State answerable for such acts? Will any one deny that the State has power to enact such law?"

An absurd ebullition, at the opening of the Massachusetts Legislature, on the 5th of October, 1814, before the Governor's message was received or Mr. Otis' resolutions followed, withdrawn next day, was symptomatic of the general infatuation: a resolution of Mr. Low, a lawyer of Lyman, for a committee to confer with all the other New England States, and see if they will join by the appointment of a committee to repair immediately to Washington, then and there personally to make known to the President the general opinion of all the New England States, in regard to the war

and its conduct, and inform him that he must either resign his office or remove those officers and other ministers of the General Government who have by their nefarious plans ruined the nation. "Is there," said the Boston Gazette, "a patriot in America who conceives it his duty to shed his blood for Bonaparte, for Madison, for Jefferson, and that host of ruffians in Congress, who have set their face against us for years, and spirited up the brutal part of the populace to destroy us? Not one. Shall we then be any longer held in slavery, and driven to desperate poverty by such a graceless faction? Heaven forbid!" The Essex Register, organ of the most disaffected, called the Essex Junto, transcending seditious language. published the proceedings of a meeting of the inhabitants of Reading, Massachusetts, Col. Nathan Parker in the chair, and Captain Jonathan Temple, secretary, at which it was resolved that, for the present and until the public opinion is known, we will not enter our carriages, pay our continental taxes, or aid, inform, or assist any officer in their collection. By the publication of such proceedings, their attempted similitude of the imputed tyranny of 1814, to that of 1776, by resistance to *continental* taxation, it was plain that individuals, numerous enough to constitute public meetings, were on foot bold enough to publish their resolves of forcible resistance to government. At the time, however, that parts of the Eastern public press openly proclaimed that the Hartford Convention would recommend forcible resistance to the national government, that men and money should be withheld from it, that a separate peace would be made with England by its illustrious sages and patriots, and a new constitution to restore peace, commerce and prosperity to New England; other portions of the public press treated these as democratic slanders, causing the only suspicion existing of the fidelity of the Convention to the Union.

The Legislature of Massachusetts, on motion of Mr. Lyman, a lawyer of Northampton, instituted a prosecution, in January 1814, by the official instrumentality of Daniel Davis, the solicitor-general, against Thomas Rowe and Joshua Hooper, printers of a Boston newspaper called the Yankee, for what was denounced as a gross and indecent libel on the legislature, by calling them a factious but lifeless body, disposed to prostrate the national government, and sever themselves from the Union, but without either nerve or power to do it. Nobody were looking at them for any great effort against either the national government, or the enemy in quiet possession of one-third of the territory of Massachusetts. To which application of the English law of libel, in all its plastic absurdity, to the American press, the accused pleaded a report by the same Solicitor-General Davis



to Governor Gerry in 1812, and by him communicated to the legislature, of 236 libels, according to the same law, in five Federal newspapers of Boston. In order to execute completely the English parliamentary privilege, this prosecution, instead of being referred to the law officers, and grand jury, should have been undertaken by the legislature themselves, and dealt with as contempt of their authority. Let the truth be given in evidence, said another newspaper, against that sepulchral body, fair without but foul within, and not a Federal jury can be packed that will acquit it.

Whether, if the army invading Louisiana had landed at Long Island, as many, and as it was said even the President, apprehended, the tone of disaffection which prevailed would have stopped with violent language, is problematical. If the Hartford Convention be guilty, its members were as fortunate as the whole Union in the location of hostilities and their timely termination. Great Britain invaded where the Union seemed weakest and proved strongest, when they might have found the strongest part apparently the weakest in reality. Though the Hartford Convention did not probably contemplate immediate action, it is hard to say what might not have been the effect of British armies at hand to encourage, hasten and protect ulterior outbreak.

With passionless inflexibility, Madison held his ground against the approaching and certainly alarming design of a New England Convention: hoping from every proof, since Henry's reluctant homage, that the people, and even the Federal party there, would not be with it, but if any, only a few leaders. "The settled purpose of those incendiaries and patricides," said the National Intelligencer, reproving the Boston press, "is from war to engender anarchy, displaying hostility to their own government which they have not the courage to show against the enemy; and openly avowing what once they would have stigmatized as a calumny: a nest of reptiles brooding dismemberment in the breast of a virtuous people; whose menaces could do no more than to encourage the foe and protract the war."

Mr. Otis' report and resolutions to the special session of the Legislature of Massachusetts, which voted the Hartford Convention, denounced the Constitution of the United States as not only an utter failure for either war or peace, but so defective in its provisions for amendment, as to require and justify the summary justice of necessity: wherefore, with inconsistent professions of attachment to the Union, measures were recommended for a meeting of delegates from all the States for amendment, and for a New England convention to confer on their peculiar grievances.

Josiah Quincy and Harrison Gray Otis descended from the Congress of the United

States to the general court of Massachusetts. In Congress Mr. Quincy vehemently opposed the admission of Louisiana into the Union, incurred Mr. Clay's indignant rebuke for suggesting the impeachment of Jefferson, declared that the United States could not be kicked into war, and otherwise represented those extreme Eastern antipathies to Southern ascendancy, that betrayed him at last, in 1813, into the proverbially odious and absurd resolution which he carried through the Senate of Massachusetts, against rejoicing in the naval victories of his country.

Mr. Otis preceded Mr. Quincy in Congress, before the seat of government was transferred from Philadelphia to Washington, when, under the elder Adams' administration, a considerable diplomatic corps, and seaport American tendencies established the commercial circle in which Mr. Otis was associated with the southern gentlemen in Congress, whose intimacy he seemed to prefer; Pinckneys, Rutledges, Marshall, Madison, Randolph, and others: respectable English, Baring, and Erskine, who married there; Copley, afterwards the Chancellor Lord Lyndhurst; distinguished French, Talleyrand, who, to his numerous oaths of allegiance, superadded one in Philadelphia to the United States of America; the Duke of Orleans, since King Louis Philip of France, with his brothers Beaujolais and Montpensier, Chateaubriand, Noailles; and notorious among those distinguished foreigners, Cobbett, editor of *Porcupine's Gazette* and the *Bloody Buoy*, audacious reviler of whatever was not English, and whatever was American or republican. Among those notabilities the member from Boston, Mr. Otis, a handsome young man, appeared with attractive manners at the little presidential court, and with persuasive rhetoric in the House of Representatives. With public and professional reputation much enhanced in 1814, when humbled to the headship of five hundred small farmers, plain mechanics, and village lawyers in the multitudinous legislature, called the general court of Massachusetts, Mr. Otis was easily chief and leader, with undisputed sway, as in the posterior correspondence concerning the Hartford Convention between him and Mr. Adams, undisguised personal ill will between rival leaders is hardly disguised.

The lexicographer of New England, Noah Webster, in a volume of political, literary, and moral tracts, published in 1843, assigns a laudable origin to that much reviled convention, which Mr. Daniel Webster, another contemporary and intimate, deemed it pollution to be connected with. Noah Webster, a member of the Massachusetts Legislature, which voted it, and present at Hartford when it assembled, pronounces it a patriotic endeavor to arrest

the continuance of disastrous war, and provide for the public safety, originating with some gentlemen in the county of old Hampshire, who invited others to consult, and on the 5th of January, 1814, Joseph Lyman, father of Theodore Lyman, whom Mr. Daniel Webster prosecuted for calumniating him by connection with that paradox, distributed a circular letter for its establishment. Accordingly, numerous memorials, from many parts of Massachusetts, as Theodore Dwight, the Secretary, pleads, went up that year to the legislature for redress; on which memorials, in February 1814, the legislature, by a committee, reported that, in concert with other States, Massachusetts should insist by irresistible claim for such alteration as would save the Union; and their report was adopted by large majorities, as the genuine voice of a large majority of the people. But they asked for no secret or segregated convention; the popular voice was for delegates from all the commercial States, to devise measures of peaceable reform, not dismemberment; involving no new New England confederacy, or anti-federal, unconstitutional, or clandestine transaction. Mr. Otis elaborated apology, by the twelve letters, vouches no such origin as that assigned by Noah Webster, but imputes the first movement towards a New England convention at Hartford, to Governor Jones, of Rhode Island, whose correspondence with Governor Strong, concerning the federal Executive's refusal to pay for militia which it was not allowed to call out or command, as laid before the Massachusetts Legislature, was the first step, Mr. Otis avers, toward Hartford.

Of Mr. Otis' seven resolutions, the second was for ten thousand troops during the war, to be organized and officered by the governor, for the defence of the State; the fourth, for the loan of a million of dollars, to support that army of observation; the fifth, for delegates appointed by the legislature, to meet and confer with delegates from the States of New England, upon the subject of their public grievances and concerns, and upon the best means of preserving their resources, and of defence against the enemy, and to devise and suggest for adoption, by those States, such measures as they may deem expedient; and also to take measures, if they shall think proper, to procure a convention of delegates from all the United States, in order to revise the Constitution, and more effectually to secure the support and attachment of all the people, by placing all upon the basis of fair representation. The primary objects of the proposed convention were, New England grievances and concerns, the preservation of their resources, and defence against the enemy; their secondary, to take measures, if proper, for a convention of delegates from all the United

States, to revise a worthless constitution, by means pronounced impracticable.

The New England antipathy to negro slavery, since imparted by Old England, of whose lightning Mr. Adams became the chief conductor, did not appear in Mr. Otis' resolutions; whose complaint was confined to slave representation in Congress, as a national representative wrong, but without any abhorrence of slavery as itself, either as individual or national evil. Mr. Otis' report, premising censures of the war and the Federal Government, and asserting the extinction of all party in one universal feeling of resistance to an enemy reproached for not discriminating between those who occasionally sought peace, and those who wantonly provoked war, argued that the national treasury, as exhibited by its Secretary, required an augmentation of taxes, which the people of Massachusetts, deprived of their commerce, and compelled, by the withdrawal of the national troops to Canadian invasion, to provide for their own indispensable self-defence, were unable to bear. There remains, therefore, no alternative but submission to the enemy, or the *control of our own resources*, to repel his aggressions; and it is impossible to hesitate in making the selection, as the people are not ready for conquest or submission. In this specious tone, a state military force was proposed, but for no national purpose. On the contrary, expatiating on the evils of the unhappy and ruinous war, ascribed to a system of commercial hostility to Great Britain, alliance with the late despot of France, and listening to men, distinguished in their native State only by their disloyalty to its interests, and the patronage bestowed as its price, (in which terms Mr. Adams, and whoever else of Massachusetts sided with him, were denounced,) the report, brandishing, if not the sword, at least the pen, of defiance, declared that the Constitution of the United States, under the administration of those in power, having failed to secure to the Eastern region their rights, is a grievance justifying and requiring some system of measures for relief, of which the ordinary mode of amendment to the Constitution affords no reasonable expectation in season to prevent ruin. The people must use their means of redress, required by their safety, the supreme law. The constitutional provision for amendments has proved defective, and no reason precludes the right to obviate those dissensions which *unfit our government for peace or war*. But as a proposition for such a convention from a single State would probably be unsuccessful, and our danger admits not of delay, the committee recommend a conference between those States, the affinity of whose interests are closest, and whose habits of intercourse, from their local situations or other causes, are most frequent, for some mode of de-



fence, directed to the circumstances and exigencies of those States, and to enable their delegates, should they deem it expedient, to lay the foundation of a radical reform in the national compact, by inviting a future convention of delegates from all the States in the Union.

With that report, and the resolutions accompanying it, came another, from another committee, of whom Mr. White, of Essex, was chairman, to whom was referred the correspondence between the Governor and the Secretary of State, respecting denial of the President's authority to place the militia under the command of any officer of the regular army of the United States, or subject them to any but his own personal command; setting forth an alarming account of the militia expenses, which the Secretary had informed them would in that case be chargeable to the State; and concluding that the legislature was bound to *preserve the resources* of the State, so far as necessary for their defence in their peculiar and distressing circumstances.

Against the black flag of separation from the Union thus unfurled, minorities in both Houses protested; extolling the Federal Constitution, denying its imputed defects, and showing that, as respected the only injustice pointed out, the New England States had a representation in the Senate of the United States, far greater than in proportion to their free population. The Senate minority report, by John Holmes, avowed suspicious that Massachusetts was to lead the New England States, by a combination, to dissolve the Union, in a course such as that contemplated by the resolutions, selecting a period of war for the purpose: suspicious confirmed by an army of ten thousand men withheld from the orders and pay of the General Government. Propositions for a separate peace for New England might grow out of the meeting of delegates, lead to a compact with the enemy, introduce a foreign army, and subjugate both sections of the Union. Against a convention of delegates from the New England States, the memorable number of seventy-six members of the House of Representatives, headed by Levi Lincoln, in another protest written by him, earnestly remonstrated, as however disguised, obviously tending to a separation and division of the Union; of which there was more designed than distinctly exposed, it having been reiterated in debate, that the Constitution had failed in its objects, and that revolution was not to be deprecated. The bond of our political union was thus attempted to be severed, in time of war, for the mad experiment of abandoning national protection for selfish enjoyment of partial resources, so that other States will say that, unless Massachusetts governs the administration, the government shall not be administered in Massachusetts. That Consti-

tution is to be destroyed, which is the charter of our liberty, and ark of safety, our liberties annihilated, and our country surrendered to implacable foes. Of the thirteen (another memorable number) signers to the Senate's protest, seven were afterwards members of Congress, John Holmes, Martin Langdon Hill, Walter Folger, Timothy Fuller, Martin Kinsley, Joshua Sloan, and Albion K. Parris, the latter now the only survivor, and ever since 1814 in respectable public stations; Mr. Levi Lincoln, draftsman and first subscriber of the 76 protestants of the House, son of President Jefferson's Attorney-General, father of a son who fell gloriously in the bloody gorges of Buena Vista, has been in Congress, Governor of Massachusetts, and Collector of the Port of Boston, while none of the majority of the Massachusetts government at that time, has ever since been able to overcome the odium entailed by the Hartford Convention, extinguishing national men. Striving in vain to maintain Massachusetts after her fall, in the Senate of the United States, after suffering the martyrdom of his predicament there, Mr. Otis resigned; confessing forfeiture of public character, more fatal than attainder of blood, abolished by our code, but leaving the intolerable mortification of being treated, as he feelingly complained, with civility and kindness, without ever being at home. Stephen Longfellow, the only other Hartford Conventionalist who underwent that punishment, a respectable gentleman, father of the professor and poet of this time, still sooner withdrew from the impracticable effort.

On the 16th October, Mr. Otis' resolutions passed the House, the second for raising a State army by only 248 votes, out of a body 500 strong; more voting against it than signed the protest of 76. The Senate soon concurring, the two Houses, in joint meeting on the 19th October, by a much less ballot than the whole number, chose the twelve delegates, the protesting minority refusing to vote for what was denounced as an unconstitutional act. The originator of the Convention, according to Noah Webster, *to arrest the war*, Joseph Lyman, was chosen one, George Cabot the first named, Harrison Gray Otis, the second; Nathan Dane, author of the well known ordinance of 1787 for the government of the territory north-west of the river Ohio, another, but none of the rest of national repute. The President of the Senate, John Phillips, and Speaker of the House, Timothy Bigelow, as directed, forthwith, on the 17th October, forwarded these proceedings to other States, to be laid before their legislatures, as "an invitation to delegates to deliberate on the *dangers of the eastern section of the Union by the war*, and devise means of *preserving their resources*," but with the significant addition to the report and resolutions of "*not repugnant to*

*their obligations as members of the Union."* Which paramount resolution, incorporated by the legislature with assault upon the Constitution, was furthermore corroborated, in order to anticipate objections from jealousy or fear, by assurance of the well known attachment of the Legislature of Massachusetts to the Union. A question of constitutional law, according to Mr. Otis, had arisen between the General and State Governments, which no umpire could settle. Under the impulse of necessity above law, the State deviated from its regular course, when it was natural for the government of states to obey the dictates of the law of nature, and stand together for their own defence. To this casuistry of nullification, the apology added, that if the war had continued, and an attempt been made to enforce the impending conscription, the case would have been pregnant with trouble, calling for measures not contemplated in the Constitution, when the people must cut the Gordian knot. To that extremity, either wilfully or actually, the report, resolutions, state troops and Hartford Convention tended. But the minority in both branches of the legislature, representing in that respect a large majority of the people, cherished the federal knot of their own workmanship; while among the majority of the general court, those hesitations and fears which in all bodies of men exist and often prevail, indefinite and conservative apprehensions, subjecting the bold and rash to the prudent and timorous, put a double curb on the resolved assault on the Federal Constitution, and constrained its assailants to profess inviolable reverence for it. With credentials thus qualified, the delegates were forbad all treasonable action and declaration, if not design, and sent forth ostensibly loyal. Their very first step was faltering: and fortune, the great regulator of events, crossed their whole way by a continual sequel of counteractions till overtaken by the catastrophe, both European and American, that crushed them. The people of the East, like all the rest, in the simple majesty of unsophisticated patriotism, the war by universal victories, the government roused and instructed by tribulation and triumph to energy and vigilance, peace hastening from beyond the ocean, when Europe did not desire America to be subdued by England, the whole course of contingencies in providential concert counteracted treason or treachery in whatever form. Had hostilities lasted to another campaign, their pressure and party machinery might have realized convulsive disunion beyond mere passive retention of funds to active revolt, by sectional peace and sanguinary dissension, for Massachusetts must have been either English by the unresisted conquest of all Maine, or Ame-

rican by co-operation in the capture of Halifax.

The States beyond New England rejected, with emphatic repugnance, the new platform of either ruptured or enfeebled union; some by legislative proceedings, all by popular indignation. In the Senate of Pennsylvania, on the 13th February, 1815, Governor Snyder's communication of the resolution of Connecticut, proposing amendments of the United States Constitution, was referred to a select committee, on motion of Nicholas Biddle, who reported against the Massachusetts plan, exposing, with special force, the wholly unfounded pretence, of such States as Rhode Island, Vermont, Connecticut, New Hampshire, or even Massachusetts, each with two Senators, to complain of undue distribution of federal power as against the people of New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio. On the 4th January, Mr. Biddle had introduced, with a few eloquent and patriotic remarks, resolutions for raising, by drafts from the militia, a corps of eight thousand men, to serve during twelve months, for the defence of Pennsylvania and the adjoining States: for procuring one or more steam frigates, steam batteries, or other means of defence, for the protection of the shores of the Delaware; and for borrowing a million of dollars, to be employed solely in the defence of the State of Pennsylvania. On Mr. Biddle's motion, likewise, increased bounties were voted to seamen for the Delaware flotilla. His father was an active member of the Committee of Safety, appointed by the citizens of Philadelphia in the autumn of 1814, when the capture of Washington and official threats of Admiral Cochrane put all places on the Atlantic on the alert; three of whose sons were in the army or navy, on all occasions distinguished by that spirit of enterprising bravery, transmitted as the inheritance of ancestors from the Revolution.

Separate eastern or northern confederation was regarded almost universally with horror and contempt. Of the New England States themselves, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut were the only three that gave it any countenance: Rhode Island, the only one whose legislature adopted the Massachusetts project without the restriction which Massachusetts herself put on her delegates to Hartford. That little State, last to join the Federal Union, with the inordinate advantage over Virginia of equal representation in the Senate, and most dependent on it, was the first and only one to disregard union. The preamble of their legislative resolution, invoking the co-operation of *neighboring sister States*, scarcely even all New England, for common defence, and appointing delegates to recommend measures for their common relief, provided



merely that they should be consistent *with their obligations to restore* and secure their rights and privileges under the Constitution of the United States. Mr. Dwight's history interprets that bald, unmeaning phrase to imply adherence to the Union. But Mr. Otis declares that before Massachusetts made any overture to her sister States, a fortnight prior to the sitting of her legislature, the State of Rhode Island made the *first advance* to the States of Massachusetts and Connecticut, toward the Hartford Convention. In Vermont, he adds, the governor actually *ordered back* the militia. In New Hampshire, when Governor Gilmer conformed to the President's requisition, he next year *lost his election*. To this state of things, so much alike in all parts of New England, and to the *communication first made from Rhode Island*, may be traced, says Mr. Otis, the first *germ* of the Convention.

Connecticut and Rhode Island being the only two States by legislative resolutions adopting those of Massachusetts, originated and outrun by Rhode Island, a questionable report from the legislature of Connecticut in session, at New Haven, in October, 1814, still further fettered the prime movers of discord, and bound them to the American Union. Depicting the evils of war, in the common terms of its lamentation by the pulpit, press, bar and counting-house, it was said to be waged for conquest, in coalition, as evident as if defined by the articles of a formal treaty, between the national administration and the fearful tyrant of Europe, aspiring lately to the dominion of the world. To that absurd calumny was added an ingenious and characteristic notion, that the very declaration of war, without providing means indispensable to conduct it, was a breach of the reciprocal obligation of the people and their government. Still there was redeeming boast that the people of Connecticut had no disloyalty to the interests of the Union, punctually paid their taxes to the General Government, met and repulsed the enemy at the water's edge, nor forgot the ties of confidence and affection which bound these States to each other, during their toils for independence. Conceding that the documents from Massachusetts presented an eligible method of combining the wisdom of New England for devising a proper course to be adopted, the report insisted that it must be consistent with Connecticut obligations to the United States. And while it was resolved to appoint seven delegates to meet those of Massachusetts and the other New England States at Hartford, to devise and recommend measures for the safety and welfare of these States, yet it was particularly required that they should be only such as consist with our obligations as members of the National Union. Not only riveting

these fetters to bind down disunion, Connecticut took care to appoint, moreover, seven delegates of known aversion to it, several of whom had long served in Congress, all disposed, without offensive manifestation, to calm and counteract any evil tendencies of the proposed convention. Rhode Island appointed her four delegates. But in New Hampshire the project was coldly received, the governor, John Taylor Gilmer, refusing to convene the legislature, so that no State delegates were appointed, but only two persons of local designation attended from that State at Hartford, and were admitted as delegates. In Vermont, the victories of Plattsburg had dispelled the clouds and silenced the clamors of disaffection. The legislature unanimously refused to appoint delegates, upon the unanimous report of a joint committee of both Houses, of which committee the majorities were Federalists: and instead voted unanimous resolutions of thanks to Macdonough and Macomb, and a farm at Cumberlandhead, the scene of his glorious victory, to the former. One local merely self-appointed delegate repaired from Vermont to Hartford, and was received into the conclave there.

Before the royal charter granted, in 1662, by Charles the Second, to Connecticut, by Winthrop's ring (so free, that he and his pedantic brother frequently tried to revoke it), was republicanized by a civil revolution in church and state, in 1818, that ancient commonwealth was a popular, ecclesiastical, and scholastic despotism. The governor, judges, and most other officers were elected annually, the legislature and council twice a year; primary meetings to nominate candidates openly, and stated elections secretly to choose them, were held in places of worship, which it would have been profanation to call churches or govern by bishops; the government was held at two different places in rotation, and, till latterly, party and political meetings were opened with prayer. With such incessant routine, and uncommon solemnity of popular transaction, men were seldom changed, and son succeeded father in office. The whole population were educated in public schools; one of the largest colleges of the United States was constantly replenished by crowds of students; pastoral influence was more absolute than parental; hierarchies, political, social, and religious, managed, with clerical exactitude, a frugal and industrious community, extremely intelligent and intolerant. Massachusetts, more commercial and freethinking, not less proscriptive, with Boston, the metropolis of all New England, was the centre of its politics, opinions, and predominance, dictating its measures. On the 20th of October, 1814, preliminary to the Hartford Convention, the legislature of that leading State, pursuant

to the plan of a great Eastern movement, meditated with malice from the purchase of Louisiana, resolved to raise an army ten thousand strong, not to aid, but awe the Union; not to wage, but arrest the war; not to be placed under the command of any of the President's prefects, as the United States generals commanding military districts were stigmatized, but to be called out, armed, officered, uniformed, stationed, employed, and disposed of exclusively, and altogether, by their own disaffected governor, in defiance of federal authority.

But John Cotton Smith, the Governor of Connecticut, was by no means inclined to sunder his State from the Union. An ancient Federalist of that State, now in his eighty-first year, "a Federalist from the belief that an unrestrained democracy, to say the least of it, would not conduce to peace and security of society," represents Governor Smith as "of opinion, that the declaration of war in 1812, was indiscreet, but, as it was commenced, it was his duty, and that of the State, spiritedly to prosecute it to an honorable conclusion without referring to necessary expense." Although many influential persons, some of them openly, were opposed to his views, Governor Smith's views of the proposed convention were, "that, however some may have wicked designs, there was nothing to be feared from it more than the result, which was to request Congress to omit collecting revenues from New England, and, at the same time, require them to defend themselves." This simple argument, in his own words, of a retired and diffident octogenarian of Hartford, excuses the stand there as requiring only national omission to collect revenue from New England while obliged to defend themselves, which was the plausible but impracticable pretext of the peaceable portion of the disaffected. Connecticut, wisely governed, was not, however, altogether ruled by her chief magistrate, whose moderate and patriotic counsels were thwarted by the legislature, inflamed by schemes of legal resistance to acts of Congress, particularly those condemned as conscriptive, and enlistments interfering with paternal or masterly power. The council, or senate, a small body or committee, attacked the militia act of Congress and Secretary of War's proposal for classification, by a resolution put forth as unanimous, though but the voice of a dozen angry politicians, acquiesced in, however, by a nearly unanimous vote of the House of Representatives, that, in case any such bill should assume the form of an act of Congress, the governor might immediately convene the legislature to consider what measures should be adopted to preserve the rights and liberties of the people of Connecticut. Legislation, instigated from Washington and exaspe-

rated from Boston, in vain moderated without being opposed by a prudent governor, broke out, not, like that of Massachusetts, in the single enactment of a formidable force, but a series of smaller defiance to the Union, by thirteen acts of petty and vexatious restrictions on national government in Connecticut; being all but six, and those six insignificant, of the whole nineteen enactments of the Connecticut legislature at their special session, pending the Hartford Convention.

In August 1812, at the first session after Congress declared war, an act of Connecticut, adopting the military heresy of Massachusetts, provided that the volunteer corps of the State should not be liable to any other military duty than to be called out by the governor for the defence and protection of the State, nor subject to any other command than that of their own officers, nor obliged on any occasion to do military duty out of the State, to which original sin as many minor offences were superadded just before the Hartford Convention as there were original States in the Union. The first, for a council of safety of five persons paid to advise the governor relative to raising, organizing and employing the State military forces, and all measures of defence growing out of the war; a second, for a thousand men to be raised for defence of the State during the war, disciplined and uniformed as State troops, to be stationed and employed at the governor's discretion; a third, granting them liberal bounties; a fourth, to pay them by a loan of four hundred thousand dollars; a fifth, authorizing the employment of the State troops in an adjoining State to repel invasion; a sixth, for an additional aid-de-camp; a seventh, repealing the act prohibiting bank notes of less than one dollar, and sanctioning the emission; an eighth, making extensive arrangements concerning the militia, taxing Quakers ten dollars, each to be collected summarily during the war in lieu of militia services; a ninth, of which the impotent malice was signalized during the convention at Hartford, authorizing ordinances by cities to designate the place and method of military parades, their rendezvous, marching and music in the streets; a tenth, concerning the quarter-master-general; an eleventh, directing the collectors of State taxes to make lists of all free white males exempt from militia duty; a twelfth, authorizing justices of the peace to employ the State military to suppress tumultuous or riotous night-meetings; and the thirteenth, prohibiting stage travelling, except for necessity or charity, on the Sabbath, by which the U. S. mail and marching of troops might be hindered.

To this distempered State legislation, were superadded city ordinances of like annoying legality, particularly at Hartford, to prostrate the military service there. At a spe-



cial meeting of the citizens, a bill passed by the board of common council was presented and accepted by a small majority of the freemen, to prohibit recruiting for the United States service. The ordinance enacted that any one, except the governor's guards and the militia, carrying a flag or color, drumming or playing on any martial instrument, within certain prescribed limits, which included most of the populous parts, and nearly the whole area of the city, should for each of such offences forfeit and pay thirty-four dollars. Rendezvous for recruiting or recruiting officers were by the same ordinance forbid to be opened in certain parts defined. This spiteful municipal offspring of the legislative act conferring the power, was obviously contrary to the supreme authority of the United States, and so treated by Col. Jessup, who, by personal courtesy to the distinguished citizens of Connecticut brought together by the Convention at Hartford, conciliated their respect, while he treated the provocations of their inferiors with contempt. The single act of Massachusetts of defiance by a State army of observation, ten thousand strong, on which alone the legislation of that great State rested, would have been more formidable than the thirteen acts of Connecticut petulance and vexation, if the will of either people had seconded their laws. But in the large State it faltered, in the small one there was no such will. Of the five New England States, two, Vermont rejected, and New Hampshire declined, an Eastern confederacy; which Connecticut, seemingly seconding, in fact countervailed. The feeblest of all, Rhode Island, was the only unhesitating State. The Massachusetts leaders, therefore, repaired to Hartford with only one State, and but one, even if that should be Massachusetts, Mr. Otis' report confessed would be insufficient. Mere county delegates, self-styled suffragans, whose surreptitious appointment is familiar to the lowest partisan, volunteered to represent parts of counties from Vermont and New Hampshire; but one of them did not join the Convention till the 28th December, when its business was nearly done, and the whole three were insignificant additions to the altogether small cabal of two-and-twenty, nearly all lawyers, almost without co-operation from the agricultural, commercial, mechanical or any other of the muscular parts of New England. A cabal of barristers, mere men of the extremities, undertook to dislocate a huge body politic, too strong to be vitally hurt by any one of its members, by an attempt as forlorn as it proved unlucky.

Hartford, at the head of tidewater, on the fine stream which shares its name with the State of Connecticut, is an incorporated city, then of some eight or ten thousand inhabitants, since much increas-

ed, and known for asylums for the insane and the dumb. On the 15th December, 1814, with excited sentiments of apprehension, mingled approval and derision, the inhabitants awaited the nefarious Convention which takes its bad name from that quiet town. The winter was uncommonly mild for military operations north, and the weather bland, while in the slime of the lower Mississippi, the season favored General Jackson by extreme severity, the British black troops being benumbed, and perishing with unseasonable cold. A concourse of curious persons, generally with sinister aspect, were collected in the streets of Hartford, to witness the inauguration of a body of whom so much evil was foretold and speculation hazarded. The winter quarters and recruiting rendezvous were there of the 25th regiment of infantry, mostly raised in Connecticut, though commanded by Colonel McFeely of Pennsylvania, and gallantly led into the thickest of the fight by Major, for that brevetted Lieutenant-Colonel Jessup of Kentucky, at the battle of Bridgewater, where, defeating at close quarters more than twice its number of the best British grenadiers, it was as much distinguished as reduced by the hard-earned glory of that bloody night. Nearly all the non-commissioned officers had their only decoration by recent wounds. With his arm in a sling and his person much scarified, the young lieutenant-colonel was selected, as much from prudence and conciliatory temper as for dauntless courage, to be entrusted with the critical task of superintending, circumventing, and overawing the treasonable convention which all the public indications threatened at Hartford. The young officers and men of the regiment held in declared aversion and contempt the traitors they pronounced those who designed opposition to their vocation, and relying on its arrogated impunity, or indulging the insolence of military power, sometimes insulted inoffensive inhabitants, and provoked the city authorities, prone to interfere with the march and music of the soldiery, as the soldiers were to aggressive and unwarrantable liberties with them. For the meeting of the Convention their drums beat funeral airs through the streets, while the British flag was hung half-mast, and the American displayed surmounting it. Even some of the meeting-house bells tolled solemn dirges. Such martial and popular reception was discouraging to the small cabal, of less than two dozen dispirited and compunctious New Englanders, venturing to prescribe the severance of eighteen united sovereignties by means that must be fatal to themselves; like woodmen chopping off limbs on which they stood, to fall and be demolished with them. As the Boston members left their homes, the Constitution frigate, then beginning to be

famous as Old Ironsides, went to sea from that port, on the last and most brilliant of her three glorious cruises, with a crew of hardy Eastern mariners. As the Convention heard the first prayers offered up for their benediction, other American seamen, in a far-distant American lake, Ponchartrain, in half a dozen gun boats, nobly resisted the forty barges from a British fleet of sixty sail which attacked them, commencing that series of noble blows by which Louisiana was welded to the Union with more than constitutional incorporation. With these auspices, a splendid aurora borealis, lighting the heavens, streamed from the north as the Hartford Convention adjourned its first day's session, retiring to rest without any token of approbation from without or within.

One of their number, Chauncey Goodrich, was Mayor of Hartford, by whose arrangements the Convention were disposed of in the retirement of the second story of an isolated stone building, in which the little State Senate or council sat when in rotation Hartford was the seat of government. Locking themselves up stairs there in awfully obscure concealment for three weeks, twice every day, except Sunday, Christmas and New Year's day, they were continually in conclave, and for nearly four years afterwards kept their proceedings a profound and impenetrable secret, of itself a circumstance extremely suspicious and detrimental. Rumors were afloat, and Colonel Jessup had occasional disclosures of their discussions. But till the final adjournment on the 5th January 1815, no reports, publication or authentic intimation of any kind appeared. Nothing but darkness was visible; for the formal report, printed and circulated, could have little effect to quell misgivings as to an assembly, from which all but themselves were excluded without inexplicable and masonic mystery. Not till several years afterwards, when the Convention was universally condemned, branded, ridiculed and its members discharacterized, could even the journal, always a bald and unsatisfactory account of any public body, be extorted by Judge Johnson of the Supreme Court of the United States, from Mr. Otis at Washington, as some tardy and imperfect explanation of what till then remained hermetically sealed from light and knowledge. Till then, George Cabot, the mystierarch, remained, and wherefore? sole keeper of even what was but faint expression of the actual deliberations, suggestions, votes, motives and proceedings of the ill-starred Hartford Convention, in its conception, transactions and termination equally unwise, unfortunate and contemptible.

For their reports and published proceedings scarcely require or deserve historical

elucidation. As abridged by Mr. Otis, in their defence, several years afterwards, they were harmless and timid politics, without a single glance at destructive acts; and if nothing more was contemplated, the Hartford Convention was a vapid futility. They were in Mr. Otis' own summary; first, application to Congress for their consent to an arrangement whereby the States, parties to the Convention, might, separately or in concert, assume the defence of their territory, at the national expense; secondly, certain amendments to the Constitution. The mode by which it was thus proposed harmoniously, as was said, to separate the States from the Union, was to allow the Eastern States a reasonable portion of the taxes collected within them, to be paid into their own treasuries, appropriated in self-defence, and debited to the United States; and authorize their governors to make detachments from the militia, form voluntary corps, employ them and the State regular troops in repelling invasions. By these extremely difficult requests, it was obvious that the Convention was either deterred from acts by fear, or guilty of double dealing.

To so tranquil and amiable a dissolution of the Union there could be no objection but that it was such; not forcible, violent, homicidal, yet, nevertheless, dissolution as effectual. Could such be the last will, or was it only the first step of testators, instigated by grievances so inveterate, denounced by infuriate abuse, and for the extinction of which such infinite pains had been taken? One faint hint, scarcely a threat, of ulterior measures, half concealed in a gentle paragraph of the report, accompanied resolves of mere hackneyed party hostilities: exclusion of slave representation, new states, and naturalized foreigners; restraints of restrictive systems, war power, and presidential tenure—were these the results of so much preparation? Small minorities in the Legislature of Massachusetts were incapable of the supernatural and incredible power of defaming him and his associates, ascribed by Mr. Otis to their unparalleled virulence and effrontery, for such venial offences. In a country where all secrecy is unpopular and treason detested, mystery may have helped to decry what it was impossible, however, to make infamous without reason.

In fearful suspense as to the fate of New Orleans, which, by our last accounts at Washington, approached its crisis, the government rejoiced in the close of a convocation characterized by the National Intelligencer as "a mere caucus, in factious temper seeking redress for imaginary evils in an illegal manner; which, in its maturity, must have been unconstitutional—whose abortion was always anticipated by those who knew its promoters. Mentioned but once in Congress, they caused little per-



turbation at the seat of government. The violent Boston men, who, from that focus of faction, generated the Convention, and filled the public prints with exasperation, to delude the people, were no doubt controlled by the sober judgment of those of Connecticut; and their proceedings appear tempered with unexpected moderation. Separation from the Union, far from being recommended, is but remotely alluded to. Civil war is prevented, not by its instigators, but by the people; so that the former are entitled to none of the merit of moderation. Their very report will, in after days, cover them with shame and confusion. Their party manifesto shows them unfit to be trusted with power."

Emboldened by Jackson's victories at New Orleans, and more excited than alarmed by the Hartford Convention, on its report to the Legislature of Massachusetts, John Holmes made the last of those remarkable speeches by which in the Senate of that State he boldly rebuked its rapid anti-federalism. "Afraid to overthrow the Constitution," said he, "you try to undermine it by pretence of amendment. You called it perfect while you were *in pay*. The friends of peace, declaring that the country could not be kicked into war, forced it on; and failing to repossess themselves of the administration, tried to destroy the government. An unauthorized and unconstitutional assemblage at Hartford, are to change a Constitution declared unfit for either war or peace, but which you dare not attack openly. The leading paper of your party, whose editor as a member of this legislature voted for the delegates, has openly and uniformly declared that there must be redress, even by violence and resistance. But violence is dangerous, and therefore you undermine by alterations. Opposition provoked the war and protracts it. The enemy takes possession of a large extent of your country. Instead of expelling him from it, you appoint a convention to divide the States, unless you are permitted to rule them. The Hartford Convention exploded in a mission to Washington. If Great Britain has not lost confidence in Massachusetts, scolding, threatening, vaporing, evaporating, she prolongs the war, but that is all. She makes the war disastrous, and calls it disgraceful, which dishonors the enemy she courts. Amid all its atrocious Vandalism, which of you has ever doubted that England is in the right? If there is such a one, I am ready to ask his pardon. You accuse the late President Jefferson of causing the war and defending it. But why excuse his predecessor, President Adams, who still more vigorously defends the war, and whom you consider ten times worse than Jefferson. You object to defending Louisiana, which all your party wanted to take by force from Spain, to rush into

invasion and war, but which, peaceably acquired by purchase, you will not defend. After duping England into the war, you continue to deceive her: you dupe her again by adulation of our common enemy, and reproach of our General Government. The war has been as useful and glorious as that of the Revolution, and eventually will be so recognized. But Massachusetts must join it, or all the disgrace will be hers."

While the Executive organ, as before mentioned, pronounced the Convention's obituary, the administration had been forecasting means to put an end to it peaceably, and even gloriously, if possible, but forcibly if necessary, and at all events; which was Monroe's master-stroke, the bright thought of a not brilliant, but thorough statesman; who united with the capital design of conquering Canada in Nova Scotia, its achievement by the very revolvers of New England, converted from conspirators or traitors to patriots and volunteers, by seducing the Hartford Convention themselves to annex the British possessions in North America to their own, thus rendering the Eastern States preponderant in the Union, and the greatest maritime community in the world. If the energy and ingenuity of their people, instead of being misdirected and wasted, had from the beginning of the war been bestowed on the annexation of Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia to New England, Great Britain might have ceased to be the mistress of the ocean, and the North-eastern possessions of the United States have more than counterpoised and surpassed all their magnificent South-west. Apprised of that intrigue—shall we call so admirable a scheme?—at the time, by its wary contriver, Mr. Monroe, and having frequently revised its circumstances since, with the prudent agent of the attempt at Hartford, General Jessup, its narration may suggest further reason why, begun in hazardous disloyalty, disappointed of expected co-operators, and counteracted by others, finding the people averse, alarmed themselves at their own design, and finally both undermined and menaced by government, conspirators in the beginning, shrunk from their undertaking, and at last sunk to mere fellow-countrymen soliciting impracticable concessions, instead of trying by force to redress imaginary grievances.

For his highly distinguished courage, discretion, and western patriotism, Lieutenant-Colonel Jessup was selected from the army for the critical responsibility, by fixing his recruiting rendezvous at Hartford, of feeling, under that demonstration, the pulse of the people thereabouts, should extreme measures be suggested by the Convention, opposing them by force if necessary, and if encouraged by popular sympathy, dispersing the rebels. He was one of the advocates of Wilkinson's and Pike's, as before

mentioned, plan of a Halifax campaign: instead of wasting efforts on the extremities of British American power, to strike at its head, which, if taken, would bring with it the limbs; and even as a mere demonstration, do more than all the State troops that all the States could raise to relieve the Atlantic shores and cities from hostile desolation. This plan, rejected by Eustis, and not adopted, or deferred, by Armstrong, was warmly espoused by Monroe, who, by a masterly stroke of policy, resolved to combine, with the expulsion of the British from America, the circumvention and conversion of the Eastern malcontents to its achievement, by inducements which it was believed they would appreciate. With forcible repression of their resistance, if need be, Jessup was to seduce some of the leading men to an admirable plan for rectifying and aggrandizing New England. After long confidential oral instructions for both these purposes from the Secretary of War and the President, Colonel Jessup repaired to his martial diplomacy, deemed more hazardous than the fields of Chippewa or Bridgewater.

The President and Mr. Monroe were uneasy at the threatening appearances of the Hartford Convention, as resolved at Boston, by the Legislature of Massachusetts. The confidential and perilous mission of counteracting it, by force, if need be, it was deemed best not to impose on General Dearborn or General Cushing, both New England men, but to select an officer from another part of the country, and who had served gallantly with a New England regiment. It was intended, however, that General Dearborn should collect a force at Greenbush, in New York, and co-operate with Jessup, in the event of resort to force, in which conflict Governor Tomkins would have taken an active part. Great confidence was entertained that any attempt at forcible resistance would be easily subdued, as the body of the people of New England appeared to be disgusted with the Hartford Convention, and numbers of young Federalists were applying for commissions in the army. After a short stay at New York, to confer with Governor Tomkins, Colonel Jessup proceeded as far as New Haven, but not to Hartford, till assured that his appearance there would not be suspected. A secret agent from Hartford met him at New Haven, and conferred with him as to what was best to do.

On his way to his post, Lieut.-Colonel Jessup wrote, on the 10th of December, 1814, from New York to the Secretary of War, Monroe:—"I have had several conferences with Gov. Tomkins. He thinks the Convention will complain, remonstrate, and probably address the people; but that its proceedings will neither result in an attempt to sever the Union, nor in a deter-

mination to resist by force the measures of the General Government. From information which I have derived from several friends of the Union, in Connecticut, I am inclined to the same opinion. It is a fact, however, that there are men who would be willing to go all lengths in favor of British pretensions and British views; but, fortunately for the nation, the leading Federalists, particularly in Boston, have not the influence attached to talents and character, but that only which accompanies wealth. They are men of calculation, and are all aware that a single hour of revolution may deprive them of fortune and its consequent influence. I will take occasion to pass through Connecticut during the first days of the sitting of the Convention. The excitement of the public mind will then be at the highest pitch, and I shall be better able to judge of the sentiments of the people at large. Rest assured that no exertion shall be wanting on my part to forward the views of the government." From New Haven, on the 15th of December, 1814, he wrote:—"The Convention which meets to-day, in Hartford, will sit, I am told, with closed doors. I am astonished at the little interest excited by the meeting. It is probable, however, that their quarters will be made pretty warm before the close of the session; for, although they have a majority of the voters in this State, there is a majority of the fighting men in favor of the government. I think it would have a good effect to give brevets to Captains Howard, Reed and White, of the twenty-fifth regiment. They have powerful influence here, and I believe are able and willing to render essential services to government. The two first were highly distinguished on the 5th of July, and the latter on the 25th. I expect information from Hartford to-morrow, when I will write again, should anything of importance have occurred."

Mixing freely with people of all classes, especially the disaffected, and above all, the Connecticut delegates to the Convention, whose good will he courted by conciliatory conduct, strict discipline, and repressing the aggressive disposition of his officers and soldiers, Colonel Jessup, ingratiating himself with some already well-disposed, soon ascertained that the Connecticut members of the Convention were opposed to disunion or disorder, that every throb of the people's heart was American, and that if blood was spilt, it would be for the country, the government, and the war, rather than against them. A small, but resolute minority, avowedly supporting the war and the United States government, held a meeting by delegates at Hartford, during the session of the legislature, introducing the Convention there, and protested against their acts as more for their own than national interest in a State, the advocate of order, by a legis-



lative act bringing itself into direct conflict with an important national law. The law called unconstitutional, authorizes the enlistment of minors; so do the law and practice of Connecticut; who, by a recent provision of the State, may be compelled, conscribed, and marched out of the State on foreign service. The national is the supreme law, paramount to that of the State; and surely may enact what the State law does to raise troops for the country. Then, as always, there was an intrepid minority, determined and able to spread light before the community, who, in case of actual collision, would have been a loyal majority. Of that minority, Mr. John Niles, the present Senator, was an active writing member.

Disorganizers, perhaps some traitors, and at any rate speculators on public necessities and miseries, there were, with numerous factionists and fault-finders. But the great body of the people, of all classes and parties, Jessup found American republicans, however federal or inimical to the national Executive, still instinctively and inflexibly faithful to their country; and, indeed, suspicious of a secret, ill-reputed and portentous Convention to disturb it. By daily letters to Washington, Colonel Jessup informed the Secretary of War of this state of things, and that at least one member of the Convention itself listened favorably to his counterplot. The citizens of Connecticut, who opposed Madison's administration, were filiations of the original Federal party, which twenty-five years before ratified the present Constitution of the United States; which was, in 1814, upheld more zealously by the descendants of those who, in 1788, by public meetings, conventions, and other demonstrations of popular opposition, rejected it, with the assumption of state debts, funding system, order of Cincinnati, and other measures of the Federalists of that period, become anti-federal in 1814. As regarded the Federal Government, parties had changed places: Connecticut, anti-federalists in 1814, being the federal majority of 1788. Still, of a large majority in 1814, become anti-federal as far as opposition to the war and Madison's war construction of the Constitution, but few among them were disposed to take up arms against the war, destroy the Constitution, and plunge the country in civil sanguinary strife, merely to rid themselves of an obnoxious administration. All parties, inured at all times to strenuous party contests, hard words, and proscription, were still unwilling from words to proceed to blows. The sheet anchor by which the American people are held fast to the rock of one and the same vital nationality is colonial, ancestral, sempiternal, and universal republican attachments.

English hostile testimony to the honor of Eastern Americanism, was frequent, public,

and unequivocal. Together with ingrain republicanism, a feeling of at least American independence of, if not aversion to, the English, pervaded the mass of the population. The Montreal Journal, of the 14th January, 1815, published: "It is said the Hartford Convention has broken up: it appears to be a kind of bugbear to frighten the national government, and deceive the British. Its sittings had been secret. The members had summoned two or three preachers, or father confessors, whose discourses will preface their resolutions. But, like Jesuits, they will keep the whole under the rose until a fit moment to develop their solemn designs. All may rest assured those designs are not favorable to Britain. If they hear of a rich prize brought into port by a federal privateer, they will set their principal preachers to work in the cause of praise and admiration of just and noble deeds. They who can prove that the people of New England are better friends to old England than they were in 1775, let them come forward and do so; but we must have more substantial evidence than comes from the lips of many among us, who are, perhaps, sincere in what they advance." The Hartford Convention, the extremest resort of Eastern disaffection, served the country, at least, in disabusing the English government and its agents, pensioned to dismember the Union, by convincing them that the mass of the American people, of all parties, had been dragooned by England into self-preservation by union under any government rather than risk destruction by English alliance. A Halifax journal, of the 30th December, 1814, argued for peace, that "the American legislature, by passing the conscription bill, have placed great power in the hands of the President. Though nominally an act for establishing a militia force for the defence of the frontiers, it has evidently a view of draining the different States and territories, and greatly strengthening the disposable force of the general government, which could be effected by no other means. This measure seems, therefore, to be a palpable hit at the Convention of the Eastern States; for without an *independent* army under their command, their inflated resolves are little better than waste paper."

Chauncey Goodrich, with James Hillhouse, and several other members of the Convention, had mellowed local prejudices and asperities in the refining crucible of Congress; determined Federalists, but not disorganizers; and without infidelity to his trust in the Convention, Goodrich particularly encouraged Jessup's advances. According to his instructions, Colonel Jessup imparted cautiously to Mr. Goodrich the scheme of a great expedition from New England for the capture of Halifax by, and for, the Eastern people; the certainty that

it would be undertaken and probably effected without them, if they held off, and whether they joined in it or not, should the war last another year; the honor, glory, wealth, and prosperity for New England, involved in the movement, by extricating the malcontents from their equivocal, painful, and dangerous dilemma. The confidence of government was declared that, in spite of the blind perversity of the Eastern oligarchy, the gallant yeomanry of the Eastern States would nearly to a man rally to the standard to be planted by them, or without them, at Halifax. Their attachment to union, law, and order, the country, the whole country, its complete vindication from ruthless invading enemies, making no distinction between the patriotic and disaffected, but devastating the homes of all alike, as barbarous in Connecticut in 1814 as they had been in 1779; part of New England, the only conquered part of the United States, to be vindicated by carrying the war where the insolent conquerors came from—were considerations urged by Jessup to Goodrich. "A small cabal of madmen, shut up in secret here, cannot hinder us," said he, "from rescuing New England, by carrying the war into the enemy's country; four-fifths of your young men in arms will volunteer for the expedition. The farmers' sons of Connecticut are every hour flocking to my standard. Before spring I shall have a thousand in my regiment, perfectly drilled and prepared to march, wherever led, in defiance of your Convention, or any such impediment. We will transfer from Old to New England the greatest commercial and maritime power on earth or water, in spite of its own infatuated opposition." Mr. Goodrich was at first incredulous. I know your President, said he, and his southern associates, having served in Congress with them. They are incapable of so great an advantage for the East. And besides, if we should accomplish it for them, they would abandon us and give it up for peace. Jessup assured him that it would not be so; but that, if taken, Halifax and its dependencies would be retained and annexed, with Canada, to New England. Mr. Goodrich's Eastern pride was touched. Louisburg had been taken seventy-six years before from the French by the people of the East, and if they chose, he had no doubt they could take Halifax. Four hundred miles of sea coast, with good harbors every ten miles in Maine; three hundred miles more along the remaining shores of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, with numberless excellent ports, the seafaring population, enterprise, and unequalled commercial skill and advantages of New England, its natural and feasible aggrandizement by excluding the English from the Eastern provinces, whose conquest would conquer

Canada too, were considerations of permanent benefit to outweigh the transient annoyances of war and a Southern administration, which such increase of the Eastern States was the surest, if not only, way to overcome, by restoring New England ascendancy in the national government. For, as in all American politics, the future enhanced the present. Four or five new and free Northern States, forty or fifty more members, with eight or ten additional Senators, in Congress, were prospectively more persuasive than even the immediate and the maritime inducements. New England, exchanging odious and unavailing resistance for her large share of the glory, and still more of the profits, of the war, for all the disbursements would be there, together with large military bounties in land, and pensions in money, such as for the militia services of the Revolution are lavished, with more than monarchical profusion; in short, the reasons for frustrating a national secession, to which Mr. Goodrich was already disinclined, and promoting a national result much more congenial with his own feelings and the interest of New England, were set before the Hartford conventionalist; and Colonel Jessup informed his superiors that he had reason to believe a favorable impression had been made. If the wonderful future, since developed by the Valley of the Mississippi, the far west, Florida, Texas, New Mexico, Oregon, and California, could then have been foretold, the political and geographical argument would have been still stronger for the East to perform the Halifax campaign. Colonel Jessup believed that the co-operation of New England for that great Eastern exploit of another year's hostilities might be expected from the Hartford Convention itself.

Confidential and clandestine as this episode to the Hartford Convention necessarily was, we cannot tell whether his belief was well founded; nor if Chauncey Goodrich ever imparted to others the vision set before him of Eastern aggrandizement, by waging, instead of arresting, that war, as the following enigmatical paragraph from the Boston Gazette at that time implied. "It is whispered that, after four or five months' utter neglect, a great expedition is to be undertaken, we will not say where, lest the enemy should know it. It is said the militia of Massachusetts are to be *invited* to achieve it, without money or provisions. The generalissimo selected on this occasion will be generally approved, as he was among the principal promoters of the war, and it is right he should have an opportunity to signalize himself. A wag, who is addicted to alliteration, remarked, that the only obstacles to its success were the want of

Arts, arms and ability,  
 Courage, conduct and credit,  
 Men, money and merit.



It will be seen that we make no reflections on the militia, for we are satisfied they will not go."

Between the 15th December, 1814, and 23d January, 1815, Colonel Jessup wrote daily to Mr. Monroe, to keep him informed of all that could be learned of the designs of the Convention, mostly sending his letters by private conveyance, sometimes taking them himself as far as New York, to prevent interception and ensure their unknown delivery. From all he could learn, the organized proceedings of the Convention were always unexceptionable. If anything obnoxious was mentioned, it was at informal and strictly secret meetings. At one time the seizure of the United States armory at Springfield was said to be agitated, and it was apprehended that if the British army, which struck its great blow in the South, had landed on Long Island, as was much conjectured for a considerable time, there were Americans of respectable standing ready with that encouragement to join the enemy. It was confidently believed, however, that any such attempt would have been easily and quickly crushed. Garrisoned with several hundred regular troops, commanded by tried and devoted officers, at Hartford, countenanced by nearly all the youthful and fighting men of Connecticut, Jessup, in the event of forcible collision, would have rallied to his standard a greater force than any opposition could muster. Such conflict with the lawful federal authority would probably have proved the sudden death-blow of revolt and disaffection, which, imbrued in blood, should have roused all the better feelings of an orderly people; most of them opposed to Madison's administration, indeed, and disapproving the war, but a large majority of them still more averse to lawless resistance, commotion and civil war, and nearly all the young of all parties willing to join the standard of their country. The Governor and most, if not all the Connecticut delegates in the Hartford Convention earnestly deprecated such dreadful strife, and would have spared no pains to prevent its occurrence. An educated, well-behaved and intelligent population, totally unlike the boors and yet more brutish townsfolks, of whom rebels are made by reckless instigators in Europe, uniformly treated Colonel Jessup with respect and kindness, which hospitality he returned by the utmost attention, and obliging his officers to similar respect of all public requirements, not incompatible with paramount military obligations. When the city of Hartford, pursuant to authority conferred by the legislature, enacted ordinances against the residence and recruiting of his regiment there, he mildly but firmly informed Mr. Goodrich, the Mayor, that as a soldier he was imperiously bound to obey the orders of his superior officers,

and execute the supreme laws of the United States, and that he could not submit to city ordinances, or State laws, which contravened such commands; on which remonstrance, Mr. Goodrich found means to suspend the conflicting local regulations. The Governor of the State, repairing to Hartford, when the legislature assembled there, in the beginning of February, 1815, Colonel Jessup, through a gentleman of the governor's circle, inquired, if an official visit from him and his officers would be well received, which being answered kindly, he went, with all his officers in full uniform, to pay the respect due to the Chief Magistrate of the Commonwealth, and was graciously entertained by the governor, surrounded by his council. Colonel Humphries, one of Washington's aids of the Revolution, a decided Federalist, but, like his great leader, devoted to the Union, and who, two years afterwards, accompanied President Monroe, on his eastern tour from Hartford to Boston, expressed, in presence of all those assembled, the gratification which he felt at a meeting between the army and the State Executive, which, he said, he regarded as a favorable sign. Soon after, Colonel Jessup and his officers were all invited to a public ball at Hartford, which they attended in full dress, several of them decorated with recent wounds; the impressions of all which incidents bruited throughout the community, softened many prejudices, and reconciled numerous converts from party antagonism to national adhesion.

Still the surface was ruffled, while beneath it a spirit of concord began to move. The statesmen were for their country and its union, at all events. But the politicians, that abominable category of disturbers of the public welfare, who by their craft fill legislatures, mislead governors, and though detested by the people at large of all parties, filch and pervert their sovereignty—the politicians were indefatigable in their contrivance to disturb government and propagate confusion. General Jessup's daily letters from Hartford, except the three incorporated with my text, cannot be found. When President Adams, in 1828, proclaimed the treason of the Hartford Convention, they were diligently searched for, as materials for his use. There is reason to believe that, passing from Monroe to Madison, and by both considered private correspondence, they were destroyed by Mr. Madison, who was as careful to destroy whatever he deemed dangerous papers, (papers which ought not to be made public till many years after they were written,) as Mr. Monroe was to preserve all papers whatsoever. Soon after the adjournment of the Convention, Colonel Jessup wrote to Mr. Monroe, the 20th January, 1815—"No regard is paid to the claim or authority of

the United States. A soldier was recently arrested for debt, and is now confined in jail. Another was fined, and being without funds, was thrown into prison, where he must remain until the fine is paid. In some parts of the country, suits have been commenced against the officers for debts of soldiers; and we are threatened daily with prosecutions in consequence of the enlistment of minors. The legislature will commence in this city early in the next week; the ostensible object for which it is called is, 'to take into consideration *the alarming state of public affairs,*' but if I mistake not, its real object will be found to be resistance to the laws of the Union. The act authorizing the enlistment of minors will be a subject of discussion, and I have no doubt measures will be taken to prevent its execution. In that event, which course must I pursue? Shall I submit or resist? Should there be an attempt (which I think not unlikely) to seize the public stores, my course is a plain one; and whatever may be the consequences to myself, I will raise such a storm as this country has never witnessed, and which in its course shall overwhelm all those turbulent demagogues who are laboring to overturn the government. The recruiting service has been attended with more success than I anticipated. I have but few officers, however, and some of them are wounded. Officers alone are wanted to enable me to complete the regiment."

February 3d, 1815, from Hartford Colonel Jessup sent Mr. Monroe a copy of the act of the Connecticut Legislature on the subject of minors, enacted there the day before; which declared the power assumed by Congress of removing the legal disability of minors to make contracts, and investing them with that capacity, in order to enable them to enlist into the army of the United States, repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution of the United States, and an unauthorized interference with the laws and rights of that State; that any person persuading a minor to depart from the State with intent to enlist into the army of the United States, without the consent of his parent, guardian and master, on conviction before the Superior Court, should be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding \$500, and to be imprisoned not exceeding a year; that any person so enlisting and enticing a minor out of the State should pay \$500; that any one advertising, or suffering to be posted on his house an advertisement, for such enlistment of a minor, should be fined not exceeding \$100, and imprisoned for not more than three months; and the State's attorneys were directed to prosecute by information all breaches of that act.

Thus Colonel Jessup, a citizen of Kentucky, and every other citizen of any other State, commissioned by the United States as an officer of the army, entitled by the Fede-

ral Constitution to all the privileges and immunities of a citizen of any State, was liable in Connecticut to conviction without indictment by a grand jury, deprived of the benefit of the two juries to pass on his case, for obeying the orders of his superiors given according to an act of Congress, which he and they were bound to consider the supreme law. Many other such vexatious state and local regulations beset and impeded officers of the United States, civil as well as military, in the performance of their duties in New England, where, without actual rebellion, or overt act of treason, continual impediments were by authority thrown in their way by politicians, in spite of the counsels of statesmen and the wishes of the people.

An act of Congress for the enlistment of minors is so unquestionably constitutional that it was a narrow and false postulate for resistance. If Congress had enacted the classification bill, that, with the odium of French conscription, might have sufficed, especially as the Legislature of Connecticut had almost unanimously resolved to resist it. The worst intent of the Hartford Convention was not immediate revolt by any overt act of treason. American abhorrence of English law of treason and its atrocious judicial enforcement, having rendered levying war indispensable to make a traitor, no such immediate resort was contemplated probably by the most treacherous. The plan was more subtle and not less ingenious. It might have led to civil strife, dissolution of the Union, separate peace and alliance with the enemy, without American treason, though, according to English law, and particularly that lately enacted for Ireland, there was treason enough for the execution of many traitors. But all the Hartford Convention designed was first to demand the taxes from the national government, if refused to seize them by act of State legislature, protected by a State army, by which crafty method of giving aid and comfort to the enemy, it was possible to put an end to the Union and the war without striking an armed blow at either.

On the 5th January, 1815, the Hartford Convention broke up in ignominious conclusion, by a formal adjournment. The Boston Patriot, on the 21st of that month, announced that the aristocratic faction of Boston, having lost all hopes of dictating to the Union, preferred a secure dominion in New England, shorn of half her strength, and all her glory, to continuing longer a despised and suspected minority under the General Government. The Legislature of Massachusetts, however, still at least endeavoring to dictate to the Union, on the 24th January, 1815, sanctioned the report of a committee ratifying the proceedings of the Hartford Convention, and applauding their devotion to the Union; pursuant to



the recommendations of which report, on the 27th of that month, it was resolved that the governor should appoint, and *instruct as he thought proper*, commissioners to proceed immediately to the seat of government, to make earnest application for some arrangement whereby the State, separately, or in concert with neighboring States, might be enabled to assume the defence of their territories against the enemy, and to that end that a reasonable portion of the taxes collected within said States might be paid into their respective treasuries, and appropriated to pay the balance due to them, and for their future defence; the amount to be credited, and disbursements charged to the United States. Accordingly, Governor Strong commissioned Harrison Gray Otis, William Sullivan and Thomas Handiside Perkins, to whom Connecticut added Calvin Goddard and Nathaniel Terry, to proceed on that still mysterious embassy to Washington. Their instructions were never published beyond their direction to make the insolent and dismembering application for as much of the national taxes as would pay the militia who had been refused for the nation, and the State troops to be levied to oppose it. To what branch of government, whether the legislative or the executive, that application was to be made, was not specified, and was immaterial, as neither Congress nor the President had either power or inclination to grant what would have undone both and the Union altogether. The mission was the precursor of *ulterior* measures threatened, however indistinctly, in the published report of the Hartford Convention, some of whose members no doubt had correspondents in Congress.

The day of its final adjournment, an ominous letter from Washington, of the 5th of January, 1815, appeared in the Baltimore Federal Gazette, darkly hinting "an explosion at hand—that the President would be called on to resign; and there *must* be peace by that or a future administration." From the time that the Senate refused, at the dictation of the Federalists, to elect Rufus King, on Gerry's death, to the acting vice-presidency, as presiding officer of the Senate, the opposition assumed a bold tone of defiance, as if denied the right they pretended to be entitled to of sharing in the government, and the direction of all its measures. The Convention, which, from Hartford, suggested envoys to Washington, to demand a separate administration for the East, recommended another and ulterior convention to be appointed by the Massachusetts Legislature, in the succeeding June, if the requirements of the first Convention should not be granted. Some of its surviving members, many years afterwards, controverting Mr. Adams' imputation of treasonable designs, excused a second convention, as, by holding out pros-

pects of lawful relief, it might repress public excitement, and prevent sudden popular outbreaks; ascribing to the people that excited and dangerous temper which they instigated, but the people generally did not participate. No second, eventual convention was attempted, to execute the ominous projects of the first, which expired in disappointment, darkness, and confusion. In the gloom of the doubts shrouding all their proceedings, both conventions, and their designs and envoys, with their instructions, were buried altogether in oblivious ignominy. But the first convention was certainly only the stepping-stone to another; and the requirement of the first for consent to its demand of separate government could hardly fail to superinduce ultimate insistence on virtual, if not violent, dissolution of the Union. The legislative premises of the first denounced the Constitution as unfit for either war or peace, and unsusceptible of timely amendment; and the crisis as superinducing the law of necessity above all other law, when the people themselves must cut a Gordian knot, which could be done only with the sword. Government, refusing such demand for its dismemberment, would have been the occasion for the ulterior convention to proclaim forcible withdrawal of the taxes and organization of the army of Massachusetts, negotiation of a separate peace, and then alliance with England, if not a northern confederacy with the British provinces, under the guaranty of Great Britain.

The explosion predicted by the Baltimore letter, by means of compulsory change of administration and peace, simultaneous with the mission from Boston to Washington, foreshadowed designs of disorganization which could leave no alternative but the national government capitulating with Massachusetts, by allowing the revolvers what they demanded, or their taking by force what was refused by arrangement. An Eastern fraction of government, in either event, was inevitable, if the disorganizers persevered in their plan.

To that result Eastern disaffection tended, whether wilfully or not; it must have been the end. Opposition to the embargo chiefly caused the war. Mr. Adams' advice to President Jefferson, in 1808, substituting the restrictive system for embargo, was the first step in concession, followed by the rest. The mission, in 1815, was the last movement preceding blows, of which the proposed separate government for New England must have been the ulterior complement.

The Massachusetts mission, dictated by the Hartford Convention, to Washington, was countenanced by many of the Federal journals out of, as well as in, New England, sedulously inculcating that no peace could be made while Madison was President;

wherefore it was indispensable to the safety, if not salvation of the country, that he should be removed from office. "The greatest curse that can befall the nation is a peace with Great Britain under the present administration," said the sanguinary Evening Post, of New York. "A union of all parties," cried the Federal Republican, "to drive Mr. Madison from power, whose continuance in office will render abortive every effort to defend and save the country. We believe, and have for some time believed, that there is no hope of preserving this Union six months, if six weeks, unless Mr. Madison resigns, or is removed from office." "Do the Democrats," asked the Boston Gazette, "think that a Madison, whose highest ambition is to balance a sentence and round a period—that the rhetorician who once glimmered in harmless debate, in times of peace, can now balance the conflicting parties of our country, or direct the energies of a powerful nation?" That Gazette of the 15th of December, 1814, confidently predicted that "we should agree to the conditions of peace (the rejected terms which at first roused, and seemed to unite all the nation), not very different from those proposed by Great Britain at first, or perhaps worse. That sentence in our commissioner's letter of the 24th of August, which rejects such terms as only compatible with surrender of our independence, is mere fustian—the rhetorical flourish of a Fourth of July discourse in Harvard chapel. Such unlucky diplomacy, penned in evil hour, seems as if Heaven intended to disgrace us. Why degrade the nation by anticipating terms equal to a surrender of our independence? The greatest people on earth have often made terms more disadvantageous, and yet preserved their character." The terms thus characterized as reasonable, which it would be mere rhetorical fustian to refuse, were the surrender of all the lakes, their waters and shores, with their sixty thousand inhabitants, (what now and what hereafter?) a direct communication from Halifax to Quebec, with five thousand people in Maine, and more than one-third of the western territories of the United States—all Michigan, Illinois and Indiana, with much of Ohio—altogether not less than one hundred and sixty-five millions of acres; which, with their waters, are now a large part of the most flourishing United States. By Blount's conspiracy, Burr's conspiracy, Henry's conspiracy, English conspiracies with the Indians, and conspiracies to instigate the Hartford Convention, Great Britain had endeavored to dismember the United States to the west, repeatedly at the south, and in the east. Of all these inexcusable designs there were Eastern American well-wishers; though without the treasonable co-operation for which English governmental corruption was lavished on the press, and some of the

partisans seduced. In the distempered, perhaps indefinite calculations of many years of disaffection to the federal government, the envoys of the Hartford Convention went to Washington. Their constituents had associated Madison with Bonaparte in the war; had openly condemned him, like his master, imprisoned at Elba, to some dishonored expulsion from chief magistracy; had, in their legislative bodies and public meetings, openly declared that he deserved to be hanged; had convinced themselves and their constituents that no doom was too bad for the principal obstacle to peace. In that temper, and with overweening confidence, they proceeded to the seat of government, through the commercial cities, where their mission found numerous abettors. Whatever were their undivulged instructions, their aim, object, and insolent assurance were the overthrow of the administration; or, failing to effect that, the dismemberment of as many Eastern States as could be misled from the Union.

On their way to Washington, the mischievous envoys of the Hartford Convention, more fortunately for them than their country, were confronted by tidings that Louisiana—the first plea for disunion, a foreign province not worthy of admission to the Union—had nobly, with western reinforcement, repelled British invasion, while it remained undisturbed, if not connived at, in part of Massachusetts, submitting to, perhaps rejoicing in, the disgraceful contrast; Boston, the cradle, threatening to become the grave of American independence. Before they reached Washington, the missionaries of disunion were still further confounded by news of peace, dropping its charitable mantle on whatever were their surreptitious designs. In the flush of consternating triumphs in which they could not sympathize, and exultation for peace, universal but for them, the agents of a disastrous attempt slunk home by illuminated roads and cities, hiding themselves from a delighted and exultant people; degraded butts of derision and abhorrence, beacons to future factionists, scorned as traitors wherever they went.

They were advertised in the newspapers as having absconded or lost themselves. The National Advocate of New York, whose editor, Henry Wheaton, after a life of public and professional distinction, lately died a professor in Cambridge University, advertised in his paper, and the National Intelligencer joyfully republished the paragraph, offering a reward for three unfortunate gentlemen from Boston, who had missed their way to Washington, in the service of the Hartford Convention, and it was feared had met with some mishap, perhaps drowned themselves. Their demeanor was furtive and chopfallen while at Washington, where, during a short and sorry sojourn, they never



ventured much abroad or to call on any member of the government, nor do more than make themselves known to the few members of Congress who countenanced their despicable project. As national songs are often more popular and effective than reason or argument, so ridicule is sometimes terrible logic, and not always the jocular or good humored, in which even its objects may join, not Greek or French mockery, lively and facetious, but the grave and scornful sneer of hateful English contumely, such as blasted the envoys of the Hartford Convention, whose punishment was novel and condign. While not a hair of their heads was harmed, permitted to live and die, and one yet surviving, unmolested in their persons and property, with fair private characters, yet condemned to complete and wholesome public degradation, for the dreadful risks to which they exposed the first trial of war by the republican government of a confederate country, by an attempt to reduce its States to dismemberment, and thus bring back dark ages of perpetual civil wars, by kings, peradventure, of Virginia, fighting kings of Massachusetts, embroiling all the intermediate States, like hostile tribes of barbarous Indians, inevitably involved in universal and incessant conflict. Europe, instead of a federal head, maintains the balance of power at immense cost of blood and treasure, by the armed prevention of otherwise perpetual war. Instead of that compelled peace, the United States of America, by their federal union, have substituted a compromise of State sovereignties, which no one can disturb for local and selfish purposes by unconstitutional opposition to the national government, without involving the harmony of the whole and supplanting order by complete disorganization. The Union is the rock of our salvation. All Washington's warning to his countrymen, admirable as the lesson is, tells less than the truth of its vital necessity, which, for the first time, was assailed by the Massachusetts combination against the war of 1812, more alarming than open rebellion. Mr. Otis' plea is, that the act of Congress of the 17th of January, 1815, authorizing the President to accept and employ State troops, sanctions the prior act of Massachusetts for raising such troops. But the State troops, authorized by that act of Congress, were to serve the nation under its commander-in-chief, the President, not to defy both him and them. South Carolina, Virginia, Maryland and New York tendered their State troops to the national executive for national hostilities. Massachusetts expressly withheld her troops under the exclusive command of her disloyal governor. The difference is a contrast between acts of patriotic State devotion and an act of State defiance, which, in all the

typographical attraction of italics, capitals and rhetorical language, Mr. Otis displays as what he calls the egg laid in the Hartford Convention, hatched by daylight under the wing and incubation of the national eagle. Still more discordant was the spirit than the letter of that hostile act.

In all American wars, there will be a peace party; war aggravating party spirit to which free speech and a free press give outrageous but legitimate vent. Chatham thanked God, in the British parliament, that America had resisted. Dexter declared that opposition must speak so loud as to be overheard by the enemy. Extreme party hostility, nevertheless, like other warfare, risks destruction, and success is its only justification. The Hartford Convention was one of those sectional and distant combinations to which this wide-spread, confederated Union is liable, justly suspicious and unquestionably unwarrantable, whether criminal or lawful, or excusable, provoked by no intolerable suffering, neither famine, pestilence nor the ordinary calamities of war, whose severest infliction was privation of commerce, enterprise and gain, not afflicting New England alone, but common, in great measure, to all the United States; not deprived of subsistence, raiment or habitation, while, by turning the versatile genius of the Eastern people to manufactures, the hotbed of war fomented what has proved as profitable as their commerce. That Convention, without treasonable act or hostile collision, contemplated the separate government of one or more States, which was dissolution of the Union; leading to partial peace and ultimate alliance with the enemy, which, Mr. Otis confessed, would have prostrated public credit and private property, real and personal, annihilated the public funds, and increased every calamity complained of. Granting the severe pressure and questionable constitutionality of the embargo, still, when war ensued, the first misdeed was withholding from national service and command the militia, and from the President, his constitutional right to judge when they are wanted, an error, as since adjudged unanimously by the Supreme Court of the United States, so flagrant that it could not be without unworthy prejudices and sectional disloyalty. Apologists for the Hartford Convention urge, the subsequent South Carolina nullification; but that was neither plotted in secret nor armed against war. Other analogies, argued from legislative, judicial or popular resistance to federal supremacy in several states, were but occasional jars in the intestine working of the complex machinery of State and United States government, faintly resembling the organized and confederated disorganization of several States combining to defeat a foreign war. The Hartford Convention stands alone in its design, mishap, disgrace,

and catastrophe; condemning Massachusetts, Mr. Otis bitterly deploras "to stand in a white sheet in the Halls of Congress, and letting loose a gulf stream of abuse on the most honored of her sons, laboring in vain to roll back, like Sisyphus, the continually recoiling fragment of popularity:" in vain, innocent of hostile collision or treasonable act, nevertheless guilty and justly condemned for infamous design against the Union. Former good character, urged for its members, every lawyer in the Convention knew that courts of justice treat as testimony so weak as to be often suspicious. The offence of the Hartford Convention, though it may have violated no law, shocked public opinion and national pride. When an individual treasonably resists government, alleging that it infringes the Constitution, it has provided judicial tribunals to pass between them. But when States by legislative acts resist acts of Congress, and command their citizens to resist them, the dissension becomes civil war. Whether the people of a State can leave the Union without breaking the federal compact, may be a constitutional question. No such power is in the charter, and, according to Mr. Adams, is like an individual's right to commit suicide or set fire to his house in a populous city, thereby endangering conflagration of all the rest.

Governor Eustis of Massachusetts, Governor Plumer of New Hampshire, and others of less authority, might not, however, have sentenced the Hartford Convention to infamy, had not the most vigorous and formidable of controversialists, from the Presidential chair, struck his mortal blow of remediless denigration. In the agonizing crisis (to borrow his own words applied to another crisis), of his presidential contest for re-election, Mr. Adams impeached the Hartford Convention of treason. The accused, who have a right to be heard, denied the charge as not only a base calumny, but uttered for the reward of apostasy. Having as Senator voted for the embargo, avowedly without deliberation, and merely, as he declared, because recommended by President Jefferson, they charged Mr. Adams with turning informer against his party and his State; and inheriting his father's hatred of Hamilton and other leaders of the Federal party, to whom father and son imputed the loss of the former's re-election, the son went over to Jefferson for vengeance and for office. To atone for a load of political guilt, individual and hereditary, prove the sincerity of his abjuration of party, place an impassable barrier between them and him, and attest the sincerity of his conversion, private denunciation of his former friends was required and given; and within a few months the Russian mission followed, leading to other promotion, and eventually to the Presidency. To this retort, Mr. Adams replied, that the first act of his public life in the

Senate of Massachusetts, was a proposal to admit to the council of that State representatives of the minority in the two Houses. And certainly his whole public career, as Secretary of State, President, and member of Congress, notwithstanding the violence of his temper, was remarkably abstemious of party and proscription. Those he accused of treason furthermore denied that he produced any proof, and asserted that, in place of witness, he was himself a mere party, twenty years after the secret of his treachery came to light, turned from accuser to accused; not naming any one living as guilty, but fixing his charge on the dead, and on them not individually. That Uriah Tracy, it was said, well aware of Adams' hereditary resentment against Hamilton, should be accused, after both were dead, of divulging to Adams so disgraceful an imputation on Hamilton, as that he was to be military leader of the northern confederacy, was treated as a palpable absurdity. James Hillhouse, John Davenport, John Cotton Smith, Simeon Baldwin, Benjamin Tallmadge, and Calvin Goddard, Tracy's associates from Connecticut in Congress, by solemn public denials repelled the charge as far as by negative testimony was possible: all gentlemen of character for truth as good as Mr. Adams. Hillhouse and Goddard were indeed members of the Hartford Convention; from which incredulity might infer their original misconduct: and notwithstanding Mr. Adams' disavowal to General Hamilton's son of belief in his father's connection with the design of disunion in 1803, in which the Hartford Convention was said to originate, yet President Adams was known to harbor that suspicion. Having left in print a declaration that it was not improbable that, at some future day, a sense of solemn duty to his country might require him to disclose the evidence he possessed, perhaps his forthcoming diary may clear up the hitherto inscrutable mystery. Whatever passions, prejudices, and errors there must be in those forty volumes of impressions, they can hardly fail to explain so important a circumstance in his life as the Hartford Convention. During three years immediately before, and three years after, its occurrence, Mr. Adams was in Europe, and acknowledges that he knew nothing about it. All he could do was to trace its conjectured descent from the indubitable design of 1803, matured, he declared, in 1808, to rotten nothingness in 1814; and while ever his memory endures, infamous, if not indisputably so.

The magic of success, especially by victory in arms, which strikes terror or joy upon the most sensitive fibres of human nature, fear and imagination, sudden, diffusive and powerful as electricity, winged the deeply impressive influences of Jackson's unexpected and astonishing triumph to the



remotest parts of North America, filling the hearts of all the war's supporters with exultation, and of all its factious antagonists with dismay. As soon as, if not before, the Hartford envoys could skulk home, running the gauntlet of scorn more stinging than the lash, and with no solace from any sympathy, the Boston tone of defiance fell to self-abasement. Distrust of and alienation from their country, confidence in the overpowering might of its great enemy, assurance of British success and American disgrace, were changed to shame and remorse by amazing victory, crowned by as unlooked for and almost unwelcome peace. By special Providence, Louisiana, the cause and argument of eastern estrangement from the Union, was the cause and place of its glorious preservation, joined to the east by sympathy like the overruling necessity which, stronger than constitutional admission, adopted that illegitimate sister into the family of jealous American States. Constitutional objections, party and personal repugnance, were drowned by shouts of universal triumph. Pilgrim descendants, in all the austerity of Puritan sectarianism, embraced French and Spanish Roman Catholic fellow countrymen two thousand miles off. Jefferson's purchase from Bonaparte was consecrated like the Plymouth Rock and Bunker Hill. The very slaves who defended New Orleans were applauded. Scales fell from the eyes of the sharpest vision to interest, theretofore sealed to the eastern advantages of the magnificent southwest, whose Kentucky savages, Tennessee barbarians and motley creoles had saved the American soil from pollution, the country of the whole United States from dishonor, and the entire American Union from destruction, almost without help from any arms but their own, none, military or civil, from New England. The British army did not retreat in more precipitate or clandestine discomfiture than the government of Massachusetts from all but factious and contemptible opposition to the war or the Union. The same Senate which resolved it unbecoming to rejoice in the victories of their own Boston built frigate, manned by New England seamen, on the report of a committee on the 13th of February, 1815, of which Mr. Josiah Quincy was a member, ordered a vote of thanks to General Jackson and the brave troops under his command, for the glorious and signal victory obtained by them over the British army near the city of New Orleans. The place mentioned for felicitation was the key and mart of those southwestern States which the press, the pulpit, the exchange and the legislature of Massachusetts, by inimical proceedings and outrageous terms, had divorced from the Union as unworthy of it with the thirteen original States. Mr. Quincy, who in Congress vehemently

contested the admission of Louisiana into the confederacy, rejoiced when he must have regretted that Louisiana had rescued the Union from dismemberment, and closed the war in a blaze of glory. Narrow-minded Massachusetts, who as early as 1643 strove to exclude even Connecticut from the primeval consociation, from 1803 to 1812 repelled Louisiana, and then all the southwest, joined, in 1815, in a national shout of far distant victory, while part of the old Bay State was a conquered British province. Mr. Quincy, driven from national distinction to the mayoralty of Boston, underwent that searing of blinded sight which opened to behold the commerce, the manufactures, and the advancement altogether of his discontented birth-place, greatly augmented by those national developments which render New Orleans the correlative of Boston, illustrated by the glory of the southwest, and without disunion by peace indefinitely perpetuated.

Yielding, however, the vanquished followers of disloyalty submitted with the worst grace. On the 28th February, 1815, the republicans of the Senate addressed Gen. Jackson in what they called the small voice of a minority of a remote State, of little repute in arms and less in patriotism, declaring that they would not then have obtruded, had not Mr. Holmes' resolution expressive of thanks experienced an extraordinary fate: committed, and after much delay and embarrassment reported, with an offensive preamble, denouncing the war as unjust, the government as improvident and wicked, with extreme virulence and invective, approving only of what related to defensive warfare; which the republicans were constrained to oppose as censure under pretext of approbation. Such was the last folly of that faction derided by Cobbett as the "serene highnesses, Cossacks and poor creatures of Massachusetts."

Perpetual peace, a dream of some enthusiasts in all ages, is repose more fatal than occasional war. Commercial people, steeped in mere acquisition, become debased like miserly individuals, and can be roused from selfish pursuits to high-minded individuality as well as nationality, raised from ignoble traffic to nobler aspirations, only by the shock of hostilities. Conflict with their own national government had long sharpened wits, but attacks of solemn enemies were necessary to awake manlier energies. Sordid motive for disaffection forbade lofty or daring action, which vented itself in vilification and petty malice. When, therefore, a whole country was relieved by distant successes, which rivetted every State to the union of all, the remorseful discord quailing, surrendered, rejoicing for victories which it envied, but dared not disown. National joy, reluctantly re-echoed from the depths of eastern

disloyalty, could not be narrowed to defensive triumphs by the metaphysics of faction.

Insulting quodlibets of the press, innuendoes of politicians, and pulpit fulminations—how their tone changed! Madison's wisdom was admired, his firmness applauded by outrageous revilers, who, a few years after his retirement from the presidency, performed pilgrimages to his Virginia homestead as a shrine, and extolled its modest master as the model of American statesmen, his politics as the true standard of constitutional principles. In that worship of success, transforming a demon to a demigod, some of the most unbridled censors of the war President were among the foremost adorers of the father of the Constitution. The Boston Gazette gave out that the legislature of Massachusetts had resolved to suspend their unexecuted law for raising State troops, except as to one thousand men; but a committee had been appointed to the characteristic duty of reporting what additional remuneration ought to be allowed to the Massachusetts members of the late Hartford Convention.

From the lofty tribunal of chief magistracy, John Quincy Adams passed sentence on those he tried, as "certain leaders of a party which had the management of the legislature (of Massachusetts) in their hands," marked them one and all with what he termed "the stamp of indelible reprobation," particularly Mr. Otis, of whom with peculiar sharpness of sarcasm he said, that, "having as putative father enjoyed unrivalled the honors, he was disposed to bestow on others the shame of its paternity." Although he reached the presidency without a popular majority, and was expelled from it with popular disfavor, yet Mr. Adams' character stood too high and fair, and his talents were too commanding for his word to be disbelieved in what he positively affirmed against those of his own State and neighborhood and party, with whom he long lived in social and political fraternity. On his authority the Hartford Convention is executed.

As foreign minister, Mr. Adams was superior to most and equal to almost any of the many able men commissioned by this country to defend its interests in Europe. Bred to that vocation, familiar with its forms, habits and conventionalities, in its princely, noble and other elevated intercourse, he was simple, candid and manly, without the derogatory obsequiousness to rank and splendid hospitalities to which American representatives so often sacrifice their political usefulness. As Secretary of State, his conduct and public correspondence kept up the high character of that department. And as President, his administration was economical and temperate, cherishing the welfare of all parts of the Federal

Union. But soon after losing the presidency, he violated the examples of all his predecessors, one of them his own father, a much better parliamentarian than himself, by plunging into that boisterous sea of troubles, the House of Representatives: rash and fatal plunge, into a purgatory where whatever sins he had committed or should, instead of being expiated, were aggravated by the turbulent violence of his temper, continually betrayed to excesses. With superior literary and scientific attainments, linguist, poet, geometrician, dramatist, one of the best biblical scholars of his day, and with many other talents for happy, dignified and admired retirement, convivial tastes, colloquial powers, perfect health, easy fortune, repute not only American but European, to constitute a household deity, like Jefferson and Madison, which even the warrior Jackson became without literary attraction—Mr. Adams preferred sixteen years of tumultuous controversy in Congress; and what might have been the brightest period of his power, as a shrine, he made a last stage of undignified squabbles on a hustings. In a splendid hall, of marvellous inaptitude for hearing and total indifference to speaking, he commanded the attention bestowed on very few and that rarely: yet no member combined so much eminence with so little influence. Indisputable homage to his superior information and experience in all branches and affairs of government, foreign and domestic, together with acknowledged purity and weight of character, well husbanded and used, might have rendered his legislative more potent than his executive word. His word, which should have been a law, was that of a disorderly wrangler in a fluctuating assembly biennially renewed from remote regions, with various views, among whom no one seemed to delight, more in noisy conflict, or voted oftener in small sectarian, ineffectual and condemned minorities than the ex-president. Although not much accustomed to public speaking till more than sixty years old, he was a frequent, strenuous and passionate declaimer, without the rhetorical finish which ornamented his written efforts, any grace of action, commanding tone or person, but forcible and eloquent from earnestness and passionate logic, the best elements of commanding oratory. On one occasion he held the floor the time allowed by rule, for thirteen successive days of one protracted speech. Owing to the licentious extravagance of his conduct, he was more than once in danger of censure or expulsion, which he anxiously and admirably prevented by inimitable powers of discussion and deprecation. In such perpetual turmoil he was never the author, hardly the mover, of any great national measure. During his service in Congress



he was always in opposition, generally with extreme antagonism to successive administrations; latterly with outrageous aversion to the slave States, and all acquisition of further southern territory, which, as Secretary of State and President, he as warmly countenanced; as much against Texas and Mexico, as he was for Louisiana and Florida. Vindication, which he ardently espoused, of what he deemed the right of petition, was rather an English than American constitutional position, more sentimental than rational, transient than lasting, and local than national. Insatiate of living notoriety as well as posthumous fame, for such gratification he spent many of his latter years in turmoil on the stage, where indeed he bravely maintained himself to die at last as he desired, in the Capitol and of emotion. One year before his glorious death and immense post-mortem glorification, no member of the whole House of Representatives was so odious to so many others, or without distinction of party, so decried. For he provoked the animosity of the representatives of fifteen of the thirty States by his unmeasured, and as they charged, malignant, envenomed, vindictive efforts for their destruction, because their votes prevented his re-election to the presidency. While he lived and railed and defied in the twenty-ninth Congress, hatred of him was nearly as universal and intense, as, in the thirtieth Congress, when dying in their midst, the feeling, without one dissenting voice, was reverential and applaudive. As Senator and Secretary of State, no one did more to extend the United States where slavery prevails, to which as President he seemed as well disposed. As member of the House of Representatives, no one so furiously and commandingly brandished firebrands of disunion.

Though Mr. Adams did not live by many years as long as his father, yet he was a man of remarkably robust frame and excellent constitution. A female, when he was first made President, complaining to a member of Congress that she could not see the chief magistrate as she desired, "You have only," said he, "to go down to the Potomac bridge any morning about day-light, and you may see him swimming in the river." After he was seventy years old, that continued to be his habit, and it was said that he often swam across the Potomac where it was more than a mile wide. Although commonly taciturn and often abrupt, Mr. Adams was a very pleasant companion in society, relished with gentlemanlike enjoyment the pleasures of the table, fond of good food, choice wines, and all other resources of conviviality. One Sunday evening, while Secretary of State, entertaining at his own house Nicholas Biddle and other gentlemen, becoming much animated with description of dramatic performances, of which

he was very fond, he started from the table to the middle of the floor, and performed an imitation of Kemble pronouncing the curse in *King Lear*. Through life a systematic student, he was indefatigable in reading and writing, and, as the world is to find, kept one of the most voluminous diaries ever put to paper. Exemplary in the whole routine of domestic duties, he was liberal, hospitable, and placable, though subject to gusts of passion and fits of taciturnity. Churches and theatres he frequented with the utmost assiduity, and so blended political with religious obligation, as to deem it incumbent on him to attend the miscellaneous divine service in the Capitol every Sunday morning, going to some other place of worship in the afternoon, and often to a third in the evening.

When he first entered the Hall to resume his seat, after some months' absence during his illness, the whole House of Representatives, every member, rose as he walked down the middle aisle, and by a salute of silent homage welcomed their illustrious associate to a place from which, for fourteen years and more, he had never been absent, in all seasons and weathers, night and day, and not only present, but certainly taking a much more constant interest than any other member in whatever was going on. Always present in body and mind from that time till his death, though his memory may have suffered with his health, his reason and conversation appeared unimpaired; but I think he made only two speeches, and neither of them with his usual vivacity.

The last speech he made was against an appropriation for the Spanish slaves who had been (as I contended unlawfully), set free by his exertions, reappearing as advocate in their cause before the Supreme Court of the United States, after thirty years absence from it. The House was in committee of the whole on the state of the Union, with the rule in force which prevented debate. The Spanish minister had strongly urged, the President recommended, the Secretary of State by special letter pressed, the Senate, almost, I believe, without serious opposition, had passed, and the proper committee of the House of Representatives reported for adoption, the appropriation which Mr. Adams opposed. He rose, and with strong feeling, asked leave to address the committee of the whole, which they had no power to give, contrary to a rule of the House that was irreversible in committee, who nevertheless gave leave by an irregular consent to a venerable and moribund applicant. Asking leave for a few minutes, he spoke for forty with animation and force, appealing to humanity and passion; and such was the effect of his expostulation that the grant was rejected by a large majority. So his last speech was against slavery, as no doubt he would have wished it should be, for his feeling on that subject had become overpowering.

On the 21st February, 1848, he underwent his death-stroke in attempting to give utterance to an emotion. The House of Representatives were voting thanks to several of the generals in the Mexican war, to which he was opposed, not only because of his disapproval of the war and the administration charged with it, but because, as he objected, some of the generals were under charges to be tried for misconduct. Uttering his nay to the clerk's call for votes, with the petulant vehemence he often affected, as if not merely to negative but stigmatize the proposition, and soon afterwards trying, as is believed, to rise and say something, he sunk forward in his seat senseless, in a fit of mortal paralysis. A crowd of members rushed to his help, and keeping my place at some distance, I did not see him till lifted up and borne off by Dr. George Fries, one of the Ohio members, who, attended by many others, carried him through the middle aisle out of the House, by the centre door, into the rotunda, where Dr. Fries in his lap supported Mr. Adams, till a sofa was brought, on which he was laid and taken into the Speaker's room. Almost inanimate, he is said to have uttered a few words, "This is the last of earth," as his valedictory to the world, from which he had prepared for conspicuous departure. His family, friends, and several ministers of the Gospel, soon came and prayed for him, not, however, without misunderstanding as to which clergyman was best entitled, and further heartburning afterwards concerning their invitations to the funeral, as passionately preached by one of the disappointed from the pulpit the following Sunday.

Few braver men have lived or died in emulous vanity of patriotism, like a soldier in the breach or martyr at the stake, intent on daily as well as posthumous celebrity. Mr. Adams longed to die in the Capitol, and surpassed Chatham's death, which he emulated. Chatham did not die in Parliament, but fainted in the House of Lords, when speaking against the Duke of Richmond's motion for acknowledging American independence, in 1778, was taken home, and lingered a fortnight before he expired. If Adams could have expired when, as well as where, he wished, it would have been next day after his attack, the 22d February, Washington's birth-day, instead of living till the evening of the 23d, on which memorable day, however, another remarkable coincidence signaled his demise. From the Duke of Orleans' first installation on the French throne, Mr. Adams confidently predicted that he could not remain there; anointed neither by the grace of God nor the sovereignty of the people, with no principle for his diadem, which, therefore, Mr. Adams insisted, he could not wear to the end of life. The people of Paris verified his prediction, and

from attempted renovation of decaying royalty in Europe, struck out a republic like the American, driving the last French monarch from his throne as Adams' prophetic spirit left the earth. Hated and vilified as he had been in the Capitol, his death was instantly followed there by a gush of unanimous veneration for his memory, and unbounded respect for his mortal remains.

Adjourning at once on his apparent, the House of Representatives adjourned again the next two days, awaiting his actual demise, and then the rest of the week for his obsequies. The Hall and his chair were draped in mourning on the day of his funeral, and many of the houses of Washington in like manner. Obituary notices were pronounced by several members of each House. Forty thousand copies of them were distributed by the House, together with the funeral discourse pronounced there by one of the chaplains in presence of both Houses. A committee was appointed to arrange the funeral ceremonies, and another committee of thirty members, one for each State, to attend the body to the birth and burial-place of the deceased at Quincy, near Boston. Transported by steam and announced by electricity throughout the long viaticum of several hundred miles from Washington to Quincy, much of the whole intermediate population of all parties and colors, and both sexes, thronged the city streets and flocked to the places of temporary deposit, reverentially to behold the face, exposed to view by a glass covering on the upper part of the coffin. Railroad companies and other conveyances refused pay for the transportation. Cities defrayed the expenses of the convoy during its stay within them respectively. City mayors, clergymen, and other panegyrists, vied with each other in eulogies on the departed patriot, whose remains were displayed at Philadelphia in the hall where Independence was declared; at New York, among four hundred thousand inhabitants, increased from forty during Mr. Adams' manhood; and at Boston, surrounded by all surviving tokens of that birthplace of riotous American independence. At Quincy, when interred, applause was first tempered with candor in the final funeral discourse, which, like obituary of Egyptian kings, awarding to the illustrious dead many excellencies, sketched also some of his deficiencies, denying him the greatest quality of a statesman, talent to rule men, to found, raise, or overturn States.

The last offices of the pall-bearers being performed, the committee of thirty returned to Boston to partake of the elegant hospitalities of that city, where two hundred and more sat down to a luxurious entertainment, refreshed by the viands of America and the wines of Europe. At every plate, in mid-winter of a harsh climate, a bouquet of flowers cast fragrance



around the table, as the hotbed of a flinty soil forces the ingenuity of New England to flourishing industrial development. Members of Congress were there from Attacapas and Florida, where no winter rages; from cotton growing Mississippi; from Chicago, once far west, already but mid-way in the march of republican empire; from nullifying South Carolina; and all the other slaveholding states; of whom Mr. Adams had more than once said, during the last year of his life, that slavery must be extirpated, though in torrents of blood. When his apotheosis was elevated, perhaps his spirit among the guests in unity at the Boston festival of merry mourners, in their midst arose a bright octogenarian, with still sparkling eye and musical voice, whom the almost deified departed had marked with the stamp of indelible reprobation, as putative father of the Hartford Convention, renouncing the shame of its paternity. Appealing with smiles to the sympathies of a national auditory, "you see in me," said Harrison Gray Otis, gaily, "a live Hartford Convention man;" and reading portions of the resolutions which he wrote for that body, he asked, "Is there any treason in this?" For the first time in twenty years Mr. Otis then appeared at a public meeting, even in Boston, after his martyrdom of attempted service in the Senate of the United States, withdrawn from public life, and marked like a regicide for voting the death of his king. Admired as a gentleman, and beloved by many friends, Boston and Massachusetts would still have awarded him public honors; but exiled from American respect, he was sentenced to national disfranchisement. When President Madison cast about for eminent citizens to appoint for the mission of peace at St. Petersburg, Mr. Otis' distinguished talents and position were taken into consideration; and he might have been selected, instead of Mr. Bayard, to negotiate the peace which, attempting surreptitiously to compel, stripped him of all his well-earned national honors.

His chief accuser, too, lived to forget Washington's valedictory precept, indignantly to frown upon the first dawning of every attempt to alienate any portion of the country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link together the various parts: in which backsliding, Mr. Adams, as member of Congress, widely strayed from all his prior and presidential federalism; encouraging, by the pernicious example of an eminent statesman, the still grosser deviations of inferior followers. Neither Hartford Convention, nullification, or ex-presidential denunciation, however, has done more than vulgarize the threat, disparage the States, and denationalize the individuals attempting that patricidal extremity of factious and sectional dis-

affection, which has been always overpowered by popular disgust, and frustrated by territorial, more than even constitutional impossibility.

Of the committee of thirty members of the House of Representatives, accompanying Mr. Adams' remains to the place of interment, besides the New England members, some representing districts in other States, were natives of New England, or their sons, and others had been educated there. When, therefore, the Boston wake closed at midnight, after pledging the memory of John Quincy Adams, and the health of Harrison Gray Otis, the whole assembly united in singing the venerated Hundredth Psalm:

"Ye nations round the earth rejoice,  
Before the Lord, your sovereign king;  
Serve him with cheerful hearts and voice—  
With all your tongues his glory sing."

The positions, recollections, and vicinity of Boston, combined to render it in 1814, what it has since become, a city of great influence throughout America, by commerce and intelligence, whose merchants are the best educated in the world. Cambridge University, in one of its suburbs, is the oldest, richest, and most celebrated of American colleges. Boston harbor, capable of containing a thousand ships in deep water, protected from storms by numerous islands, from enemies by a narrow entrance, guarded by forts Warren and Independence, has Copps' Hill, Lexington, Concord, Dorchester, Roxbury, and other classic grounds, hard by, to call to mind the daring exploits of an uncommon population, whose intelligence, enterprise, and advancement palpitate in every throb of American national existence. Not a church, or a forum, a medical hall, or counting-house, but is continually replenished by, and both Houses of Congress acknowledge the intellectual contributions of, those New England States, of which Boston is the capital. The name of mixed reproach, admiration, and aversion by which the whole country is known in others, comes from those thickly settled throughout all its borders, composing a universal Yankee nation. But many innocent persons burned to death from religious hatred, the Revolution begun by a respectable mob, and the prevalence of metaphysical refinements on Christianity, mark a peculiar and intolerant community. While Vice-President Gerry at Cambridge, Judge Story at Salem, and the patriarchal ex-president, John Adams, at Quincy, zealously sustained the war, and Madison's administration of it, a large majority united with Mr. Otis, Mr. Quincy, Governor Strong, and others, to oppose both, among them Mr. Thomas H. Perkins, whose princely fortune and establishments were staked on his errand as one of the ministers of the Hartford Convention.

Should the British North American pro-

vinces become parts of these United States, with the Newfoundland fisheries, and shores, the mariners of New England masters of the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, must concentrate a large portion of the commerce of the globe in Boston. But without that union, which too many of its angry inhabitants resisted, what now would be Boston, Massachusetts, and New Eng-

land? dwindled to worse than insignificance. If disunion was the design of the Hartford Convention, no part of these United States has gained so much by its frustration as the authors of that design; whose moral treason and moral punishment are among the memorable events of that war, and sunset pledges of perpetuated free government.

## CHAPTER XI.

### THE BANK AS ATTEMPTED AND PREVENTED IN 1814.

ON the 4th January, 1814, a young man of Long Island, New York, John Lefferts, one of the delegation from that State, presented a petition, signed by one hundred and fifty of its inhabitants, dated 18th December, 1813, praying for the establishment of a national bank, with a capital of thirty millions of dollars; offering to loan half that sum to the government; and stating as reasons for the bank that its means of lending to government would be much greater than those of the state banks; and all the fiscal concerns of government much better conducted by it than by them. Such, they said, had been its experience. The whole circulating medium of the United States, fifty millions, is now appropriated by the stockholders of the State banks to their own purposes, who, in lieu of it, circulate their own paper; whereas by a national bank, the whole people would receive the benefit of its funds. The political effects, this petition added, would be as useful as its fiscal and economical. It would induce men of property all over the United States to invest their means in a national institution tending to perpetuate the Union. On Mr. Calhoun's motion, the petition was printed. On Mr. Leffert's motion, it was referred, contrary to the desire of Mr. Calhoun and others, to the committee of ways and means, of which Jefferson's son-in-law, John W. Eppes, an uncompromising enemy of a national bank, was chairman, and the other members were John Taylor, Jonathan Roberts, William Creighton, Willis Alston, Alexander McKim and William Cox. This important committee consisted, as Mr. Speaker Clay's committees mostly did, of a decided majority of members of his own party. The general principle is to appoint two to one, or five to two of a committee consisting of seven members, like this. The only Federalist upon it was Mr. Cox of Burlington, New Jersey, a well-informed and respectable gentleman, but not one who ever made speeches. A majority of the

committee at that time denied constitutional power to charter a bank. The influence of the Executive, disorder of the currency, and tendency of public opinion, concurred to render eventually such an institution so convenient, as to resolve the question of constitutionality into that of necessity. It was supposed to become essentially necessary to the execution of a power expressly delegated by the Constitution. The commercial interest had no representative on that committee but Mr. McKim, of Baltimore, an intelligent merchant; while the landed interest was largely represented by Mr. Eppes, Mr. Roberts, Mr. Alston, and perhaps Mr. Taylor and Mr. Creighton, who at any rate were without seaport sympathies with inhabitants of commercial marts, to whom banks were most familiar and acceptable. In a few days, therefore, on the 10th January, 1814, Mr. Eppes reported in three lines of conclusive rejection from the committee, that a national bank is unconstitutional; and there the matter seemed to be ended with a flat negative of the possibility of any bank. On the 4th February, on Mr. Calhoun's motion, however, the committee of the whole House was discharged from further consideration of the report of the committee of ways and means on the petition for a national bank; and both report and petition were referred to the committee of ways and means, with instructions to inquire into the expediency of a national bank in the District of Columbia; to be located, the resolution said, in that district. By that escape of the question of unconstitutionality, the first of Mr. Calhoun's steps in the movement was taken. On the 19th February, Mr. Taylor from that committee reported, accordingly, a bill for the establishment of a bank in the city of Washington, with a capital of thirty millions of dollars, declaring, however, himself opposed to the report and plan, which was also opposed by several other members, and had few friends, none probably among



the President's adherents. Like the first attempt by Mr. Lefferts, that second one by Mr. Calhoun proved an abortion.

On the 2d of April, 1814, Felix Grundy moved for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the expediency of establishing a national bank; which resolution, Thomas Newton moved to postpone indefinitely. The motion for indefinite postponement, by mixed votes, in which parties were confounded, was lost by seventy-one ayes to eighty nays. An amendment to confine the bank within the District of Columbia got only thirty-two votes. Grundy's motion was then carried by a majority of seven, seventy-six to sixty-nine; and a special committee appointed, consisting of Felix Grundy, Thomas J. Oakley, John C. Calhoun, Wm. Gaston, John G. Jackson, William Lowndes, Artemas Ward, Samuel D. Ingham and Jonathan Fisk. Of these nine, only one, Mr. Jackson, was opposed to a bank, and that only as unconstitutional, and there was some prospect of its success. But the session was then too near an end for anything requiring time and discussion. On the 18th of April, 1814, Congress adjourned till the last Monday in October following, and thus every effort to create a national bank then failed; Grundy's in April, like Mr. Calhoun's in February, and Lefferts' in January. During those four months the circulation of the whole country was distempered. Without national financial reservoir, ignorant and avaricious state legislation supplied an unwholesome currency, taken from the turbid and often stagnant pools of local banks erected in virtual, if not actual violation of the Federal Constitution.

The course of hostilities, before Congress met again, gave color, if not cause, for resort to a national institution.

The official statements of the twenty-six banks of Massachusetts, rendered in January, 1814, and published by order of the Senate of that State on the 20th of that month, reported nearly seven millions of specie in their vaults. Simon Snyder, the Governor of Pennsylvania, in his message of the 19th of March, 1814, putting his veto on the bill of the legislature of that State, creating the litter of forty-one banks, declared, "a fact, well ascertained, that immense sums of specie have been drawn from the banks of Pennsylvania and certain other States, to pay balances for British goods, which Eastern mercantile cupidity has smuggled into the United States. The demand for specie has in consequence been, and is still so great, that the banks in Philadelphia and in some other parts have stopped discounting any new paper. Shall we increase this pressure? Shall we indirectly aid our internal and external enemies to destroy our funds and embarrass the government, by creating forty-one new banks, which must

have recourse for specie to that already much exhausted source? Is there an intelligent man in Pennsylvania who believes that a bank note of any description is the representative of specie? Forty-one new banks, with a nominal capital of seventeen millions of dollars, upon the bare payment of one-fifth part, shall have the right to throw into circulation an additional overwhelming flood of paper money!"

The banks which flooded the State with paper, and ruined hundreds of people, intoxicated the prosperity and swelled the seeming capital of the whole commonwealth. Those who endorsed for each other to borrow credit of the banks, compelled to pay when they could not, were many of them ruined. The sheriff sold the houses they built and farms they improved by bank discounts; but the houses and farms remained in the hands of other owners, and the infatuation continued unabated. One of the most respectable members of that legislature, Mr. Thomas Sergeant, voted with the majority to overcome the veto, for fear, he said, of its recoil. The year before he voted against the bank bill which provided for twenty banks. The exasperated mercenaries who solicited them threatened to resume the effort next year for forty instead of twenty; for why, said those ignorant and rapacious men, should the city of Philadelphia make all the money for the State? Accordingly, when their threat was realized in 1814, by a bill for forty, Mr. Sergeant and the Governor's nephew, George Kremer, voted for the forty, not because they approved them, but dreaded an infliction the year after of eighty. In such geometrical ratio of usurpation have those scourges of American industry and morality multiplied till near a thousand disorder the currency, impoverish the community, and grind the poor.

The tanner governor of Pennsylvania was the first of that Democratic dynasty of chief magistrates, ruling, as he said, by common sense instead of the lawyer learning of common law, triumphantly chosen throughout his constitutional term of nine years, as Shakspeare's grave-digger, philosophizing on the skulls of lawyers, statesmen and courtiers, had said, "a tanner shall last you nine years." In spite of his eloquent remonstrance, pregnant with the wisdom of political economy, the constitutional two-third rule of lawyers, bankers, brokers, speculators and their creatures in the legislature, vanquished the veto, and let loose the ravages of irredeemable paper money. Science, experience, the Constitution and common sense contended in vain against avarice and fraud trampling down all obstacles at Harrisburg, as on such occasions they always have at London and at Paris. But the Regent Duke of Orleans, with the splendid aristocracy of France, in 1790, and the Premier Pitt with the commons, prelates

and peage of Great Britain, in 1797, yielded to the paper storm, which the tanner governor resisted, though in vain, in 1814.

A member of the State Senate of Pennsylvania, then dawning, who afterwards fell a blazing meteor from the firmament of banks, in 1814 a young man of fine talents, temper and address, well educated, and improved by the finish of European travel, Nicholas Biddle, was one of the minority who stood by Simon Snyder against that reckless and senseless revival of continental money, issued on corporate, so much worse than public credit. Another, who, as Secretary of the Treasury, struggling to undo Jackson's soldier grip of the Bank of the United States, tearing out its vital deposits, when by Nicholas Biddle as defyingly defended as assaulted, William J. Duane, who mediated in that battle of giant combatants, resolved to rule or ruin—likewise in the crisis of 1814, as a member of the Pennsylvania legislature, voted with the minority, vainly sustaining Governor Snyder.

The banks of Boston, full of ill-got gain, those of Philadelphia, New York and Baltimore, drained nearly to emptiness, the capture of Washington on the 24th of August, 1814, brought on the panic which was instantly followed by the stroke of palsy. The banks of that forlorn metropolis fell empty into the enemy's hands. The nine banks of Baltimore being nearest the disaster, quickly gave way. On the 30th of August, 1814, the presidents of the six banks of Philadelphia gravely and gladly advertised that they were no longer able to pay coin. Large importations of foreign goods into eastern ports had drained, they complained, the eastern banks; a drain increased by trade in British government bills of exchange, causing large sums to be exported from the United States. The banks of Philadelphia thus announcing their own insolvency, publicly ascribed to the treasonable practices of those of Boston, next day a meeting of a committee from all the New York banks, considering that the Philadelphia banks had suspended, considerably indebted to those of New York, affecting the utmost regret, nevertheless found it necessary to stop. The usurpation of bank imposture thus established, reigned for several years without interruption, redress, or almost complaint. Large discounts and dividends ruled with impunity and flagrant wrong. The banks yielded to the always desirable necessity of submitting to irresponsible promises and inflated dividends; protesting aversion, like lewd women ravished in a sacked town. Village pigmies, hardly pretending to metallic subsistence, of course followed their city betters. South and west of New England, everywhere the whole frail sisterhood, with affected regret, gladly submitted together to revel in ruin.

On the 4th of March, 1814, the Baltimore

banks solicited the Secretary of the Treasury to suggest an act to Congress rendering foreign gold a legal tender and preventing exports of specie. The Boston banks surfeited with it, and spawning small notes, the precursors of smaller, worse and still more abominable, nick-named shill-plasters, triumphed in the derangement of the currency of the war-waging States, and mocked the agonies of the federal government. The Eastern press and pulpits, with Timothy Pickering in Congress, openly, and others by connivance, decried all banks subscribing to war loans. One extremity of the Union rampant with the means of disaffection, the rest reduced to paper money, the whole monetary system disordered, the sudden and overwhelming capture of Washington gave the finishing stroke. Money entirely disappeared, except where virtually represented by small notes, which constituted the exclusive circulation then, as they still do, in New England and New York. The ashes of the capital and the feculence of currency forced the second edition of a national bank. Beginning with a ruined circulation to rectify, its outset disordered by disgraceful speculation of its own officers, after some years of precarious existence, fluctuating even when well established between expansion and contraction, delirious in decline and tremendous in dissolution, with too much capital for the Union controlling the State banks till driven from it and constrained to become one of them, with that unwieldy capital, then protracting caducity by unwarrantable contrivances, the great mistress of banks broke at last with a catastrophe not confined to America, but felt in Europe and in Asia. Notes, which in China, India, and England had been taken as better than gold, proved worthless in the hands of impoverished and defrauded holders. Worse than the frauds, illegalities and immoralities of stupendous confusion by paper money, through the deranged resources of the flourishing commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and maledictions of English holders of its stocks, the stigma of repudiation of public debts was unjustly and audaciously fixed on the national character of the American people. The Constitution of the United States saved them, after the war of 1812, from bankruptcy by paper money repudiation like that which followed the war of the Revolution. Since that solitary revolutionary repudiation, the United States have never failed in the punctual payment of their debts, and are the only nation that has extinguished them all, though cursed with a debased and vile currency. Great Britain for three and twenty years repudiated just as her fundholders reproached Pennsylvania; and pays the interest of debts which the most credulous cannot hope will ever be extinguished. If



State laws could evade the Federal Constitution forbidding legal tender of paper money, the enormous iniquity, of which an act of English Parliament was the seducing example, might have found American imitators aggravating English fraud, as Americans are prone to exaggerate English improprieties, and English tribulation to restore coin might have proved intolerable throughout so many sovereign States, empowered, it seems, to grant intangible bank charters. Moreover, excepting that federal safeguard, our monetary system is worse than the English, its suspensions more inevitable, and its destruction more fatal. English depreciation was uniform and universal; American as various as different localities, and as much worse as one dollar notes or less are worse than one pound notes or five dollars. Rills of circulation, defended by the Malagrowthers of the Scotch novelist, may fertilize by irrigating there. But they depress and degrade American labor. Nowhere in the world is small paper money so pernicious, so inexcusable, so unnatural or so absurd as in America. Whether a national bank is the most effectual prevention of it and the best means of a sound convertible circulation, the disastrous fate of the second bank has precluded the fair ascertainment.

Mother country aberration more than reconciled this to bank suspension. The banks were not complained of. When Jackson substituted them as safe depositories of the public money in preference to the national bank, their paper emissions of the war, loaned to the government for money, were eulogized as acts of patriotism. Indispensable brokers were cursed, and an inevitable war blamed, for all the vexatious inequalities of prices and embarrassments of travel. Few perceived—none, or hardly any, denounced—the losses they submitted to. Prices rose, business was brisk, dividends increased, the press was interested to sustain inflation, and flattering facilities of trade intoxicated the community. A school of modern economists arose, of whom a brother of the English chief justice, connected with Washington's family—another Law—was one of the first preceptors, who, like the Vansittarts, Percivals and other pharisaical ennobled of Pitt's followers in England, denied the value of bullion and taught the superiority of paper. While the bank was undergoing its many trials in Congress, even Mr. Calhoun was pleased with that novelty. The National Intelligencer was filled with its metaphysics. That cabinet gazette, transplanted from even Simon Snyder's organ, the Democratic Press of Philadelphia, that "all men of business, property and patriotism considered that the Philadelphia banks acted wisely in suspending specie payments. The directors have the public confidence, and that con-

fidence is the greater because they adopted this salutary measure." Thus necessity fashioned public opinion for a Bank of the United States.

By taxation put off till hostilities languished, through thirteen months of want and fear, and when at last enacted in July 1813, not to go into effect till 1814, when the war was nearly over; within fifteen months of its termination, the income averaged but about twelve millions; of which, eight were taken for interest of former debts and for ordinary civil expenditures. There was but about one million sterling to make head against a mighty and vindictive foe, relieved from all other enemies, with one hundred millions a year to take vengeance with on us. Three millions of treasury notes in 1812, six millions in 1813, and eight in 1814, bearing interest at five and two-fifths per cent., always reimbursable within one year, much reduced the ostensible avails. Though the first loan of six millions in 1812 was got at par, that of twenty millions in 1813 cost one hundred and thirteen dollars for each hundred, and the twelve millions of 1814, with difficulty obtained, cost one hundred and twenty-five; diminishing means all paid in paper depreciating more and faster than it was possible either to reckon or prevent. Much of the last loan was not paid at all; the contract was broken from inability of the contractor to borrow worthless bank notes to loan government. The body politic was sick, its blood was diseased, and strength wasted, when the capture of Washington gave the finishing blow.

There had been no Secretary of the Treasury from Mr. Gallatin's retreat in May, 1813, when he embarked on his pilgrimage for peace, determined never to return without it. During the disconsolate interval, from May 1813, till February 1814, Mr. Jones imperfectly performed the routine duties of that vital organ; who, on the 23d of July, 1813, in the midst of our first session, in a report respecting duties on prize goods, not only overruled Mr. Gallatin's and Adam Smith's opinion, but by quoting Hudibras, as a fiscal reason. Mr. Gallatin's position was, that the duties on importations are paid by consumers; to which Mr. Jones' reply was "the maxim derives more weight from the felicity of argument and commanding character of the great author of the *Wealth of Nations*, than from the universality of the principle. It is undoubtedly true in the abstract; but my experience as a merchant has taught me to know the practical value of a maxim derived from an author of a lighter cast:

"What is the worth of anything  
But so much money as 'twill bring?"

Hamilton's master reports, and Gallatin's,

in unpretending prose, had ill prepared the community for lyrical economy; at whose interpolation in a finance report, Congress laughed, while the community complained of obstinate dereliction of the most important department.

At last, during the winter, Mr. Madison received private intelligence from Mr. Gallatin that he was no longer to be expected; and it became indispensable to fill his place. For that purpose the President had long been thinking of Mr. Dallas, to whom he was personally much attached, and of whose abilities he had formed a high estimate. The desire to get him into the cabinet was, however, nearly disappointed, and for some months more of treasury stagnation at least deferred. On the 10th of February, 1814, the Senate confirmed the appointment of Albert Gallatin as one of the mission to Gottenburg. Next day, George Washington Campbell of Tennessee resigned his seat in the Senate, on being appointed Secretary of the Treasury.

Both the Pennsylvania senators, Jonathan Roberts and Abner Lacoek, were of that portion of the Republican party of Pennsylvania opposed to Dallas. Mr. Roberts' senatorial predecessors, Dr. Leib and General Lacoek, were so inimical to him that, when sounded, by Madison's direction, as to his nomination, they flatly refused their votes in Senate for a mere Philadelphia lawyer, as they contemptuously termed Mr. Dallas, out of favor with the great bulk of the Democratic party, against which he and Mr. Jones, with others, not long before the war, had taken sides with the Federalists, at first defeating Simon Snyder, the favorite of the country and ultimately prevailing democracy. Before Mr. Campbell was selected as Secretary of the Treasury, when John W. Eppes and others were thought of by Madison as Mr. Gallatin's successor, and, I believe, the place was tendered to Mr. Cheves, who declined it, the Secretary of the Navy, Jones, was authorized to write to Dallas, informing him of the absolute necessity of appointing a successor to Mr. Gallatin, and asking Mr. Dallas to take his place. Mr. Rush and I also wrote, strongly urging him. William Pinkney having just then resigned the attorney-generalship, the choice of that place or the treasury was presented to Mr. Dallas, who declined both early in February, 1814. Apprehending the hostility of Lacoek and Leib, Mr. Madison would not expose Mr. Dallas to the mortification of rejection by the Senate; which was too probable, if both Pennsylvania Senators opposed him. He was not then appointed, but Mr. Campbell became the Secretary for a few months.

Mr. Speaker Cheves changed the committee of ways and means, leaving Eppes at its head, but excluding Alston, McKim, and Cox, and substituting Stevenson Arch-

er, Jonathan Fisk, Thomas J. Oakley, William Gaston, and Samuel D. Ingham—the last named for Jonathan Roberts, gone to the Senate. William Creighton, retained, favored a bank; which, by this new construction of the committee to pass upon it, had no opponent except the chairman, and the ablest advocates in Mr. Gaston and Mr. Oakley, with friends, also of ability, in Mr. Ingham and Mr. Fisk.

The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Campbell, on the 26th of September, 1814, sent in his report on the state of the finances, deplorably indicating that he had not been successful in their gestion. Of the loan of twenty-five millions authorized in March, 1814, ten millions had been advertised for in May, only \$9,795,056 got for the ten millions, and, at a very losing rate, \$1,900,000 of the ten contracted to be paid was not paid. In August six millions more were advertised for, of which only about two and a half millions could be obtained, and that small sum at 80 for 100; the Secretary's plea for taking it at that ruinous rate being that 80 was the market price of the United States stocks. He had to submit, moreover, to the condition exacted by the lenders, that if any other sum was borrowed at less, their loan should be put down to that of the lowest. An attempt to effect a loan in Europe altogether failed. Outstanding treasury notes amounted to six millions; internal taxes yielded less than three millions; customs only about four. The Secretary faintly suggested some increase of taxation; but not a word of a bank, to which he probably was not inclined, and which was reserved for Secretary Dallas' approaching advent. This state of financial atrophy, the toils and chagrin of the treasury, depriving Mr. Campbell of health and confidence, brought him to the determination to resign, which he did, immediately after his report, on the 28th of September, 1814.

"Tell *Doctor* Madison," said Senator Lacoek to the President's private secretary, "that we are now willing to submit to his Philadelphia lawyer for head of the treasury. The public patient is so very sick that we must swallow anything the doctor prescribes, however nauseous the bolus." On the 5th of October, 1814, Alexander James Dallas was nominated, and the next day confirmed as Secretary of the Treasury; whose exploits and labors, his intrepidity and firmness, gave fresh impulse to the war for the few months that it lasted after his coming—from October, 1814, till February, 1815—and rescued the treasury from the disgraceful inanition it had fallen to during the prior twenty-eight months of hostilities. Arms, revenues, national power and resource were just elevated to the proper war standard when it ended—never till then.

On the revolution of parties in 1801, when the federal government had been recently



transferred from Philadelphia to Washington, Mr. Dallas was appointed by Jefferson the District Attorney of Pennsylvania. During the succeeding thirteen years of republican ascendancy he was always useful and well known to the general government, a leading member of the distinguished bar of Philadelphia, and active in the politics of Pennsylvania—though not, from Simon Snyder's election, in 1808, in perfect harmony with the Democratic party. Philadelphia, from 1790 to 1801 the metropolis of the Union, trained lawyers there to discuss all the great topics of national and international, constitutional, maritime and elevated jurisprudence; to which the judiciary of a large seaport in a considerable State also contributed. Mr. Dallas had filled important State offices, was the author of several volumes of law reports, and well reputed as a gentleman, prepossessing in figure and address, for liberal, literary, and hospitable qualities. Still, his reputation was local. Never a member of any legislative body, that first credential of a public man in popular government was not his passport to preferment. Perhaps newspaper abuse, as he was an active and very able partisan, was the chief means of his notoriety. Not known to have ever turned his attention to finance, and profuse in his own expenditures, the usual detraction met his selection for the treasury, by sneering queries where our new Secretary, Madison's strange choice, had learned his political economy, or any economy at all. As his bold stand and vigorous measures, from the very outset, surprised most and disconcerted many, some of the old Republican economists, who voted for war but shrunk from its cost—Macon particularly—desired to know if their experience of many years in public affairs was to be all at once set at naught by a mere Philadelphia lawyer, whose powdered hair, old-fashioned but ostentatious dress and graceful manners were far from merits in many observing eyes. Macon complained of Dallas' high tone to Madison; and the President cautioned his Secretary against giving umbrage to that vanity of place which is inveterate with members of Congress immediately representing portions of sovereignty. From the very outset Dallas denounced inefficient measures. Unlike Gallatin and Campbell, both brought up, by service in Congress, to that reverence of its power to which the President, too, had served his apprenticeship, Dallas laid hold of the crisis to bear him out in loud calls for increased taxes, and more taxes on everything taxable. The conjuncture, crowned by sack of the capital, was fortunate for a minister determined to rally the people, and bring forth their resources, with their patriotism, to repel a foe who everywhere, except at Washington, was defeated as his arro-

gance and barbarism increased. It was the moment, as he was the man, to conquer expensive parsimony, and not be over nice with restive constitutional scruples in the legislature.

Macon abounded in parables and radical axioms. One of his sayings was that *paper money never was beat*; a maxim which Dallas enforced with a sway perhaps indispensable. Whatever was his motive for refusing, in February, the station he so earnestly assumed in October, the fall of Washington, suspension of specie payments, blockade of all our coasts, interruption of most business, professional and other, concentration of all thoughts on war, took him to his post, bent on a bank of the United States as the only regulator and curb of the State banks, a principal one of which, the Bank of Pennsylvania, he had been among the leading Republicans of that State to charter as a counteraction of a national bank. The first bank of the United States had always been a hard money institution. The State banks, after its charter expired, the 4th of March, 1811, poured out their paper, much of it in small notes, which became the chief, and from their suspension just before Dallas went to the treasury, the only currency, and that in local circulation. Intimate with Albert Gallatin, Stephen Girard, David Parish, John Jacob Astor, and many other of the financiers and commercial capitalists, he imbibed their ideas as he enjoyed their confidence. Some of the old Republicans, Gen. Samuel Smith, the Livingstons, and other northern politicians, pronounced a national bank the best relief. Contrary to the original judgment by which he so powerfully protested against its constitutionality, President Madison was brought to yield to the weight of the imposing authorities, federal, state, legislative, judicial and executive, which nearly everywhere and everyhow sanctioned its constitutionality. More, much more than that, notwithstanding Madison's beautiful denunciation, in the Federalist, of the pestilence of paper money, he was subdued, if not to discard coin altogether as the basis of a bank, at least to disown its just and indispensable proportion. Hamilton's bank, preceding the monster bank fraud of the English government in 1797, never issued a note for less than ten dollars. After a strife, extending through several sessions of Congress, Dallas' bank, but for veto upon veto, would have legalized not only five dollar notes, but suspension of coin payments.

On the 14th October, 1814, Eppees, for the committee of ways and means, "having had under consideration the support of public credit, by extending taxation, officially informed the Secretary that their report was suspended to afford him an opportunity of suggesting any other, or such additional provisions as might be necessary to

revive, and maintain unimpaired, the public credit." In three days, forthwith, on the 17th of that month, Mr. Dallas sent his extensive answer, strongly recommending the national bank, of which he submitted outlines, asserting that repeated sanctions had settled the constitutionality, of what was "the only efficient remedy for a disordered condition of our circulating medium, a safe depository for the public treasure, and constant auxiliary to the public credit," adding that the Secretary would "not merit the confidence which it would be his ambition to acquire, if he suppressed the declaration of an opinion, that in these times the establishment of a national bank will not only be useful in promoting the general welfare, but that it is necessary and proper for carrying into execution some of the most important powers constitutionally vested in the government."—Hamilton went no farther, if so far.

The second bank followed the precedent of the first in its origin. Congress asked for neither openly; if at all, it was by unpublished understanding. Both, according to the public journals, came of executive initiation, and both as mere engines of public credit. An order of the House of Representatives, the 9th August, 1790, required Secretary Hamilton to prepare and report, at the next session, such further provision as might, in his opinion, be necessary for establishing the public credit. From that hint, if such, on the 13th December, 1790, his report premised a bank of the United States in the first sentence—the first five words. Organic law of September, 1789, made it his duty to prepare plans for the support of public credit, so that the special order of the House was a work of supererogation. In like manner a call in October, 1814, by the House of Representatives, through their committee, on Secretary Dallas, for additional provisions by extended taxation to support public credit, with no allusion to a bank, produced in three days his report, strongly recommending one of which he presented a plan. All four of the national banks passed by Congress, in 1791, 1816, 1832, and 1841, were Treasury suggestions, adopted by acts originating in Senate, even the two vetoed by two presidents, in 1814, and 1841. The first bank began and ended in Senate, without recharter, by the casting vote of the vice president, George Clinton, in 1811, after having been indefinitely postponed by a casting vote in the House of Representatives. President Washington did not approve the charter, till the eleventh day after its passage, notwithstanding the constitutional provision for ten days, as the Sundays were not counted. The Senate committee, by whom it was originated, were Caleb Strong, Governor of Massachusetts during the war of 1812,

Robert Morris, General Schuyler, the father-in-law of Hamilton, Oliver Ellsworth, afterwards Chief Justice, and Pierce Butler. The bank bill approved by Madison, the 10th April, 1816, began in Senate, and was agitated by reiterated trials in both Houses of Congress, from January 1814, when the subject was introduced, for more than two years before an act was carried to the President, to which he would set his signature. The bank commencement in 1817, and end in 1841, were not equally, only because the latter was more disastrous. The Bank of England has been radically altered in 1844. Its bankruptcy in 1797, protracted by acts of Parliament till 1823, was the mother imposture of all the lesser ones of the thousand offspring of that iniquity since pullulated throughout the United States.

On the 24th October, 1814, in committee of the whole House, with Timothy Pitkin in the chair, the standing committee's reported resolution that it is expedient to establish a national bank, was carried by ayes 66, to 40 nays, without one word of debate. The committee then rose and reported it, together with resolutions considerably increasing taxation. On the 28th of that month the House passed upon the report of the committee of the whole, for a bank with branches in the States; when State sovereignty was laid low by a vote of 138 to 14; Richard Stanford, of North Carolina, a gentleman of the Macon school's motion, to strike them out, being rejected by that overwhelming majority. Three great States were then supplying the deficiency of Congress to vote armies adequate to the crisis, to succor and maintain the Union, when Congress resolved to enter their borders by banking establishments, with commanding regulations, transcending all other federal and even martial law. As soon as that vote was taken, the House adopted the resolution for a bank, with branches in the States, by 93 ayes to 54 nays.

Eppes, and the constitutionalists thus deposed, and many of them not sorry to be so, for many thought the bank expedient who could not consider it constitutional, the resolution was referred to the committee of ways and means, to bring in a bank bill, and on the 7th November, 1814, Jonathan Fisk, now become the leader of the measure, reported the bill, which was in due form twice read, and committed to the committee of the whole House. It was essentially Mr. Dallas' plan, with some modifications, however. He sought and had a personal conference with the committee of ways and means, in which he explained and enforced his views with all the eloquent earnestness of which he was capable. The capital was to be fifty millions of dollars, one-fifth in gold or silver, three-fifths in loan stock, and one-fifth in treasury notes; the United



States to subscribe for twenty millions, and the bank not to lend them at any one time more than three hundred thousand dollars; no other bank to be created, and this one to last twenty years, its notes receivable in all public payments; and the President of the United States was authorized to direct temporary suspension of specie payments, if at any time there should be an undue pressure for them, either for exportation, or with sinister design to injure the bank.

On the 13th and 14th November, 1814, came on the battle—not of the bank, but of the stocks: for the small proportion of coin was not much considered; but the prevailing controversy, to which the whole scheme ultimately fell a victim, was what stocks should compose the capital. The frightful power suggested, for the President to suspend specie payments, such as the Emperor of the French or of Russia never could have exercised without national convulsion, and for exercising, something far short of which to save a country, Jackson was severely punished soon after at New Orleans—that awful illegality was little dwelt on in discussion, though expunged before the bill was finally lost, and the withdrawal of that monstrous license was a principal cause of the failure of the bill. Mr. Webster, late in the discussion, advocated the indispensable virtue of coin. The capital should not exceed, he contended, twenty millions; all notes not on presentation paid in specie, should bear interest from the moment they were refused; and penalties should be inflicted on directors who put notes in circulation while specie payments were suspended. Mr. Gaston, too, in several speeches, deprecated the amount of capital, which he moved to reduce from fifty to twenty millions, and the inordinate disproportion of paper, which he likened to Law's Mississippi scheme and the assignats of the French Revolution. During the eleven days' discussion that ensued, from the 14th to the 29th November (with some interruption), many motions and speeches were made which need not be mentioned, mostly concerning the government subscription, direction, and other functional parts of the plan, and on the constitutional question. On the 16th November, Mr. Calhoun struck in with his triumphant project, which carried all before it, by large majorities, on repeated divisions, till at last, under the direct and energetic interposition of Mr. Dallas, both their plans, in severe collision, were rejected, and all others with them. On the 15th November, 1814, George Bradbury, of Massachusetts, moved to substitute future for past loans, denouncing the whole plan, however, as a contrivance to issue paper promising to pay more paper, a mere paper money bank. Mr. Calhoun got the committee to rise, for the day, and Mr. Bradbury to withdraw his

motion, in order that, next day, Mr. Calhoun might submit his project. Striking out all government interest in or control of the bank, together with the presidential power of suspension; the bank not to be compelled to loan any money to government; his plan was a capital of forty-four millions of treasury notes, to be provided by future acts of Congress, of which twenty to be thrown as fast as possible into circulation; fifteen millions to be disposed of so as to convert them into stocks; five millions applied to redeem treasury notes falling due at the commencement of next year; thus raising, as Mr. Calhoun reckoned, the price of stocks so much as to afford a bonus for the bank, and indirectly a loan to the government, which was to receive exclusively the bank notes in payment of all taxes, duties and public debts. By this plan, Mr. Calhoun argued, with his usual cogency and ardor, the treasury would be relieved from immediate pressure, public credit permanently elevated, and a permanent as well as safe circulating medium afforded. Six-fiftieths of the capital were to be paid in coin. John Forsyth, Samuel D. Ingham, and Jonathan Fisk attacked the Calhoun project, which William Lowndes and Thomas J. Oakley defended. Its severest and most strenuous assailant was Mr. Ingham, some years afterwards one of Mr. Calhoun's warmest adherents. My unimportant help was also given in a speech vindicating the treasury plan. Mr. Ingham, afterwards Secretary of the Treasury in the beginning of Jackson's administration, was Secretary Dallas's most effective advocate for provisional if not spurious doctrine, which the crisis pleaded by Dallas' report might render then justifiable, but which neither Mr. Madison, Mr. Dallas, nor Mr. Ingham could deem permanently proper. Vindicating the English bank suspension and its American exaggeration, Mr. Ingham declared that "necessity sometimes requires suspension both at home and abroad; and with the existing condition of the specie medium of the country in full view before us, it would be a species of *frantic enthusiasm* not to provide for the case." It was stated in Senate, as a reason for giving government control of specie payments during war, that whatever amount of coin might be placed in the United States bank, would inevitably be drained from it by the enemy and his American confederates. Cost what it might, that fatal operation would be effected. Government had got hold of a treasonable contract with British agents to furnish them with as much specie as there probably was in the country. At that time, though the Boston banks were full of it, the State treasury of Massachusetts was almost without any funds, and dependent on loans from the banks for all the State had to pay. On the

19th November, Mr. Lowndes, supported by Mr. Forsyth, but earnestly resisted by Mr. Calhoun, made an unsuccessful effort to reduce the capital from fifty to thirty-five millions. That day the committee of the whole rose and reported the bill, so altered that even the clerk could not read the numerous and extensive amendments, carried by decisive majorities. It was, therefore, ordered to lie on the table, and be printed. On the 21st, 22d, 23d and 25th November, 1814, the House by numerous votes confirmed the adoption in committee of Mr. Calhoun's, rejecting the administration plan. On the 25th November, Mr. Lowndes, stating that reference to another select committee might accomplish reconciliation of views, which he thought further debate would rather increase than diminish, moved and carried that reference. The new committee consisted of Mr. Lowndes, Mr. Fisk, Mr. Calhoun, Mr. Ingham, Mr. Forsyth, Mr. Oakley, and Mr. Gaston. Every one of them had professed his wish for a bank; but scarcely any two of them agreed in the plan. Five were opposed to that of the Secretary, who had but three supporters on the committee.

On the 27th November, 1814, Mr. Lowndes, by direction of the new committee, called on the Secretary for his opinion in relation to the effect which a considerable issue of treasury notes, receivable in subscriptions to the bank, might have on the credit of the government, and on the prospects of a loan next year: whether it would be practicable to get forty-four millions of treasury notes into circulation without depreciation; and his further opinion in regard to any part of our fiscal system. Instantly, the same day, Mr. Dallas answered, in terms of strong and lofty condemnation of Mr. Calhoun's, or any such, scheme. His feelings thrown into his judgment in unusual terms for a state, especially a fiscal state, paper, he retorted:

"When I arrived in Washington, the treasury was suffering under every kind of embarrassment. The demands upon it were great in amount, while the means to satisfy them were comparatively small; precarious in the collection, and difficult in the application. The demands consisted of dividends upon old and new funded debt, of treasury notes, and of legislative appropriations for the army, the navy and the current service; all urgent and important. The means consisted, first—Of the fragments of an authority to borrow money, when nobody was disposed to lend, and to issue treasury notes, which none but necessitous creditors or contractors in distress, or commissaries, quarter-masters and navy agents, acting as it were officially, seemed willing to accept. Second—Of the amount of bank credits scattered throughout the United States, and principally in the southern and western

banks, which had been rendered in a great degree useless by the stoppage of payments in specie, and the consequent impracticability of transferring the public funds from one place, to meet the public engagements in another place. And, third—Of the current supply of money from the imports, from internal duties, and from the sales of public land, which ceased to be a foundation of any rational estimate or reserve, to provide even for the dividends on the funded debt, when it was found that the treasury notes, (only requiring indeed a cash payment at the distance of a year,) to whomsoever they were issued at the treasury, and almost as soon as they were issued, reached the hands of the collectors, in payment of debts, duties and taxes; thus disappointing and defeating the only remaining expectation of productive revenue."

Such of us as had labored to place Mr. Dallas in the treasury, even though not satisfied with any bank not founded on the rock of the precious metals, were consoled for the loss of his plan by the manly fervor of an official reply to Congress, that "a faithless government might borrow even without credit, which hardly existed at that moment. But when the wants of to-day are supplied, what is the new expedient that shall supply the wants of to-morrow? After all, the immeasurable tracts of the western wild would be exhausted in successive efforts to obtain pecuniary aids, and still leave the government necessitous, unless the foundations of public credit are re-established and maintained." This was a tone to which the puny sovereigns and constitutional economists of Congress were little broken. Whether Mr. Dallas was right or wrong in his bank plan, his tone to Congress, in the face of the country, and before the world, was a stirring appeal to the rising spirit of the nation. Born in Jamaica, with tropical excitability, he would shed tears at that time of trial, provoked by the contradictions, anxieties and disappointments he was doomed to undergo: but with ambition and capacity for indefatigable toil, his buoyancy never failed. Exertions were not spared to bring him and Mr. Calhoun together, but without success. The strife of stocks and schemes was irreconcilable.

The day after his uncompromising letter, on the 28th November, 1814, Mr. Lowndes reported the bill without alteration; informing the House that the select committee had not been able to discover any means of uniting the conflicting opinions on the subject. Then it was that the Secretary had his first gratification in Congress. Colonel Johnson rose on his crutches in the House to put an end to contest by moving the previous question, which was carried on engrossing the bill for a third reading; when Mr. Calhoun was left in a minority by ayes and nays of more than



two to one; the vote for engrossing his treasury note bill being but forty-nine to one hundred and four against it. So ended the fourth attempt for a bank. John Forsyth, who voted in the majority, immediately moved a reconsideration to clinch the rejection, which he said he voted with us in order to do. After much excitement and sharp skirmishing, he withdrew the motion, intending to renew it, but lost his chance. But for succor from Senate, the cardinal measure of the administration had no chance that session. Revived and quickly passed there, with extreme difficulty it struggled through the House of Representatives, to be at last strangled by the Executive, so anxious for a bank enactment.

Notwithstanding his failure to obtain a bank, Mr. Dallas had much restored public credit in the few weeks of his administration of the treasury. It was known that he contemplated the establishment of a vigorous sinking fund, a mere fiscal delusion unless the nation actually spends less than it receives. But such was its influence on most minds, especially those of the seaports, where credit is fabricated or extinguished, and public delusion a large element of it, that the anticipation of such a fund, amply endowed, together with the altered and elevated aspect of all Secretary Dallas' measures and conduct, enabled him to effect the loan in October which in August his predecessor had failed to obtain. There were no constitutional scruples; the whole Republican party were united respecting a sinking fund. Notwithstanding Timothy Pickering's published letters, and his speeches in Congress, proclaiming that future administrations would not be bound to redeem the loans contracted for Madison's war, as he and other Eastern antagonists denounced it, there were few, at any time of that extreme disaffection, which success crushed in ignominy. Moneyed men, as those in credit are called, were too clear-sighted to be blinded by such mists exhaled from the conduits of faction.

Mr. Dallas and Mr. Calhoun were unshakenly firm in patriotic confidence. John Caldwell Calhoun was the same slender, erect, and ardent logician, politician, and sectarian in the House of Representatives in 1814 that he is in the Senate of 1847. Speaking with aggressive aspect, flashing eye, rapid action and enunciation, unadorned argument, eccentricity of judgment, unbounded love of rule, impatient, precipitate ambition, kind temper, excelling in colloquial attractions, caressing the young, not courting rulers; conception, perception, and demonstration quick and clear, with logical precision arguing paradoxes, and carrying home conviction beyond rhetorical illustration; his own impressions so intense as to discredit, scarcely

listen to, any other suggestions; well educated and informed.

In September, 1814, a petition from David M. Clarkson and others of New York, had been presented to the Senate, for a national bank, and referred, on motion of General Samuel Smith, on the 31st of October, 1814, to a select committee, consisting of Rufus King, Samuel Smith, John Taylor, William W. Bibb and Jeremiah Mason. As soon as all proceedings in the House of Representatives, on the subject, ceased, with no prospect of their renewal, Mr. King, on the 2d of December, 1814, reported another bank bill, which, after three days' consideration, on the 5th, 8th and 9th of that month, passed the Senate by yeas seventeen to fourteen nays, mostly party votes, the Republicans for, and the Federalists against the bank, and on the last-mentioned day, it came to the House of Representatives for their concurrence. There it was at once referred to the committee of ways and means, and by Jonathan Fisk from that committee reported, with amendments, on the 14th of December, 1814.

The capital of this scheme was to be fifty millions, five in coin, twenty-seven in past loan stocks, seven in treasury notes, redeemable in stocks, and ten to be subscribed by government in stock bearing interest at four per cent.; to loan government not exceeding five hundred thousand dollars, unless authorized by act of Congress, which might require a loan of thirty millions. During the war and for one year after, the directors were authorized in certain contingencies to suspend specie payments, and to report it to the President of the United States, for his affirmance or reversal. On the 23d of December, 1814, debate broke out afresh, in a renewed argument against the constitutionality of a bank, all of which arguments I omit, for there are frequently measures whose expediency is more momentous than the Constitution. On the 24th of December, after a long day's discussion, the committee rose, and the bill was reported by the chairman, Macon, to the House, without material alteration. On the 26th, the few amendments were concurred in. On the 27th, William Hale, a Federalist of New Hampshire, moved to strike out the section authorizing a suspension of specie payments. Whereupon I called for the previous question, and got it by a small majority, seventy-two to seventy. Mr. Webster then moved to lay the bill and amendments on the table; which, Mr. Macon in the chair, substituted for the Speaker, Mr. Cheves, ruled out of order, as the previous question was in force. Mr. Gaston appealed from that decision, and again from Macon's further decision, that the question was not on Mr. Hale's proposition, but whether all the amendments reported from the committee of the

whole should be engrossed, and the bill read a third time. That settled, the main question was carried by eighty ayes to sixty-two nays, Mr. Lowndes and Mr. Calhoun voting with us, the minority composed of the Federal opposition and the constitutionalists.

There were well founded hopes then of the passage of the bill in that shape. But next day, the 28th of December, 1814, Mr. Gaston succeeded in getting it recommitted with instructions as to some details, and a change of the kind of stock to be subscribed, the much contested future to be coupled with the past. Next day, Stephenson Archer, from the committee, reported the required amendments; one of which was then, however, refused by the House, another carried only by the Speaker, Cheves', casting vote; and angry debate ensued on the kind of stock, past or future. The whole day was consumed in motions to lay the bill on the table, to recommit, to adjourn, and their attendant speeches by Mr. Webster, Mr. Gaston, Mr. Pitkin, Mr. Oakley and others to defeat, Mr. Forsyth, Mr. Ingham, Mr. Archer to carry the bill. It was the stormiest bank day of the session. A paper money bank was supported and assailed by contending parties, as the pivot of the administration. Denounced as fatal and corrupt, defended as the only means of restoring credit, maintaining the government and carrying on the war, the majority strained every nerve to pass it that night, but were frustrated by the pertinacious manœuvres of a minority, nearly always invincible if resolved not to give way. Seldom, whenever passion prevails, does a majority rule in a deliberative assembly. Tactics defeat numbers in Congress and in arms. As venerable as the Bible and Homer is the truth, that not to the strong, but the artful, belongs victory. On that occasion Mr. Webster and Mr. Gaston led and triumphed with striking ability. Webster's last effort was a motion to recommit with specific instructions, on which, after his own and several other speeches for, and none against it, our ward being silent action without debate, at length an adjournment was effected. New Year's day, like Christmas, was a relaxation from the combat. On the 2d of January, 1815, Timothy Pickering, with others of the opposition, took the floor, and Mr. Webster made his ablest speech; an admirable view, commercial, economical, fiscal, political, past, present and future of the whole subject; quite superior to anything said on either side during the session. He had studied thoroughly, historically, and presented doctrines immutable in diction of the choicest rhetoric. With that masterly effort, after some insignificant motions, the debate closed and the votes were taken, eighty-one for, eighty against the final passage of

the bill; Mr. Lowndes voting for, Mr. Calhoun against it.

Then instantly took place one of those memorable struggles in legislation which are attended by strong sensation at the moment, and followed by deep impression ever after among the combatants, though unarmed, carrying or losing the turning point of excited controversy. The year 1814 ended on Saturday. The day before, the death of Richard Brent, one of the Virginia senators, a gentleman of the equestrian order, as he might be considered, for he seldom was abroad, except on horseback, attended by his well mounted slave, but long incapacitated by the disorder of which he died, suspended proceedings in both Houses; superadding the last twenty-four hours of that anxious twelve months to Sunday's repose, retrospect, combinations and arrangements for renewed conflict. Congress were huddled in the post-office building, the only public edifice not in ruins. The departments, with their various incumbents, were billeted about in private houses; the President occupied a gentleman's mansion; the department of state was without a secretary, Mr. Monroe, on General Armstrong's discharge, after the capture of Washington, having been transferred to the war department. On the 2d of January, 1815, the new year came in with intelligence of General Jackson's arrival at New Orleans, the first day of December, to prepare for the invasion, of which the van was said to be off Mobile in a ship of the line with several transports.

Thursday's vote had defined the position of parties with discouraging precision. Eighty-one of the Republicans voted for a bank, the false hope long deferred of a perplexed administration. By that fiscal contrivance, five millions of coin altogether, which by familiar bank necromancy might be diminished two-thirds when the bank went into operation, with forty-five millions of stock, were to enable government to borrow from the bank thirty millions more. Seventy-five millions of discredited paper, with at most five millions of coin, was at least fifteen to one, the reliance for a nation's fiscal salvation. It was the drunkard's bill of Falstaff, five shillings and eightpence worth of sack to a halfpenny of bread. For that delusion we contended as our existence. Nonsense of the people, does it surpass the folly of their wise representatives in Congress assembled? Madness of party, how often does it save, as well as destroy! Twenty Republicans, after nineteen had that week voted with us for the third reading of the bill—twenty intractable Republicans, combined with sixty Federalists, now stood out against all that country was supposed to demand, and party angrily, or entreatingly urged. Many no doubt voted from factious



motives to embarrass government, but not a few because conscience forbade, and some few under the influence of wise economy.

Mr. Cheves, elected Speaker by a mixed party vote, disgusted with the administration, impressed with strong and settled conviction against paper contrivances, reminding the House of the rule which authorized, and he thought required, the presiding officer's interference on such an occasion, voted with the minority and defeated the bill; which, in an impressive brief discourse, he pronounced not only dangerous, but desperate, as a resort to merely speculative and ruinous experiment. Once more, and for the fifth time, the unlucky bank miscarried. There were, however, so many of both parties voting against the rejected plan, yet willing to sanction another, that Bolling Hall, one of the most strenuous Republican sticklers for new, in preference to Dallas' plan of past stocks, immediately moved a reconsideration. Sufficiently disturbed by the evils of that doubtful day, the House adjourned without taking the question. Next day, the 3d January 1815, reconsideration was carried by nearly two to one, 107 to 54: but the journal of names gave poor promise of any bank; the speeches still less.

On the 3d January 1815, Mr. Hall, a plain upright Georgian, who afterwards lived and died in Alabama, from his seat next to mine, advocating his motion to reconsider, vehemently rallied the Republican party to rescue their country from internal traitors, worse than foreign foes, who were striving to crush the administration; indignantly expressed his contempt of the attempt twice made by Mr. Grosvenor to prevent my voting because I held government stock. Such attempts, he declared, made his blood run cold. But, after numerous sharp and angry speeches on both sides, Bolling Robertson, afterwards Governor of Louisiana, William P. Duvall, afterwards Governor of Florida, Mr. Forsyth, Mr. Calhoun, I and others earnestly urging reconsideration, strenuously opposed by Mr. Grosvenor, Mr. Gaston, Mr. Webster, Mr. Macon and several more, it was finally carried, on the merciful motion of Alexander McKim, a Scots merchant representing Baltimore, who said he was opposed to any bank, but disposed to let his friends (he was of the Republican party) have every chance on a question of such magnitude. The vote, as before mentioned, was 107 to 54. Samuel McKee, of Kentucky, a very peculiar person, one of the few who had voted for war against France as well as England, considering the injustice to us the same—having also his own notions of what kind of bank it ought to be—moved to recommit the bill, but without instructions, to another select committee, which, after farther angry controversy, carried by 89

votes to 71. Mr. Cheves gave us as the committee, for this sixth essay, Samuel McKee, William Findley, Richard Stockton, Timothy Pitkin, John Taylor, Alfred Cathbert and Bartlett Yancey; five for some kind of bank to two likewise for a bank, but uncompromisingly hostile to the administration.

Before I proceed with the narrative of their, the final, abortion, which the President vetoed, I must mention a remarkable outbreak in the House, of the 3d of January 1815. One of the Ohio members, John Alexander, was a giant between six and seven feet high, large, stout, muscular, and apparently strong in proportion to his formidable thews and sinews. Immediately after Hall's appeal to our party, which was extremely animated and unreserved, Alexander planted his imposing frame right at the foot of the Speaker's chair, and standing there erect, almost in contact with Mr. Cheves, he poured out upon him a torrent of the fiercest invective for his casting vote of the day before. The Speaker had expressed his regret at feeling obliged to vote as he said duty required. Alexander acrimoniously denounced such regret. To vote against a measure which the Speaker condemned as ruinous and desperate, should have pleased, not pained, an honest man, and his Ohio assailant broadly intimated offensive doubts, whether other than either conscientious or patriotic apology could be pleaded for so reprehensible a vote. Mr. Cheves, who always wore spectacles, had the benefit of their intervention between his looks and the flashing glance of his accuser. The Speaker calmly kept his eyes on the orator during his harangue, which, like many more bursts of passionate disappointment, passed off without any permanent effect, except perhaps the recollection of the actors in that exciting scene.

On the 6th January, 1815, Mr. McKee reported from the select committee their scheme; a bank with thirty instead of fifty millions of capital, five millions of coin, fifteen millions of treasury notes, and ten millions of war stock; no loan to government, or power to suspend specie payments. With \$1,666,000 in gold and silver, and twelve millions in stocks, the bank was to begin. Mr. McKee pronounced it a specie paying bank, on which alone, he said, could a sound circulating medium rest. After a few brief speeches, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Pitkin, Mr. Yancey and I advocating the scheme as a compromise more likely than any other to pass, Mr. Forsyth and Mr. Pearson opposing, the capital was fixed at thirty millions by a vote of one hundred and twenty-nine to thirty-one. Next day, January 7, 1815, after very little said by but a few members, the bill was passed by one hundred and twenty ayes to thirty-eight nays, and sent to Senate.

On the 9th January, 1815, our bill was referred in Senate to a select committee, consisting of Samuel Smith, William W. Bibb, Joseph Anderson, William B. Giles and Joseph B. Varnum. On the 13th January, 1815, they reported some minor amendments, that the capital should be thirty-five millions, and the bank empowered to suspend specie payments. On the 14th, 15th, and 17th January, 1815, the subject was debated in the Senate, who, by a majority of one vote, seventeen to sixteen, resolved to authorize suspension of specie payments; by a majority of three, seventeen to fourteen, increased the capital to thirty-five millions; and then passed the bill, thus amended, without a division. On the 17th January, 1815, their amendments came to the House. Next day, after much sharp contest, personal and party recrimination, we refused by eighty-seven votes to eighty to enlarge the capital, and by eighty-five to eighty to authorize suspension of specie payments. Republicans, some of them, pleaded, others denied, the fact and force of a compromise attempted by all parties in this bill. Federalists declared that they had gone as far as they could in concession, and would yield no more. The House insisted on such of their amendments as the Senate disagreed to. Recriminations began to extend from persons and parties to the two Houses of Congress, and the Executive too. Each House blamed the other for unnecessary procrastination and unreasonable tenacity. On the 19th January, 1815, the Senate quarrelled with each other and with the House, in that excited state which indicated that the end was at hand, in whatever shape it might be. The administration Senators insisted on the increase of five millions to the capital, and still more pertinaciously on the power to suspend specie payments, as a *sine qua non*. James Barbour, of Virginia, lately chosen from being Governor of that State, to supply Mr. Brent's place in the Senate, General Smith, Jonathan Roberts, William Bibb, (afterwards Governor of Alabama,) not only pressed the increased capital and suspension power as indispensable, but declared their repugnance to the bill without those clauses, which Mr. King and Mr. Giles supported. Defeated in that effort, the administration, represented by motions severally made by Mr. Roberts and Mr. Bibb, endeavored to reject the bill altogether. It passed, however, on the 19th as it went from the House; the Senate receding from their amendments, after every shift of parliamentary strategy had been exhausted to prevent any bill for a specie paying bank. From the petition presented by Mr. Lefferts in the beginning of January 1814, to the bill reported by Mr. McKee in February 1815, much of the time of two sessions of Congress had been vexed in the elaboration of an imperfect and time-serv-

ing fiscal contrivance, which, after on the seventh trial coming out of the fiery furnace, was flung back again with indignation, on the eighth, and once more frustrated by public good luck on the ninth trial. A year afterwards, by another Congress, in April 1816, at length a bank became a law and a charter, which war alone made necessary, and peace at least postponed. Offspring of distress, its war birth was as protracted and painful as its first miscarriage by peace was exciting, and final dissolution calamitous.

On the 30th January, 1815, the President returned the bill to the Senate, where it originated, with his objections. In substance they were, that the notes were too few, and the coin too much, of which the institution was to be compounded; also that the bank would be too independent of the government. Next day the Senate re-considered, when but fifteen were for the vetoed bill, and nineteen against it. On the 6th February, 1815, Governor Barbour on leave introduced another bill, which, on the 8th and 10th, was warmly discussed in Senate. Mr. Giles moved clauses compelling a loan of thirty millions by the bank to the government, and legalizing suspension of specie payments till April 1816; both of which amendments were rejected. Christopher Gore, too, tried an unsuccessful amendment, that the notes should express their nonpayment in specie. On the 11th February, 1815, Senate passed this bill eighteen to sixteen. Its features need not be particularized, as peace prevented it becoming a law. The day it came to the House, was that on which the dawn of peace broke on us from the East, on the 13th February, 1815. The bank thereupon lost much of its importance and attraction. After motions to commit and to alter the bill, which failed, we adjourned rejoicing. Great news, great joy, great national, and great party triumphs crowded in upon us from all quarters.

On the 14th of February, 1815, the welcome rumor, current the night before, of Mr. Carroll's arrival from Ghent, at New York, with peace, was published and generally credited. Next day the fact and the terms were officially made known. The last lingering spasms of the bank, in both Houses, were almost without sympathizers. After our tame, languid action in the House on the 13th of February, the day of the dawn of peace, quickly following the triumph at New Orleans, the subject slept through the 14th, 15th, and 16th. No one cared for banks, for stocks, even for silver and gold. The country, crowned with victory, was blessed with peace. The party which waged the war triumphed in the redoubled joy of patriots and partisans. When, therefore, on the 17th of February, 1815, the House resumed the bank bill,



after some cold, and, as it were, posthumous, at least moribund discussion, between Mr. Forsyth, Mr. Fisk, and others, on one side; Mr. Gaston, Mr. Oakley, and Mr. Calhoun, on the other; an ineffectual attempt was made by Solomon Sharp once more to recommit the prostrate bill, with instructions to a fifth special committee; and another, also ineffectual, to revive the expiring battle of the stocks. But that temperate, judicious, and independent member, William Lowndes, moved its indefinite postponement. He had no hostility, he said, to a national bank; but the present moment was most unfavorable to its establishment. Pressure of the times had suppressed important differences of opinion. The evil, as it was universally acknowledged, of suspended specie payments, would be prolonged by establishing a bank then. In short, that was the worst moment for a bank. Forsyth insisted that it was the best; Gaston, that it was as good as any; Grosvenor and Pickering, always opposed to the administration, whatever it wanted, were for putting off what might be another triumph superadded to the incredible victory of New Orleans, and the comfortable consummation at Ghent. Postponement was carried by the magical majority of one vote, seventy-four ayes to seventy-three nays. Macon's quaint maxim, that "one is majority enough," signalized the last moments of a national lottery, of which the whole drawing attested another of his fiscal saws, that "paper money was never beat."

The final vote was promiscuous; neither party, as such, voting either for or against, but both parties all mixed together. There were many absentees. After Speaker Cheves' vote defeated the bill on the 2d of January, 1815, so near was its death beyond reprieve, that only six Federalists voted to reconsider. And when McKee's bill bid fair to become a law, there was great administration rejoicing. No doubt was allowed of its passage. "Speculators and money-mongers," said the National Intelligencer, "are no longer to prey on the necessities of the nation, or sport with the public credit. Treasonable intercourse between New England and the British provinces will no longer encourage the buying specie at twenty per cent. above government paper; the whole country will not be paying tribute to one disaffected corner." On the other side, denunciation and detraction were not idle or diffident. "Madison," it was reported, "would resign: he must: a sufficient number of his own party were resolved to insist upon it. The imbecility of the administration—their wretched failure to raise means, and profligate waste of what little they had—their evasion or violations of the Constitution—their whole course since the wicked and unnatural war

began, had convinced majorities in both houses—as the people were undoubtedly of opinion, that other rulers were indispensable. Peace, or a change of administration, we *must and will have*."

Prior to the bank veto on the 9th of January, 1815, the bill to provide additional revenue for defraying the expenses of government became a law. On the 17th of January, the Secretary of the Treasury, in a letter of much animation, laid bare to foes as well as friends the condition of the country. Little more than fifteen millions was estimated as the maximum of the year's income; and more than forty millions as the minimum of its expenditures. Taxes were called for to a large amount on many objects from which Congress shrunk; incomes and legacies, mortgages, stocks, flour, manufactures; an emission of fifteen millions of treasury notes, and a loan of twenty-five millions of dollars. "A liberal imposition of taxes," said the Secretary, "ought to raise public credit, but can have no effect in restoring a circulating medium. It is for the wisdom of Congress to decide what other means can be resorted to than taxes, loans, and treasury notes. The humble opinion of the Treasury Department has been frankly given, and remains unchanged."

Although no bank came of that official oburgation, at any rate Mr. Dallas succeeded in getting taxes laid with a liberal hand; and the taxing power, which State opposition could not effectually interrupt, worked well throughout the contest everywhere. As money is the main sinew of war, so the Federal Constitution is much less fettered in the financial than the belligerent faculty. Massachusetts could lay no tax for rebellion without revolutionizing parties there: whereas the federal government heavily taxed many things in that commonwealth, and much increased the taxes. The mass of the people, who always pay the bulk of taxation, paid without a murmur. In vain the richer, not paying their proportion, labored to excite and mislead the poor, who paid more than theirs. Popular instinct preferred taxes to revolt: nor could State authority do anything but revolt, either by overt treason, or color of law, to resist the federal government. Hence a Hartford Convention to devise, if possible, a peaceable plan to withdraw from the nation, and transfer to the State the exclusive and complete constitutional means exercised at Washington; legislative, judicial and executive—even military, if need be, of enforcing, collecting, and applying the public revenue. A national bank would have been for that purpose additional federal power; and there were no anti-federal engines worked with more effect than the Boston banks.

Soon after the struggle, that followed peace, for the restoration of money and reduction of paper, Mr. Dallas resigned—re-

sumed the practice of law, and died in January 1813. His labors were not confined to what may, without exaggeration, be termed heroic remedies for the diseased and prostrate finances, in which his intrepid administration was like Brown's and Jackson's in the field; it invigorated the Executive, roused Congress, and inspired the people. Elevation, promptitude, conciliation, and decision, with great labor, characterized his brief career; which began with government at the lowest, and soon left it—favored indeed by fortune—at the highest pitch. In three of the principal

departments, he left the impression of that fearless but prudent energy which governs best and is most approved. The ablest vindication of the causes of the war was the production of his midnight hours, stolen from the repose required after toil some treasury days. And the delicate task of reducing the army from the war to a peace establishment, which Monroe, a candidate for the presidency, would have found an invidious and ungracious duty, was performed by Mr. Dallas as acting Secretary of War.

## CHAPTER XII.

### CHARTER AND CATASTROPHE OF THE UNITED STATES BANK.

THE next Congress, when I was no longer a member, received, in the President's annual message, the 5th December, 1815, Madison's first entire adhesion to a national bank, though in still measured intimation. "If all other means failed of arranging the finances and exchanges," it said, "and the operation of the State banks cannot produce the result, the operation of a national bank will merit consideration." Next day a special committee, the seventh raised by the House of Representatives for that purpose, besides several in the Senate, was appointed by Speaker Clay, re-elected, consisting of John C. Calhoun, Nathaniel Macon, James Pleasants, Joseph Hopkinson, Bolling Robertson, George Tucker, and Timothy Pickering. Secretary Dallas' report, on the 7th December, 1815, strongly recommended, and his letter of the 24th of that month, in answer to Mr. Calhoun, for the committees' official call of that day, developed his plan of the institution, which, on the 10th of April, 1816, was duly chartered by act of Congress, approved by President Madison. The bank was carried by the Republican party, mainly; the Federalists mostly voting against it, especially Daniel Webster, Jeremiah Mason, and John Sergeant, who became its chief counsellors, advocates and agents. Opposition by Joseph Hopkinson and John Sergeant nearly fixed it at New York instead of Philadelphia. The votes on the final passage of the bill in the House were 80 to 71; in the Senate 22 to 12.

The difficult and disreputable beginning, slow and doubtful progress, succeeding usefulness, power and celebrity, contest and catastrophe of the bank, were not events of the war of 1812, but, considered as among its offspring, may justify a continuance of their history from the beginning to the end.

In 1800 one of those civil revolutions, which, without mobs, massacres, or more than popular commotion, periodically convulse by party and corroborate by patriotism this republican empire of distant sovereignties, placed Jefferson, one of the few inflexible opponents of a bank of the United States, in the presidency. But from 1801, when put there, till 1809, when he retired, the bank was in full operation, and his Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Gallatin, had become convinced of its great public utility, if not constitutional propriety. As a member of Madison's succeeding administration, he endeavored to bring about its re-charter, and among the disadvantages of the war of 1812, regretted the want of such a fiscal engine. Restored, as we have seen it was, after five years' interregnum, in the close of Madison's, the eight years of Monroe's tranquil, and the four of John Quincy Adams' contested presidencies were administered with a bank of the United States, several years of them under Mr. Biddle's much approved direction. The United States had never, but for the short interval from 1811 to 1816, been without a national bank, when in 1828 another civil revolution raised a soldier to the chief magistracy, who, as he conquered the Indians in 1813, and the English in 1814, by similar bold aggression in his first year, attacked the bank of the United States, never resting till he achieved its overthrow. Mr. Rush's last annual report to Congress, as Mr. Adams' Secretary of the Treasury, in December, 1828, bore strong valedictory testimony to the great usefulness of the bank. President Jackson's first of his rapid series of Secretaries of the Treasury, Mr. Samuel D. Ingham, soon after the Jackson administration began, in an official letter to the bank, dated the 11th of July, 1829, "took occasion to



express the great satisfaction of the treasury department at the manner in which the president and directors of the parent bank have discharged their trusts in all their immediate relation to the government." The President, too, in his first annual message to Congress, in December, 1829, applauded the judicious arrangements of the officers of the bank, averting an evil apprehended at a time of unusual pressure on the money market, in paying off a large amount of national debt.

Yet a distinct and alarming paragraph in that same message significantly declared that "the charter of the bank expires in 1836, and its stockholders will most probably apply for a renewal of their privileges. Both the constitutionality and the expediency of the law creating this bank are well questioned by a large portion of our fellow-citizens; and it must be admitted by all that it has failed in the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency. If such an institution is deemed essential to the fiscal operations of the government, I submit to the wisdom of the legislature whether a national one, founded on the credit of the government and its revenues, might not be devised, which would avoid all constitutional difficulties, and at the same time secure all the advantages to the government and the country that were expected to result from the present bank." With that portentous assault began the struggle and final agony of the monster, as Jackson afterwards called the bank, whose dissolution shook this country to its foundations, involved the State banks in alternate expansion and suspension, disturbed the exchanges with Europe and Asia, and, after many years of tribulation more painful than foreign war, and more expensive, accomplished, if any thing, that separation of State from bank, which was no part of Jackson's design. To a United States bank his uniform language indicated that he was not opposed; with the State banks he was led into extremely detrimental conjunction. His most confidential intimates and advisers, if indeed he took any advice so persuasive as his own instinctive will, declare that he assumed the presidency determined to put down the institution as it was. His intention was to proclaim that determination in his inaugural address. But from that he was dissuaded by friends, who convinced him that, inasmuch as the bank charter was a legislative act, his first notice of it ought to be in a message to Congress. From the intimation of that first message he never swerved, though great efforts were made to turn him aside. He relinquished the idea of retirement after his first presidential term, in order to effect his purpose. Early appeal to the popular attention and excitement he deemed necessary to his success, considering the bank question not a formidable

but a favorable issue to lay before the people, for the people love vetoes, and his veto, notwithstanding strong interposals to prevent it, was inevitable.

The early attempt of Mr. Ingham, his first Secretary of the Treasury, to remove Mr. Mason from the Portsmouth branch, instead of Jackson's effort to enlist, was Mr. Ingham's to preserve the bank, and that skirmish, which seemed to bring on the great battle, was not at all indispensable—the battle was inevitable. Still, it was provocation. The president of the bank set up a standard of independence which could not be maintained; the power of money on credit, against that of popularity, in the country of universal suffrage. Sharp letters between him and the Secretary of the Treasury, with futile *éclat*, swelled the parade of hostilities, proclaimed, as the adherents of the President of the United States affirmed, to turn a government bank into a bank government.

The first annual message of December 1829 was countervailed by favorable reports from the appropriate committees of both Houses of Congress. The House of Representatives referred the subject to a committee, of which Mr. George McDuffie was chairman, and the Senate to one presided by General Samuel Smith, both of whom made reports, that of Governor McDuffie pre-eminent in constitutional and fiscal exposition; that of General Smith abounding with practical views, all in favor of the bank, and deprecating the President's destruction of it. Three years of contest followed between the president of the bank and the President of the United States. Jackson's sagacious temerity, his hatred not of a bank, but of all currency but coin, his unbounded confidence in the people and theirs in him, were resisted by Biddle, with unlimited disposal of several millions a year, for enlisting the press, the forum, legislation, speculation and party under a leader proud to be pitted against the great tribune, and resolved, like him, to conquer or die. Jackson staked his re-election on the issue; proof of uneducated knowledge of mankind, superior to the calculations of those who are wise by learning, instead of mother-wit: Biddle staked the bank on wresting a charter from Jackson; and seldom was the might of money more thoroughly, or more adroitly exerted. In 1832, Mr. Biddle pitched his tent at the seat of government, and there, with majorities in both Houses of Congress to sustain him, precipitated the conflict with General Jackson, upon his own anticipating tactics. Nearly all of Jackson's cabinet, favorable to the bank, warned Biddle against then bringing on the struggle whether the government should rule the bank, or the bank rule the government.

The second annual message of 1830 in-

dictated no insuperable, much less constitutional objection to a bank of the United States. "The importance of the principle involved in the inquiry, whether it will be proper to recharter the Bank of the United States, requires that I should again call the attention of Congress to the subject. Nothing has occurred to lessen, in any degree, the dangers which many of our citizens apprehend from that institution, as at present organized. In the spirit of improvement and compromise which distinguish our country and its institutions, it becomes us to inquire whether it be not possible to secure the advantages afforded by the present bank, through the agency of a Bank of the United States so modified in its principles and structure as to obviate constitutional and other objections.

"It is thought practicable to organize such a bank with the necessary officers, as a branch of the treasury department, based on the public and individual deposits, without power to make loans or purchase property, which shall remit the funds of the government; and the expenses of which may be paid, if thought advisable, by allowing its officers to sell bills of exchange to private individuals, at a moderate premium. Not being a corporate body, having no stockholders, debtors, or property, and but few officers, it would not be obnoxious to the constitutional objections which are urged against the present bank; and having no means to operate on the hopes, fears, or interests of large masses of the community, it would be shorn of the influence which makes that bank formidable. The States would be strengthened by having in their hands the means of furnishing the local paper currency through their own banks; while the Bank of the United States, though issuing no paper, would check the issues of the State banks, by taking their notes in deposit, and for exchange only, so long as they continue to be redeemed with specie. In times of public emergency, the capacities of such an institution might be enlarged by legislative provisions.

"These suggestions are made, not so much as a recommendation, as with a view of calling the attention of Congress to the possible modifications of a system which cannot continue to exist in its present form, without occasional collisions with the local authorities, and perpetual apprehensions and discontent on the part of the States and the people."

This repeated attack had no great effect. The House of Representatives took no action on the subject; and Colonel Benton's motion in the Senate for leave to introduce a bill against recharter was rejected by 23 to 20 votes.

On the 20th April, 1831, the government gazette, the *Globe*, astonished the community, by officially announcing a total

change in President Jackson's cabinet. A camarilla quarrel, which troubled the unity of his administration, was supposed to have eventually led to that explosion, or state stroke, in which, as females were involved, no more need be said than that it was one of those sudden, astonishing, and strange events, such as a Duchess of Marlborough or Madame de Maintenon might cause, but till then in American republican government unknown; to which, however, it is proper to allude, as far as it affected the bank, and as a trivial personal quarrel of society acted on the gestion of public events. After the death of De Witt Clinton, who, it was supposed, would have been President Jackson's Secretary of State, he called to that post Martin Van Buren, Governor of New York, who gave out that he should go to Washington to revive the doctrines of Jefferson, which others had preached, but he should practise, and among them he soon coincided in General Jackson's opposition to the bank, to which Mr. Van Buren professed uncompromising hostility. Appointed minister to England, on resigning the Department of State, and succeeded in that department by Edward Livingston, the bank acquired a fast friend, instead of an avowed enemy there, near the President's person. Mr. Louis McLane, brought home from the English mission to take Mr. Ingham's place in the Treasury Department, was, like him, a supporter of the bank, without approving the course of its president. In his annual report, the 7th December, 1831, Mr. McLane applauded "the present good management of the bank, the accommodation it has given government, and the practical benefits it has rendered the community, which give it strong claims upon the consideration of Congress." And he connected it with Jackson's laudable longing to extinguish the national debt, by selling the government bank shares, if sold, for eight millions of dollars, which, in addition to the incoming receipts, would accomplish that consummation. The President's annual message at the same time left the matter to Congress, where it belonged. "Entertaining," said the message, "the opinion heretofore expressed in relation to the Bank of the United States, as at present organized, I felt it my duty in my former messages frankly to disclose them, in order that the attention of the legislature and the people should be seasonably directed to that important subject, and that it might be considered and finally disposed of in a manner calculated to promote the ends of the Constitution, and subserve the public interest. Having conscientiously discharged a constitutional duty, I deem it proper, on this occasion, without a more particular reference to the views of the subject heretofore expressed, to leave it at present



to the investigation of an enlightened people and their representatives."

In that frame of the President's mind, the Senate recalled Mr. Van Buren from England, by an inconsiderate for themselves, and for the bank unfortunate mistake. Established, and contented in London, with his epicurean inclinations and easy temper, the American minister enjoyed the splendid hospitalities of the British aristocracy in a life of luxurious ease, freed from the rude cares of democracy, and perhaps without thought of further promotion, when, on the 7th December, 1831, his nomination was cast into the Senatorial urn. The dean of the diplomatic corps then at the court of St. James, old Prince Talleyrand, had lived an exile at Albany, an unfrocked and impoverished priest, when Martin Van Buren was a poor boy at Kinderhook. On the 19th May, 1794, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand Perigord voluntarily made oath before Matthew Clarkson, Mayor of Philadelphia, that "born at Paris, and arrived at Philadelphia from London, I will be faithful and maintain allegiance to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and to the United States of America, and that I will not, at any time, wilfully and knowingly do any matter or thing prejudicial to the freedom and independence thereof:"—one of his numerous oaths of allegiance, to which he had added several more before meeting Mr. Van Buren in London. Soon after that oath the French ambassador's royal master, Louis Philippe, rode on saddle-bags, which contained all his wardrobe, a wanderer in American wilds, cleaning his own boots and taking other lessons of humility, which in 1831 he seemed to approve, and in 1848 is sorrowfully bound to undergo. The sailor king of Great Britain, William the Fourth, of George the Third's seven sons the most vulgar and ill-bred, with facetious civility, entertained the American minister at Windsor. Among the gorgeous embassies of spendthrift potentates, condemning the parliamentary reform by which some approximation to American institutions was attempting to prevent revolution in England, the American minister was basking under the Corinthian columns of magnificent governments, while Senatorial cabal conspired to degrade him and mortify his protector. In that Senatorial caldron seethe the many patent, and still more numerous latent presidential aspirations, thirsting for the draught never enjoyed; for they are curious facts in American politics, that no Senator ever has been elected President, and but few Presidents have been Senators.

After favorable report from the committee on Mr. Van Buren's nomination, John Holmes, on the 17th January, 1832, moved to recommit, with instructions, involving the cabalistic changes in the cabi-

net. With ominous discussion, finally, on the bitter cold night of the 25th January, 1832, Mr. Van Buren was rejected by a vote of 23 to 23, and the casting vote of Vice President Calhoun. Mr. Webster, the last on whom such an imputation sat gracefully, charged Mr. Van Buren with subserviency to England. An ill-assorted triumvirate of Mr. Clay, Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Webster, all aspirants for the presidency, defeated President Jackson and his favorite, recalled Mr. Van Buren from his mission to preside over themselves as Vice President; and from that bound, by them and their adherents, by Jackson's support, and the bank's opposition, to be carried forward to the presidency, after Jackson's second term, which he then thought proper to undertake, after having unequivocally declined it.

By like Senatorial passion was Isaac Hill raised from being second comptroller to Senator, who probably caused the attempt to remove Jeremiah Mason from the presidency of the Portsmouth branch bank. Mr. Van Buren's elevation by popular reaction was a severe blow to the bank, against which Jackson's ardent antagonism had in him a calm, wary, influential and provident aid. On the 22d March, 1832, Mr. Van Buren had his audience of leave in England, on the 24th dined at Windsor Castle with the king, and on the 5th July landed at New York on his triumphant recall: declined the popular ovation there awaiting him, because of the cholera then prevailing in that city; but on the 8th was closeted with Jackson at Washington, to confirm his veto of the bank bill, sent the second day afterwards to the Senate, where it originated.

Soon after the third annual message against the bank in December, 1831, Mr. Dallas, one of the Pennsylvania Senators, on the 9th January, 1832, presented their memorial for recharter, and had it referred to a select committee, who reported on the 13th March, 1832, a charter, with modifications, for the term of fifteen years. Meantime, the conflict having begun in the House of Representatives, the Senate bill was laid on the table to await the action of the other House. On the 9th January, 1832, Mr. McDuffie presented the memorial there, and had it referred to the committee of ways and means, of which he was chairman, which committee, on the 10th February, 1832, reported for the recharter. Mr. Mark Alexander, from the minority of that committee, reported against it. Five thousand copies of the bill, report and counter-report, were ordered to be printed. When Mr. McDuffie, on presenting the memorial, moved its reference to the committee of ways and means, Mr. Cambreleng moved a reference to a select committee, which motion, after debate and under the previous question moved by Louis Condict,

was negatived 100 to 90. Among the negatives on that vote appeared Mr. James K. Polk, the future President, whose opposition to the bank as member, as chairman of the committee of ways and means, and as Speaker, was uniformly active and energetic. On the 23d February, 1832, Mr. Augustine S. Clayton, on leave, moved his resolution for a select committee to examine into the affairs of the bank, with power to send for persons and papers, and to report to the House. On the 14th March, 1832, that resolution was considered, and after various amendments rejected, that of Mr. Adams was carried, 106 to 92, for the amended resolution, and the select committee appointed by the Speaker, Andrew Stevenson. Mr. Edward Everett moved to choose the committee by lot, but withdrew the motion on Mr. McDuffie's request, and the Speaker named Augustine S. Clayton, John Quincy Adams, George McDuffie, Richard M. Johnson, Churchill C. Cambreleng, Francis Thomas, and John G. Watmough. By Mr. Adams' amendment the committee had leave to meet in Philadelphia, were to make their final report by the 21st April, 1832, might employ clerks, and their expenses were to be paid out of the contingent fund of the House.

Not till the 1st May, 1832, Mr. Clayton from the majority of the committee; on the 11th May, 1832, Mr. McDuffie from the minority; and on the 14th Mr. Adams alone, made their respective reports. Three of the committee for the bank, three against it, and one, Colonel Johnson, voted with the three supporters to enable them to report, but declared that, though he assented to their report, he disclaimed any intention to cast the least reflection on the integrity of the president of the bank or its government, and upon Mr. Biddle bestowed high praise for great merit. It would be useless to repeat the several counts of what Mr. McDuffie called Mr. Clayton's indictment. The bank went back to Congress not only not found guilty, but unimpaired by a faltering if not failing impeachment. All the majority ventured to report was only that nothing should be done as to rechartering the bank until the public debt was paid, and the public revenue adjusted to the measure of public expenditures: conjunction, like individual competency, always desiderated, but never accomplished. On the other hand, the minority report was a bold and thorough vindication of the institution. Mr. McDuffie pronounced "visionary in the extreme all imagination that the bank was in the slightest danger of being reduced to the necessity of suspending payment;" and taxed the majority with "design to produce a scene of general embarrassment and distress in the absence of natural causes." Mr. Adams, with all the power of the bitter

polemics he delighted and excelled in, defended what was charged as subsidizing the press. Why should not a bank be succored by a free press, as well as a president? who shall fetter the hallowed freedom of the press? and he lashed with unmerciful if not unmerited castigation a quondam bank director who had forsworn (as Mr. Adams charged) against Mr. Biddle. In short, it was at worst for the bank a drawn battle, if that.

Public sentiment was aroused, but the bank had the best of it. A solitary resolution of the Legislature of the State of New York had, on the 8th of February, 1832, instructed the Senators of that State, and requested its Representatives, to vote against renewal of the charter. On the 23d of January, 1832, Colonel Benton asked leave of the Senate to bring in a joint resolution declaratory of the meaning of the bank's charter, on the subject of the paper currency to be issued, which was refused, 26 to 16; Mr. Dallas voting against, Mr. Forsyth, Mr. Grundy and Mr. Troup, three members of the House when the bank was attempted in 1814-15, voting for, Colonel Benton's leave. The horoscope of stocks and of party, feeble reports to Congress against, forcible reports for, the bank, the undeniable fact that not one charge against it had been incontrovertibly substantiated, betokened that the President, if relying on Congress, would be disappointed. Mr. Cambreleng and Mr. Thomas indeed imputed sinister expansions and contractions. Mr. Clayton, by bolder accusation, proclaimed the bank broken, and that it could not pay its debts. Mr. Polk, and a few other members of Congress, with Colonel Benton and the Attorney General, Taney, avowed their determination to put an end to it. But nearly all the conservative portion of the Democratic party, with the venerable Madison at their head, advocated a renewal of the charter; and very few of any party believed that the public deposits were not perfectly safe, with a superabundance of capital to meet every liability. No charge had been established as specified, except, perhaps, the least specific, but most dangerous of all, that the bank was in the field of politics, assailing government in the person of a popular chief magistrate, who, though by no means the government in theory, was practically so, and a formidable foe to challenge by a bank, whose influence, however extensive and great, did not reach down to the roots of plebeian potentiality.

Of the twelve members of Jackson's two successive cabinets, in less than two years no less than eight, four out of six of each cabinet, were friends of the bank, desiring its recharter. Majorities in both Houses of Congress were always so; and Jackson's aversion was not to a bank of the United States. Mr. Ingham's appeal to the public gave it to be understood that the Pro-



sident's reiterated objection was to its expediency, but not constitutional. His public acts, and the veto itself, all said so. There were written applications on the files of the bank for branches (and other similar tokens of approbation) from Andrew Jackson, Martin Van Buren, and Thomas H. Benton. Thomas Jefferson, in 1817, recommended a branch bank. Ex-President Madison, in two published letters, ex-President Monroe and William H. Crawford, in published letters, Edward Livingston, Samuel Smith, if not Albert Gallatin, and many more of the aboriginal Republican party, and a majority of the war republican party, were avowed advocates of the bank, and nearly all of them of its recharter. It was a Republican act, as far as parties were concerned. The Federal party were nearly unanimous for a bank; and though many of their representatives in Congress opposed the bank attempted in 1814-15, and chartered in 1816, yet they soon became its supporters, counsel, agents, directors, and stockholders. The legislatures of many States, memorials from town meetings and various respectable bodies of citizens, solicited branches, for which sixty-three applications, respectably and powerfully presented, were refused by the bank, besides the twenty-five established. The Legislature of Pennsylvania, in February, 1831, by large majorities, resolved that the Constitution of the United States authorizes, and near half a century's experience sanctions, a bank of the United States, as necessary and proper to regulate the value of money and prevent paper currency of unequal and depreciated value: and again, the next year, in February, 1832, instructed their Senators and requested their Representatives in Congress to use their exertions to obtain a renewal of the charter during that session of Congress, with such alterations, if any be necessary, as may secure the rights of the States.

Although General Jackson's early, and, as was charged, premature and continual denunciation of the bank, it was insisted, justified and required its earlier application for recharter, some time before the expiration, yet all the Democratic supporters of it counselled delay; not to urge the question till after the presidential election. Mr. Clay and Mr. Sergeant, professionally employed by the bank, were the candidates nominated against General Jackson and Mr. Van Buren; which proved a provoking circumstance, when forbearance would have been a great virtue, and inaction, probably, more masterly than any movement.

To the last Mr. Biddle was strongly advised not to press the recharter when it was done. Mr. Livingston, Secretary of State, Mr. McLane, Secretary of the Treasury, and, I believe, General Cass, Secretary of War, as well as Mr. Barry, Postmaster General, General Smith, John Forsyth, Mr. Wilkins,

Mr. Dallas, the Pennsylvania Senators, nearly all that portion of the Republican party which sustained the bank, counselled delay. Let the President have time, and his friends opportunity of reasoning with him. Do not force, do not hurry him. Wait the event of his election. Let him be the author, instead of destroyer, of a bank. Edward Livingston was constant in belief and assurances that, if conciliated and not constrained, the rugged chieftain would yield on fair and reasonable terms. The Attorney General, Mr. Taney, was the only open cabinet opponent of the bank. From the plains of New Orleans, where he served as his aid-de-camp, to the council, where, together, they produced the proclamation against nullification, Mr. Livingston enjoyed Jackson's confidence. Into his hands a letter from Mr. Biddle was safely deposited—not trusted to the post—offering to accept a charter on almost any terms that Jackson might prescribe. Mr. Biddle was not insensible of the delicacy of his situation among ambitious leaders whom he could hardly resist, avaricious followers whom he despised, and numberless flatterers. He too was ambitious, not avaricious; not insensible to flattery, but not infatuated; fond of mysterious ways, but not a mere intriguer. Surrounded as he was at Philadelphia, much more at Washington, there were presidential candidates, party leaders, and other politicians to whom the proffer through Mr. Livingston would have been unwelcome intelligence. Some of his surrounding counsellors dealt with the bank as only the means of a political end. Striving to overcome the President and supersede him, they labored to bring Jackson to a dilemma by which he would be either degraded to submission, or driven to what they deemed the desperate resort of a veto. Others were avaricious and ambitious too, while many looked only to their own lucrative ends. Not a few flattered Mr. Biddle's ambition by assurances that the bank was his way to political honors—to the presidency of the United States, which was continually held up to his contemplation. And who is proof against adulation? which misled Biddle and Jackson, as it did Napoleon and Alexander: by republican flattery more captivating than regal, as it is addressed, without impediment or interposition, directly and personally to its object.

Notwithstanding, however, the politicians and the avaricious, the bill, as it passed both Houses, showed that Mr. Biddle yielded, contrary to the wishes of both those classes, to the supposed predilections of General Jackson. No note under \$50, unless on the face of it payable where issued; power expressly reserved to Congress to prohibit, in 1836, all notes under \$20; no more small checks or drafts; every branch to receive notes of any other branch in payment of balances

due from State banks—were concessions of circulation to the States, and of coin to the President's preference, limitations and deprivations of a national bank clearly indicative of sacrifices wisely made by Mr. Biddle for General Jackson's expected acquiescence. On the 2d of June Colonel Benton, the most uncompromising senatorial antagonist of the recharter, said no more than "if the bank is pressed *now*, Jackson will put it down, as he did the British army; and government attempting to rectify its usurpations would be sending Ralph, the apothecary's boy, with a syringe to shiver the rock of Gibraltar."

In June, 1832, at Gadsby's hotel, on Pennsylvania Avenue, the great thoroughfare of Washington, the bank standard was hoisted by Nicholas Biddle, in person, and majorities of both Houses were ready, if not all, to flock to it, yet to vote as he wished. The most conspicuous, and a majority of the Senators attended his drawing-room, partook of his entertainments, as some of them had of his bounties, counselled with him, caucused in his apartments, and did his bidding. Contrary to the warnings of a few, some of them disinterested advisers, Mr. Biddle's flatterers, debtors and deceivers, urged constant action, early action, and compulsion. Of the five hundred bank officers he so extravagantly defended and applauded, and the five thousand bank borrowers who thronged his ante-chamber, there were few but fomented his confidence, which, misled as it was, was never so rash as theirs, indicated by votes of parasite directories, with the color of by-laws to arm him, with power transcending the President's constituted authority. The bank's flourishing rental of three millions and a half a year, was put at his irresponsible and clandestine disposal. Twenty-five directors were melted into one gigantic corporation sole, in his person, with the revenue of a principality, and more than the power of a monarch, to distribute as he pleased. In the profit and loss account, what were one hundred thousand dollars a year, spent from three and a half millions? a scarcely perceptible sum to lend, or give by discounts, fees, or other largesses, to those who make and interpret laws in legislatures and in courts, create and annul public sentiment in print. From the Senate committee on finance, in December, 1834, Mr. Tyler, a constitutional opponent of any and every national bank, with his future Secretary of State, Mr. Webster, and others, members of that committee, vindicating the moderation, extolling the wisdom, and to prove the purity of the bank, reported that there were never more than 59, nor less than 44, debtor members of Congress to the bank, whose loans, bills, and discounts, never exceeded \$233,000. "Loans of sums of money could not be regarded," said that report, "as likely so to

operate, as to induce a member to forget the obligation he is under to himself, his country, and his God!" Yet not long before the bank made an insolvent assignment of its effects, the debts of one Senator to it for drafts, discounts, and other advances, amounting to one hundred and eleven thousand dollars, were compromised for a conveyance of wild lands in the West, of no realizable value, leaving unsettled and outstanding, another debt of twenty-eight thousand dollars.

In the Senate, on the 8th and 9th June, 1832, Hugh L. White, Isaac Hill, and Colonel Benton, intimates of the President, delivered speeches against the bank. On the 9th, Mr. Wilkins presented the Pennsylvania resolutions of instruction in its favor. The bill was then ordered to be engrossed for third reading, by 25 to 20 votes, three of its voters not present at the moment.

Renewed and earnest entreaty was then once more addressed to Mr. Biddle, to stop, and rest on that success, and not to venture further; but with that vote of the Senate to indicate and influence public opinion, to pause, and wait for it next year, without then forcing a bill on the President. Nothing like personal enmity had then occurred between Mr. Biddle and General Jackson. At the beginning of that session, on the 30th December, 1831, General Jackson had nominated Mr. Biddle, as theretofore, one of the government directors, all of whom voted for him as president of the bank. The boasted exchanges, large circulation, profitable dividends, great accommodation to government, Mr. Biddle's pleasing manners, and avowed discountenance of party preferences, all recommended the institution. But he would not, probably could not, stop then. He had been threatened with opposition from the party then his chief reliance, unless he went on. Another bank of the United States might be chartered instead of that at Philadelphia, and he was assured that there was no danger of the threatened veto. It might be threatened, but never would be put in force. Jackson would not dare that extremity. If he did, the consequence would be his inevitable defeat at the polls. Veto, or no veto, therefore, the bank course must be onward. Mr. Biddle's presence at Washington might have offended one less umbrageous than Jackson, and looked like an attempt to carry the bank in spite of the President, whose intimates had mentioned the veto, and presses had promised it. Beyond doubt the bill from the Senate would pass the House of Representatives; so that everything depended on the conduct of two individuals, Nicholas Biddle to withhold, or Andrew Jackson to reject the bill, and neither hesitated.

On the 9th June, 1832, Colonel Watmough presented the Pennsylvania Legis-



lative expectations to the House of Representatives, with all the weight of that transcendent thing, a state, clothed in the imposing forms of constituted authorities; the Speaker of the Senate and governor, authenticating the document both democratic. On the 11th June, 1832, Monday, the bank bill was presented to the House as it passed the Senate the preceding Saturday. The intervening Sabbath, with all its opportunities of reflection, and concert, made no change. On the 12th June, Mr. McDuffie moved its reference to the committee of the whole House on the state of the Union; which, after various skirmishing motions, was, by the arrival of twelve o'clock, put out of the routine for that day. On the 13th June, Mr., now Judge Wayne of the Supreme Court, withdrew his pending motion to postpone the consideration of the bill to the first Monday of July, and Mr. McDuffie, withdrawing, likewise, his motion, to refer it to the committee of the whole, which left its results to the ordinary accidents and delays of legislation, substituted and carried, without serious opposition, a motion to make it the special order for Monday, the 18th June, which gave it preference in the order of business. But it was not considered till the 30th June, when Mr. Clayton moved to commit it to the committee of the whole. On that day, except a motion by Mr. McDuffie, to retain the established branches, nothing beyond some common movements of legislative tactics, took place. On the 2d July, propositions to tax the branches, and the foreign stockholders, and to limit the interest on discounts, some of which were within three or four votes of being carried, were all rejected, and Mr. McDuffie's amendment succeeded. An attempt to close further controversy by the previous question failed. Next day, July 3d, 1832, the previous question was at length carried, 96 to 82, on motion of Gen. Henry A. S. Dearborn, son of the General of that name, of the war of 1812. Engrossing the amendments, and reading the bill a third time, were carried, 106 to 84. So strong and eager for a bank were more than the avowed majority that the order of business was suspended, so as to authorize reading the bill a third time that day, by a vote of two-thirds, 124 to 61. The previous question was then again carried on General Dearborn's motion, and the bill was passed by a majority of 22 votes, 107 to 85. On the same day, 3d July, 1832, the Senate, on Mr. Dallas' motion, without delay, or division, concurred in the House amendment respecting branches. On the 4th July, the bill was reported as enrolled, and on the 6th, that it had been presented to the President for approval. All the Pennsylvania members present in both Houses, voted for the bank, except one, who hanged himself afterwards. Large numbers of the

Jackson party, as it had then been called, were for the bank, with numerous presses.

To Mr. Biddle's personal superintendence of the passage of the bill, the Senate super-added, after it was presented to the President for his approval, another irritation. The House had passed a resolution for putting an end to a session of more than seven months duration, by adjournment on the 9th of July. As the bill was not presented to the President till the 4th of that month, it was said that he might keep it without returning it till after Congress adjourned. To prevent that, and compel him either to sign or reject the bill, the House resolution for adjournment, on the 9th July, after Mr. Webster moved to lay it on the table, was changed from the 9th to the 16th, so as to give full ten days of session, without counting the Sundays. To this the last of many provocations Jackson reposted the next day by sending his veto to the Senate.

Various, contradictory, and perplexing were the week's predictions, conjectures, doubts, hopes, notions, from the 4th to the 10th, whether the bill would be approved or rejected. Public journals of all parties had taken sides on the question; before the bill passed Congress many insisted that it would be approved, others that it would be rejected. Did Jackson weigh both sides as Washington had done in 1791? He certainly did not require written opinions from any of his constitutional advisers. Did he yield to counsel and to circumstances like Madison in 1815-16?

Upon Jackson's re-election or defeat both political parties put the fate of the bank. His hostility to it was avowed, his want of confidence in Congress to restrain or not recharter it, nay, his distrust of the federal judiciary by legal proceedings to repeal or to punish it. He would hang the ring-leaders of the nullifiers, and wring the bank's head off. The Democratic press of Virginia and other places invoked the veto as the only safeguard against a bank become what Hamilton denominated it, a *great political engine*. But in Mr. Adams' felicitous application of the language of Hero in "Much Ado about Nothing," Nicholas Biddle took Hamilton's definition only to "spell him backward." All its millions were said to be lavished to conquer recharter, to carry it by torture. Whether the twenty-eight millions of increase in sixteen months, from forty-two millions of loans in January 1831, to seventy millions in May 1832, of which Jackson accused the bank, could be reduced, as the bank contended, to eighteen millions, and that increase explained by sufficient reasons for such expansion; whether expansion and contraction in frightful and tormenting round, as Mr. Cambreleng and other adversaries imputed; whether the *subsidized press*, which Mr. Adams vindicated as parcel of its hallowed

freedom not to be touched, and as warrantable in the president of a bank as the President of the Union; whether these and other impeachments were well founded, they were at any rate urged as facts beyond denial or excuse. Hostilities were declared with extreme bitterness. Three years of fierce rose to furious conflict between the rival presidents, struggling with terrible composure, the subdued rage of victory or death, whether one should crush the bank, or the other overthrow the administration. The conflicting monarchs of popularity and of wealth raged till the deposits were removed. Then, though the masses did not suffer so much, the bank people, the tradespeople, money makers, dealers, artisans, speculators, and discount dependants, with their numerous tribes of auxiliary editors, lawyers and politicians; active workmen in the busy laboratory of ephemeral public sentiment, suffered, or thought and cried that they all suffered, intensely. The periodical wail of ruin went up from cities to the political metropolis, with hosts of hostile committees and of alarmed friends to browbeat or entreat the President; who mocked at the ruin, which, he said, ought to overtake those who overtraded on borrowed capital in paper money, and defied the storm with imperturbable resolution. "He was sure," he said, "of the cross roads. The streets of cities might swarm with bank myrmidons, his opponents. But the rural districts, where the plough worked without loans, and God gave the increase, not bank directors, in luxurious towns made by man—the yeomanry would sustain him." His entire confidence in the mass, and theirs in him as one of themselves, his sagacious and even artful boldness, if not temerity, his innate and honest detestation, not of a national bank, or any bank, but of all artificial, and more than that, of all privileged machinery for counterfeiting money, supplanting the good old system of personal loans, and individual credit by that of bank corporate discounts, protests and prosecutions, his love of coin as the only currency, strung his iron nerves to immortal resistance. The country people, too, adhered to their primitive methods of lucrative transaction. When what was called scarcity of money distressed the seats of commerce, with devouring usury, money to lend was plenty, at legal or less than legal interest among farmers and others not hasting too fast to be rich. Especially was that the case in the German counties of Pennsylvania, inhabited by the most frugal and thrifty agriculturists on the finest farms in America, of which more are transmitted from one generation to another in the same family than in the Eastern Puritan regions, whose boasted universal but imperfect education makes many ashamed of manual labor, stimulated to

other means of subsistence and advancement. More learned, are the people of New England as wise as the Swabian race, contemptuously derided as American Boeotians—the Simon Snyder race of plodding, unspiculating Germans, the truest of the Saxon descent? The only two colossal American fortunes were amassed by plain, uneducated men, one a Frenchman, Stephen Girard, the other a German, John Jacob Astor, without a drop of English vitality in their veins. It was officially stated in Congress, as a reason for a bankrupt act, that official ascertainment gives 95 failures out of every 100 mercantile enterprises in the United States. Why? Is it because the new Englishman is an exaggeration of the old, with greater licentiousness of paper money superadded to the English loose currency; more liberty, but liberty fatal to equality, by incorporated privileged classes, fomenting excess and perverting trade to gambling.

Besides immediate and extrinsic motives, the veto was preceded by political occurrences and party combinations, in all of which the bank, through the great body of its advocates, openly took part. Some of them declared that its error consisted in doing indirectly and sparingly what would have been more effectual if avowed, and openly carried out to the uttermost of its vast means of influence. On the 4th July, 1832, the usual boisterous notes of conflict were uttered in the Saturnalian quodlibets of politicians unavoidably, however undeservedly, influential with the people, heralding preparations for the summer and autumnal campaign to decide whether Jackson or the bank should rule. Angry correspondence between the President and Vice-President had estranged them, embittered by nullification. Among the interminable fragments of party, a mystic and sentimental anti-masonic modification had arisen; and many national exigencies to excite a people fond of commotion, and their chief magistrate restless without exploit. The Maysville road veto, western river and harbor controversy, the King of Holland's unfounded compromise of the Maine boundary, and resilient Madawaska hostilities, the Georgia Cherokee nullification, removal of the Indians beyond the Mississippi, Black Hawk war, Florida troubles, Falkland island and Sumatra naval attacks, proposed distribution of the public lands, treaties of amity with Turkey and Mexico, of indemnity from France and Naples, wrung by compulsion, all furnished fuel to the fiery era of bank contest. In September, 1831, the anti-masonic convention nominated their presidential candidates. In December 1831, the National Republican party nominated Henry Clay, the boldest of the bank's advocates, and of Jackson's antagonists, by whom excited antagonism was returned,



for President, and of course a Pennsylvanian, John Sergeant, director, counsellor, agent, intimate and immediate representative of the bank, as Vice-President. The Legislature of Pennsylvania renominated Jackson, who was nominated by the Democratic National Convention, with Mr. Van Buren as Vice-President. A fraction of that party in Pennsylvania, after wavering between George Mifflin Dallas, the son, and William Wilkins, son-in-law, of Dallas, author of the bank, settled on Mr. Wilkins, who, with Jackson, received the Pennsylvania thirty votes.

Parties were marshaled and confronted on the bank bill as it passed through Congress to be vetoed. Before his election denouncing party as a monster, Jackson afterwards forfeited the support of nearly all those won by that denunciation, who were shocked when he declared the bank a monster, and rallied party to its overthrow. Leaders need parties, which sometimes become factions, though demagogues are seldom long public favorites. But the people love vetoes, and admired his when it was laid before them in copious appeals to their reason and passions. Jackson's confidence in them induced him to think that they love also extensive appeals to their judgment; that the illiterate enjoy state papers teeming with well developed views. One of them himself, he sympathized in their sentiments, and cordially vindicated what he considered their rights. Taking his stand accordingly, when his ignorance and violence were themes of half-educated egotists, their contempt made little impression on the mind, and less on the suffrages of the community, while complete success at the polls gave his arguments the merit of predictions, and a volcanic banking system continually justified his opposition to it.

Throughout this reading republic many who live by their wits, despise honest labor, and the toiling millions. With them patriotism is a calculation, while with the common people it is an emotion. History written by and for the educated, bestows its homage on those who despise the uninformed. Yet glorious as it is to do right, regardless of popular clamor, and in despite of it, historical homage is likewise due to those who not only strip privilege of its unjust advantage, but to liberty, which has long flourished, add equality but little known. Jackson's whole life and death taught the lesson which Napoleon, child and champion of democracy, was tortured to death for disregarding, that the discernment and attachment of the illiterate are less selfish and more reliable than those of the aristocratic.

On the 16th July, 1832, Congress adjourned. Before the next session began in December, Jackson was re-elected by two hundred and nineteen votes to forty-nine

for Clay, and Van Buren, by all the democratic votes, except Pennsylvania. In that State, too, the success was signal of Jackson over the bank, by the choice of large majorities of his supporters. By that plebeian victory firmly fixed, he chose to consider it not only his right, but duty and popular instruction, his mission, to put an end to the Bank of the United States, and establish some other means of fiscal operations. The issue had been tried and decided, he thought, by his re-election. That event was soon followed by two exclusively banking transactions which fortified his growing antipathy to the institution, now pronounced and carried into destructive action. In the affairs of the three per cent. stocks, and the French draft, the bank gave its antagonists arguments for the final and fatal blow of withdrawing the public deposits. Concealment threw over the stock transaction a cloud of suspicion; detention of the disputed damages on the draft was treated as an act of rapacity, both illegal, the former as confessed by the bank, the latter as adjudged by the Supreme Court of the United States.

The three per cent. stocks of the United States were part of the offspring of Hamilton's funding system, having its paternity at the time and by the measure, which originated the first bank of the United States. That funding system was the first great measure on which American parties divided, into those who under Hamilton clung to English system of finance, and those who with Jefferson struck off into a more independent course. The three per cents were part of one of those fiscal compromises so frequent in English budgets since the Bank of England took root there. The subscribers to the public debt of the United States, consisting of foreign not quite twelve millions, domestic principal and arrears of interest upwards of forty millions, and state debts estimated by Hamilton at twenty-five millions, altogether nearly eighty millions, were funded by act of Congress of the 4th of August, 1790. Among his certificates, each subscriber was to receive indents of interest, issued in payment of interest, purporting that the United States owed the holder the sum specified, bearing interest at three per cent., payable quarterly, subject to reduction by payment of the sum specified, whenever provision by law should be made for it. On the 1st January, 1817, more than sixteen millions of the three per cents remained part of the public debt of the United States; and it was not thought probable that it would ever be redeemed, without undergoing some modification by act of government, with consent of the holders. Nearly seven millions were held by English, about eleven millions in this country. This remnant of the original funding system, Jackson's administration

were determined to extinguish, together with all the rest of the debt of the United States.

On the 24th March, 1832, the day of Mr. Van Buren's royal feast at Windsor, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Asbury Dickens, by a confidential letter to Mr. Biddle, gave the bank notice that the means of the treasury would be sufficient to discharge one half of the three per cents. on the first of July, and that it was proposed to give public notice accordingly on the first of April. One of Jackson's passions was that his administration should accomplish what William Lowndes in Madison's administration began, extinguishment of the national debt, a monument to public faith by a country audaciously reproached since for repudiation of debts by England, whose public debt often compromised, once for three and twenty years repudiated, never can be extinguished but by the bloody sponge of revolution. Jackson's incessant attention to the affairs of his administration, with an intelligent chief clerk, Mr. Dickens, made the necessary arrangements for discharging the three per cent. stock. The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. McLane, was one of those warning Mr. Biddle not to press the recharter when it was done in 1832, or provoke the veto. On the 19th July, 1832, he wrote to Mr. Biddle that the treasury would redeem about two-thirds of the three per cents. on the first of October, the other third on the first of January, and publish notice of it on the 25th July. On the 28th July, 1832, Mr. Biddle answered, that the bank had taken the necessary steps to obtain the control of a considerable portion of those certificates, and would cheerfully employ it in such manner as might best suit the convenience of government. But those necessary steps were kept secret, and when divulged, confessed to be illegal. On the 18th July, 1832, immediately after the veto, General Thomas Cadwalader, "long a director of the bank, and enjoying its entire confidence," was despatched from Philadelphia to London to make an arrangement with the firm of Baring, Brothers & Company, for postponing payment of five millions of the stock to be redeemed. The arrangement he made with them by contract in London the 22d August, 1832, was to "buy up the three per cent. stocks on the best terms that could be done," in violation of the bank charter, forbidding its purchase of the public stocks of the United States. This was not generally known till by Baring's circular published here the 12th October, 1832. On the 15th of that month, Mr. Biddle wrote to Baring, Brothers & Company, disavowing the purchase as illegal, and proposing a different arrangement. To indignant and abrupt vi-

tuperative sensibility, like Jackson's, a common texture of strong minds impelled by strong passions—the secrecy, illegality and detection of what he deemed an intrigue, excited doubts of the bank's solvency, and suspicions of Mr. Biddle's fairness. It was, Jackson alleged, conclusive proof of the inability of the bank to refund the public deposits to the government, for payment of the public debt, as bound to do. The pretences and misrepresentations, he declared, by which it attempted to conceal the true cause from the government and the country, proved it unworthy of public trust. When General Cadwalader was sent to England, the public deposits in the bank were nearly twelve millions, and thirteen millions on the first of October, when only nine millions of the public debt were to be paid. It was then only the betrayal of the bank's shifts by the appearance of Baring's circular of the 12th October, that forced Mr. Biddle, General Jackson charged, three days after, on the 15th, to disavow his clandestine and illegal contrivance to prop up the tottering bank. On the 27th October, 1832, Mr. Biddle, in conversation with Mr. Dickens, explained this business, and by his request in a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. McLane. But by his reply of the 31st October, 1832, requiring further information, it was plain that the Secretary was not satisfied, as soon was distinctly and officially manifested. Early in July, 1832, the Asiatic Cholera appeared in America, beginning at Quebec, and traversed many parts of the United States. The ravages of that pestilence were pleaded for the bank, as threatening the pecuniary affairs of the country with great confusion, and, added Mr. Biddle, threatening "if it continued, to press with peculiar force on the public revenue, more especially, as the demand on account of the foreign holders of three per cents. on the first of October, at New York and Philadelphia alone, would have exceeded five millions of dollars." To Jackson's mind this was mere pretext.

Negotiations involving millions at London were not calculated to check or diminish the established animosity between the bank and the government of the United States, when an occurrence at Paris rendered the French government almost a party to the contest, of which the whole mercantile world, European and Asiatic, were spectators, many of them interested in it. Nicholas Biddle's name became familiar everywhere, more so than that of any other living American, not excepting Andrew Jackson. Eight millions of the stock of the bank of the United States were owned in foreign countries, mostly England. That immense dictator of public sentiment, American, French and German, besides English, the London Times, interfered in the bank quarrel, to declare it "an institution founded on



correct principles, which aided commerce to a *greater extent than any bank* in the known world." On the other hand, jealousy of foreign interest and influence figured largely in the veto. Nobility and hierarchy, said to be among the stockholders, were frequent topics of reprobation in Congress, and did not escape presidential animadversion. The three per cent. detection and contrivance, as denounced by the bank's enemies, occurred in the midst and heat of the presidential election. The affair of the French draft followed soon after, almost simultaneously with Jackson's renewed espousals to the American nation; whose plebeian judgment it was his pleasure to consider as recorded at the polls of more than a million of constituents, that he should destroy the bank. The deposits were to be removed, and both London and Paris furnished unexpected reasons for that strong measure of executive power.

The French Revolution of July, 1830, accomplished in no small degree by an American citizen, La Fayette, afforded the American minister at Paris, Mr. Wm. C. Rives, an opportunity which he properly laid hold of, not only to settle the long pending demands reciprocated by the United States and France on each other for indemnities claimed ever since Washington's proclamation of neutrality, in 1793, infringing Franklin's treaty at Versailles, in 1778, but for ameliorating the commercial intercourse and amicable relations between the two countries, not without much reason to sympathize, but by a series of fatalities so long alienated. By Mr. Rives' treaty, dated the 4th of July, 1831, France engaged to pay the United States five millions of dollars. The treaty was mortifying to French vanity, and payment of the debt onerous to the parsimonious Chamber of Deputies, reluctant to appropriate for such a purpose. Without waiting for the requisite appropriation, as soon as the first instalment fell due, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. McLane, on the 7th of February, 1833, drew for 4,856,666 66 francs, equal to \$912,050 77, as the first instalment, according to the treaty, including interest on the 11th of February, 1833, and the draft was purchased by the bank of the United States, which placed the amount to the credit of government. The draft was in favor of S. Jaudon, cashier of the bank, on Mr. Humann, the French minister of finance. Presented at his office, the 22d of March, 1833, payment was refused, and the bill protested. On the same day, Hottinguer & Co. interposed and paid it for account of Mr. Jaudon, cashier of the bank. On the 26th of April, 1833, the bank received information of the fate of their bill; and on the 13th of May, 1833, claimed the amount with damages, from the Secretary of the Treasury. On the 16th of May,

1833, the Secretary repaid the money, but without the damages, which he denied as unfounded. At the next semi-annual dividend, on the 7th of July, 1833, when the dividend declared on the bank stock of the United States, was \$233,422, the bank withheld \$170,041 18, for the damages claimed on the protested bill.

Mr. Rives having returned home, leaving only a charge d'affaires at Paris, and the settlement of our difficulties with France, requiring there a minister plenipotentiary, it was determined to commission Edward Livingston, and appoint Mr. McLane Secretary of State in Mr. Livingston's stead. But these changes were deferred till after the election. As soon as it was over, on the 4th of December, 1832, Mr. Wm. J. Duane was requested by Mr. McLane to take the Treasury Department, as Mr. McLane's successor, which was finally done on the 1st of June, 1833. In August following, Mr. Livingston sailed for France on board the frigate Constitution. By that time, the removal of the deposits from the United States bank to State banks had become the President's anxious resolve. Dallas' United States bank was much more affiliated to government than Hamilton's. It was Mr. Dallas' plan, defeated by Mr. Calhoun, that the President of the United States should nominate the president of the bank. And going beyond Hamilton's plan, the second bank was by charter to be depository of the public money, unless the Secretary of the Treasury should otherwise direct. The Attorney-General, Mr. Taney, and Auditor of the Treasury, Mr. Amos Kendall, by whose talents, industry and devotion to his cause, Jackson was much aided and gratified, countenanced a change of the public money from the United States to selected State banks, to which the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. McLane, was decidedly averse, and his successor, Mr. Duane, also, unless ordered by act of Congress. In the annual message to Congress, the 4th of December, 1832, the President, after reproachfully adverting to the bank postponement of the three per cents., proceeded to say, that "such measures as are within the reach of the Secretary of the Treasury, have been taken to enable him to judge whether the public deposits in that institution may be regarded as entirely safe. The subject is recommended to the attention of Congress, with a firm belief that it is worthy of their serious investigation. An inquiry into its transactions seems called for by the credit given throughout the country to many serious charges impeaching its character, and which, if true, may justly excite the apprehension, that it is no longer a safe depository of the money of the people." The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. McLane also, in his annual report to

the House of Representatives, brought the subject under consideration.

The untoward management and aspect of the three per cents., together with increasing alienation between the Executive and the bank, induced the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. McLane, on the 26th of November, 1832, by virtue of the charter authorizing him, *ex officio*, to inspect the general accounts of the bank, to empower Mr. Henry Toland, a respectable merchant of Philadelphia, long a director of the bank, and an intimate friend of General Jackson, to make that inspection. His examination was to be as complete as the law authorized to ascertain the security of the public moneys, and the solvency of the bank. On the 4th of December, 1832, Mr. Toland reported that he had made all the investigations required, excepting the accounts of private individuals, taking the monthly statement of the 1st of November, 1832, as the basis of all his inquiries; that the liabilities of the bank, exceeding somewhat thirty-seven millions of dollars, were provided for by assets considerably exceeding seventy-nine millions, so that neither the security of the public money nor the solvency of the bank admitted of a doubt. And its Western debts, to which his attention was particularly called, the examiner also reported as being as safe as the same amount would be on the Atlantic frontier. The president of the bank, in anticipation of any executive movement, however, and with a view to all events, on the 9th November, 1832, suggested to the directory the propriety of taking into consideration, at a full meeting of the board, the present situation, course of policy and future operations of the bank. The distant members, invited to Philadelphia for that purpose, on the 20th of November, 1832, took these subjects into consideration; and, on the 23d of that month, by Manuel Eyre, chairman of the committee, reported against any change in the general system of its operations; so that they might be continued and increased, or closed without inconvenience to the community.

The bank was, therefore, still indisposed to despair, if to doubt, of its continuance, notwithstanding the veto. But the President of the United States was resolved on depriving it of the public deposits; and the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. McLane, though not agreed to that measure, was dissatisfied with the conduct of the institution. The affair of the three per cents., and other circumstances, inclined him to question the safety of the deposits and even the solvency of the bank, to question which is to endanger such an institution, whose commercial surface, as presented to Mr. Toland, and by him to the government, might be no reliance for its real situation. The simplicity of the books and familiarity with bank business, which Mr. Toland's report men-

tioned as the grounds of his judgment, were the very means to mislead it. More than probable, as it is, that the deposits were then perfectly safe, and the bank solvent, it is nevertheless part of the perilous price paid by commonwealths for such luxuries, that it is impossible to know what their condition is, which no examination can ascertain, while discredit may ruin them.

The President's annual message recommended a sale of the government stocks in the bank; for which purpose, on the 13th of February, 1833, Mr. Polk, from the committee of ways and means reported a bill. But Mr. Charles A. Wickliffe, taking the strong ground of objecting to it, when, by parliamentary rule, a bill is to be at once rejected without reading, if that be the sense of a majority, the previous question, demanded by Mr. Elisha Whitlesey, was sustained, and put an end to even listening to the attempt to sell the stock, by a majority of two votes, ninety-three to ninety-one.

On the 11th of December, 1832, Mr. Cambreleng moved for the correspondence and documents relative to the arrangement in Europe for postponement of payment of the three per cent. stocks. On the 14th of December, 1832, these documents, meantime communicated, together with Mr. Toland's report of his examination, were, on Mr. Wayne's motion, referred to the committee of ways and means, which consisted of Gulian C. Verplanck, Ralph J. Ingersoll, John Gilmore, Mark Alexander, Richard H. Wilde, Nathan Gaithers and James K. Polk. On the 1st of March, 1833, Mr. Verplanck, from that committee, to which during the session had been referred sundry communications in relation to the agency of the bank, in the payment of a portion of the public debt, and to the pecuniary and financial state and management of the bank, reported a resolution that the government deposits might, in the opinion of the House, be safely continued in that bank, Mr. Polk, at the same time, from the minority of the committee reporting adversely. Next day, Mr. Polk presented an additional report, of which ten thousand copies were ordered to be printed, and appended to the report of the majority, whose resolutions regarding the safety of the deposits in the bank had been that day adopted, under the previous question, by ayes one hundred and nine to nays forty-six: of which majority many were the President's personal and political friends, but the minority voted his determination.

The twenty-second Congress ended with the determination in his mind fixed to deprive the bank of the deposits and to prevent its re-charter. Jackson's want of confidence in it was undisguised. His want of confidence in Congress was also avowed; and that the courts of justice could not be



relied on for its condemnation or impartial trial by judicial proceedings. The charter was a contract which, it was generally believed, could not be revoked; and any attempt would be futile to punish or put a stop to imputed irregularities. Not long after, it was said that the District Judge of Pennsylvania, before whom, as one of the Circuit Court there, legal proceedings, if attempted, must be tried, not only entertained but published in the newspapers an anonymous opinion as to what, in contemplation of law, constitutes the treasury of the United States, which opinion was also said to be controverted in another newspaper, anonymously, by the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Taney, whose opinion was, that the United States Treasury is no where but where the Treasurer of the United States thinks proper to keep it, while Judge Hopkinson insisted that it is everywhere where public money is kept.

Meanwhile, the giant stride of American physical prosperity was moving onward with developments more prodigious as stimulated by bank expansions; at times, indeed, checked and receding; but never falling back to where its ascent began, and the government of the United States mostly has the advantage of this natural progression. The bank contended for recharter with great odds, against the prosperity of a young and thriving people, nearly all voters, the popularity and ascendant of their favorite leader, and the canker of paper money undermining it.

Washington and Monroe, the two military Presidents preceding Jackson, and the only two Presidents re-elected without opposition, introduced themselves personally, assuaged party spirit, and corroborated union, by journeys throughout the United States. The preponderance of national emotion over party altercation on such, as on most exciting occasions, lulls party, even where most inveterate and predominant, constraining nearly the whole population to render homage to their own representative in the chief magistracy. After Jackson's triumphant re-election, he too performed a presidential visitation to the Northern and Eastern States and cities, leaving Washington for that purpose the 6th June 1833. The season was propitious, nature in her first and gayest summer attire, the country teeming with flowers and pregnant with harvests, the towns progressive, animated, and prosperous. Jackson, like Washington and Monroe, was an excellent horseman. Mounted on a noble steed, barcheaded in the warm sunshine, he gracefully saluted the concourse cheering his progress through the streets of Philadelphia, the city of the bank, where a large majority of the inhabitants, discontented with his conduct towards it,

and the city authorities, were awed into silent acquiescence, while the mass of population hailed the visit of a triumphant chief magistrate. With his tall form and long countenance standing erect in the consecrated Hall of Independence, he received the thronging people, orderly, curious, each one grasping by the hand their first servant and soldier. In the art of polite popularity Jackson was also a master, kind, and communicative with all, distinguishing the least apparently entitled to notice by some encouraging word, and saluting their seeming betters with elaborate urbanity. In what the Quaker founder Penn called "the great town," when it was but a hamlet, political liberty was promised by peaceable but unsubduable resistance to clergy, and soldiery, tithes and war, state, household and personal ostentation. An ultramontane Presbyterian, not more radical than Penn, fierce, stern and devout, with warlike decision and popular pomp, was come to enforce other doctrines of the Society of Friends, their repugnance to corporate power and lucrative rapacity, by methods more arbitrary and abrupt, but not more inflexible or pronounced.

Passing expeditiously through the capital of New Jersey, the scene of Washington's most desperate campaign and Monroe's only military exploit, Jackson landed in the magnificent bay of New York, at the confluence of the great North and East rivers, whose aquatic superiority displays its numerous and industrious shipping, by sail and steam the carriers for the world, welcomed at New York, the commercial emporium of America, as at Philadelphia, the ancient capital, by every demonstration of homage. At Boston, the busy and polished metropolis of New England, his reception was, if possible, still more flattering, for emulation of places swells the tide as it rolls on. The growl of opposition was hushed in loud acclamations of respect. Harvard University, the first collegiate institution of the United States, pursuant to an absurd English usage, conferred on the President the Doctorate of Laws; certifying that an illiterate man, and in the opinion of nearly all who awarded the diploma, entirely ignorant of the rudiments of law, was sufficiently versed in its faculty to teach its sciences. Wherever he went universal attention, as far as the horizon of his perception extended, hailed his advent with gratification: for no monarch is more obnoxious to parasite imposture than an American President, whom all may approach and flatter. The crowd of attendants is too dense for perception that there are also some neither present nor pleased.

Jackson, always restless with some ruling passion, thinking nothing done while aught remained to be done, in the midst of the festivities and congratulations of travel bent on removing the public deposits from the United States Bank, made that his constant premeditation. The new Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. William J. Duane, inducted the 1st June, 1833, was immediately apprised of the President's intention, before his departure, in several free conversations, in which he says the President expressed apprehensions of both Congress and the judiciary, neither of whom, he feared, could be relied on in controversy with the bank. The President, therefore, earnestly contemplated timely measures, before the first session of the next Congress, for sustaining the veto, and, as he uniformly insisted, the will of the people expressed by his re-election, that the United States Bank should be deprived of its mischievous power. Jackson was resolved to remove the deposits, and find secretaries to do what he was willing and proud to take all the responsibility of. Mr. Duane detected, he thought, a clandestine and irregular influence, stigmatized as the kitchen cabinet, embarrassing to him and disgusting to the public. Great men are often ruled by wives, children, servants, favorites, mistresses; all easily made objects of popular prejudice and historical reproach. Though a man of Jackson's temperament was readily influenced, yet no will was so absolute as his own, much more apt to give than to take impressions. Mr. Duane's sensibility transpired throughout the well-constructed volume, which, several years after his removal, because he would not remove the deposits, he laudably dedicated to permanent public opinion. Yet the letters from Jackson to Duane in that book are as temperate and convincing as those from Duane to Jackson, arguing the question of removing the deposits. Apprising his new Secretary of the Treasury, before leaving Washington, that he would write to him from Boston, and send him the opinions of the members of his cabinet, Jackson, on the 26th June, 1833, from there dispatched letters largely arguing the question, and indicating his desire that it should be effected early in the following September. On the 12th July, 1833, soon after the President's return to the seat of government, the Secretary of the Treasury placed in his hands a voluminous answer, dated the 10th of that month, to the President's also extensive letter of the 26th June, from Boston. They agreed to discontinue using the United States Bank as fiscal agent; mutually regretted that Congress had not taken the President's recommendation to substitute some other than bank agency for that purpose; and resolved that the deposits should be removed. But the President required their early removal, with-

out waiting the sanction or action of Congress, and furthermore placing the deposits in selected State banks. The Secretary questioned the safety or fitness of all State banks, and desired, for whatever might be done, preliminary act of Congress.

The Secretary had the right of removal, however questionable the policy; but posterior coincided with prior experience, to confirm his opinion that State banks cannot be safely used either as places of deposit or fiscal agents for the United States. A President should not venture on that experiment till Congress regulated the proceeding, however taught to apprehend irresolute and compromising proceedings by Congress, of which Jackson's experience in the affair of the bank should not have determined his course; for a President has no right to presume that the legislature will do wrong; but is bound to await Congressional action, if not regulation. His official influence with Congress is very persuasive; the veto is a powerful arm; and Jackson, with his personal popularity, could hardly fail to accomplish his laudable purpose; if that was to dethrone the bank, and the paper money usurpation both together, and restore coin, or strictly convertible medium. The President and Secretary harmonized in their monetary principles; but while the latter faltered upon temporizing and unavailing remonstrance, the latter plunged into a detrimental, if not illegal experiment. Jackson's work would have been admirably done, his fiscal renown would surpass his military, his personal popularity, beginning a second term of administration, was the power which might have induced Congress, and the mass on whom he so constantly relied, if, casting away all banks, and their flimsy contrivances, he had mounted at once to the pure sources of constitutional currency, to which he was attached, and separating government from banks, planted the treasury on the rock of precious metals. Instead of that obvious and simple reform, after, on the 15th July, personal communion with the Secretary, on the 17th of that month he expended his force in an elaborate reply to the Secretary's letter of the 10th, with no view to such revival; but after some acrimony on both sides abated, they at last agreed in a letter of instructions to Mr. Kendall, authorized to ascertain what could be done with the State banks.

To the Secretary's alleged aversion to office, disgust at the clandestine influence he soon detected, and reluctance to comply with the President's wish for prompt and perilous action, were then superadded his doubts of the President's fairness and sincerity, suspicions of his double dealing, fears of the press, and of his own firmness to resist such conspiracy of malignant evils. His letter to the President of the 22d July, therefore, closed with the



half threatening penultimate, to concur, *or retire*. After many misgivings, however, he submitted to the President's uncandid alterations, as he read them, of the controverted letter of instructions to Mr. Kendall, delivered it to him, and he went on his ill-judged errand. The President left the Secretary uneasy at the treasury, to spend a few days sea-bathing at the Riptaps. There, on the 3d August, his impatient feelings vented themselves in a letter to Henry D. Gilpin, John T. Sullivan, and Philip Wager, the government directors at Philadelphia, with whom he was in frequent and confidential correspondence, concerning alleged irregularities, which he and they were busy in endeavors to detect from the books and proceedings of the bank. Whether the undisclosed influence was as reprehensible as Mr. Duane thought, there is no doubt that the Attorney-General, Mr. Taney, and Auditor, Mr. Kendall, were advocates for the State banks, and Mr. Duane probably believed that they were large contributors to the long letters by which the President strove to refute him; for it is a curious enigma in Jackson's character, that, uneducated, as he certainly was, his written compositions are copious, elegant, and masterly, though several of those dismissed from his confidence, would, if they could, have made known his incapacity to write what is published as his, and denied by his antagonists.

On the 25th August, 1833, the President and Mr. Kendall had both returned to Washington. The government newspaper, the *Globe*, in its editorial paragraphs, noticed the dissidence between the President and the Secretary, concerning the bank deposits, with strong approval of the President's position. Mr. Duane, whose being one of the editors of the *Aurora* newspaper, had recommended him to Jackson's choice, dreaded the overrated assaults of the press. On the 10th and 17th September, cabinet meetings were held, at which Mr. Kendall's report was considered, and the President desired the opinion of each member on the removal of the deposits from the Bank of the United States to the State banks. The Secretary of State, Mr. McLane, spoke decidedly against it, having before submitted his reasons, in a paper of nearly one hundred pages. The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Duane, was against it, without the prior sanction of Congress. The Secretary of War, General Cass, left it to the Secretary of the Treasury. The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Woodbury, was for its gradual accomplishment in the course of the next year. The Attorney-General, Mr. Taney, was always for it, and then more than ever. Next day, the 18th September, 1833, the President read to his cabinet, again convened, the

paper which has been the subject of so much animadversion.

Mr. Duane, asking leave to read it, the President directed his Secretary to hand the paper to him. After reading it, he inquired if he was to understand the President as directing him to remove the deposits. The President said such was his desire, but on his own responsibility. At the private interview of the 14th of September, he had more than hinted to the head of the treasury, that his acceptance of another place would be acceptable; with whom all his intercourse, by that gentleman's account, was kindly. The newspapers reported the probability of the Secretary of the Treasury's translation to a foreign mission. On the 19th of September, 1833, the President's private secretary called and inquired of the Secretary of the Treasury whether he had come to a decision respecting the deposits; apprising him that the President's would appear in the *Globe* of next day: to which Mr. Duane objected as indignity, and asked for time to prepare his justification for the public. Next day the President's decision appeared: whereupon Mr. Duane wrote, and personally delivered to the President, a letter, with twelve reasons why he would neither remove the deposits, nor retire, as intimated by his previous letter of the 22d of July. That day, 21st of September, 1833, he submitted no less than four letters to the President, who returned them as inadmissible; and by a note, dated the 23d of that month, notified him, that his services as Secretary of the Treasury were no longer required. A short correspondence between Mr. Duane and the President's private secretary, Mr. A. J. Donnalson; conciliatory on the latter's part, complaining and suspicious on the former's; closed Wm. J. Duane's brief and uncomfortable sojourn at Washington as chief of the treasury department.

Before Mr. Duane was selected to succeed Mr. McLane as Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Kendall had, with much force and earnestness, by written communications to the President and Mr. McLane, urged both the political and fiscal advantages of removing the public deposits, called moneys, but in fact no more than credits, from the United States Bank to State banks; to which fatal misstep General Jackson yielded. On the 16th of March, 1833, Mr. Kendall addressed the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. McLane, a long letter against the United States Bank; and on the 18th of that month, another to the President, in answer to a letter from the President to him, dated the 16th, in which letter Mr. Kendall decried any bank of the United States, and contended that the State banks would better answer every

purpose. On the 24th of May, 1833, Mr. Campbell P. White, in a letter from himself, at New York, forwarded to the President a representation from forty-three citizens of that city and State, representing the dangerous power of the United States Bank, and urging the removal of the public deposits from it to the State banks. Letters from Mr. Van Buren and Silas Wright to the President, advised delay, without discountenancing the removal, but suggesting that it ought not to be done without the action of Congress; while Mr. Flagg made known to the President his opinion that it should be done at once, without any delay. In that state of the question, Mr. Duane was called to succeed Mr. McLane in the treasury; Mr. Duane's sentiments on the subject not known, though believed to be in accordance with those of Mr. McLane, whose suggestion was said to have led to Mr. Duane's appointment as Mr. McLane's successor. Mr. Van Buren's correspondence with Gen. Jackson was of the most unreserved and friendly kind; who endeavored to temper his self-willed patron's inflexibility by caution and delay. The deposits would probably not have been removed till Congress passed upon the subject, had his advice prevailed. Nor was General Jackson rash or imprudent, however self-willed. On the 8th of September, 1833, he wrote to a son of Alexander Hamilton for information respecting his management of the public deposits while he was Secretary of the Treasury; also to ascertain the condition of the United States branch bank at New York, and whether the State banks there would be safe depositories of the public funds. Mr. James A. Hamilton, on the 16th of September, 1833, answered confidentially by enclosing a letter from William Seaton, cashier of the State bank of New York in 1792, to Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury, complaining that the Bank of New York was drained of specie by the United States Bank, to redress which grievance, Mr. Hamilton stated that his father ordered some of the public moneys to be deposited in the Bank of New York.

Thus General Jackson's investigation was fortified by a precedent of the highest authority, not only for the power, but the policy of removal, when necessary. Mr. James Hamilton added that Mr. Gallatin's opinion was that the State banks would be safe places of deposit, which Mr. Hamilton strongly recommended: so that the President had the action of Hamilton, and, as he was assured, the judgment of Gallatin, both of great weight, that the deposits had been removed by the Secretary of the Treasury, and that the State bank is a proper place to which to transfer them. His preconceived determination thus confirmed, on the 18th of September, 1833, he

read to his cabinet the forcible and animated argument then presented.

On the 23d September, 1833, General Jackson—certainly without an amanuensis or adviser, for the original is all in his writing and marked with his feelings—addressed a note as follows:—

"To R. G. TANEY, Esq., Attorney-General of the United States:—

"SIR,—Having informed William J. Duane, Esq., this morning, that I have no further use for his services as Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, I hereby appoint you Secretary of the Treasury in his stead, and hope you will accept the same, and enter upon the duties of said office forthwith, so that no injury may accrue to the public service.

"Please signify to me your acceptance or non-acceptance of this appointment. I am, Sir, with great respect,

"Your most obedient servant,

"ANDREW JACKSON."

Endorsed also in his writing:

"The President's note to Mr. Taney informing him that Mr. Duane is *dismissed*, and appointing him Secretary of the Treasury United States, in the room of Mr. Duane."

When Mr. Duane presented his fourth and last note to General Jackson, on the day of his dismissal, fatigued and disturbed by the efforts and excitements of that anxious day, the President (as he styled himself by endorsement on the note to his successor), said to him, "Mr. Duane, you are fatigued; you had better go to bed and rest;" which was the farewell of a chief who was resolved on a lieutenant to execute his orders, and who knew that Mr. Taney had constantly said that it ought to be done without delay. Mr. Van Buren was at his elbow, always, as he had written from Albany to General Jackson, ready to sustain whatever course he might take, as he felt indebted to Jackson for his great and rapid fortunes. Mr. Kendall, too, was a constant counsellor of the President, to whom, when apprised of his selection for the treasury department, Mr. Taney expressed his deep regret. The ambition of his whole life had been, he said, a seat on the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States, which would be marred by involvement in the trammels and politics of the treasury, under a leader whom it was still more dangerous to displease than to follow. The future chief justice could not foresee, through the lowering *imbroglio* of that conjuncture, that the vivifying plumage of Jackson's broad protecting wing, warmed by senatorial spleen, would bear him upward to the highest seat on the bench, where he only aspired to one less elevated. Nominated to succeed Judge Du-



vall as an associate judge, on his resignation, and rejected by the Senate, Mr. Taney was afterwards nominated and confirmed to the chief justiceship on the death of his illustrious predecessor Marshall. And when Mr. Van Buren, inaugurated as President of the United States, was sworn by Chief Justice Taney, in presence of the Senate, with what philosophic triumph Jackson, standing by, said, "there is my rejected minister to England sworn as President by my rejected Judge of the Supreme Court!"

Throughout that year, frequent correspondence with the government directors of the bank, called in the Senate Jackson's spies, apprised him of what they represented as the continual and flagrant misconduct of the other bank directors; abetting and instigating their chief officer to unexampled interference, by loans to newspaper editors, profuse publications of pamphlets and other means, inflaming general sentiment against the Executive, and, by secret appropriation of large sums for open denunciation. Exasperated by unwarrantable contest, flushed and immovable by success, tantalized by an adverse cabinet, urged by extrinsic counsellors, exciting his own tendency to high-handed measures, besides the flatterers always waiting on power, Jackson poured forth his antipathy to the bank, the object of whose attempt at re-charter, on the eve of his re-election, was, he said, to put him to the test. Immense extension of loans was to bring large numbers into the bank's power, and enlist conductors of the public press to procure from the people a reversal of his decision by veto, which was but the rational sequel of all his prior messages. He accepted the challenge, the battle was fought as offered by the bank, and the people had ordered him to do, what he would be ungrateful to them, as well as unmindful of his duty, not to do. The bank being to end, the public deposits must, before it expired, be in due time carefully removed from it by Executive power, always asserted and often exercised. The bank was faithless as a public agent, misapplied public funds to interfere with elections, put its funds, including the government share, at the disposal of its arrogant president, to compel re-charter. He opened a secret negotiation to delay payment of the national debt, deceiving, personally at Washington, the Secretary of the Treasury, and through him the President. For that secret purpose, a clandestine agent, dispatched to England, made an arrangement palpably illegal; disavowed, but not till accidentally made known to government; the whole contrivance betraying the inability of the bank to pay its debts. Since Congress resolved that the deposits were safe there, a new state of things had arisen, which, if known to the

House of Representatives, would bring them to a different conclusion. The bank controls, in effect owns, and without disguise supports, insolvent presses to assail the government. With six millions of public deposits, buying a government bill on France, for which it was merely credited, not paid, the bank attempted to dishonor government by demanding damages for protest of the draft. Although the charter declares that not less than seven directors shall transact business, discounts are made by a committee of five, who never report to the board. The President alone conducts nearly all operations, many of them in secret, the directors by repeated resolutions having invested him with the entire, uncontrollable, and irresponsible power, and the government directors being excluded from all participation in, or knowledge of, what is done. The funds of the bank are put at the president's irresponsible control, to hire writers and newspapers, to convert the bank into a vast electioneering machine, to embroil the whole country in deadly feuds, and extend corruption through all the ramifications of society. Publications have thus been extensively circulated, containing the grossest invectives against officers of the government; all are degraded who resist its grasping and wanton calumnies. Torrents of abuse are continually issuing from its reservoir. With these facts officially reported to him, the President would be an accomplice, not to punish the guilt of a body thus taxing human ingenuity for reasons to disarm it. A bank suffered thus to abuse public money entrusted to it, must entail its corruption on the community. Assuming the responsibility of a measure of transcendent importance, and requiring no member of his cabinet to do what he believed unlawful or unconscientious, the President begged his cabinet to consider the measure his own, which he thus fervently pressed to execution.

Orders to transfer the public funds from the United States bank to State banks were given first on the 1st of October, 1833, and thereafter, from which moment furious conflict raged between the bank and the President of the United States.

Whatever reason or right there was for the strong, harsh measure of depriving the United States bank of the public funds, the President and his favorite advisers committed a pernicious error by transferring to State banks funds safer and less liable to abuse in the Bank of the United States; plunging them, as Mr. Duane well objected, in the chaos of State banks, none of which were able to meet their own responsibilities in coin. There was in fact little or no actual removal of deposits, but by familiar commercial legerdemain a mere transfer by checks and orders of the credit of one bank to the credit of several others, with which

the federal Executive had no legal privity. The whole operation was in paper. If the money had been taken from the United States bank in specie, and deposited, anywhere, even in State banks, as a special deposit of coin, to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States, Jackson's mismanaged design might have been accomplished. But that reform, worthy of his genius to conceive, and of his power and popularity to execute, seemed not to be thought of. Whether the State banks are constitutional, is debatable ground, on which the Supreme Court of the United States and other eminent personages have differed in judgment. But there is no doubt that the State banks, if not contrary to the Constitution, as near a thousand of them stole on the United States, are noxious, if not fatal to the exclusive control of the currency, which by the Constitution was believed to be secured to the federal government. The President pleaded, that as Congress, by the charter, gave the Secretary of the Treasury power to remove the public funds from the United States bank, it must necessarily be in the first movement an executive act, and he regretted that Congress had not thought proper to adopt his suggestions as to a proper substitute. But he never seems to have contemplated the simple recurrence to first principles, by which all banks should be discarded. Congress had not, indeed, by the bank charter prescribed where deposits removed by the Secretary should be put, but State banks were the last place to be thought of.

The journals and proceedings of the two Houses of the first session of the twenty-third Congress, from the 2d December, 1833, to the 30th June, 1834, are overloaded with vestiges of the bank deposit conflict. Many printed volumes of petitions, memorials, reports and debates surfeit with materials the narrator of a controversy, which subsequent events have deprived of much interest. On the 13th December, the Speaker communicated to the House of Representatives the memorial of the government directors. On the 18th December, Mr. Binney presented the memorial of the other directors, urging their contract right to retain the deposits taken from them, and asking redress. On the 4th of March, 1834, Mr. Polk, chairman of the committee of ways and means, and Mr. Binney, from a minority of that committee, reported resolutions on the subject. On the 4th of April, Mr. Polk's resolutions were carried, that the Bank of the United States ought not to be rechartered, by a majority of fifty-two votes; that the public deposits ought not to be restored to it, by a majority of fifteen votes; that the State banks ought to be continued and further guarded as places of deposit, by a majority of twelve votes; and that another select committee

should be appointed to examine the bank at Philadelphia, by a majority of one hundred and thirty-three votes; who were accordingly appointed, viz: Francis Thomas, Edward Everett, Henry A. Muhlenburg, John Y. Mason, William W. Ellsworth, Abijah Mann, Jr., and Robert T. Lyttle.

On the 22d May, 1834, by Mr. Thomas, that committee reported to the House, (Mr. Everett and Mr. Ellsworth a minority, making a contradictory report,) that the bank refused to submit its books and papers to inspection, and its officers to answer interrogatories: wherefore he called for a resolution, by the Speaker's warrant, to compel the attendance of Nicholas Biddle and the directors, at the bar of the House, to answer for the contempt. On the 29th May, 1834, Mr. Adams moved resolutions that there was no contempt, and that no warrant should issue. On the 13th June, the Senate's joint resolution disapproving the removal of the deposits was, on Mr. Polk's motion, laid on the table of the House by a majority of 13 votes. After various motions by several members during the session, which need not be particularized, the session closed on the 30th June, 1834, without action on the report of the select committee sent to Philadelphia. Mr. Polk, like Mr. Van Buren, another presidential pupil of Jackson, successor of Mr. McDuffie, as chairman of the committee of ways and means, without his genius, but indefatigable, with a clear mind and fixed purpose, maintained successfully the then established and increasing uncompromising hostility to any national bank.

In Senate, on the 9th December 1833, Mr. Benton moved for direction to the Secretary of the Treasury to report a statement of the deposits in the United States Bank; which next day was amended on Mr. Clay's motion, and on the 11th December adopted as amended. That day, on Mr. Clay's resolution, the Senate called on the President for a copy of his cabinet paper of the 18th September, which next day in terms of decided negation he refused. On the 8th January 1834, Colonel Benton moved to amend Mr. Clay's resolution, by requiring Nicholas Biddle to appear at the bar of the Senate, to be examined on oath touching the curtailment of the debts of the bank, and the application of its moneys to electioneering and political objects, which, like all his other motions, was overruled by large majorities. On the 4th February 1834, the President denounced, in a written message to the Senate, the United States Bank for refusing to surrender the pension fund, which Mr. John M. Clayton, by a report of the judiciary committee, the 17th of that month, justified, denying the authority of the war department to appoint pension agents, wherever the United States bank or its branches were established,



which report was adopted by the Senate on the 26th of May, 1834. On the 4th of February, 1834, Mr. Poindexter moved several resolutions concerning the bank, which were not carried. On the 6th of that month, on Mr. Southard's motion, inquiries were ordered as to the State banks selected for the depositories; and several other resolutions in the course of the session were presented by other Senators on other points of this subject. Finally, on the 30th June, the last day of the session, on Mr. Southard's motion, the extraordinary authority was conferred on the committee of finance, consisting of Mr. Webster, Mr. Tyler, Mr. Ewing, Mr. Mangum, and Mr. Wilkins, to sit during the recess on the subjects with which they were charged by the resolutions of February 4th and May 5th; [they were then charged with no subjects by any resolution;] and, among other bank questions, into the general conduct and management of the bank since 1832. Pursuant to that imperfect resolution and authority, Mr. Tyler, early in the next session, 18th December 1834, reported from that committee an elaborate defence of the United States Bank from all the charges against it. On the 26th December, 1833, Mr. Clay moved a resolution which was referred to the committee on finance, and after being occasionally but profusely debated till the 28th March 1834, was then carried by 28 votes to 18, as amended, that the Secretary of the Treasury's reasons for removing the depositories were unsatisfactory and insufficient; and by 26 votes to 20, that the President, in relation to the public revenue, had assumed authority and powers not conferred by the Constitution, but in derogation of both; which resolutions of the Senate were rejected by the House of Representatives on the 13th June 1834.

On the 17th December 1833, the President nominated Peter Wager, Henry D. Gilpin, John T. Sullivan, and Hugh McEl-derry directors of the bank on the part of the government for the year 1834; together with James A. Bayard, who resigned, after being confirmed by the Senate. The four other nominees, after various proceedings in Senate, were rejected on the 27th February 1834. On the 11th of March 1834, the President re-nominated them, with a letter to the Senate, explaining why, and stating that, if they were not confirmed, he would nominate no others. On the 1st of May, 1834, Mr. Tyler, from the committee of finance, reported arguments against confirmation, and the nominees were again rejected by increased majorities. On the 24th of June, 1834, the Senate punished Mr. Taney by rejecting his nomination as Secretary of the Treasury. On the 28th of June, 1834, Mr. Woodbury was appointed Secretary of the Treasury; and eventually, Mr. Taney, first nominated in January

1835, to succeed Judge Duvall as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, was confirmed on Jackson's nomination as Chief Justice.

Mr. Van Buren's election in 1835 to succeed President Jackson, completing the bank's exclusion from national expectations, on the 18th of February, 1836, a fortnight before General Jackson ceased and Mr. Van Buren began to govern, it was re-chartered by the State of Pennsylvania. Next day, at Philadelphia, the stockholders assembled at the bank, Benjamin W. Crowninshield, Secretary of the Navy during the latter part of the war of 1812, in the chair. Nicholas Biddle presented the charter, and recommended its acceptance as stronger than that held of the United States. Mr. John Sergeant moved the resolutions, and expatiated on the happy auspices which, by Mr. Biddle's talents and virtues, shone upon a great institution, rescued from destruction and revived to more than pristine credit, usefulness and influence. Mr. Crowninshield moved, Mr. Sergeant seconded, and it was unanimously resolved, that the directors be requested to cause to be prepared and presented to Nicholas Biddle, Esq., a splendid service of plate, with suitable inscriptions, in token and commemoration of the gratitude of the stockholders for his faithful, zealous and fearless devotion to their interests. For sixteen years Mr. Biddle said he had been connected with the bank, for thirteen president, during which period the circulation increased from four to twenty-five millions; and in no country so extensive was the currency so sound as that furnished by this bank. Of its unfortunate partner, the federal government, he desired to speak with forbearance. During their strife, his effort had been to maintain the rights of the institution, and he thought it better that the bank should perish in the struggle than survive its independence.

On the 23d of June, 1836, Congress, by large and eager majorities in both Houses, passed, and President Jackson approved, an act to regulate the depositories of the public moneys in State banks. That fatal act superadded direction to deposite all the surplus beyond five millions of dollars in the Treasury of the United States, on the first day of January 1837, with the States pledging their faith to keep safe and repay the said moneys from time to time whenever required, pursuant to which act thirty-seven millions of dollars, so called, that is, credits for that amount, were transferred from the national Treasury to commonwealths greedy of gain, and who never will repay. By the same act Congress required the Secretary of the Treasury to select and employ such State banks for depositories of the money of the United States, as redeemed their notes

in specie on demand, and issued none for less than five dollars. By that widest and wildest of all such departures from the spirit of the Federal Constitution, all experience and the whole science of currency, it was imagined that a better substitute than the Bank of the United States was provided for those vital functions of national government for which the wise organic act of 1789 provided by the establishment of the Treasury; and from which every departure since has proved calamitous, even by national banks, but infinitely more so by State banks. Jackson's farewell annual message to Congress breathed his ominous misgivings. For that illiterate but strong-minded man of impulses felt the deep conviction that coin is the only certain reliance, and that the Union is the only legitimate author of the circulation. In strong terms he declared the consequences he apprehended when the deposite bill of the prior session received his reluctant assent; and declared that the States had been advised unlawfully to use as a gift the funds entrusted to them as a loan. His regret went much further, for he added that such improbity was not the worst result. The State banks with whom the money was deposited had proceeded to make loans of it, by which persuasion bank charters were multiplied and vicious speculation encouraged. Reviewing at considerable length his controversy with the bank and the principles of circulation, he approached so near the original Treasury system, which bank commotions and general distress soon after forced a return to, as to vindicate his arbitrary edict called the specie circular, wisely aimed at the western banks, by requiring payments in specie for the public lands sold, which from two or three millions a year had swelled to the unwholesome extension of twenty-four millions. Bank notes loaned to speculators, getting their own notes discounted by banks, were paid to the public receivers, who immediately returned them to the banks, to be forthwith reissued to other worthless borrowers. So that government got nothing but inconvertible bank credit from greedy speculators for the most valuable public lands, engrossed by distant, non-resident gamblers in lands and stocks, often members of Congress, excluding the hardy and honest pioneers of the wilderness from purchase or actual occupation of the national domain.

It was impossible that a man of Jackson's simple but superior instincts should be blind to the fatal and monstrous disorganization inflicted on national currency by eight hundred State banks, to a selection of some of which he had nevertheless been prevailed upon to commit the public money. The following plan, therefore, of a national bank, which is nothing more than the much dreaded Treasury bank, as more dangerous

than the bank destroyed, received the sanction which, in his own hand-writing, signed with his initials, is margined upon the outline, as the following printed copy from the original indicates.

"Outline of a substitute for the United States Bank.

"The objections to the present bank are:

"1. It is unconstitutional.

"2. It is dangerous to liberty.

"Yet, this bank renders important services to the government and the country.

"It cheapens and facilitates all the fiscal operations of the government.

"It tends to equalize domestic exchange, and produce a sound and uniform currency.

"A substitute for the present bank is desired, which shall yield all its benefits and be obnoxious to none of its objections.

"Banks do two kinds of business.

"1. They discount notes and bills, for which they give their own paper.

"2. They deal in exchange.

"These two kinds of business have no necessary connection. There may be banks of exchange exclusively, and banks of discount exclusively. Both may be banks of deposite.

"The United States may establish a bank of exchange exclusively based on government and individual deposites.

"This bank may have branches wherever the government may think necessary.

"They may be clothed only with the power to sell exchange on each other; and required to transmit government funds without charge.

"They need only have such officers as their duties require, checked by frequent and rigid inspection. The whole may be placed under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, through a separate bureau.

"The present bank is unconstitutional:

"1. Because it is a corporation which Congress has no constitutional power to establish.

"2. Because it withdraws the business of bank discounts and the property of private citizens from the operation of State laws, and particularly from the taxing power of the States in which it is employed.

"3. Because it purchases lands and other real estate, within the States, without their consent, under an authority purporting to be derived from Congress, when the General Government itself possesses no such constitutional power.

"The proposed substitute would not be a corporation, but a branch of the Treasury department; it would hold no property, real or personal, and would withdraw none from the operation of the State laws.

"The present bank is dangerous to liberty:

"1. Because, in the number, wealth and standing of its officers and stockholders, in its power to make loans or withhold them,



to call oppressively upon its debtors or indulge them, build houses, rent lands and houses, and make donations for political or other purposes, it embodies a fearful influence, which may be wielded for the aggrandizement of a favorite individual, a particular interest, or a separate party.

"2. Because it concentrates in the hands of a few men, a power over the money of the country, which may be perverted to the oppression of the people, and in times of public calamity, to the embarrassment of the government.

"3. Because much of its stock is owned by foreigners, through the management of which an avenue is opened to a foreign influence in the most vital concerns of the republic.

"4. Because it is always governed by interest, and will ever support *him* who supports *it*.

"An ambitious or dishonest President may thus always unite all its power and influence in his support, while an honest one who thwarts its views, will never fail to encounter the weight of its opposition.

"5. It weakens the States and strengthens the General Government.

The within the only safe outline for a bank or government deposit. A. J. { "The proposed substitute would have few officers, and no stockholders, make no loans, and have no debtors, build no houses, make no donations, and would be entirely destitute of the influence which arises from the hopes, fears and avarice of thousands. It would oppress no man, and, being part of the government, would always aid its operations. It would have no stock, and could not be reached by foreign influence. It would afford less aid to a dishonest President than the present bank, and would never be opposed to an honest one."

"It would strengthen the States, by leaving to their banks the whole business of discounts and the furnishing of the local currency. It would strengthen the General Government less than the custom-house, immeasurably less than the post-office, and less than the present bank when it acts in concert with the national authorities.

"The proposed substitute would cheapen and facilitate all the fiscal operations of the government as completely as the present bank.

"It would, in the same manner, tend to equalize the exchange. Until since the last annual message of the President, the present bank charged a premium on all exchanges, except for government, public officers, and members of Congress. This practice will, doubtless, be resumed, should that bank be rechartered. The profits of the exchange business heretofore done, was sufficient, it is believed, to pay all the expenses of the bank.

"The proposed substitute may charge such a premium on all exchanges, excepting those for the government, as will suffice to pay its expenses.

"It might be made in the same manner, although not perhaps to the same degree, to operate upon the currency. By taking the paper of such local banks in the vicinity as pay specie, it would restrain over-issues and tend to preserve the currency in a sound state.

"The usual deposits of the government would be an ample capital for a bank of exchange. Independent of its capital, the bank would always have cash on hand equal to its outstanding bills of exchange. But it might not be at the right points, and a small capital would be necessary to meet unequal calls at those points until the equilibrium could be restored.

"Exchange works in a circle. It is against the west in favor of the east, against the east in favor of the south, and against the south in favor of the west. By constant interchange of information and judicious management, little funds would be wanted at either point, other than those that would be raised by selling exchange on another.

"In time of war, the capacities of this bank might be increased by an act of Congress.

"Such a bank would not be unconstitutional, nor dangerous to liberty, and would yield to the government all the facilities afforded by the present bank. Further than this, perhaps the General Government ought not to look. But its incidental advantages to the country would scarcely be inferior to those afforded by the present bank, while it would destroy a favored monopoly."

The annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Woodbury, in December, 1836, expatiated on the merits of State banks, though it acknowledged more than a million of dollars of what had accumulated as unavailable funds in the treasury from worthless State bank notes. Still, the Secretary was willing to rely on the State banks for deposits, exchanges, pension agencies, and all other federal duties. If the States would all unite in repressing entirely the circulation of small notes, and add a few judicious limitations to the amounts of discounts, (the former contrary to the inveterate practice of most of the States, the latter as little to be expected as that the explosion of a steam boiler should be limited to some harmless extent,) the Secretary, on those impracticable terms, was willing to capitulate the English bank parlor indefensible postulate of three dollars promissory bank notes for one convertible in coin. For confusion had not then enabled adversity to administer its hard philosophy, by strokes of tremendous warning, which came, however, with the explosion of all the banks within less than six months. Scarcely was

Mr. Van Buren's administration in charge of the government, sighing for repose from the commotions of Jackson's agitating reign, than the whole legion of State banks stopped payment the 9th of May, 1837, and demolished in one hour by one stroke, all reliance on them as places of safe public deposite, much diminishing confidence in them for keeping private funds.

When the United States Bank ceased to be a national institution, and became a mere local corporation, with a capital too large for the whole United States, and unmanageable as that of a mere private firm, it was no better, but worse thereby than all the other State banks; and history of the United States need not follow its decline and catastrophe, except cursorily, to rectify errors of public opinion concerning the American banking system, and the extraordinary individual to whom its fatal vices were imputed; as though they were Nicholas Biddle's misdemeanors, not those of all the pernicious banks by which American currency, finance, morality, law, and religion, are continually debased and periodically disorganized. Could any partnership manage profitably thirty or forty millions of credit, called capital, for the benefit of others? Without reference to the extensive nature of the trust, it must be impracticable to employ such funds advantageously; and no individual sagacity or probity could redeem or explain the inevitable tendency of the American State banking system. From 1837 to 1841, all banks were bankrupt; with short fits of resuscitation, keeping the whole community in jeopardy. The entire banking host, presidents, directors, cashiers, and other officers, of however fair character and good intentions, fell under universal and exaggerated odium, with a system which no management could render honest. Spontaneous combustion of nearly a thousand privileged broker shops inflicted on public sufferance a terrible lesson; called suspension at the beginning, and of which nothing but perdition could be the end. The follies, frauds, and abominations of a monstrous system struck the community with dismay and disorder, without quite striking the scales of avaricious credulity from their eyes. Jackson, with immense popularity, might have in vain wielded an executive vigor beyond the law—vetoed charters, and torn away depositories. Scientific economy pleaded to no purpose. Experience taught no lesson by occasional distress. Paper money required deeper and more dreadful inflictions for even its partial reform: shocking and calamitous, universal and ruinous explosion, to rouse the country by a catastrophe, organic and inevitable, so obvious as to strike every woman and child; to make the poor suffer in their poverty, and the rich in their abundance—to confound all but the

few who thrive on such disasters—by universal distress. Such a manifestation was the end of the United States Bank of Pennsylvania.

The reputation of Nicholas Biddle was magnified to financial renown. No American had such European repute: Jackson's was the only one comparable, and that far inferior to it. Flattered, caressed, extolled, idolized in America, Biddle was praised and respected in Europe, as the most sagacious and successful banker in the world. Governors, senators, legislators, judges, clergymen, ladies, thronged his bank parlor, and by fulsome adulation entreated his favors. His town house and his country house were the seats of elegant hospitality, in which he shone with the blandishments of a polished gentleman, amiable, witty, liberal; never harsh or offensive to antagonists: but spoiled by sycophants of the highest rank. Chambers of commerce, boards of brokers, and other representatives of trading associations—cities, corporations, and sovereign States courted his support and solicited his favors. The London Times, that vast engine of not only English, but European, Asiatic, and American opinion, pronounced the bank of the United States the greatest and purest banking institution in the world. The governor of the Bank of England declared Mr. Biddle's banking operations in cotton and tobacco eminently judicious, honorable and praiseworthy. Like John Law and Robert Morris, Nicholas Biddle involved and lost his private fortune in splendid expenditures on the same highway to ruin they trod before him, to live vilified and persecuted, and die insolvent. His country-seat, Andalusia, on the Delaware, was magnificently embellished, irrigated at princely outlays by artificial waters, and ornamented with sumptuous furniture. A colonnade on the Delaware front imitated that of the United States Bank, that the throng of travellers from all parts might behold his copy of the great original he had created. In mid career of these delusions, on the 29th March, 1839, it was unexpectedly published that Mr. Biddle had resigned; happy, said his letter of resignation to the directory, to leave the bank surviving all its conflicts, in the highest state of prosperity, quietly pursuing its appropriate business. Resolutions of the directory next day followed, eulogizing his unrivalled finance, in all respects deserving the gratitude of the stockholders, and respect of the whole country.

But soon tribulation told the truth; the whole system was rotten, and the bank ruined; no more, however, by Nicholas Biddle, than the Reign of Terror, in the French Revolution, was the work of Robespierre, who was but a feather in the tornado of destiny, which uprooted him with



the thousands of other victims he was accused of immolating. Nicholas Biddle was Acteon, torn to pieces by the dogs that came at his call, crouched at his feet, licked his hands, and fawned on his footsteps; as he said himself, the slaves revolted to destroy their master. Mankind, who worship heroes, require victims. They who as directors, counsellors, borrowers, and otherwise idolized in him the captivating incarnation of bank infirmity, became his merciless revilers, when the bubble burst. They turned their demigod into a demon, and held him answerable as a culprit for the offences they advised, sustained, and applauded; they for lucre, but he for fame.

All the tricks of the institution, long after Mr. Biddle ceased to be its head, were visited on him. They who kept his bust among their household deities, who watched him in the streets to admire, who coveted the pelf which he despised, turned on him as their stocks and notes fell, with furious and unmanly vituperation. Like Robert Morris, in the same place, and under many similar circumstances, Nicholas Biddle was cast as a malefactor from the Tarpean rock, and crushed to death. Throughout America, and by his former idolaters, and in Europe, his extravagantly celebrated name became a byword of reproach. In Philadelphia, the theatre of his particular distinction, he was deserted, execrated and reviled with all the bitterness of upstart men and spiteful women, suddenly reduced from wealth, or competency, to privation or want. As banker, as gentleman, and as honest man, his position was reversed. His considerable private fortune was swallowed up in the ruin of insolvent stocks, in which he had ventured more than he was worth. Instead of being welcome in every house, the doors of nearly all were shut against him. Societies of which he was a favorite member, were annoyed if he intruded among them. His town residence, the scene of elegant hospitality, his colonnaded, decorated, and costly Andalusia, incumbered with mortgages, were both sold by the sheriff. Destitution, disgrace, and abuse, and insult, were the daily fare of one so lately almost universally admired, feted, courted, and applauded. Most men would have withdrawn from such a storm of animosity. Many commit suicide from less cause, flee their country, or shut themselves up from general observation. Mr. Biddle's defamation was so signal, that it needs no fanciful description; the simple truth is far more striking than any fiction. Like most of mankind, bearing with greater equanimity bad than good fortune, his apparent composure was singularly undisturbed, and his firmness unabated. He went abroad as usual, wrote in the newspapers; there was no change of aspect, manners,

or behavior; while he moved unnoticed and solitary in the crowd, once thronged with his followers. His case recalled that of Law, to which it bore some resemblance, but far outran its vicissitudes, and disastrous celebrity. Law and Biddle resembled each other in being sensible, resolute, reserved, but daring men, fully impressed with the solidity of their banks, embarking and losing large private fortunes in them, careless of gain, generous, gentlemanly, courted by the great, and admired by all—in these characteristics they were alike. Their victims were more nearly so, for men in all ages, and countries, individuals and multitudes, princes and populace, rich and poor, are much alike when avarice levels all to the same low standard. The Duke of St. Simon, whom the Regent of France confidentially consulted about Law's scheme, says, that Law's chief anxiety was that he should not be forced to issue more notes than he had coin to answer for them. Biddle, likewise, was a hard money man, who deemed convertibility indispensable. And in what do the princes, nobles, potentates, ladies, the gilded aristocracy of France, crouching at Law's footstool, differ from the governors, Senators, lawyers, merchants, and others, of the American peerage, who fawned on Biddle, and flattered him to his downfall?

But there the resemblance ceases. Nicholas Biddle's fate was much harder than John Law's. A recent French historian, M. Blanc, vindicates Law's scheme from the aversion and contempt of Voltaire, and most others who describe it. Whatever its merits or demerits, its author retired from France, found in Italy refuge and repose. But Nicholas Biddle was tortured to death on the scene of his celebrity. After public indignation was heated to that feverish state which frequently seeks judicial redress, an individual of the many sufferers by the bank failure, laid his complaint, in January, 1842, before the Grand Jury of Philadelphia, who presented Nicholas Biddle, with Cowperthwaite and Andrews, two of the bank officers, as guilty of a conspiracy to cheat the stockholders. This presentment was in due form laid before the prosecuting officer, who prepared an indictment accordingly. He whom a few years before there was scarce a court of justice strong enough to restrain, was on the point of being crushed in one. A fundamental principle of Saxon jurisprudence was interposed, that the Grand Jury have no authority to *institute* prosecutions, by inquisitorial transactions; that an accused has a right to be confronted with his accuser, in the first stage of prosecution, to meet and contradict him before a magistrate. Instead of that method, the Grand Jury, in the delirium of public excitement against the individual accused of all the ruin, as he once had been extolled for

all the prosperity, of the community, compelled some of the accused to appear in their conclave, and after examining indicted them. That unlawful inquisition the court set aside, pronouncing an elaborate review of the circumstances, as well as the law in question. By the former it appeared to the court that the bank directors were more censurable than Mr. Biddle and the other bank officers; for all was done by authority of the directors, who allowed, and indeed encouraged, every one to borrow of the bank, by way of employing its unwieldy capital.

Nicholas Biddle was as iron nerved as his great antagonist, Andrew Jackson, loved his country not less, and money as little. On the 27th of February, 1844, at Andalusia, in the bosom of an affectionate family, he died of a broken heart, the issue of a wounded spirit, when complaint, seclusion, or flight, might have prolonged his life and relieved his sufferings. Born on the 8th January, which his great antagonist rendered a national holiday, fifty-eight years before, he left the world with the great merit of dying poor when he could have lived rich.

After midnight, in the tumultuous close of the first session of the twenty-eighth Congress, on the 17th June, 1844, by one of those rapid, sometimes imperceptible enactments by which great changes are often made by law, the banking house of the late Bank of the United States became the Custom House of Philadelphia. An appropriation of two hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars to purchase it of the bank assignees for that purpose, inserted by the Senate, was voted without opposition in the hall where so many protracted controversies concerning the bank had wearied the patience of Congress, and excited the controversial spirit of the country: and the marble palace of the ruined bank of the United States was turned into a custom-house.

Some time before, a fire insurance company of Philadelphia, lucky in its risks, and rich in its stocks, established in an old house, which, from its location, might be sold to advantage, smit with the love of show, disposed of a good building in order, with the proceeds, to build an elegant insurance office elsewhere. The clerk, and two or three managers of the nominal and accredited directors, in the vanity of imaginary opulence, selected a spot, and erected an edifice commensurate with their supposed wealth. A splendid mansion, replete with every elegant convenience, a residence for a prince, was prepared for a little corporate body, infected with the malady of stock riches and its common infirmity of extravagant ostentation; and the new house, surrounded by high walls to extensive appurtenances, was equipped

with luxurious accommodations. Reverses soon reduced the means of the insurance company, and the noble mansion was beyond them. Too extensive and expensive for a private dwelling, the palace was let as a boarding-house; some of its apartments were occupied as such, others for the insurance company, and a few small rooms rented for the impoverished remains of the once mighty bank of the United States; bank and building altogether monuments of the incurable proneness to those perilous ways of wealth and ruin which are the common highways of the vain haste to become rich.

At the first (or extra) session of the twenty-seventh Congress, acting President Tyler vetoed two bank bills, one originated in the Senate, and another in the House of Representatives; and it is not probable that a further attempt will be made. The currency of the United States is the offspring of repudiation of a national debt of more than two hundred and sixty millions of dollars in continental notes, the wages of independence. But that revolutionary paper money, sometimes a thousand in paper to one dollar in coin, at least pretended to convertibility. English unqualified repudiation from 1797 to 1823, and consequent anti-bullion opinions asserted by eminent persons, revealed to this imitative and exaggerating country the fatal secret that paper may be made money without metal. Since then convertibility, like certain legal forms adopted from English jurisprudence, has become an authorized fiction, and nearly a thousand banks, great and small, spawned by State laws with enormous privileges, pullulate small notes by monstrous increase of paper money. Peel's bill of 1821, with terrible suffering, restored coin in England; and his bill of 1844 restricts bank issues with great difficulty. But in that, as in some other modern reformations, England is far in advance of us. When the first Secretary, and organizer of our excellent treasury, Hamilton, allowed a State bank note to pass at a custom-house, the note represented specie, dollar for dollar, and the sufferance was but momentary: for Hamilton had no conception of an inconvertible bank note, and his, the first United States bank was created to prevent them. But since that first slight freedom with the elasticity of currency, what a career of prostitution has followed one backsliding! Even the national banks vetoed by Mr. Tyler were degenerations toward paper money; and a United States bank, unless endowed with metal to control State banks, does but add fuel to the consuming fire. One of Jackson's presidential pupils was sacrificed to the glorious martyrdom of divorcing government from banks, and another has united it with coin. Whether avarice and party will suffer this



consummation to endure, and money to remain what and where it was settled by, and at, the Constitution, is the most important

American problem, on whose solution depend the wealth, morals, and general welfare of the United States.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### TREATY OF GHENT.

It is not intended to treat here the negotiations at Ghent, or the character and consequences of the peace made there; all of which important topics, with the entire foreign relations of the United States, are reserved for another volume: but to sketch in this chapter merely certain extrinsic circumstances of that collateral part of the contest belonging to the period to which this volume is appropriated.

When the Emperor of Russia agreeably surprised Madison's administration, and somewhat disagreeably perplexed Castle-reagh's, by a sincere, politic, generous, and imposing proffer of Russian mediation, Mr. Gallatin turned at once from a dilapidated treasury, a Congress neither unfrightened nor harmonious, and disastrous commencement of hostilities at home, to go in search of peace abroad under foreign auspices. Whether the administration or Congress was most to blame for the want of energy and forecast which each imputed to the other, at all events relief was much wanted. Mr. Gallatin was confident that peace was attainable by Russian intervention, within a few months; and that for so short a period, the war might limp along on borrowed funds without taxes. Although doubts of the nation, and the war, and hopes of foreign succor, were all disappointed, and some of us, with Mr. Clay, condemned any but warlike ways to peace, for which the American successes of the year 1814 proved the principal English inducement, yet the mission which, from St. Petersburg to Gottenburg, and finally at Ghent, with visits of some of its members to London, Paris, Amsterdam and other European capitals, accomplished peace on fair and reasonable terms, was a fortunate close to American triumphs. It constituted a sort of permanent American Congress in Europe, from which this country was almost entirely cut off by British maritime sway, ready at any moment, without frequent instructions from Washington, to seize the first English inclination to put a stop to the contest. President Madison had thought of Rufus King or Harrison Gray Otis for the Federal member of the commission, to join Mr. Gallatin and Mr.

Adams; but finally chose James A. Bayard, an eminent lawyer, for twenty years a conspicuous member of both houses of Congress, pronounced in his Federal politics, resolute and honorable, as he had proved in the remarkable conflict between Jefferson and Burr devolved on the House of Representatives for the presidency. Till Mr. Clay and Mr. Russel were added to the legation, the war party was without a representative in it; and when they were appointed, it was supposed that Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard were coming home, after the English rejection of Russian mediation.

The navy agent at Philadelphia, Mr. George Harrison, a gentleman remarkable for his elegant hospitalities, sumptuously provisioned the ship *Neptune* with princely profusion of luxuries and comforts for the mission by varieties of the richest wines and abundance of other material assuagements of the life of landmen at sea.—Mr. Gallatin, with a suite, consisting of President Madison's step-son, Mr. Payne Tod; the present Vice-President of the United States, Mr. George M. Dallas; and Mr. James Gallatin, Mr. Bayard, with Mr. George Milligan; the four younger members attached as secretaries, without salaries; accompanied by several friends from Philadelphia to New Castle; there embarked for St. Petersburg, where they found the Emperor gone to his armies, but his prime minister, Romantzoff, ready to receive them. Moreau, who, it was said, confidentially informed Mr. Gallatin that he was going by request of the Emperor of Russia to command the allied forces, promised his co-operation to bring about peace between England and the United States; and Lafayette's intervention was also engaged, through La Harpe, the Emperor Alexander's Swiss preceptor, who imbued his majesty's education with such liberal ideas that he told Levitt Harris he would have been a democrat if not born an Emperor. In position to deal with crowned heads, Lafayette wrote to Alexander, entreating for the American republic, that he would pursue the noble path he had entered upon for the new world.

Thrice did the autocrat earnestly proffer

his imperial mediation, when his union, almost one and indivisible with Great Britain for the overthrow of Napoleon, was perfectly harmonious. But Russian interference was constantly and pertinaciously, however respectfully, refused by England, who would not suffer the great northern maritime power, that headed the armed neutrality, to superintend settlement of naval pretensions with their transatlantic champion; nor would England suffer any settlement at all till the United States renounced what they declared war for, resistance to English right to impress British born subjects. Yet to obviate Russian umbrage at the British refusal of mediation, it was deemed prudent by the cabinet of St. James, to signify to both Russia and America that, declining the former's intervention, England had no objection to treat directly with the latter. What less could be said, unless war was to be perpetual? But the intangible maritime rights of Great Britain to impress men from American vessels, must be acknowledged before England would treat at all; and while treating, she would inflict the punishment incurred by untimely and unpardonable American armament against England when least able to defend herself, and defending America, with all the rest of the world, against France.

The mediation thus ended at the same time that Mr. Gallatin's appointment to treat under it was rejected by the Senate, and the attempt to evade war without fighting was condemned by that large portion of the war party, who had been strengthened by nearly every election after its declaration. They insisted that the people were willing and able to carry on the war as the right way to durable peace, which, if made by missions and mediations, would be no better than uneasy truce, by mere suspension of hostilities.

Mr. Gallatin was not without reason for confidence that the mediation of a potentate so commanding as the Russian Emperor, closely allied with England, would be accepted, and the Russian monarch was gratified by republican solicitation for imperial intervention. The St. Petersburg Gazette of the 19th October 1813, published by authority, that, on the preceding Sunday, "the Empress granted audience to Messrs. Adams, Bayard and Gallatin, in the quality of Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary from the United States of America: and that the mission caused universal satisfaction there. Its complete success was desired, that the re-establishment of peace between his Britannic Majesty and the Republic of the United States may free the navigation and commerce of the Russian Empire from the only restraint which it could experience since the renewal of its ties of the strictest friendship with England. The striking proof of friendship and

confidence which the Republic of the United States had given to the Emperor, and the distinguished selection it made of plenipotentiaries," the Court Gazette added, "are much applauded here." As the French Bourbon monarchs have always proved more friendly to the American Republic than either the French Republic, the Consular, Imperial or Royal Orleans Governments, and the Tories of England more so than the Whigs, so, as the Emperor Nicholas told the American Minister Mr. Dallas, the single sovereignty of an individual over all the Russians, sympathized with the multitudinous sovereignty of a whole people in America; unmixed democratic with unmixed imperial sovereignty—both, said Nicholas, equally absolute and intelligible. While allusion, however gentle, to freeing the commerce and navigation of Russia from the only restraint which it could experience, was unwelcome to England, though accompanied by assurances of ties of the strictest friendship, yet so strong was Mr. Adams' hope that the Russian mediation would be accepted by England, that he wrote, as was understood at the time, to Reuben Beasley, American agent for prisoners in England, and to American merchants in London, that negotiations were in train, and peace would speedily take place. And in a strain of fervent, perhaps politic flattery, he proclaimed the Emperor Alexander the modern Titus, delight and blessing of mankind.

But after a flattering but fruitless reception, the Asiatic magnificence of the Russian metropolis was all that remained to compensate the disappointment of the American ministers. Poor, studious, ambitious and secluded, Mr. Adams lived there on the narrow basis of the parchment of his commission, respected for learning and talents, but little given to the costly entertainments of an opulent and ostentatious court circle: his mind bent on the much higher gratification of succeeding his father in the presidency of the United States, as he confessed at St. Petersburg. Authorized by the usage of American foreign missions to increase the scanty allowance of his salary by drawing for it, whenever the rate of exchange was profitable, and living frugally, withdrawn from all but indispensable parade, Mr. Adams laid the basis of a modest competency for his return to America, whose official acquisition American republican parsimony induces, if not justifies. But the extraordinary mission could afford and was entitled to more expensive circulation in the splendid palaces of a magnificent city, inhabited by the owners of thousands of serfs, and some of them of Ural mountains containing mines of gold. In the society in St. Petersburg, more luxurious than in the smaller residences of London aristocracy, or the less



frequent hospitalities of Paris, the American ministers were entertained, particularly the President's son, whose simple position in America was exaggerated by European mistake to princely position. Architecture, furniture, painting, statuary, luxury and comfort, combined their attractions in palaces warmed by double windows and heated air flues to the temperature of delightful summer weather, while the cold without is intense and destructive. Costumes of oriental richness, precious ornaments, furs of excessive price, and labor so low that large retinues and costly equipages are the least expensive outlays of noble households, distinguish crowds of menials from imperious masters. Peaches, pineapples, grapes, strawberries, the most delicious fruits from hot-houses, far fetched game of the wilderness, tea by land carriage in caravans, transported five thousand miles from China, incomparably better and much dearer than the costly sea-born and sea-sweated beverage so much sought in America and England; the purest coffee of Mocha; wines of every wine-growing region, Asiatic and European, are the common fare of the entertainments of Russian nobles of countless riches and continual fetes, where much more numerous assemblies than elsewhere meet in the freedom of social enjoyments, to counteract the rigors of climate, and from the terrible severities of despotic government seek that solace by which almost every mortal privation is somehow compensated. The younger members of the American mission found in such enjoyments compensation for its political failure, while their seniors, contrary to impressions industriously circulated by the press, English and American, were treated with imperial and general attention. Count Pahlen, the Emperor's first minister to the United States, and son of his father's chief murderer, was then in South America, but his secretary, Poletica, was at St. Petersburg, to exhibit a grateful recollection of the hospitalities he received in America.

The Emperor of the French betrayed his jealousy of the Russian intervention by a paragraph, which was published in the *Journal de L'Empire* the 16th December, 1813, concerning the Empress' reception of the American envoys. "The Gazette of St. Petersburg exults in the peace which would be negotiated by Russia between the United States and England, because that peace would remove the impediments which hostilities between these two powers placed in the way of Russian commerce and navigation. By that we may judge of the importance attached in Russia to the navigation of the United States, and the consternation which English rejection of Russian mediation will occasion in Russia." The *Journal de L'Empire* was so

rigorously official, that the Emperor Napoleon himself often dictated, and sometimes wrote, its editorial articles. The paragraph just quoted from it shows that he was beginning to be aroused by American naval successes to the importance of the United States as a check to the arrogant, turbulent, and inaccessible shop-keepers, whom alone, of all Europe, he strove in vain either to overcome or despise, and in whose perfidious custody he was doomed soon to fret his life out. But no Russian consternation broke forth when their good offices were declined, to which, from first to last, England showed invincible repugnance. As early as the 8th July, 1813, an English Journal, the *London Star*, stated "The American envoys have arrived at Copenhagen to excite animosities against Great Britain and the cause of Europe. We cannot flatter ourselves with any prospect of peace from them since they have commenced their diplomatic visit at Copenhagen. It is reported that Lord Keith is ordered to command in America in place of Admiral Warren, recalled because he gave the American Commissioners permission to proceed to Russia;" indications of British aversion almost amounting to consternation at any foreign interference with the resolution, at all hazards to maintain their dominion of the seas, and to punish American rebellion against it.

Never were the character and prospects of the country of North American republican experiments so low, since the acknowledgment of its independence, which at that time seemed to be in jeopardy. It was the nadir of American, the zenith of British power. Of the hundred and twenty years from the English revolution of 1688, till the second conflict of Great Britain with her American offspring in 1812, the mighty islanders, veterans in war, had spent half that period in waging and learning its arts. The vastest of all her prodigious conquests was the last of her many successes over France, to whom her officers, civil and military, dictated in their splendid capital the hard terms of ignominious subjugation. At the head of all the monarchs of Europe her stipendiaries, England, having conquered France, turned with vindictive confidence from all mediation and interposal to the infinitely easier conquest of America.

On the 7th of June, 1814, the cartel Thistle arrived from Halifax at Boston, in seven days, bringing the first news of those astonishing reverses: Napoleon, in the British frigate *Undaunted*, gone into banishment at Elba, a little island in the Mediterranean, of which few in America had ever heard; Louis the XVIII. propped on the throne of his ancestors by foreign armies, commanded by the Marquis, thereupon created Duke, of Wellington, occupying France reduced from the Empire of 1812 to the Kingdom

of 1792. Glorifying, as well they might, in the close of a gigantic struggle with the constitutional monarchy, the bloody anarchy and the enormous empire of France, England had nothing to fear from, but her own terms of submission to impose on, the poor, distracted Republic of America. The most considerate Englishmen questioned whether nominal independence or complete subjugation would be best for that refractory and ungrateful, abandoned and forlorn child of rebellion. Restricted frontiers, surrounded and tormented by revengeful savages, with sovereignty within the States to prey on their vitals, no colonial trade, no fisheries, no free ships making free goods, no denial of impressment, paper blockade, or any other of the maritime rights of Great Britain, were among the postulates of the moderate Lord Liverpool, the resolves of the imperious Lord Castlereagh, and the orders of the magnificent Prince Regent. "If the good old king could be restored to his senses, how his pious trust in ultimate justice would be soothed and rewarded," was the common saw of loyal Englishmen. "A very general expectation," said a London journal of the 25th of April, 1814, "appears to be entertained that the Americans, when apprised of the recent changes in Europe, will cashier Mr. Madison. It is even anticipated in the ministerial circles as not a very improbable event, that the Americans may follow the example of France still further, and return to the protection of their former sovereign. A memorial has been presented to Lord Liverpool, and favorably received, the object of which is to prevent the Americans from conducting the fishing trade as heretofore on the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador. It is said to be the intention of government to prevent this branch of our commerce from all intrusion by the citizens of the United States, under any arrangement that may be made with that power." Simultaneously with these English speculations, the Gazette of France published, "The delightful name of peace is heard on all sides. Europe is awakened to the enjoyment of its benefits. Negotiations have also been opened to bring about the establishment of a good understanding between England and the United States, which has only been disturbed by the effect of the disordered system adopted by Napoleon. It is known that the plenipotentiaries of the two powers are to meet in Gottenburg, perhaps even they may negotiate at London. We have learned with pleasure that the chief of one of the first tribunals in France invited to his house Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Crawford, the Minister of the United States. Several persons of consideration were present, both French and English. It was remarked that the two ministers, on seeing each other for the first time, did not behave with any distance of manner. The

toast of universal peace was proposed to them, and they replied to it accordingly." But in Holland, the Leyden Gazette of the 22d of May, 1814, stated that, "according to advices from Vienna, England was about to conclude a secret convention with the allies, by which they are not to intermeddle, after the pacification of the continent, with the affairs of North America, and to stipulate by the peace that France shall not take any part."

When Crawford met Castlereagh at the French entertainment, heralded in the court gazette, the polished, placid, reckless premier of Great Britain, paymaster of Europe, commander of Wellington, controller of herds of dethroned and impoverished potentates and princes, rabid for restorations to demolished thrones, meditated the punishment as well as conquest of the American instruments of French usurpation; Madison deposed like Bonaparte; America humbled like France; Washington captured like Paris; bloody dreams of English revenge; Europe to stand aloof while the mother scourged her unnatural offspring, if not back to re-colonization, at any rate to bitter repentance and humble submission. Castlereagh and his associates of the Tory ministry were of the school whose lessons were the doctrines of that moral philosopher and favorite of the pious George the III., the great teacher of English language and dogmas in politics and ethics, Doctor Johnson, who said, vindicating the outrages of British revolutionary hostilities in America, "Sir, let me tell you these are but the whippings of children. I would have set fire to and burned every town, nay, every house, on their coast, and roasted the rebels, men, women and children, in the flames of their rebellion." In the inherited spirit of that maternity, English journals in 1814 called on the British troops embarking from France for America, to "carry birch rods to whip the froward children of Columbia, who cry for what they know not what, who profit so little by the lessons of experience." In an admiralty order of the 30th April, 1814, the Irish Secretary Croker regretted that "the unjust and unprovoked aggression of the American government in declaring war after all the causes of the original complaints had been removed, did not permit the reduction of the fleet at once to a peace establishment, but left the issue for the maintenance of those maritime rights which are the sure foundation of our national glory. Their lordships hope that the valor of his majesty's fleet and armies will speedily bring the American contest to a conclusion honorable to the British arms, safe for British interests, and conducive to the lasting repose of the civilized world."

In that spirit of barbarous infatuation war was reinvigorated and infuriated, and



peace procrastinated for near twelve months after all cause of war ceased. London, Paris, Vienna, Leyden, the capitals of all Europe were either aroused or neutralized for hostilities by which Great Britain, without a European enemy, was to crush America without an ally in the world. Just after the conquerors of France marched into Paris, on the 2d of April, 1814, Vice Admiral Cochrane from Bermuda, by the first of his diabolical proclamations, announced the horrors of the most dreadful of all strife, servile, worse than civil or savage, war—war which, whenever kindled in the Roman dominions, never ceased to rage till, after years of havoc and extermination, every slave was butchered; and which from St. Domingo peopled this country with victims. That official manifesto was,—“Whereas, many persons have expressed a desire to withdraw from the United States, with a view of entering into his majesty’s service, on being received as *free* settlers in some of his majesty’s colonies, this is therefore to give notice that all disposed to emigrate will be received on board his majesty’s ships-of-war, or at military posts on the coast of the United States, with the choice of entering into his majesty’s sea or land forces, or being sent as *free* settlers to the British possessions in North America or the West Indies, where they will meet with all due encouragement.”

The Russian mediation having failed, Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard were constrained to take leave of St. Petersburg on their way homeward; but determined to try one more, and that an humble effort. For that purpose Mr. Dallas was sent to England, in October, 1813, under the passport of a Russian courier, with confidential and highly important dispatches to Prince Lieven, the Russian ambassador in London, and Alexander Baring, the constant friend of this country and of peace. With the dispatches so fast sewed to his clothes that it was impossible to take them from him without stripping him by corporal violence, and imperatively ordered to deliver them in person to Prince Lieven and Mr. Baring, Mr. Dallas journeyed expeditiously through the northern parts of Europe, by Hamburg to Harwich, and reached London the 28th November, 1813. The forlorn mission was then almost desperate. Still Mr. Gallatin neither despaired nor ceased to strive, persevering almost against hope to the end. The day after Mr. Dallas’ arrival in London, Lord Castlereagh angrily said in the House of Commons, that one of the American commissioners for peace had had the temerity to proceed from Russia to England, and was then actually in London. Mr. Baring, however, to quiet the premier’s displeasure, held himself responsible for Mr. Dallas’ conduct and object, and to obviate

all offence, put in Lord Castlereagh’s hands the letter he (Mr. Baring) had received from Mr. Gallatin. Mr. Dallas was suffered to remain in England till joined there, in the spring of 1814, by Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard. On what conditions or expectations they were received in England, I am not aware, when lingering hopes of peace induced them to go. Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Baring were, I believe, of Franklin’s opinion, that any peace is better than any war, and that all war is unnecessary. In their charge peace was well cared for, and of the negotiations at Ghent, which Mr. Gallatin so sedulously labored to conclude by peace, he had reason to be proud.

The winter journey of the American envoys from Russia to England, performed when Prussia and Holland, countries through which they travelled, were in the ferment of resistance to France, and the restoration of their own monarchs, was continual demonstration of the approaching end of all republican government. Amsterdam, where they stopped some weeks, was the head of the Dutch revolution that repelled the French from Holland, and restored the House of Orange, not as stadtholders, but kings. *Orange bovern* was the cry which everywhere saluted their ears. The old stadtholder, long in exile from Holland, and resident of London, was just brought home to the kingdom, placed at his disposition. His son had been educated in England. Holland was almost an English province; and, as we have seen in another part of this sketch, the London press complained of the King of Holland for sending a minister to this rebellious country, which there was reason, it insisted, to believe would, like Holland, return to the paternal rule of its legitimate monarch. A journey through Europe at that time was, to Americans, warning that government by revolution was to be no more, and republics no longer to disturb mankind.

After the representatives of American independence thus traversed Europe, from Cronstadt to the Dutch capital, reminded by every intimation, that there was no power in Europe to check the vengeance of Great Britain, soon to be inflicted on the United States, they crossed the German Sea, and landed in England, at Harwich, in April, 1814. By that time the triumph of England over all her foes, save one, was complete. Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard, unnoticed and disconsolate, made their humiliated entry into London, blazing with light streaming from every house throughout its narrow streets and dreary immensity, by the illumination ordered and gladly kindled for the capture of Paris. Napoleon was a captive. The Bourbons of both branches, long by English inexpugnable safe-keeping protected

from French harm, were to be transferred to the throne of their ancestors. London had dictated peace in Paris; Europe was to be reconstructed as before the French Revolution, offspring of the American. All Christendom, after twenty years of dreadful strife and convulsions, was to be reconstructed as of yore. All Christendom was at peace and exulting, except the American hemisphere, where alone North America was disturbed by unnatural war, and South America by revolutions, whose contagion was taken, like a pestilential distemper, from the odious and unpardonable North American rebels against English sway. About the time that Parliament, both Houses without a dissenting voice, voted Wellington, then promoted to the highest honors of British peerage, two and a-half millions of dollars, Mr. Gallatin, on the 9th May, 1814, wrote from London to a friend in New York: "The public feeling is strong here against us, and the prosecution of the war would be popular with the nation. The overthrow of Bonaparte is a blessing for mankind; but it is a matter of regret that our affairs were not arranged before the restoration of a general European peace. This leaves a formidable land and naval force at the disposal of government; and you must expect that a portion will be sent this summer against us. This makes me still more desirous of being with you; and if I find the negotiation likely to fail or to be protracted, I will not wait the final issue. In the meanwhile, I beg you to make yourself as comfortable as you can. I would feel more easy if I knew you to be at Philadelphia than New York." His apprehension was that the city of New York was in danger: at any rate, that it might be attacked. In the same letter he added that he had been kindly treated in London, met some old friends and made new ones there. But ministerial countenance could not be openly bestowed on the American envoys soliciting peace in London, while Madame de Staël, then in exile there, extended her useful as well as agreeable society to Mr. Gallatin. Mr. Foster, British minister in the United States when war was declared, meeting Mr. Payne 'Tod in the street, condescended to invite a President's son to Devonshire house, but had not the manliness to notice the American envoys, nor the good breeding to visit gentlemen, whose civilities he had enjoyed during ten years' residence at Washington.

There is not much besides mere official, which of course is reserved, correspondence from the American envoys at that time in the department of state. The following significant letter was sent disguised in cipher; when, owing to the common delays and extraordinary interruptions of the seas, of which Great Britain was post-mas-

ter, it was perilous to trust dispatches so liable to capture. When it was received does not appear; but probably when confidence in London and alarm in Washington were, as events soon showed, equally unfounded:

*London, 13th June, 1814.*

Honorable JAMES MONROE,  
Secretary of State.

SIR:—The armament fitted against America will enable the British, besides providing for Canada, to land at least 15 to 20,000 men on the Atlantic coast. Whether the ministry be nevertheless disposed for peace, a few weeks will determine. It may be intended to continue the war for the purpose of effecting a separation of the Union, or with a view of promoting the election of a President of the Federal party, or in the hope of imposing conditions which will curtail the territory, the fisheries, and diminish the commerce of the United States; but even with the intention of a speedy and equal peace, the pride and vindictive passions of the nation would be highly gratified.—What they would consider a glorious termination of the war, as an expedient that may console them for the mortification of naval defeats, retrieve the disgrace of the campaign in the Chesapeake, and cripple the naval and commercial resources, as well as the growing manufactures, of the United States. To use their own language, they mean to inflict on America a chastisement that will teach her that war is not to be declared with impunity against Great Britain. This is a very general sentiment in the nation, and that such are the opinions and intentions of the ministry was strongly impressed on the mind of —, by a conversation he had with Lord Castlereagh. Admiral Warren also told Levitt Harris, with whom he was intimate at St. Petersburg, that he was sorry to say that the instructions given to his successor on the American station were very different from those under which he had acted; and that he apprehended that very serious injury would be inflicted on America. Knowing the species of warfare practiced under him, and that he was blamed for the inefficiency, and not on account of the nature, of his operations, you may infer what is now intended. Without pretending to correct information respecting the plan of campaign, I think it probable that Washington and New York are the places, the capture of which would gratify the enemy, and that Norfolk, Baltimore, and the collected manufacturing establishments of Brandywine and Rhode Island are also in danger. The ostensible object everywhere will be the destruction of the public naval magazines and arsenals, and of all the shipping, whether public or private, but heavy contributions, plunder, and whatever marks a pre-



datory warfare, must be expected: unless the ultimate object be to sever the Union, demand a cession of territory, &c., in which case the more permanent occupancy of New York, or of some other important tenable point, will probably be attempted instead of mere destruction. Whatever may be the object and duration of the war, America must rely on her resources alone. From Europe no assistance can, for some time, be expected. British pride begins, indeed, to produce its usual effect. Seeds of dissension are not wanting. Russia and England may, at the approaching Congress of Vienna, be at variance on important subjects, particularly respecting the aggrandizement of Austria. But questions of maritime rights are not yet attended to, and America is generally overlooked by the European sovereigns, or viewed with suspicion. Above all, there is nowhere any navy in existence, and years of peace must elapse before the means of resisting with effect the sea power of Great Britain can again be created. In a word, Europe wants peace, and neither will nor can at this time make war against Great Britain. The friendly disposition of the Emperor Alexander, and a just view of the subject, make him sincerely wish that peace should be restored to the United States. He may use his endeavors for that purpose: beyond that he will not go, and in the it is not probable he will succeed. I have also the most perfect conviction, that, under the existing unpropitious circumstances of the world, America cannot, by a continuance of the war, compel Great Britain to yield any maritime points in dispute, and particularly to agree to any satisfactory arrangement on the subject of impressment: that the most favorable terms of peace that can be expected are the status ante bellum: a postponement of the questions of blockade, impressment, and all other points which in time of European peace are not particularly injurious; but, with firmness and perseverance, those terms, though perhaps unattainable, at this moment, will ultimately be obtained, provided you can stand the shock of this campaign, and provided the people will remain and show themselves united: this nation and government will be tired of a war without object, and which must become unpopular, when the passions of the day will have subsided, and when the country sees clearly that America asks nothing from Great Britain. It is desirable that the negotiations of Ghent, if not productive of immediate peace, should at least afford the satisfactory proof of this last point. I might have adduced several facts and collateral circumstances in support of the opinions contained in this letter, but you know I would not risk them on slight grounds. You may rest assured of the general hostile spirit of the

nation, and of its wish to inflict serious injury on the United States; that no assistance can be expected from Europe; and that no better terms of peace will be obtained than the status ante bellum, &c., as above stated. I am less positive, though I fear not mistaken, with respect to the views of the ministry, to the object of the armament, to the failure of the Emperor's interference, and to the consequent improbability of peace before the conclusion of this year's campaign.

I have the honor to be,

With great respect,

Your obedient servant,

ALBERT GALLATIN.

That letter of Mr. Gallatin, expressive of well-founded apprehensions for New York and Washington, particularly, and little anticipating the American triumphs that accompanied and strengthened the negotiations at Ghent, contemplated nothing better than the mere Fabian policy of delay; enduring British hostilities till their frenzy should be exhausted, and trusting to the mere chapter of accidents for saving the United States from dismemberment and subjugation. A few days after, with Leveitt Harris, who accompanied the envoys from St. Petersburg to London, Mr. Gallatin had the honor of an interview there with the Emperor Alexander. Admiral Cochrane's proclamation of April, 1814, inviting the slaves of the Southern States to revolt, was soon followed by his official letter of August, to Mr. Monroe, announcing, but not till after their perpetration at Washington, the barbarous devastations there committed, and to be repeated wherever British fleets and armies could strike. The only question was, as Mr. Gallatin wrote, between predatory hostilities of uncivilized atrocity and permanent conquest. To one or the other of these inflictions Great Britain resolved that America should submit. In the fever of that fell spirit, the American envoys, in London, sought an interview with the only person who might possibly avert or mitigate the blows.

In the midst of the tumultuous exultations of London, large embarkations of troops for America took place, of whom the Duke of Wellington, Lord Hill, Marshal Beresford, and Sir Thomas Picton were reported as leaders. After settling the Bourbons on the precarious French throne, their imperial and royal guardians proceeded, the 6th June, 1814, on a visit to London. The Emperor Alexander and King of Prussia, with their suites, a large concourse of illustrious princes, generals, and nobles, the modern knighthood of most of Europe, for whose reception great preparations were made; for never in the glorious annals of Great Britain, since Henry VIII. and Henry IV. met at Calais on the cloth of gold, had

such guests been her visitors. In consideration of the leading part England had acted, the invaluable succors she had given, the still more important example she had set, the only kingdom unsubdued or unterrified, the only one that had not acknowledged not only the usurper emperor, but all his tributary kings and princely parasites, it was said that the Congress for general peace was to be held in the British metropolis, the largest city of Christendom, and that the treaty should bear the name of London in all future generations and histories. The 18th June, 1814, by felicitous anticipation of the coming battle of Waterloo next year, was fixed as the day when the City of London, in a magnificent entertainment, should invite the chivalry of England, Scotland, and Ireland, to meet those of Russia, Austria, Prussia, France, and all the other powers of Europe, at Guildhall, the ancient seat of British justice, the chosen place of the banquet, for which a grand Gothic hall, with superbly painted windows, was gorgeously equipped. The walls were tapestried with bright crimson cloth, festooned into arcades, in the recesses of which were tables loaded with all the city plate from the Mansion House, and that of many noblemen, gentlemen, and companies proffered for the occasion; sumptuous in display of gold and silver, magnificent candelabra, epergnes, tureens, ewers, cups, dishes, glaciers, and other richly wrought ornaments, all selected for the purpose. Illuminated by chandeliers of beautiful cut glass, redoubled by mirrors, reflected by cordons of lamps, the royal and city banners of the twelve principal corporations were displayed in galleries terminated at the monuments of Chatham and his son, William Pitt, one the great author of modern British commercial renown, the other of its utmost development. Bands of military music, and orchestras of vocal performers, by turns enlivened the scene. The Prince Regent, with the Emperor of Russia on his right and King of Prussia on his left, sat on an elevated platform, in massive gilt chairs, covered and canopied with crimson velvet, fringed with gold and tied with golden ropes: the sword, sceptre, and crown glittering above their august heads. The floor in front of the regal table was terraced with a profusion of the rarest and costliest aromatic shrubs, flowers, and exotic plants. The city council, courts of law, Lord Mayor, and nobles, galleries crowded with ladies in full dress, waving white handkerchiefs, within, and innumerable populace without, were back-grounds of a splendid frontispiece. The streets from Temple Bar, where the procession entered the city, were spread over with bright gravel, and the crowd kept off by posts and bars. The only turtle that could be procured was presented by a

West India merchantman, whose name is gratefully preserved for history. A large baron of the roast beef of Old England, with the royal standard, was placed on a stage at the upper end of the hall, in view of the royal table, attended by the sergeant carvers, and one of the principal cooks, in proper costume. France was represented at the festival by the Duke of Orleans, since the first elected and last dethroned king of that country: England, by the prince regent and his brothers, the dukes of York and Kent, and their cousin, the Duke of Gloucester. The future William the Fourth, then Duke of Clarence, was too poor and insignificant to be present; and the Duke of Sussex, too liberal to be tolerated in his regent brother's presence. Metternich; Nesselrode; the Cossack Hetman Platoff; Hardenberg; the Duke of Saxe Weimar, who afterwards visited the United States; Blucher; Bulow; Humboldt; Admiral Warren; Castlereagh; Peel; with long lists of English and other European noblemen, princesses, ladies, and distinguished, but not historical personages, attended.

The day of that entertainment by the city, was appointed by the Emperor Alexander; and the hour before he left the place of his residence, in Leicesterfields, to proceed to Guildhall, as the time for Mr. Gallatin's reception, whose associate on the occasion was Levitt Harris, long known to the Emperor of Russia as American consul, and the only public functionary near his court; recommended there by that well-educated monarch's good feelings towards American institutions, his wish to cultivate American commercial relations, the lively amenity and European tastes contracted by Mr. Harris during many years' residence in St. Petersburg. The streets of London that afternoon, near the imperial residence, bright with summer daylight, swarmed with tens of thousands of elegant carriages; more than a considerable army of opulent gentlemen on fine horses, attended by as many well-mounted grooms, in all the admirable and unequalled display of English equestrian splendor; perfect in equipages, liveries, and equipments; an immense parade of beautiful women, stout men and richly-dressed servants; surrounded by hundreds of thousands of brawny populace; all assembled to see, cheer, and admire the continental heroes, who, in their pay, and under their control, had at last conquered their most formidable foe, and sung Rule Britannia in the capital of subjugated France.

Through as much of that concourse of Britons in all their glory, acknowledged the masters of the world, as a mean and solitary hackney coach, with a permit, could work its despicable way, hooted and reviled, the American representatives, suffered with



difficulty to proceed, slowly moved in striking contrast with the surrounding magnificence of impediments, wonder, and contempt. No people are more intolerant of all others, scarcely the Chinese or Japanese, than the English, *toto orbe divisos*; no populace more insolent to their own superiors; the former from insularity, the latter from uneducated popular freedom; no mob more derisive or insulting; no solitude more disheartening than the vast crowds of his kin, and like thronging the interminable ways of London, to an American, who finds them strangers, distant, contemptuous, and censorious of everything transatlantic. Mr. Gallatin, who, if recognized as such, might have been grossly insulted, escaped with nothing worse than volleys of jeers at his foreign aspect, and sometimes being hailed as old Blücher. A few years afterwards, when American minister in France, the King, Louis the Eighteenth, whose long exile in England perfected his familiarity with the English language, but who disliked an able Genevan, whom he looked upon as almost one of his own subjects representing a foreign nation at his court, said, "Mr. Gallatin, you speak French perfectly." Bowing to the compliment, the American minister did not anticipate its sarcastic sequel, when the king added, "but I think my English is better than yours." Few Americans would visit London or Paris, with less of the bodily characteristics of this country than the now venerable statesman, who, though perhaps more anxious to prevent and avert war than some other Americans, and soliciting peace with extreme entreaty, was always, whether at St. Petersburg, Amsterdam, London, Paris, or Ghent, one of the truest advocates of the rights of the adopted country he so long and faithfully serves still.

Alexander's reception of the American courtiers of his mediation, was what Mr. Clay might have enjoyed more than Mr. Gallatin. In the strong, coarse diction not uncommon to sovereigns and the great, French words equivalent to "keep a stiff upper lip," was his imperial majesty's expressive advice. To the solicitor of peace, the autocrat's wise counsel was, not to be discouraged, but, with manly resistance to put on the port of resolution, and at least assume a virtue, even if we had it not. "Verily, Jonathan," said Cobbett's Register just then, "if you repose in vain hopes, you are on your last legs. You have negotiators in Europe, who have a great opinion of their powers of speech. We here do not make long diplomatic speeches, but use more laconic arguments of much greater force. You have lately seen what a shilly shally state the powers of the continent were in, till our Lord Castlereagh got among their counsellors. You have

seen the result; after that, rely, if you will, on the superior powers of *talking*. Perhaps you may take it into your heads that, negotiators chosen from among our friends, *the Federalists*, those 'Burkes of the western hemisphere,' of whom the Times newspaper speaks, perhaps it may come into your noddle, that negotiators picked out from among those 'friends of social order, and regular government,' will be likely to succeed better than those who were not for open war against Napoleon. Try, then, Jonathan, and be sure to fix on gentlemen who think themselves clever, and love to hear themselves talk. Try, in all manner of ways, the powers of talking. Alas! to be serious with you, your safety lies now in the forbearance, the magnanimity, and compassion of his royal highness, the prince regent. You did not like the Emperor Napoleon. One party amongst you abused him, and the other disclaimed all desire to aid his views. Volumes did your negotiators write to convince us that you did nothing to favor him. You have got into a nice little independent war of your own. You have put your little *independent* war as a sort of an episode to the great drama. You may, I hope, rely on the moderation and magnanimity of our prince regent. But I do assure you, if you were rooted out to the last man, you would excite but little commiseration in Europe. It is in vain to talk; a disease of the mind, of which nations are never cured, but at the cannon's mouth."

The philosopher of Botley, as Cobbett began to be styled, from his strong Saxon writings in the Political Register, which he edited from a farm near that village in Hampshire, did not stop at writing; but, completely converted from extreme hatred of, to a great preference for, American institutions, atoned for some of his abuse of them, while conducting Peter Porcupine's Gazette in Philadelphia, by a remarkable visit and communication to Mr. Bayard, at London. As that gentleman, and Mr. Christopher Hughes, the secretary of the legation, were breakfasting one morning at their lodgings, in Albemarle Street, the card of William Cobbett was brought from the door, followed by a big, burly, rough-looking, coarse-dressed, elderly man, entering with a large oak stick in his hand, the image of a sturdy Briton. "I am come," said he, "to warn you Americans against this cabal, caucus you might call it in America, of crowned heads now in London, whose objects must be sinister, and, as I believe, bode your republic no good. The republican spirit is to be put out, the light of liberty extinguished, and your country, the candlestick in which it now flickers, broken to pieces, that it may blaze no more. Our old king, you know, is mad; confined to rooms padded with cushions along the

walls, so that he cannot knock his brains out, or hurt himself, and filled with pianos for him to soothe his insanity by music, of which he is fond. His hopeful heir apparent is a mere voluptuary, whose only desire is to dress, drink, and wench when he is able. But old Queen Charlotte is smit with lust of power as well as wealth; and she wants to make the greatest dolt of her seven stupid sons, the Duke of York, what do you think, sirs? nothing less than king of North America. They tried to make a bishop of him, then a general, and failed at both; but hope he may do for a king, who, by law, *can* do no wrong; and what brings all these potentates from Paris to London, with Metternich and others to represent the absent royalties? Certainly, to plot the overthrow of the only republic that stares them in the face. Depend on it, Mr. Bayard, that Castlereagh and Arthur, as the prince regent calls the new Duke of Wellington, have assembled these monarchs here to organize a Cossack force, like the Hessian, to be sent to America to crush you. Old Charlotte is full of it, as I learn; and all your begging peace will come to nothing. If you cannot fight, you must be conquered. There are men enough well armed and disciplined, ships enough all ready to carry them; fools enough like the old queen, to urge the enterprise; ministers enough like Castlereagh and Metternich, to recommend it." Cobbett's visit and communication were received by Mr. Bayard, who had known him in Philadelphia, with silent attention.

Encouraged by the Emperor Alexander as to the indispensable necessity and wisdom of relying on warlike virtues and measures, as the only way to peace, the American envoys soon after left London for Paris.

During their occasional visits and their suites to Paris, in the summer of 1814, preceding their settlement at Ghent, for the negotiations conducted there, a circumstance made known from Paris to Washington, through one of the unofficial attendants of the legation, deserves to be mentioned, importing that scarcely was Ferdinand the Seventh on the throne of Spain once more, before his ministers conceived a design of dispossessing the United States of New Orleans. Midway between English and Spanish America, it was considered the headquarters of the insurrections and revolutions, exemplified and inculcated by the former to the latter, of which the furnace at New Orleans, occupied by Spanish forces, might be made the most convenient extinguisher. Whether the English expedition to Louisiana had any connection with that design, I am not informed. A former French charge d'affaires in this country, directed to prevent the marriage of Jerome Bonaparte to an

American wife, Pichon, not succeeding in that undertaking, incurred the displeasure of Napoleon, and from that estrangement became gradually alienated, till at last he threw himself under the protection of the Bourbons. By his disclosure to one of the attendants of the Ghent mission, our government was given to understand that the Spanish applied to the French Bourbons for co-operation in the project of dispossessing the United States of New Orleans, and establishing there a centre of counteraction against all further South American and Mexican revolutions. The French government, however, did not feel strong enough to espouse so expensive and precarious a contest, and it was relinquished.

I cannot assert that such a Spanish design was entertained in 1814; and am not aware that Mr. Madison's administration was advised of it by any of his ministers at the time in France; my information coming from another source. But of the knowledge and assent of that administration to another, as it had reason to believe, Spanish design on Louisiana, I am so well assured as to append it to that first mentioned, though it did not occur till shortly after the period of my narrative, in the autumn of 1816.

While General Jackson was commander of the South Western military division of the United States, with his head quarters near Nashville, and Colonel Jessup, stationed at Baton Rouge, with the first regiment and parts of some others, in immediate military command of New Orleans, and the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, a respectable Roman Catholic clergyman, Father Antoine, and Col. Peire, who commanded the seventh regiment of United States infantry at the battles of New Orleans, confidentially informed Colonel Jessup that a Spanish attempt was on foot for the forcible seizure of that city, by an army to be conveyed from Cuba with that intent. The Spanish population of Louisiana, supposed to be still attached to Spain, were sounded, through some of whom Father Antoine obtained and communicated the information. With General Jackson's approbation, and without President Madison's disapproval, measures were therefore taken by the American local commanders, in concert with Governor Claiborne, of Louisiana, Governor Holmes, of the Mississippi Territory, and Commodore Patterson, who commanded that naval station, to counteract the threatened Spanish invasion, by simultaneous seizure of the island of Cuba. While the militia were to defend Louisiana from the Spanish invasion, all the regular forces of the army and navy that could be collected, twenty-five hundred volunteers, under General Hinds, from Mississippi, and the same number from Louisiana, so as to constitute an army ten thousand strong,



were to be embarked for Havana, whenever there was reason to believe that the Spanish army of invasion was coming from Cuba. Secret agents were sent to Havana, who brought back precise accounts of the state of the troops and fortifications there, of which the most accurate details were in possession of the American officers. Their condition was believed to be such as that they must fall an easy prey to the force intended to seize them. Should Spain invade Louisiana, it was deemed constitutional and politic to repel, by simultaneous seizure of the place of Spanish armament and departure, as Scipio defended Rome by carrying the war into Africa. President Madison was officially informed of the apprehended Spanish invasion, and intended American counteraction, and did not forbid it. It may have been his opinion, that the Executive may lawfully repel invasion when imminent, by counter invasion, without an act of Congress declaring war. It was a dream of Jefferson's far-sighted genius that all North America, from Davis' Straits to the Isthmus of Darien, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, including all the West Indies, will eventually compose republican United States, under the same federal head, with perfectly free trade among all, by which means American war would cease, with the most prolific causes of it. Hamilton likewise contemplated vast extent for this country. Much and marvelously has been already realized, and in no instance has extension of American territory been the result of a mere spirit of aggrandizement or conquest. Louisiana, Florida, Texas, New Mexico, and California, have not been incorporated with these United States, without hostile European occasion for it. Spain, by transactions in Florida, and designs on Louisiana, has done much more to justify American attraction of Cuba, than this country has to disturb Spanish sovereignty there.

The Russian mediation being unexpectedly rejected by England, but with an intimation that she would listen to terms of peace not inconsistent with what were called, and too generally conceded, to be her maritime rights, elsewhere than at St. Petersburg, Gottenburg was suggested as a convenient place, and the King of Sweden, Charles the Thirteenth, was flattered that his territory was to be the place of negotiation. He had previously commissioned a minister, Kantsow, to the United States, whom President Madison endeavored to reciprocate by nominating Jonathan Russell as envoy extraordinary to Sweden; but the Senate rejected that nomination. In January, 1814, when it was believed that the Russian mediation was at an end, but that still there was a hope of peace, and as Mr. Gallatin, also rejected by the Senate, and Mr. Bayard, were supposed to be on their way home,

Mr. Clay and Mr. Russell were appointed with Mr. Adams to the second mission, whose meeting was to be at Gottenburg, and Mr. Russell also minister to Sweden. While St. Petersburg was contemplated as the place of the meeting of the ministers, the American consul there, Levitt Harris, was commissioned secretary of the legation. When that was no longer to be the place, but Mr. Adams still was to be a member of the mission, Mr. Harris, by direction of the President, was appointed charge d'affaires in Russia, during Mr. Adams' absence from that country, and Mr. Christopher Hughes was appointed secretary of the legation.

On the 27th February, 1814, Mr. Clay and Mr. Russell, with Mr. Hughes, accompanied by William Shaler, as a confidential and secret agent of government, and Henry Carroll, as unofficial secretary or companion of Mr. Clay, sailed from New York in the John Adams sloop-of-war. After a tempestuous passage in that frail vessel, and inhospitable reception in the Texel, where they first made Europe, they landed at Gottenburg, to be first informed there of the prodigious successes of Great Britain and her allies, which took place after they left America, in the capture and peace of Paris. Hearing, at London, of the arrival of an American ship with peace commissioners at Gottenburg, Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard sent Mr. Bayard's unofficial secretary, George Milligan, to ascertain whether it was so, and what were their instructions, with whom Mr. Hughes repaired to London, taking the new commissions of the envoys there. The peace commission then consisted of the five gentlemen, Mr. Adams, Mr. Bayard, Mr. Clay, Mr. Russell and Mr. Gallatin; attended by the President's step-son, Mr. Payne Tod, Mr. George Dallas, George Milligan and Henry Carroll; British commissioners being appointed, and Ghent selected as the place of meeting.

Ghent, a Belgian city of some seventy or eighty thousand inhabitants, between the rivers Scheldt and Lys, not far from the sea, was then occupied by British troops, commanded by Sir Edward Lyons, whose only knowledge of America was that his father was killed in the battle of Bunker-hill. The American ministers had been there some time, waiting for the English, who did not arrive till after their coming was long anxiously expected. Admiral Lord Gambier, the chief of the mission, was a retired naval officer, of no very marked character. William Adams was an admiralty lawyer, with all the preconceived opinions, and not much more than the learning, of Doctors' Commons. Mr. Henry Gouldburn, the only publicist of that side, was a young man, connected with a noble family, training to statesmanship, since Chancellor of the Exchequer. The feeling in England toward this country

was almost universal anger, aversion and contempt, well represented by the English mission at Ghent, which seemed to be chosen not from any distinguished capacity, experience or fitness for their functions, but because the ministry were resolved to conduct the negotiations themselves, from London, and to open them arbitrarily and inflexibly, with such lofty demands as consisted with universal English sentiment, that such demands might be dictated through any agents, and would be at once unhesitatingly conceded. The secretary of the British legation, Anthony St. John Baker, was the consul-general detected in the distribution of trading licenses at Washington, when war was declared. On the other hand, the United States fortified themselves for the negotiation by some of their ablest men; Mr. Adams, educated and practiced in diplomacy, Mr. Gallatin, familiar with the maritime and commercial questions to be discussed, Mr. Bayard and Mr. Clay, distinguished and experienced members of Congress, and Mr. Russell, who, as charge d'affaires, first at Paris, when so left there by General Armstrong, and afterwards at London, when war was declared, had commended himself to respect by the adroitness, firmness, and manliness with which he performed his delicate and difficult offices. Having been appointed minister plenipotentiary to Sweden, he visited Stockholm, and presented his credentials there prior to joining his colleagues at Ghent.

Of such antagonists in the discussions to be entered upon, it needs no American prejudice to aver, what the Marquis of Wellesley mentioned in the House of Lords, that the correspondence of the American commissioners was obviously superior to that of the English; which was stated when he must have known that the English commissioners were kept always advised by the cabinet in London, and uniformly waited for instructions across the Channel before they ventured to answer any American letter: which was the invariable course of the negotiations. The ministers of both parties met together at a place and time appointed, orally made their suggestions and objections as either one thought proper, which were minuted by the secretaries, Mr. Hughes and Mr. Baker, and followed by letters as deemed expedient; but no American letter was answered till after the interval necessary for the English commissioners to send it to London, and get the answer there given by the cabinet. The American envoys had no such advantage. Three thousand miles from their government, they were obliged to act on such original instructions as were taken with them, or wait many weeks for further orders when indispensable. But it was one of the beneficial results of American transatlantic distance and weakness,

both before and soon after national independence, when the United States were more dependent on reason than strength, and the pen was a more available instrument than the sword, it was indispensable to send none but superior men to Europe on foreign missions. Wherefore Franklin, John Adams, Jay and Jefferson were employed to institute that excellent American diplomacy, which for many years distinguished the United States; lengthy and argumentative, as is the method of those whose state papers are subjected to popular judgment, but arguments in which the vindication of nations is couched. By putting off peace from April, 1814, when by the cessation of war in Europe all cause for it in America ceased likewise, till March, 1815, nearly eleven months given to vengeance, conquest and aggrandizement, thus deferring the treaty of Ghent, Great Britain provoked the triumphs of American negotiations in Europe as signal as those of American arms at the same time in America. The palm of victory which was not denied at Plattsburg, New Orleans, and other fields of military glory, was conceded also in Westminster to that of diplomacy at Ghent, and the retribution of such successes, intellectual and martial, of the weak over the strong, is one of the most memorable occurrences of that year; the European effect of which has been enjoyed in such American peace and prosperity as no peace could have occasioned without such triumphs.

It is delicate and invidious truth to add, that of the five American commissioners, there was probably only one inflexibly resolved on yielding nothing. It should not disparage Mr. Adams, Mr. Gallatin, Mr. Bayard and Mr. Russell, to say, that, imbued as they were from residence and associations with the commercial deferences of this country for England, no lack of spirit, patriotism or wisdom is imputable to any one of them who, on some of the questions to be passed upon, might incline to compromise with what seemed inevitable to save their country from great distress and calamity. Mr. Gallatin's London letter of May, 1814, shows that he did not expect any British concession, though no one, as will appear, was more prompt or determined to reject intolerable exaction. Mr. Adams, equally tenacious of American rights, was nevertheless apprehensive of American inability to maintain them, as betrayed by his letter from Ghent to Levitt Harris at St. Petersburg, which despondingly inquired, "with three frigates for a navy and five regiments for an army, what can be expected but defeat and disgrace?" Mr. Bayard on all occasions evinced his strong American feelings; and Mr. Russell, not only of the war and administration party, was resolute to maintain the position which alone could save them



from disgrace. But all those gentlemen were under the Atlantic influences of a commercial nation, which seldom tend to the loftiest patriotism. There was no member of the American legation who did not despise the capitulation of the Boston press, quoted in another part of this sketch, that the British terms first dictated *sine qua non* would and ought to be acquiesced in, and that it was Fourth of July fustian to treat them as insulting. No member of the legation hesitated to reject, to repel and to resent degrading terms. But there was one alone with ultramontane, transallegheanian instincts of uncompromising resistance to any British exaction, as several years afterwards partially appeared in print; that one, as Lord Castlereagh called him, was the Kentuckian, Mr. Clay, whose social independence that polished, iron-nerved and elegant courtier is said to have preferred, when after peace he entertained them all in London, to the endowments of his more cultivated and accomplished colleagues. For as for war, so for diplomacy, for oratory, even for society, there is genius which outstrips the endowments of culture. Born on the Atlantic shore, and bred in seaports, where with every importation come, like ship-fevers, unwholesome influences, let us confess that beyond the mountains man becomes a nobler republican, ruder perhaps of speech, garb and manner, but patriot as women are chaste, not by reason or education, but by instinct.

Not till the 3d of August, 1814, when the British forces, expedited from France, Spain, England and Ireland, had arrived in great numbers in America, and the three armies destined to defeat at Baltimore, Plattsburg and New Orleans, were far on their way to anticipated conquests, besides that of the Penobscot, then also in operation, did the British legation leave London for Ghent. Their departure, when British invasions of America were all in the ecstasies of achievement, was thus heralded by the London Courier, the official paper, of 1st August, 1814. "Upon prospects of peace with America, we are not so sanguine as some of our cotemporaries. The American commission was first issued upon designs of chicanery. It first sought the mediation of Russia, or rather its protection to the principle that free bottoms make free goods, hoping to draw the Court of St. Petersburg into a quarrel with us upon the old question of neutral bottoms, which Russia and the northern powers espoused so zealously thirty years ago. This was a trick of Bonaparte's, who employed America to embroil Russia and England at the moment he made his grand attack upon the former, two years ago. The Emperor of Russia referred the overtures to England, which could do no less

than express a desire of peace with America; neither could the American commissioners do less than express a similar desire. Hence arose a proposed meeting of negotiators on each side, which was but little attended to by either, each knowing that nothing could follow from it, and the Americans being chagrined at the failure of their insidious designs. Now that America is stripped of all hope of assistance, now that the Corsican is annihilated, the same commission of negotiators may at last be earnest, if they are provided with sufficient powers. But however magnanimous it may be in the Regent to declare his wish for peace on terms honorable to both parties, we hope it will not be made on terms *equally* honorable to both parties. Let the guilty pay some forfeit for their offence. We look rather to the prosecution of the war with vigor."

The stolid ignorance of leading English statesmen concerning this country needed defeat to make them wiser, as much as we did to render us independent of their influence. In the debate in the House of Lords, vindicating the capture of Washington, the Earl of Liverpool, long the substantial and most reliable minister of the crown, said that he had "seen much stronger justification of the conduct of his majesty's forces at Washington, published in America, than any that had been published even in England. Not only were the Americans not more hostile to us," said his lordship to the peers of Great Britain, "since that event, but the reverse is the case. In places where the British arms have been successful, the people have shown themselves in our favor, and seemed well disposed to put themselves under our protection." Such slander of nearly all the American nation was taught the English government by the pusillanimous neglect or determination of the government of Massachusetts respecting the eastern part of that State, conquered and held by British masters, from a community too well described by Lord Liverpool as "well disposed to put themselves under British protection." It was credibly reported at Paris that, when informed of the burning of Washington, Lord Castlereagh said that was not the only American town to be taken and perhaps burned; that several others, and among them New Orleans, must pass under the yoke, and the Americans be so environed by British troops, from the mouth of the Mississippi to the falls of Niagara, as to be little better than prisoners at large in their own deserts. One of the lords of the admiralty, Sir Joseph Yorke, was reported by the London journals, to the great delight of nearly all England, to have said in the House of Commons, "We have President Madison to depose before we can lay down our arms." "Peace," said the Times news-

paper, "between Great Britain and the United States can nowhere be properly made but in America. The conferences must be carried on at New York or Philadelphia, having previously fixed there the head-quarters of a Picton or a Hill." "The war," said Cobbett, "is almost universally popular. It is the war of the Times and the Courier. The press has worked up the people to the war pitch, and there it keeps them." After Madison exposed their first demands at Ghent, which the Times called "the means of uniting the whole American people against us," Cobbett replied, "You ass! they were united before, except a handful of Serene Highnesses and Cossacks in Massachusetts, the acquaintances of John Henry." Intoxicated by Napoleon's downfall and the subjugation of France, the monarch of the British press, the London Times, proclaimed "No peace with Madison as with Bonaparte. Part of our army in France will be immediately transferred to America, to finish the war there with the same glory as in Europe, and to place the peace on a footing equally firm and strong. Now that the tyrant Bonaparte has been consigned to infamy, there is no feeling stronger in this country than indignation against the Americans. The American government is as much of a tyranny as his was. Hatred of England is the fundamental point of Madison's policy; the ostensible organ of a party, all whose thoughts and feelings are guided by that master key. He himself, on the occasion of Jay's treaty, laid it down as an axiom that no treaty should be made with the enemy of France. Young as is the American Republic, it already has indulged in dreams of great ambition, and dreads any power that stands in the way of universal ambition. Their design in this war was to sap the foundation of our national greatness by denying the allegiance of our sailors, seize on our American colonies, and thus pave the way to our West India possessions. Now that the republic has lost her French buckler, Napoleon, shall we have the folly to let her off? We have wrested the dagger from the assassin, shall we give it back to him to sheathe? No. In his very last speech Madison has furnished us with a rule of conduct, viz. *not only to chastise the savages into permanent peace, but make a lasting impression on their fears.* [Applied by the President to Jackson's conquest of the Creek Indians.] The Eastern, which are the most moral, intelligent, and respectable States, are reduced to complete thralldom by the Southern. The small States, said Fisher Ames, are in vassalage to the rod of Virginia. The Constitution sleeps with Washington, with no mourners but the virtuous, or monument but history. If that was true before the acquisition of Louisiana, how much more

so now, since that addition has broken down the balance between the States, and poured an irresistible stream of corrupt influence into the executive channel. And this Southern preponderance is made by slaves. The slave owner is generally a democrat, and democrats are the most servile supporters of tyrants. The free and honest States must then be separated from the treacherous individual who has dragged them reluctantly into this war. When we speak of Madison, however, we mean his whole faction. Gallatin may be more artful, Clay more furious, Jefferson more malignant. There is a ferocious banditti of them, of whom, perhaps, Madison himself stands in awe: Irish traitors, fugitive bankrupts and swindlers, exceeding the native Americans in rancor against Great Britain. There are some respectable Americans. Fisher Ames, little known on this side of the Atlantic, was an American Burke. Madison's Generals Dearborn, Wilkinson, and Hampton, by their ridiculous blunders, have thrown ridicule on the conquest of Canada. Then comes the overthrow of his great patron, attended with the execration and scorn of all Europe. A vigorous effort on our part will annihilate a faction alike hostile to Britain and fatal to America. Is not the time propitious for uniting at least the sounder and better part of the Americans to a union of interests with the country from which they sprung?"

In such universal strain of malicious prejudice and stupid ignorance, the British press and Parliament counseled war, stripped of all its humanizing mitigations, naked and ferocious war, to reconquer the United States by divisions and invasion; war of principles and institutions; civil war in its worst outrages; and servile war with all its Roman horrors: In which atrocious instigations is perceptible not only the English design of that day, but the English influence which still prevails throughout New England, inflaming it, under the disguise of negrophilism, to unnatural and suicidal antipathies against Southern fellow-countrymen.

Just then an English renegade, once an English common soldier, then American journalist, vilifying everything American, whose Poreupine shafts were continually aimed at Mr. Gallatin, from flaming loyalist, become furious radical, Cobbett, stood up in the midst of Hampshire, in the heart of England, a volunteer American champion, when there was no American inducement to his vehement espousal of our cause. With the superior knowledge, derived from long residence, of the institutions, people and resources of this country, he wielded coarse, pure, Saxon English, with the force of Swift or Paine, in American vindication, striking with a pen like a sledge-hammer, and always hitting in the right



place. Pitt, Percival, and afterwards Castlereagh, successive English premiers, who all died by political excesses, once objects of his excessive applause, became butts of his withering ridicule, and marks of his deadly blows, America erst abominated, at last his delight; sturdy English volunteer, proclaiming the justice of our cause, the fortitude of our people, their republican attachments and unconquerable union in spite of prefatory reverses, superficial and party divisions. When the Bourbon restoration was a fact accomplished, and the Times and other English journals proclaimed that twenty-five thousand of Wellington's veteran troops were to be transferred to America, to finish the war as in France, and with the same glory, Cobbett, from his rustic sequestration, rebuked them in tones of contemptuous defiance, which reverberated throughout the four corners of this wide confederacy. "Our quarrel," said he, "with America, ceases with the war. [Orders in Council repealed, and no occasion or pretext, if even pretended, right of impressment in time of peace.] But the American government and President are bad, and must be put down. For that the war is to be continued, and no peace till then. I acknowledge that a war to recolonize America will be the most popular ever waged, at least for a while. Peace and reduction of our forces will ruin so many, who are all, men, families, women and children, clergymen and all for war, *as undertakers are for deaths*, and with as little malice in their motives. The farmers are for war, because they think it makes corn dear. The land-owners, generally, because they think it keeps up rents. The ship-owners and navigation interest, because in peace the Americans rival them with cheaper shipping. The manufacturers expect a monopoly instead of rivalry of American manufactures, if the United States are recovered by Great Britain. The stockholders hope to make America contribute to pay the national debt. Politicians see in America a dangerous maritime rival growing, like their Indian corn, prodigiously yet imperceptibly. And fifty fallen Napoleons cannot wash out the shame of their losing such colonies. English high-minded patriots cling to Great Britain's supremacy as mistress of the seas. Other Englishmen hate America, because free, and the asylum for the oppressed of this and other countries; a country without sinecures, pensions, tithes, and hardly any taxes; where corruption and bribery are unknown, and putting a criminal to death as rare as an eclipse of the sun. These English look on America as Satan did on Eden, not with envy, but with deadly hate, to exterminate, burn and destroy it. American happiness *sears their eyeballs*. They dread what they deem the disorganizing principles of America. They

have the press in their hands, and control the prejudices and passions. For these selfish reasons, I believe [said Cobbett] the war will be popular. But whether it will succeed, is a very different question: and I warn ministers and the Prince Regent against being warped by such notions, proceeding from the selfishness of some and rage of others. I confess the time is propitious. Not only have we the best army in the world, made of the best stuff, commanded by the best officers; *but we do not know what to do with them*; and for a year they must cost as much in peace as war. We have more than ships of war enough to carry them all over the Atlantic, without employing a single transport. In the whole world there is no fleet but ours: and France, Spain and Holland have enough to do at home for some years. We can lay waste the American sea coasts, and at first beat them in every rencontre, demolish some of their towns, and force Congress to change their quarters. But the fall of Napoleon, the language, threats and attempt of England will unite the Americans of all parties in resistance to us. When their government is to be forcibly subverted, as advertised in the Times and other English journals, the Americans, instead of being divided, as those journals predict, will be alarmed and united. They do not want to see what has taken place in France, under our arms, a RESTORATION. Fisher Ames is complimented by the Times as the Burke of America. I dare say he would like to get a good pension. Poor driveling hankerer after aristocracy, his party wished to establish a sort of petty noblesse. But the people took the alarm and put them out of power, since when they have been trying to tear the vitals out of their country. The fall of Napoleon will leave them nothing to scold about: and the American people will be roused, when they hear that their government is to be treated like his. Look here, Jefferson's followers will say, the first fruit of French overthrow is to be that of this country. If all parties unite there, ten such armies as we may send, the bravest and best disciplined, will fail. We may destroy their corn-fields, factories, mills, shipping, and no doubt tear the country a good deal to pieces. Yet even by adding another eight hundred millions to our debt, I do not believe that we can gain a single colony from the United States of America. Napoleon's was no representative or popular government as the Americans' is: and to put theirs down will cost us more blood, treasure and time than his. For all our sacrifices, his enemies promised us *durable peace* whenever he was put down. But no sooner is he down than they propose another war, a causeless war, a war to cost more and last longer than his. It may bring in its train many places for the crown to dispose of.

Yet I warn the Prince Regent and his ministers against the consequences."

By such popular caustic appeals and predictions were the apostate Irish premier Castlereagh, and his apostate master the Prince Regent, admonished by an English apostate hating everything Irish, even to the potatoe on which the poor Irish subsisted, which Cobbett pronounced an unwholesome vegetable, and recommended as its substitute the Indian corn, which, while I write this paragraph, has been supplied by America to Ireland, in large quantities, to take the place of the potatoe, failing by inexplicable rot, so that Indian corn has become at least the temporary substitute. Upon the extension of British suffrage by the reform of 1830, Cobbett ended his long career as a member of Parliament, where, however, he made no impression or figure, either from advanced age or inaptitude for parliamentary contention. When least to be expected, an unsought and unrewarded champion, he rose up, and fought with fierce intrepidity the battle of a people whom, when among them, he contemned, and from whose borders he absconded.

Not only Ghent but Vienna, where the great European Congress assembled in September, 1814, and Paris, and St. Petersburg, where there was no disposition, after putting down the continental tyrant, to raise a sea despot to succeed him, and nearly all maritime Europe, united with Washington, rejoicing in Plattsburg and Baltimore, to curb Great Britain, and verify, even by European jealousies of her domination, Cobbett's auguries of its American defiance.

Mr. Adams and Mr. Russell, with Mr. Hughes, went to Ghent in the John Adams, Mr. Clay by land from Gottenburg. Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard joined them from London. The five American commissioners, with their secretary of legation and four junior assistants, established in a considerable hotel, kept house together, in the uncommon ease and dignity, for American foreign ministers, afforded by a hundred thousand dollars a year; the amount of their united five outfits and salaries. The city authorities of Ghent received them with respect and an exchange of hospitalities. Entertainments, dinners, and balls, at which Mr. Adams was the only dancing member of the mission, civilities extended by the British commander, General Lyons, to the mercurial and gallant secretary of the American legation, Mr. Hughes, diverted the time during which they were all kept waiting the arrival of their English opponents, who, leaving London the 3d, arrived at Ghent on Saturday the 6th of August, 1814. As Sherbrooke invaded Penobscot, and Prevost was preparing, pursuant to a plan of operations sent him from London, to enter New York from

Plattsburg, and Ross to capture Washington, and the forces of which, on Ross' death, Pakenham was appointed commander, were organizing for the attack of New Orleans, when the only question of the British government and people was, whether it should be war of territorial conquest or coast depredation—just then, the insignificant agents of ministerial vengeance carried inadmissible demands from London to be dictated at Ghent. But the very first step of the negotiation, in the mere formalities of meeting, indicated the American spirit, and perhaps the English. Mr. Adams by long service, and Mr. Russell by some, were versed in those ceremonies of diplomatic intercourse which, in the Old World, are treated as substantial, in the New as trifling, observances. Sunday noon, the 7th August, when all the gentlemen of our mission were absent except Mr. Bayard, the secretary of the British legation, Mr. Baker, called at the American hotel, to fix a time and place of meeting to enter on the business of the mission, and, with Mr. Bayard, arranged it for next day, at the British hotel. Mr. Bayard, inexperienced in forms and indifferent to ceremonies, made no objection to the suggestion of that place by the British secretary, but at once acquiesced in it. As soon, however, as his colleagues returned, and were apprised of what was an untoward outset of the transaction, Mr. Adams instantly and warmly refused to comply with it. "Meet," said he, "the English ministers, who have kept us here so long waiting the condescension of their coming, in the face of all Ghent, meet them at their bidding, at their own hotel, to be the laughing-stock of this city, of London, and of Europe!" "Never! never!" repeated Mr. Gallatin, "I would rather break up the mission and go home." "But," said Mr. Bayard, "the arrangement has been made, and we are promised to it." "Not at all," replied Mr. Adams, "you may be, not I, nor we. It would be a submission to English encroachment to which, for one, I will not submit." By unanimous and animated reversal, the understanding was annulled, and the secretary, Mr. Hughes, employed in his first essay, with instructions reduced to writing by Mr. Adams, to call on Mr. Baker and have the place of meeting changed, and it was accordingly changed to another, where the legations afterwards met each other, their first session being fixed for the 8th August.

Ghent was full of persons to watch the negotiations for commercial speculations; several American and many English merchants there, attracted by the interesting nature of the issue; among the rest Mr. Churchill C. Cambreleng, afterwards distinguished in the public service, both legislative



and diplomatic, of the United States; Mr. George Emlen, who was to have accompanied Mr. Russell as secretary of legation to Sweden; and Captain William Shaler, expert as a linguist, seaman, merchant, and a democrat in advance of his day, employed by our government as a confidential attendant of the American mission, whom it was at one time intended to send on a secret errand of observation to Vienna during the Congress of sovereigns there, whose proceedings might considerably affect those at Ghent. American staples were also doing their work in the pending negotiations. Tobacco, a weed, had its weight in the scales of peace; and cotton, then sixty cents a pound, supplanting iron, once the standard of English national wealth and refinement, was rapidly producing that complete revolution of the relations between this country of production, and England the country of artificial wealth, by which the mother country may be said to be colonized to her former colonies. Commercial letters from Liverpool, dated early in September, 1814, and received at Savannah, stated that it was "extremely probable that, during the winter, we shall take possession of some American districts, from whence supplies of cotton may be brought;" referring, no doubt, to the contemplated invasion of Louisiana.

"To such a pitch," said a London journal of the 10th September, 1814, "has the spirit of speculation on the insignificant negotiations at Ghent been carried, that it is not saying too much to assert, that the whole funded property of the British empire takes its relative value from the varying prices of tobacco. If you want to know the price of stocks, it is first necessary to ascertain the price of rappee. How comes it that such importance is attached to American affairs, when we have only America to drub into honesty and peace, to which, at a period of our being engaged in a controversy a thousand times of greater magnitude, was scarcely paid the slightest regard? That the rise and fall of tobacco by Yankee speculation from Ghent, should have so great an effect on our money market, is the height of folly."

On Monday, the 8th August, 1814, "the place having been agreed upon," as the official dispatch of the American commissioners stated, the Congress at Ghent had their first conference, exchanged their powers, and the British *sine qua non* respecting Indians and boundaries was launched at once. Our commissioners having no instructions or idea to treat such claims, the English commissioners asked for time to communicate with their government; and excepting another meeting on the 9th, to settle a protocol of the terms proposed on the 8th, there was no further conference till the 19th, when the

English, on the morning of that day, called for another meeting the same afternoon, impelled by a great event that had occurred at Ghent. The day before, on the 18th August, Lord Castlereagh arrived there, with a suite of twenty carriages, in all the pride and circumstance of British might and splendor, on his way to the Congress of sovereigns at Vienna. Lord Gambier and his colleagues had, therefore, the oral commands as well as written instructions of the great paymaster of their royal European stipendiaries, who, at his bidding, and under his brother Sir Charles Stewart's personal superintendence, had waged the immense hostilities by which Great Britain conducted in triumph her Russian, Prussian, Austrian, and the other coalesced dependents on her loans, and imitators of her fortitude, to the capital of their former conqueror. The fearless statesman, who, at Chatillon, had so recently been foremost to refuse Napoleon terms, and order the Marquis of Wellington, without hesitation, to march on Paris—could he pause or compromise with the American republicans in his power and their ministers at his feet? No. That was no moment, Castlereagh was the last man, to forbear to punish America and Madison as he had subjugated France and castigated Bonaparte; and if his Irish bowels had betrayed any yearnings of compassion, the three kingdoms, England, Scotland and Ireland, king, lords and commons, army, navy and clergy, would have risen up against such puling tenderness, yielding more than enough when dictating less than absolute surrender of American independence. As to the islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, just then by bloodless and unresisted, if not to Massachusetts grateful subjugation, wrested from the United States, when our commissioners asked what were the British views concerning them, the insolent reply was, to keep them, without discussion, for they belong to Great Britain, and are no more subject of negotiation than Northamptonshire. At the conference of the 19th August, 1814, therefore, not only was the Indian *sine qua non* repeated, but our relinquishment demanded of the lakes, on all of which we had then superior squadrons, and with them surrender of territories, much larger than England, together with the fisheries and the navigation of the Mississippi.

Of such demands the official advice of our commissioners, laid by the President through Congress before the nation and the world, was, "We need hardly say the demands of Great Britain will receive from us a unanimous and decided negative. We do not deem it necessary to detain the John Adams, for the purpose of transmitting to you the official note, which may pass on the subject and close the negotiation. And we

have felt it our duty immediately to apprise you, by this hasty but correct sketch, of our last conference, that there is not, at present, any hope of peace." A private letter from Mr. Gallatin, dated at Ghent, the 20th August, to Mr. Dallas (Secretary of the Treasury when it arrived), carried by his son with the official report, in terms still more explicit and honorable to Mr. Gallatin, made known his impression. "Our negotiations may be considered at an end. Some official notes may yet pass, but the nature of the demands of the British, made also as a preliminary *sine qua non*, to be admitted as a basis before a discussion, is such that there can be no doubt of a speedy rupture of our conferences, and that we will have no peace. Great Britain wants war in order to cripple us: she wants aggrandizement, at our expense: she may have ulterior objects: no resource is left but in union and vigorous prosecution of the war. When her terms are known, it appears to me impossible that all America should not unite in defence of her rights, of her territory, I may say of her independence."

The peace commission was brought nearly to an end by that huge British blunder, which, by our commissioners at Ghent, by the President, in Congress, and throughout the country, was received with nearly universal indignation. Mr. Clay accepted Mr. Crawford's invitation to visit him in Paris, Mr. Adams was about to return to St. Petersburg, Mr. Russell to repair to his mission at Stockholm, the ship Neptune was prepared at Brest to bring home Mr. Bayard and Mr. Gallatin. Mr. George Dallas, on the 31st of August, sailed from the Texel in the John Adams, with the white flag of a cartel at her mast head, to convey to Washington the entire failure of any effort to put a stop to the war, by mediation, negotiation or solicitation in Europe; and assurance that war alone was the way to peace. Mr. George Emlen returned with Mr. Dallas in the John Adams. The London Courier, of the 14th of August reported proceedings at Ghent, thus:—"Yesterday, government received dispatches from Lord Gambier. We understand that the first meeting between the English and American commissioners at Ghent was held on Monday last, when their respective credentials were exhibited. A second meeting is stated to have taken place on Wednesday, when some discussion ensued between the plenipotentiaries on the interests of their respective governments, but of too general a nature to admit any certain conclusion to be drawn from it. It is rumored, however, that the Republican commissioners were extremely reserved and slow in the disclosure of their pretensions. Ministers expect to receive further dispatches and of a less indecisive character

to-morrow. Connected with this subject is a report, which was circulated last night, but for the truth of which we do not pledge ourselves, that the expedition fitted out at Portsmouth, under Lord Hill, had been suspended, and all the preparations for it discontinued."

That publication, not less than semi-official, indicated that the ministers supposed their terms would be submitted to, without the necessity of sending more troops to America. The London Courier of the next day, 15th of September, 1814, resuming the topic, thus rebuked the opposition for stating that "the American commissioners assume a high tone. What gives them a right to assume that tone? We deny that the Ghent negotiation is either broken up or broken off. And is it the *justice* of their cause or *brilliance* of their success that emboldens them? We must have no high tone from America. We owe it to ourselves and to posterity in this unprovoked war, undertaken for the most unjust purposes, to make such an impression on their fears as shall curb the desire of aggression and conquest for many years to come. America ought, in this contest, to be fully and explicitly taught that a false neutrality, and subservience to an ignorant but violent populace, are crimes in a *government*, which, though they may promise an immediate advantage, must nevertheless be followed by merited chastisement, and the loss of those just interests they might have permanently secured, had they not in the spirit of rapine grasped at that which justice had closed as the right and property of another." Thus semi-official ministerial oracles, stupidly ignorant of the country they condemned and were to chastise, fomented the brutish credulity of the English populace. The same paragraph in a Plymouth newspaper, which announced Major-General Keene's arrival at Portsmouth, to embark for America, with inhuman delight, enumerated, in the list of his equipments, "ten thousand suits of clothing, supposed to be for the North American Indians, and an immense quantity of warlike instruments adapted for their use."

Not only the English impression at London, but that made by their agents at Ghent, was that Lord Castlereagh had settled matters there as at Chatillon, by the same bold tone of ennobled upstart Irish audacity. The Ghent Gazette, of the 22d of August, 1814, published: "Since the conversation which Lord Castlereagh, the first minister of his British Majesty, has had with the American envoys, and after the return of a courier from London, the negotiations of the Congress have recommenced, which had been suspended, and are continued with activity. Mr. Dallas, one of the secretaries of the American legation, went yesterday to the Texel with dispatches for



his government, and is to embark on board an American ship for America. There is every hope that the conferences will have a speedy and favorable issue." As Ghent was then garrisoned by British troops, and General Sir Edward Lyons regulated public sentiment, which, even without the police of a British garrison, was not freely imparted by the press, unless sanctioned by authority, it is plain, from the London and Ghent official paragraphs, that the English ministerial calculation then was, that the United States would acquiesce in the terms dictated by Great Britain, and not only so, but readily, if not gratefully. Why not? They were by no means as hard terms as those just imposed by the same masters on France, and hailed there with acclamations of delight. The thousands of travelers who now journey from Boston or New York to New Orleans, by that belt of the American Union, the Lakes and Chicago, can form some notion of the state of English opinion, or information, when all those familiar interior American highways were demanded as the price of peace, reluctantly to be granted by Great Britain to grateful America. Impressment, illegal blockade, indemnity for unauthorized captures, to redress which war was undertaken, were, and only a few of them, scarcely allowed to be intimated by our ministers, and by the British not so much as noticed.

English history, printed travels, such as that of Basil Hall, and the press generally of that country, have attempted to apologize for their reverses here by the false assertion that, absorbed with the mightier European contest, Great Britain had not time, and did not feel sufficiently interested, to attend to that with America. But from and after the 1st of April, 1814, there was no war in Europe, and the whole prodigious preparations of England for that year, flushed with wonderful successes and impelled by an exasperated, enthusiastic nation, were turned against the United States. Precisely then it was that their American reverses began; those who conquered in Europe were defeated in America. And no barometer indicates the weather more sensitively than American victories did English change of sentiment. The London press, ministerial and independent, which, throughout April and from that time till the middle of October, called vehemently for unmerciful hostilities against this country, then began to quail, as from Erie and Champlain, Washington and Baltimore, a constant stream of amazing American triumphs, with one signally disgraceful British, confounded them; when at length a London journal published, "instructions have gone to Ghent of so pacific a nature as to induce a confident hope that the negotiations will terminate successfully;" as they did, by Great Britain's withdrawing all her imperious terms of

August *sine qua non*, and sinking, in December, to the level of *uti possidetis*.

In Washington and throughout the United States, and thence by reverberation in London and all England, till the impression reached Vienna and every other seat of European influence, Lord Castlereagh's total misapprehension of the American temper and condition, thinking he had but to command obedience, his dictation at Ghent proved a foolish and fatal mistake. As soon as the John Adams made the American coast, Mr. George Dallas, hastening with dispatches which our envoys were confident would unite the country, got into a gunboat to expedite his landing at New York, took an express stage, and stopping but one hour in Philadelphia, to see his family, after being three days and nights without rest, reached Washington with his important intelligence. On the 10th of October, 1814, the House of Representatives received from the Senate their joint resolution of thanks to Captain Macdonough, his officers, seamen, and the infantry acting as marines in the squadron on Lake Champlain: and we were in committee of the whole, Mr. Macon in the chair, on the resolutions from our military committee, expressive of the sense of Congress of the gallant conduct of Generals Brown, Scott, Gaines and Macomb—we were reveling in victories, when Edward Coles, the President's secretary, brought a message from him, which proved instantaneously a master-stroke of bold American policy. He laid before Congress "communications from the Plenipotentiaries of the United States, charged with negotiating a peace with Great Britain, *showing the conditions on which alone that government was willing to put an end to the war;*" adding that he would send likewise his instructions to the commissioners.

The committee rose at once to hear the message, which, read in the House, electrified all parties. The message and correspondence were referred to the committee on foreign affairs; and on John Forsyth's motion for five, amended by Alexander Hanson's motion doubling the number, ten thousand copies were ordered to be printed. On Friday, the 14th October, we got the instructions which were also referred to the committee on foreign affairs. Exposure by official publication of those hostile exactions was faintly complained of in England as contrary to diplomatic usage and governmental delicacy; the British ministry being surprised, annoyed and confounded by it, throughout that country as well as this put palpably in the wrong. The London Sun, of the 3d of August, 1814, before the negotiations began, stated that their requirement was our surrender of the fisheries, of the whole of Lakes Erie and Ontario: all northern military posts, and all the country north of the Ohio to the Indians. When to such ex-

actions equally impolitic on their part and insufferable on ours, were superadded the fisheries to rouse New England, with the lakes on which we had conquered British fleets, and the Indian haunts whence our frontiers were desolated, the American nation closed its ranks, and at once, almost to a man breathing war, uttered defiance, while considerate Englishmen, and the opposition there joined in condemnation of such wanton prettexts for protracted and interminable hostilities. One-third of the present State of Maine (since disgracefully given up by the treaty of Washington,) all the State of Michigan, one-third of the State of Ohio, all Illinois, and Indiana, tracts of country larger than England, Ireland, Wales and Scotland; an independent savage power within the States, no American armed vessel on the lakes or the many great rivers their confluent, the fisheries on the Grand Bank and the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and navigation of the Mississippi, were concessions which the Executive had no constitutional power to make, which the entire Union was equally interested and resolved to prevent, and which it was flagrant, must dismember, degrade and nearly destroy the American Union.

Madison, Monroe and Dallas were then completely and earnestly united in the conviction, that nothing less than the whole resources of the United States called forth for war would give them peace. The instantaneous exposure of the British demands, by a bold and novel but just and politic innovation on the common routine of international negotiations, was the first great movement; and not only was that innovation wise for the occasion, but as an exemplary appeal, on all such conjunctures, to a nation and the world as the best resort. It was a salient precedent of republican American independent departure from the clandestine mystifications of selfish superannuated European monarchical diplomacy. Such official and executive invocation of popular intelligence and sentiment asking advice of the right feeling community, whose generous impulses are often wiser than cabinet ministers, and always less selfish, instead of the short-sighted motives and limited understanding of a few secret negotiators, appeals to the multitude of counsellors, in whom there is most safety, and submits to the whole world what much concerns it altogether. Treaties would not be so often unjust and so often broken, if nations were consulted about their stipulations, which are contrived by a few, always selfish, and often venal ministers, and not promulgated till irrevocably binding on their numerous constituents. Although negotiation cannot always be transacted by numbers in public, yet publicity is often as beneficial to negotiation as to legislation.

Seldom has this feature in the open as-

pect of republicanism been more attractive or more commanding than in that instance, so opportune and well managed. The Canadian victories by land and water, the Baltimore repulse, the barbarian desolation of Washington, the tide of fortune and of war turning in our favor, concurred with British enormity of demand and American promptitude of its exposure, to rally this country and disabuse all others. In Congress the effect was instantaneous and obvious. Sitting in the only public building left standing by the ruthless invaders, opposition in Congress to the war and the administration was discountenanced, and their supporters, in augmented numbers, encouraged to unanimous approval of whatever strength of measures and severity of endurance might prove necessary to avoid the ignominious conditions of peace demanded by insolent and defeated foes. So much improved was public sentiment, that, when the House fell to work, as it did earnestly, on providing the supplies, the National Intelligencer of the 23d of October, announced it with striking gratification. "The House of Representatives, with whom all the revenue bills must originate, has entered on the consideration of the ways and means for the ensuing year; and a general disposition appears to prevail to vote the necessary supplies. A large majority of the Federalists in Congress will unite with the Republicans in providing the means for carrying on the war, which, all nice distinctions being out of the question, is acknowledged to be a defensive war. If this Union lasts, the United States will be what they would have been long ago, had it earlier been victorious over all their enemies at all points." "We are glad," said the *New York Gazette*, a Federal journal, "to find the following *American* sentiments in the *Georgetown Federal Republican*. A message was yesterday received from the President transmitting dispatches from our commissioners at Ghent, which give no encouragement to expect a favorable termination of the negotiation. The terms on which the enemy offers peace, are such as no American will hesitate in rejecting as degrading and humiliating in the extreme." The despicable ebullition of a Boston journal, the only part of the country where such a sentiment would have been conceived or endured, has been already cited that the terms proposed by the enemy at Ghent were not unreasonable, and therefore must be submitted to. In the whole United States from New York included to Louisiana, there was hardly a man of that unworthy spirit.

A distant relative of the present President of the United States, an officer of the Revolution, William Polk, a Federalist of North Carolina, at an early period of the war tendered a brigadier-generalship in the regular army, which he declined, published at Ra-



leigh, on the 17th of October, 1814, a letter to Governor Hawkins, of that State, denouncing "the degrading conditions demanded by the British commissioners from the American government as the price of peace, conditions as new as humiliating, inadmissible under circumstances far more perilous than the present, and such as no American ought to submit to. While these terms are contended for, and made the *sine qua non* of an adjustment of our difficulties, I hesitate not to declare my intention to unite with and support the government in such a system as shall compel the enemy to respect our rights, and bring the war to an honorable termination. The crisis has arrived when it would be useless to inquire what were the causes, or who were the authors of the misfortunes which have overtaken the country. It is enough to know that *dishonorable conditions* have been demanded, and that danger exists. It behooves us to show the world that there is firmness enough to reject the one and spirit enough to meet the other."

While such was the nearly universal feeling in America, that of England suddenly veered toward justification of our defensive and condemnation of their aggressive hostilities. Exposure of their demands and invasion, after all cause of war was at an end by the peace of Europe, illustrated by a career of American victories, turned public sentiment and belligerent operations altogether in our favor. "Madison's abrupt publication of the conditions of peace worked like Jackson's instantaneous surprise of the British as soon as landed below New Orleans; master-strokes of policy and strategy. Opposition was proclaimed in the British Parliament itself (both houses) against a war of vengeance, territorial aggrandizement, and ruthless invasion. On the 11th November, 1814, the Prince Regent's speech to Parliament was equivocal, by no means menacing, if not yielding; for "it regretted the large expenditure which must be met that year, the war still subsisting with America, rendering the continuance of great exertions indispensable." Opposition forthwith planted their batteries on such manifest tendency to capitulate. On the 21st November, in the House of Lords, the Marquis of Lansdowne inquired of the Earl of Liverpool, whether the Ghent correspondence was authentic as published, and declared that the pretensions set up by Great Britain called loudly for the interference of Parliament. Lord Lansdowne was willing to support the doctrine of perpetual British allegiance and impressments, but not war for conquest or territory, for the lakes or Indians. The Earl of Donoughmore introduced a new and substantive objection to the hostilities carried on by the English in America, by strongly condemning the capture and exportation of slaves. The

British people had been taught to believe, he said, that they were contending for a vital principle, their marine sovereignty and independence, whereas it appeared that they were fighting for extended territories and abstracted slaves: Lord Liverpool, not denying the authenticity of the published negotiations, complained of their publication as unprecedented and irregular, pending the time of treating. Of captured slaves, he denied all knowledge and probably with truth, such was British ignorance, although, for eighteen months, that violation of the laws of war and humanity had been actively carried on, and the British American naval stations, Bermuda and Halifax, were crowded with black victims, many of them in British regimentals, serving in the army and navy. In the Commons House, Whitbread, loudly cheered, charged ministers with having so fought and so negotiated, that the large portion of America siding with England when the contest began, is now all against her, and but one common mind exists for directing the whole force of the republic. The Chancellor of the Exchequer could only whimper that it gave him great satisfaction to say that the conferences at Ghent were not broken off. To Ponsonby's stern inquiry whether the papers laid before Congress were correct statements of what passed at Ghent, the whole bench of ministers said nothing, but stood mute; while the author of one of the most violent pamphlets against America before the war, and leading to it, called War in Disguise, Stephens, complained that America had departed from the usual conduct of civilized governments, in publishing papers before negotiations were terminated. But, said Horner, the principle of the war has changed to conquest, which will not be supported by the House or the public. And Baring added, that no man in England could expect America to yield to British pretensions, when we had gained no advantage over her in the war. The press of continental Europe combined with that of nearly all America, fought our battle triumphantly against the British press, incessant reviler of this country and instigator of hostilities against it,

Who unpack their hearts with words,  
And fall a cursing like a very drab.

The war, as Cobbett said, is a war of the Times and the Courier, who rouse the whole nation to war. The press has warmed up the people to the war pitch, and there it keeps them. But that fell spirit sunk before the campaign of the Niagara, the discomfiture at Plattsburg, and the devastation of Washington, changing the mind of all Europe, and completed by the abortion of Ghent. Publication of those dispatches, the Times confessed, "has been made the means of uniting against us the whole American people."

Cobbett, reeking from the twelve months' imprisonment, and smarting under the thousand pounds fine inflicted on an alleged libellous publication, as vehemently American in England as he had been English in America, with redoubled violence repeated his attacks on the ministry and their presses. Victorious arms and negotiations, with unusual, but wise and just publicity, calling the whole world to witness American rights and admire American victories, made a platform on which English good sense and European justice took a stand with us, while that of the American apologists of England fell from under them. Disunion nearly disappeared from America, and discord rose in England, with a prevailing sense of the justice and moderation of our cause.

The negotiations and peace of Ghent, whereof the acknowledgment by treaty, like perfect health, indicative of mere absence of disease and distress, have not enjoyed the merit the arrangement deserves, because importing no more than cessation of hostilities, seemingly without settlement of the cause of conflict. But while uniform and universal success attended the American arms, what more was wanting than such pacification, begun and closed by two remarkable and fortunate coincidences? In a letter, dated the 24th of August, 1814, the American ministers, while the British invaders were burning Washington, after an admirable refutation of the British letter which it answered, presented that modest and reasonable basis of peace, which the British cabinet finally adopted and engrafted into the treaty. For the whole negotiation was with the British cabinet, conducted by American envoys, three thousand miles from their constituents, and, as will be presently shown, under vexatious interruptions of their advices from Washington, while their antagonists received theirs regularly and promptly from London. Notwithstanding such disadvantages, fortunately presenting the adopted terms of peace, the very day of the greatest outrage of hostile vengeance, without being aware of it, the uniformly dignified and superior terms of the American communications became, after knowledge of that disgrace to their country, and indeed to both countries, and continued, constantly more stern, unyielding, and unterrified to the end; and that end was another remarkable and fortunate coincidence. Allowing for the change of time between Ghent and New Orleans, the treaty was signed at Ghent just as Jackson defeated the first detachment of the British army, on the night of the 23d December, 1814; so that negotiation began in disaster and closed in triumph.

The treaty of Ghent, without our northern victories, might not have made honorable peace. But, unless signed before the

southern victories could be known in England, would there have been any treaty of peace at all? Fortunately for this country when our fortune seemed to be invariable, the proud and mighty empire it waged war with, was eager to come to an accommodation before it knew of a great discomfiture. For New Orleans might have prevented peace, till restoration in arms, as many English declared indispensable even without that defeat, of the tarnished renown of Great Britain.

On the 25th November, 1814, the cartel schooner Chauncey arrived at New York from Ostend in the then uncommonly short passage of twenty-five days, bringing Mr. John Connell, a merchant of Philadelphia, with further and more favorable dispatches from Ghent. That vessel entered the noble harbor of New York, garrisoned by twelve thousand soldiers, that day under arms, celebrating the anniversary of its evacuation by the British army at the close of the Revolution. From Boston to New Orleans, the Atlantic cities, real cities, not nominal capitals like Washington, warned by its fate, Cochrane's slave and devastation official notices, were prepared, like Baltimore, to defend themselves, while government was straining every nerve to carry the war into British America, with rational confidence that the campaign of 1815 would much surpass that of 1814. Boston was fortified and armed by the most violent opponents, forced to become supporters, of the war. The National Intelligencer of the 30th November, 1814, advertising to the dispatches brought by the Chauncey, stated, semi-officially, that "it would be highly injudicious for our government or people to calculate on any advantages to result to our interests from events to happen across the Atlantic."

The American spirit of resistance to British demand had become national; when a little spiteful infliction of hostile ill-temper terminated our intercourse with Ghent. The naval commander-in-chief, Cochrane, refused our government a flag of truce to take the last dispatches to Ghent, so that there was no alternative but to let them run the gauntlet of the innumerable British cruisers vexing the Atlantic from New York to the Texel. The brig *Transit* was therefore employed to carry George Boyd, one of the clerks at Washington, and brother-in-law of Mr. Adams, with two sets of confidential dispatches, one containing, besides the public instructions, such private advices as were deemed unfit for the enemy's information, and which the bearer was to throw overboard whenever about to be overtaken by a British vessel. The other package, enveloped to the American ministers, was accompanied by an open letter from Mr. Monroe to Lord Castlereagh, stating that Admiral Cochrane, having re-



fused a flag of truce, the President had no means of conveying further instructions to his ministers at Ghent, than by committing them to the honor of the British secretary, which was appealed to for the safe and speedy transmission, unopened, to their destination, of advices important to peace. The *Transit* met, fortunately, with no British vessel, but arrived safely in Europe, at that period of uninterrupted American good luck. Lord Castlereagh's magnanimity was not tried when Admiral Cochrane refused the cartel. But such barbarism was consistent with his orders to proclaim and execute devastations, and with British contempt for America.

On Christmas eve, Saturday the 24th December, 1814, the treaty was signed, in several copies, of which, as the secretary, Mr. Hughes, could not make all the required numbers as soon as desired, Mr. Clay kindly contributed one in his excellent hand-writing, and a Polish exiled count, afterwards killed on Miranda's expedition to Mexico, whom Mr. Hughes generously employed, copied another. It is the usage, on such occasions, for the ministers of each nation to sign first their own copy of the treaty, and for the signatures of the other party to be placed beneath. But at Ghent, the British ministers overreaching such alternation, signed their names first, before the Americans, to all the copies, ours as well as theirs. As soon as the copies were all signed, Mr. Carroll was dispatched with one copy to be taken to America, by the way of England, and Mr. Hughes, with another by the way of France. The *Ghent Journal* announced the treaty as "an arrangement of which the terms were unknown, but presumed to be equally honorable to both nations," adding, in the midst of the British garrison, that "the peace was glorious recompense for the efforts and patriotism of the Americans." The city authorities of Ghent, in a body, paid their respects personally, and congratulated both the American and British legations, and found nothing in the admiral, the admiralty proctor, or the future chancellor of the exchequer, superior in conversational attraction or personal intercourse, as in negotiation, to the representatives of the New World.

Mr. Hughes posted the same night to Paris, to embark at Bourdeaux in the *Transit*. Notwithstanding the speed of his winter journey, day and night, a British courier, better provided with means of rapid transport, preceded him, and he found the American minister in France, Crawford, in possession of the news some hours before Mr. Hughes flattered himself that he should be its first communicant. The Duke of Wellington, who, from the head of his conquering army, had been appointed to succeed Lord Castlereagh as British ambas-

sador at Paris, was the first person there to receive an official account by *Estafette* of the signature of the treaty, of which, by a prompt note of gracious congratulation, he immediately informed Mr. Crawford; so that Mr. Hughes, as soon as he reached Mr. Crawford's residence, instead of imparting, was informed by him of the good news. In the afternoon, they went together to wait on the Duke of Wellington, which was the commencement of personal intercourse, flatteringly forwarded by the puissant British ambassador, breaking through the forms and delays that official ceremonies might have interposed. The *Journal* of Paris, of the 31st December, 1814, noticed Mr. Hughes' arrival, his errand, and his fine qualities highly appreciated at Ghent. Not finding the Duke at his residence when Mr. Hughes called there with Mr. Crawford, Mr. Hughes returned the same evening, and was courteously received by that great captain, then in the flower of his age, and many victories, to be completed next summer by one still more glorious than all the rest. His intimacy had then begun with the three American sisters, of Maryland, Mr. Hughes' State, one of whom married a member of the Duke's military family; and another, his elder brother, through whose, as well as his own merits, Mr. Hughes, courteously welcomed by the Duke of Wellington, was told by him that he rejoiced in the termination of what he called an unnatural and useless war. The polite circles of Paris abounded with volunteer and influential advocates of the brave young Republic, to undervalue whose weight in the world, Sir James Mackintosh taught circles, both French and English, of political, social and literary eminence, as that war and peace established, was an English error. Madame de Staël, Lafayette, Dupont de Nemours, and many other champions, vindicated America. Talleyrand cast it, a golden apple of discord, into the Congress of Vienna, where that experienced cultivator of many intractable fields sowed dissension to check the aggrandizement of Great Britain, and through the maritime states of Europe, operate on the Ghent negotiation. Americans in Paris found it necessary to wear eagles in their hats to distinguish them from Englishmen, against whom French vituperation was as natural as admiration of Americans. Madame de Staël told Mr. Hughes that the Duke of Wellington had been asked if he would lead an expedition to restore the dilapidated fortunes of European warfare beyond the Atlantic: to which he answered, that if commanded, his function was to obey, and do what he could; but that he should regret the undertaking.

A letter from Paris, published in American newspapers soon after the treaty of Ghent, stated that the politicians of Paris connected with England there, doubted its

ratification at Washington; because it was whispered among diplomatists that Spain had ceded Louisiana and the Floridas to England for her services in Spain: that Pakenham's great armada was to take possession of New Orleans; and then from New Orleans treat for peace with the United States. Stipulation by the treaty to *restore* all territory, places and possessions taken from either party by the other during the war, might not be inconsistent with holding New Orleans; because, argued the Paris letters, the American title to Louisiana being doubtful, Spain never having voluntarily transferred that province to France, Bonaparte had no right to sell it to Jefferson. After the peace of 1783, England withheld the frontier posts in spite of its terms urged long in vain by Washington's administration. There was in 1815 as much magic in the name of Bonaparte to annul, as in 1803 there was to establish, his acts; and his alleged fraudulent transfer of Louisiana could be pleaded with better grace than many of those establishments annihilated by his conquerors.

On the 6th of January 1815, the *Transit* sailed from Bourdeaux with Mr. Hughes' copy of the treaty, and Mr. Russell and Mr. Shaler his companions, on board that vessel, which did not land her passengers till the first of March, at New London.

On Monday, the 26th of December 1814, the treaty left Ghent for London; the English copy taken by Mr. Baker, the English secretary; the American counterpart by Henry Carroll, son of Charles Carroll of Bellevue, near Georgetown, before mentioned as one of the intimates of Madison and Monroe. At London the treaty was so far altered in cabinet council as to put off peace till it was ratified in America; with a view no doubt to military operations, as to which relative distances would give the American government advantages such as the British had for negotiations so near them at Ghent. A sloop of war called the *Favorite*, her amiable name said to influence the selection, was commissioned, equipped, her sails bent, water and provisions shipped, all within sixteen hours after her orders for sailing, and dispatched to transport Mr. Baker, with orders to receive the American ratification, and thereupon announce peace, with a cessation of hostilities, to the British commanders of fleets and armies in America. On the 2d of January, 1815, the *Favorite* sailed from England, and on the 11th of February, Saturday evening, landed her passengers at New York, whence Mr. Carroll immediately hastened to Washington. On the 12th of February he left New York, and on Tuesday evening the 13th, delivered the treaty to the President. *Not an inch ceded or lost*, were the first words we heard at Washington of the treaty.

At the distance then of America from Europe, thrice what it is now, since the two continents have, by substituting steam for sail, been removed, as it were, near to each other, there was something mysterious in the inexplicable transmission of intelligence, anticipated sometimes by either conjecture or rumor, with marvellous exactitude. The *Brason* sloop of war, Captain Sterling, sailed from Portsmouth the 30th of December, 1814, with peace dispatches for the British authorities in America; arrived at Port Royal, Jamaica, the 3d of February 1815, and sailed thence the fifth of that month, communicating with Admiral Cochrane off Louisiana before the 18th of February 1815, who that day made known the fact of peace to Edward Livingston, visiting his ship, the *Tonnant*, from New Orleans by General Jackson's orders, under a flag of truce, for an exchange of prisoners. But early in and throughout February, 1815, the impression of peace prevailed at Washington, brought there from various, mostly English, sources of information. The first tidings were on the 2d of February from Castine, then a British possession in constant intercourse with Halifax, where a vessel arrived the 31st of December 1814, only one week after the treaty was signed, and when *cis-Atlantic* knowledge of it was impossible, which vessel left England the ninth of December, two weeks before the signature of the treaty, reporting that immediate peace was daily expected. Commercial letters received from England at Halifax, and officers of the *Maidstone* frigate just arrived there, confirmed the report, against which, when published at Washington, the *National Intelligencer* in vain semi-officially warned Congress, from the first reception of the altered British demands, supinely credulous that the war would soon be over, and that nothing further was wanted but a bank to cure the currency, which was the absorbing consideration. On the 8th of February, 1815, the privateer *Harpy*, eluding, as so many of our vessels, private and public, did, the British swarming on the wintry coast, got safe into Boston, with English reports and surmises, as late as Christmas, that peace was certainly at hand, the Prince Regent's speech not having discountenanced it, and petitions for it from upwards of sixty manufacturing places having been presented to Parliament. At Washington, with a constant belief that it was at hand, there was a feeling of such national, administrative, and war party confidence, after Jackson's success, that peace, though desired, was much less longed for: and the terms Jackson had rendered almost matter of indifference. We could not possibly lose anything but the part of Massachusetts which disgracefully accepted the yoke; and its representative in the House



was the only member of Congress having cause for disquiet; that part of his district having been insisted on at Ghent as British, as much as Northamptonshire. But war is an onerous and uneasy state, against which, like death, the wishes and prayers of mankind are perpetually operating on their feelings, so that almost any peace is welcome; as passengers landed after a long and dangerous sea voyage are transported by certainty that disquiet is succeeded by safety. Monday evening, the 13th of February 1815, it was currently reported at Washington that one of the secretaries of the Ghent mission had arrived at New York with preliminaries of peace. Next morning the rumor was in print that Mr. Carroll had landed at New York with them, and on Monday, the 15th of February, 1815, the *National Intelligencer* officially published:

"We have the pleasure to announce that the treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain, as signed by all the commissioners of both parties at Ghent, on the 24th December, 1814, was last evening delivered by Mr. Carroll to the Secretary of State, who immediately submitted it to the President. The general principle of the treaty is a restitution and recognition of the rights and possessions of each party, as they stood before the war; with adequate provisions to settle all the disputed points of boundary, by commissioners, subject to the decision of an amicable sovereign, in case the commissioners do not agree in opinion. The title to the islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy being controverted, the possession will remain with the parties respectively, which now hold them, until the commissioners decide upon the title, but without prejudice to the claim of either party. Periods are fixed for the restitution of maritime captures in different latitudes, and hostilities are to cease as soon as the ratifications of the treaty are exchanged at Washington. It is understood that Mr. Baker is the bearer of the treaty ratified by the Prince Regent; and will be ready to exchange the ratifications when the President and Senate have passed upon the subject. We are happy to add, that the treaty is thought in all respects to be honorable to the nation, and to the negotiators. The President will probably lay it before the Senate to-morrow."

With what instant preference for peace and kindness to England a treaty was received in America shall be told hereafter: with what wounded pride, in England, the British press shall tell.

On the 21st November, 1814, the *London Times* began its lamentations over defeat and peace—with defeat, thus:

"It is singular enough that the first distinct notice of what has been going on at Ghent, should be conveyed to us from the

other side of the Atlantic; but the President found it so much to his interest to disclose to the nation the negotiations, that he has not lost a moment in laying the details before Congress, and no less than ten thousand copies have been printed and circulated. Our readers will do us the justice to recollect, that we have never augured any good from the negotiations. We most distinctly see that they have been productive of serious evil. The British government has been tricked into bringing forward demands which it had not the power to enforce, and these demands have been made the means of uniting against it the whole American people." "At a subsequent meeting, on the 19th August, the British commissioners used elaborate reasonings to persuade Messrs. Clay, Russell, &c., that it would be desirable that the United States should give up many places of which they are in quiet possession; but, unfortunately, the American gentlemen were insensible to this logic." On the 30th November, speaking of the anticipated peace, that journal said, "Besides, it is to be remembered that we have at this moment a powerful expedition directed against the southern boundary of the United States. Two sail of the line, several frigates, and probably not less than ten thousand troops have been directed to this undertaking. Some of the ships of war went round to Jamaica, to take on board *two black regiments*, and subsequently four other regiments have been sent off to join the expedition, of which it is impossible that we should learn the result in a less period of time than four or five months."

The editorial article of the *Morning Post*, of 27th December, referred to the points left open by the treaty signed on the 24th, and hoped that a proper firmness would be manifested on the part of the British government, "more especially as we are now about to assume a more imposing and commanding attitude than ever, amply provided with the means of enforcing our just demands, and, if necessary, of regaining the lost laurels of our heroes of the Peninsula." "On this, as on every other occasion, the opposition can only be mentioned, to be laughed at, or despised. The war in Europe over, they contended the causes of the American contest had ceased, and therefore the war ought to terminate also. This was a flight of impudence, which the Americans themselves could not easily come up to," &c.

28th December. "The theatres are like a graduated scale, by which the public opinion upon public events suddenly promulgated, is unerringly estimated. The feeling which was manifested on the evening before last, [the fact of a treaty having been concluded with America, was announced at each house,] too clearly indicated that, on

this occasion, our triumph was very far from being complete. The intelligence of peace, always most exhilarating in the abstract, was here viewed, on the impulse of the moment, as accompanied by a latent cause for mortification. One consolation only still remains, and we are not without hope, that before the intelligence of the pacification can reach America, *some great blow*, guided by an able hand, will have been struck on our part."

The Sun, a ministerial paper, indulged in the same language, though, on the arrival of the ratification of the treaty, it was candid enough to say, "with redoubled satisfaction, under the present aspect of Europe, we communicate to the public the gratifying event," &c. "We this day lay the American treaty, that important and seasonable document, at full length before our readers."

*22d December.* The intelligence this day is headed "Most important news from America. This morning we received, by way of Quebec, American papers to the beginning of last month, and Quebec papers to the 17th ultimo. The former are of the utmost importance. They contain the American Secretary of War's letter to Congress, with explanatory remarks, urging the necessity of bringing into the field, at the beginning of the ensuing campaign, one hundred thousand regular troops. He declares that peace is not to be expected from negotiation, but from the sword; that the American government must not give way to a single point, or concede one right, and he asserts that the war must be pushed into Canada, accompanying the assertion with the conviction of the power of the United States to expel us from the continent of America. It is this most important intelligence, probably, that has produced of late such frequent and late sittings of the Cabinet."

*26th December.* A second edition of the Courier states, "We have just received information from authority, that peace was signed with the United States of America on Saturday last, 24th inst."

*27th December.* "Mr. Baker, the bearer of the treaty, did not reach London till late in the day, at 4 o'clock. Nothing had transpired at the public offices. Soon afterwards, however, a letter was sent to the lord mayor, and we procured a sketch of the terms upon which peace had been concluded. We can see many circumstances in the present state of affairs, both internal and external, which might make a termination of the war desirable, but we never could have approved the termination of it, by the concession of one point of honor."

*29th December.* "But those who disapprove of the treaty argue as if our naval reputation had been blasted by the war; as if it had received an almost mortal wound. Again,

can it not be easily conceived that the continuance of the war with America might have an effect by no means favorable at Vienna? That it might prevent us from assuming an entire freedom of attitude; that many representations which we might make would have less effect from the idea that our attention and force were chiefly occupied in a war on the other side of the Atlantic? Let it be recollected that we were the only power at the Congress engaged in war; that all the rest were able to direct their whole care to the business of negotiation and peace."

*January 3d, 1815.* The expedition against New Orleans is referred to, and its success anticipated; "but in consequence of peace, the place will be given up." In the same paper it is stated, "that at Bristol the member for that town had read a letter from the Earl of Liverpool, which contained an abstract of the terms of the Treaty of America; and in which the noble earl adverted to the period of time that would necessarily transpire before the ratification could be exchanged, observing that hostilities would be continued in the meantime, and that it would probably be late in the ensuing year before our fleets and armies would be withdrawn from America. His lordship added, 'That on these accounts it might still be deemed necessary to continue the property tax until April, 1816.'"

*19th January.* "An article from Vienna of the 3d January says, 'that the language of Great Britain has been more energetic since the conclusion of the treaty with America.' When we proceeded to the Congress with the war still on our hands, it might easily be conceived that our representations could not have all the weight they would have had without this incumbrance. But enabled, and unexpectedly to the European powers, to throw it off, and say the war is terminated with America," &c.

*23d January.* In the paper of this day is an article, dated Vienna, 7th January. "The conclusion of peace between Great Britain and the United States has produced a change in the tone of the notes of Lord Castlereagh, which, to the 16th December, were couched in language not very energetic. The courier arrived to-day from London, appears to have brought fresh instructions to the English ambassador, who has since pressed strongly the termination of the negotiations."

Another London paper, of the 29th December, 1814, published:—

"We understood that a copy of the treaty was laid before the cabinet on Monday last, and acceded to with the mere addition of the clause, that hostilities shall continue until the ratification. In the interval, our readers will recollect Mr. Monroe's letter, with explanatory observations, has been received, in which it is declared, that the rights claimed by America shall not be



ceded in a single instance; that the ensuing campaign must open with an army of one hundred thousand men, a force presumed fully competent to expel the English from the American continent, and that for this purpose recourse must be had to a military conscription; to which American papers add, that this proposition was so well received, that bills for carrying it into effect had been brought into Congress, and passed through several stages in the short space of ten days from its first recommendation. The advocates for war, who form an active and numerous body in the city, flatter themselves that the determined and inveterate spirit of hostility displayed in these proceedings will generate, both in this country and in America, difficulties and discontents that may prevent the ratification of the treaty. They think it very hard to have been witnessing two or three dull acts of a tragedy, exhibiting only the minor and preparatory incidents, and that the curtain should drop abruptly, at the very moment when they were expecting the grand denouement. It certainly is a disappointment that must not a little hurt their feelings and wound their pride; but it is one, we apprehend, they must endure with the same patience with which they have endured its authors, the present ministers. The extraordinary grumbling which took place at the Stock Exchange yesterday, although a holiday, is now fully explained.

"Mr. Baker, the bearer of the dispatches, arrived yesterday, about twelve o'clock; and, soon after, Lord Liverpool carried them to Carlton House, where he had a long interview with the Prince Regent.

"The terms of the treaty are not liked; and the funds, which rose yesterday upon its first announcement, and the immensity of business done by anticipation, have declined."

The Times deplored it as a peace of European necessity as much as American disaster, occasioned by disclosures of maritime independence, at the Congress of Vienna, where Russia, Prussia and Austria inclined to sustain Madison's innovations on the marine code. "Those who by British subsidies and fortitude were upheld, when quailing under Bonaparte, desert Great Britain retiring from the American contest with the stripes of Plattsburg and Baltimore bleeding on our backs. There is scarcely one American ship that has not to boast a victory over the British flag; not one British ship in thirty or forty that can boast such an honor. We retire from the conflict with the balance of defeat so heavily against us; that is our complaint. The inevitable consequences are the speedy growth of an American navy, and the recurrence of a more formidable American war. We kiss the rod, when we should retaliate its exercise. Such false and feeble humanity is

not calculated for the guidance of nations who require war as a tremendous engine of justice, in calm and even tender calculation of consequences. Better is it that we should grapple with the young lion when first flushed with the taste of our flesh, than wait until, in the maturity of his strength, he bears away at once both sheep and shepherd. Preparations are making for an extended system of warfare, should the President delay the ratification of the treaty, when every ship and every sailor must be employed to add weight to our negotiations at Vienna, whose negotiations and fetes are infinitely insignificant compared with the probable growth of the American navy and loss of our transatlantic provinces."

Such hostile teaching by confession and complaint, accompanied the terms of peace, when scarcely any terms could have been dishonorable in the midst of our successes, the groans of the British press, and the applause of Europe. The opinion was universal, that a patient people had been mistaken for pusillanimous, and of great resource when treated as impoverished. American loan stock rose fifteen per cent. in Holland. The European conviction was, that, single-handed, the United States proved an over-match for Great Britain. As soon as made known in London, by the ministers' letters to the mayor, the treaty was proclaimed at all the theatres. By one o'clock in the day, a great rise took place in the funds, and large purchases. Wherever informed throughout England, the people seemed pleased, particularly in the manufacturing places. At Birmingham an immense assemblage took the horses from the mail, and dragged it to the post-office. Still, apprehensions of the ratification of the treaty were thus expressed in the Times, of the 31st December:

"Whether Mr. Madison may or may not ratify the treaty of Ghent, will, perhaps, depend on the result of the expedition to New Orleans; the permanent occupation of which place would be a fatal blow to the American views of aggrandizement on the side of Louisiana. But that blow Mr. Madison has it now in his power to parry with a stroke of the pen. We trust that he is strictly limited to its immediate ratification, besides being required to retract the insolent and menacing expressions in Monroe's answer to Admiral Cochrane's letter. At Birmingham, Manchester, and one or two other manufacturing places, the peace was received with demonstrations of joy, it is true. But the funds have fallen, and the terms excited no satisfaction at Liverpool, whose merchants are well acquainted with the complexion of American politics, and where the general opinion was, that if Madison could find, by any means, resources to carry on the war, he would rejoice in adding to the indignities he has

heaped upon us, that of refusing to ratify the treaty."

The British government made a peace with America, decried in England as that with France was welcomed: the one gratifying, the other mortifying the pride and expectations of a great, haughty, and commanding people. Not long after general European condemnation and English compunction for their only and much scandalized victory of that year, at Washington, orders were sent to the British commanders in America, countermanding Cochrane's prior instructions to proclaim indiscriminate devastation. From midsummer till Christmas the tone of English fierce confidence was continually falling; though, peace at all, and still more, its concessions, extorted terms of disappointment. "The people of England," said Cobbett, "were utterly astonished and confounded at peace, which not only failed to establish the viceroyalty promised on the capture of Washington, but any American capitulation, territorial, or maritime. Not a point was gained, or menace realized." "We had to contend with the Americans at home," said Lord Melville, laboring to explain British naval failures. "Yes," said Cobbett, "and if you continue the war, it will last several years yet of American triumphs, for there are no fits and starts, or changes of ministry, in Jonathan's steady politics and cheap government." "Furthermore," said that sturdiest of all American advocates in England, "you gratify many wise Americans, who reckon English injuries blessings to their country. Not only maritime rights were at issue, but form of governments: a trial of republicanism against royalty. The greatest naval power in the world, mistress of the ocean, staked her all against the feeblest republic, in a contest for life or death, by which, whoever failed, would be beat completely, never to resume the former state." Vain calculations, and immense expenditures to destroy the American government, under the Union, depose the chief magistrate, conquer parts of the country, if not re-colonize the whole, at least cripple and retard its growth for half a century; what did they come to, but Great Britain, inordinately victorious in Europe, invariably defeated in America?

"Motives for peace," said the Halifax Recorder, "were found in British disasters in Canada, particularly on the lakes." If it had been made with that of Paris in April, 1814, England would have escaped the disasters of Plattsburg, and New Orleans, and the disgrace at Washington.

The treaty of Ghent, adopting the terms suggested by the American commissioners the 25th August, 1814, made peace by mutual restoration of territory, and mutual silence as to what had become abstract ques-

tions of maritime rights. The reception of those terms by the English public has been presented, as indicated by the press. Several years afterwards, the Quarterly Review (March, 1828) confessed, that peace with the United States had the effect to "leave the government of this country free and unembarrassed, at a most eventful juncture, to take that great and leading part presently after in continental affairs which their extraordinary character so imperatively demanded." On the 23d May, 1814, repeal of the corn laws was brought forward in Parliament by petitions presented, of which the British Annual Register stated, that "the members who presented them thought it their duty in some instances to express their sense of the danger that might arise from urging measures so unpopular with a great part of the nation." Such in part was the conjuncture, whose perils and outrages need but be alluded to. An entire view of the subject cannot be inserted in this volume, already exceeding its intended dimensions. But it would do injustice to leave it without at least a glance at the situation of England, at home, and throughout Europe, contributing, with American firmness and successes, to compel British abandonment sudden of pretensions in the flush of triumph and confidence of power first advanced at Ghent.

Lord Liverpool's letter to the member for Bristol, already quoted from a London journal, concurs with every other indication to show how severely the income tax, which affected chiefly the rich and influential, together with the whole financial pressure, urged the ministry to relieve the country. They were eager to hold out the prospect of peace with the United States as the means of relief. The Courier, as before quoted, significantly stated that "there were many circumstances in the present state of things, both internal and external, which might make a termination of the war desirable." And the Sun, as quoted, welcomed the *seasonable* peace. Manufactures, Ireland, India, the income tax, the corn laws, combined to render the crisis alarming. On the 9th March, 1815, when it was not known in England that the treaty of Ghent had been ratified in America, the imperative necessity of military repression in London was palpable from the following publication in the Courier. "It would be unjust not to pay a tribute of applause to the prompt, vigorous and vigilant conduct of the Home Department throughout the whole of these outrages. The alacrity and judgment with which they collected and distributed the military force were admirable. There are now in London, besides the household troops and 10th dragoons, which occupy the king's mews, &c., the 16th dragoons at the queen's riding house, the 5th dragoon



guards were at Rumford, the 7th hussars at Putney, the 18th at Lambeth. The 5th regiment of foot is at Knightsbridge, and the first Lincoln militia in the Tower. A great number of troops were also drawn yesterday into town and its vicinity. There was not a foot soldier left to mount guard at Windsor yesterday, a circumstance unprecedented."

Such was the condition of London, as much under military government then, as ever Paris has been. And that of other places was not much less so. "During the show of cattle near Norwich," a journal stated, "the populace assembled in a tumultuous manner around Mr. Coke, Lord Albemarle, and other gentlemen, whom they assailed with stones, hisses and groans, and cries of no corn bill. It was necessary to make good their retreat to the Angel inn, where they were followed by the mob. The mayor, sheriff, and magistrates interposed in vain. Mr. Coke and his friends escaped secretly about the time the Brunswick hussars, commanded by Col. Von Temperly, were drawn up in the market place ready to have acted," &c.

Thus pressed at home about the time of the negotiations at Ghent, the continental perplexity of England was still more favorable to peace with the United States. "Having covered Europe with her gold," says De Pradt, "whoever wanted could have it against Napoleon, and there was no limit to English largesses. But when settlement day came, after the battle, then it was that England felt the extent of her sacrifices. Maritime rights presented one formidable obstacle in her way. The day would come," De Pradt trusted, "when Sweden, co-operating with other powers, would constrain England to temper her naval superiority by the exercise of justice." Great Britain was the only one of the conquerors that would not yield her share of the spoils. Malta and several other conquests she would not part with. Our American fellow-citizen, Talleyrand, at the Congress of Vienna, had no option but to sustain our cause at Ghent. When cited before that court of justice, France, even under Louis XVIII., might rather take the chances of wager of battle again than submit to what was justly deplored as the *frightful* payment of seven hundred millions for her rescue from Napoleon, besides all the further charges and poignant mortification of five years' submission to the foreign force commanded there by Wellington, debts pleaded by France to the American minister, and acquiesced in by him, as reason for postponing settlement with us. The Edinburgh Review (Vol. XXXII., p. 403) has since declared "that it was generally understood that the state of the discussions at the Congress of Vienna was on the point of lighting up a new war." No sooner was

the treaty concluded at Ghent, than England assumed a new and peremptory attitude at Vienna, and entered into a separate treaty with France and Austria, to the exclusion of Russia and Prussia, when, on the 11th December, 1814, the Archduke Constantine at Warsaw issued an order, by which negotiations conducted in opposition to the views of the Russian Empire, were threatened with five hundred thousand Russian troops to settle the Polish difficulty, and save the Congress of Vienna all further trouble. Opposition at Vienna, of France and England to Russia, induced the Emperor Alexander's causing Talleyrand's removal from the French ministry. Napoleon, on his escape from Elba, finding a treaty, offensive and defensive, between France, Austria, and Prussia, among the archives of Louis XVIII., had made it known to Alexander, and flung among the sovereigns as an apple of discord.

While such was the portentous aspect of Europe toward England, and her own domestic condition, all urging sudden and total change of tone at Ghent, the United States, by instantaneous disclosure of the first demands there, were made to feel that what had not been unanimous must be national hostilities, no longer offensive, but defensive, and involve the existence of the country, whose whole energies were indispensable to its rescue, as the Executive was resolved to call them forth. From the moment the people were thoroughly roused by British dictation at Ghent, an American spirit was displayed before which the British government thought it best to recede. Another campaign, and in all probability most of the English North American possessions would have been wrested from them. And, while such might have been the issue here, there could have been, without the treaty of Ghent, no victory of Waterloo, achieved by British arms. Many British authorities, to enhance Wellington's glory, have asserted that his thirty-five thousand British troops at Waterloo were what Lord Castlereagh, in Parliament, called *green*, and Sir Walter Scott, in his extremely fabulous life of Napoleon, also misrepresents as but few reliable, while the *veterans* remained in America. If so, not only the militia of Vermont and Tennessee defeated the best British soldiers at Plattsburg and New Orleans, but the worst British soldiers defeated the French at Waterloo. But the latter is not the fact. As soon as peace was ratified, the British armies in America began their return to England and arrived at Waterloo. General Lambert, on whom the command devolved, after Pakenham and Gibbs were killed, and Keene wounded at New Orleans, and General Kempt, who served with Prevost in Canada, are officially applauded by Wellington for their services at Waterloo, to which battle

Admirals Cockburn, Malcolm and Codrington, taken from the Chesapeake and Mississippi, are also mentioned as naval contributors. Without the peace of Ghent, especially after their discomfiture at New Orleans, all those troops, with the whole navy, must have remained in America, and probably the death of Ross, Pakenham and Gibbs have required the great Captain's presence on this side of the Atlantic. For the military character of Great Britain demanded that to her first military talents should be committed the task of retrieving the honor of British arms, and satisfying the exasperated passions of the British nation. Where, then, on the irruption of Napoleon in March, 1815, would have been the British troops, which, by a train of fortunate circumstances, were enabled, under Wellington, to make a timely stand during four hours and a half on the 18th of June, 1815, against the assaults of the French, and sustain their shock till the Prussians came to British relief? Overpowered Napoleon might have ultimately been; but English agency in effecting that result must have been insignificant, and her chance of either glory or profit by it proportionably slight.

If Napoleon had not reappeared, English difficulties, almost insuperable at Vienna, had become more intractable from a belief there and everywhere that she was too much engrossed and pressed by the American war to be able to sustain adequately her lofty and selfish hold upon the spoils of

European conquests. All she could do or attempt, after disengaging her right (the naval) arm, was to divide the allied powers by secret league with the Bourbons, whom, as was well said, she contracted one-half her national debt to build up, and then the other half to pull down. Sending more British troops either across the British Channel, or the Atlantic, was out of the question, in the condition shown to have been that of her own metropolis, when its tranquillity was maintained by military force only.

Without the peace of Ghent the condition of the United States would have been anxious and critical, no doubt, but involved no lasting or terrible distress of the country or danger to the Union. English armies, led by Wellington, might have perpetrated severe inflictions, perhaps captured some places, more like cities than Washington, and turned the spirit of the rising generation more completely from pacific to military pursuits. But no considerate person can suppose that what failed in 1777, could have succeeded in 1815. Predatory and profitless mischief, what would it do, but unite this country, disgust all others, and mortify the British people themselves? And this historical sketch, exhuming facts and reviving recollections, is no appeal to English fear, but memory; not to provoke, but prevent another war, by telling the truth of the last, when in all probability another campaign would have expelled Great Britain forever from North America.






















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